# A dissertation entitled

ELUCIDATING THE PATH TO LIBERATION:
A STUDY OF THE COMMENTARY ON THE *ABHIDHARMAKOŚA*
BY THE FIRST DALAI LAMA

submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

DAVID PATT

Degree to be awarded: December 1993 May 19___ August 19___

Approved by Dissertation Readers:

______________________ 9/29/93
Major Professor Date of Examination

______________________

______________________ ______________________
Dean, Graduate School

# *ELUCIDATING THE PATH TO LIBERATION:*
# A STUDY OF THE COMMENTARY ON THE *ABHIDHARMAKOŚA* BY THE FIRST DALAI LAMA

by

DAVID PATT

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
(Buddhist Studies)

at the
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON
1993

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**PART III**
**ELUCIDATING THE PATH TO LIBERATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE ABHIDHARMAKOŚA**
**by**
**rGyal Ba dGe 'Dun Grub**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The great joy of this project has been the opportunity to study with a series of kind and brilliant Geshes, each of whom embodied, in his own way, the wisdom and compassion of the Bodhisattva path.

At the beginning and at the end, it was my great fortune to study with Geshe Lhundup Sopa, who introduced me to dGe 'Dun Grub and the esoteric pleasures of Abhidharma at the beginning. At the end, it was Geshe-la who untangled the last, unsolved quandaries in the text, without needing to consult any commentary other than his own profound knowledge.

It is my humble privilege to be among the last Ph.D. students to complete a degree under Professor Sopa, and this seems an appropriate place to mark the great contribution he has made to the progress of Buddhist studies in this country, in this century. He came to America as a young refugee, with hardly a word of English; soon he will retire, having supervised or participated in the training of a long series of scholars who populate Religion Departments and Buddhist Studies programs across the nation. Notwithstanding his status as a "native scholar," Geshe-la has advanced the scientific study of the Buddhist tradition, and in particular, Tibetan Buddhism, in innumerable ways. His ability to transcend the context of his own training and to flourish in the

Western academy is a tribute to his status as a scholar among Tibetan scholars, as well as to the power of the quest for truth to transcend cultural differences.

The modern field of Buddhist Studies was created at the University of Wisconsin by the eminent faculty including Minoru Kiyota, Robert Miller, A.K. Narayan, Frances Wilson, Geshe Sopa and the late Richard Robinson. Since this will be one of the last in a very long row of dissertations to sit in the Memorial Library stacks written under their supervision, it seems a fitting place to express sincere gratitude to these "openers of the chariot way," on behalf of all the Buddhist Studies students who have preceded me. May the virtuous karmic seeds they have planted bear fruit for many generations.

While conducting my research at Sera Monastery in South India under a grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies, I was honored to study with Khensur Geshe Lobsang Tenzin, who was always in demand but always seemed to have more time to give. My old friend and teacher Geshe Thubten Tandhar was of invaluable help in introducing me to dGe 'Dun Grub's Abhidharma style, and indeed, to the whole process of translating Tibetan into English. Later, in Bristol, England, Geshe Lobsang Donyo was unfailing in his patience, kindness and scholarship while reading the last three chapters

with me. Others who have assisted me on particular points include Geshe Paldan Drakpa of Drepung Monastery; Gen Lobsang Tseten of the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in Washington, New Jersey; and the late Gen Lobsang Namgyal, who remains an inspiration.

For their perfection of the practice of giving hospitality I must thank all my friends at gTzang Pa Khang mTsan at Sera Monastery, and in particular Gen Tenzin Dorje and Thubten Gyaphel. And without Geshe Gendun Gyatso, nothing of any practical importance would ever have gotten done. The same kind of overwhelming generosity that, I learned, typifies a Tibetan monastery, was offered to me in Madison by my friends Rodney Stevenson and Karen Kunz during the final months of my work on the translation. Also at that time, the profound insights of Dr. William S. Waldron into the meaning of the *Kośa* were a continuing inspiration, as was the encouragement and good cheer of Bill, Kitty and Anna Yeshe. Throughout the long years of meandering from continent to continent while writing this work, it was my dear friend John Haggarty who looked after things in Madison and kept me straight with the mother of us all, the University of Wisconsin.

And finally, immeasurable thanks go to my wife, Mary-Christine Lauppe, without whose kindness, patience, will and support, this project would never have reached the path of no more learning.

I dedicate this work to all my fellow beings, wandering through the terrors and confusion of this strange world; I hope that in some small way it contributes to peace and understanding. May whatever merit it produces benefit sentient beings everywhere.

## ABBREVIATIONS

*ADKB--Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu*. Second ed. Edited by Swāmi Dwārikādās Śastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981.

*ADKK--Abhidharmakośa-kārikā* (In above edition.)

*ADS--Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Edited by Pralhad Pradhan. Shantiniketan: Visva Bharati, 1950.

*BC*--Kloetzli, Randy. *Buddhist Cosmology*.

*BHS*--Edgerton, Franklin. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit*.

'Bras sPung Edition-- *Dam Pa'i Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi rNam Par bShad Pa Thar Lam gSal Byed*. The Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dGe 'Dun Grub Pa. Dolanji: Patshang Lama Sonam Gyaltsen, 1978.

*CCB*--Stcherbatsky, Theodore. *The Central Conception of Buddhism*.

*Dn--Dīgha-nikāya*. Pali Text Society.

*bShad Pa-- Chos mNgon Pa mDzod Kyi bShad Pa*. Dharamsala: Council of Cultural & Religious Affairs of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1969.

*GDD-- mDzod Tik Thar Lam gSal Byed*. Second ed. Varanasi: Gelugpa Students Welfare Committee, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1982.

*'Grel bShad-- Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi 'Grel bShad* in *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition*. Vol. 116, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957.

*Index*--Hirakawa, Akira, ed. *Index to the Abhidharmakoshabhāsya*.

*KZAV*--Bhikkhu Pāsādika. *Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhaṣya des Vasubandhu*.

*Mn--Majjhima Nikāya*. Pali Text Society.

*MOE*--Hopkins, Jeffrey. *Meditation on Emptiness*.

MS--Zahler, Leah, Jeffrey Hopkins, Lati Rinbochay and Denma Locho Rinbochay. *Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism*.

*Mv--Mahāvyutpatti*. ed. Sakaki, R. Tokyo: Kokosho kankokai, 1982.

*MW*--Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*.

PTS--Pali Text Society.

*SAKV-- Spuṭārthā-vyākhyā, in Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya*

*Yaśomitra*. Second ed. Edited by Swāmi Dwārikādās Śastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981.

Sarnath Edition-- *mDzod Tik Thar Lam gSal Byed*. Second ed. Varanasi: Gelugpa Students Welfare Committee, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1982.

*SCD*--Sarat Chandra Das, Rai Bahadur. *A Tibetan-English Dictionary*.

To.--*Tohoku Catalogue*

*rTza Ba--Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi Tsig Le'ur Byas Pa*. Third ed. Sarnath: Sarnath Legs bShad gTer mDzod Par Khang, 1978.

{i.37}--Curly brackets indicate chapter and verse of *ADKK*.

[p.56; 33a1]--Brackets indicate page numbers of 1) Sarnath Edition, 2) 'Bras sPung Edition.

# INTRODUCTION

Few texts in the history of Buddhist śāstra literature have achieved the widespread acceptance, popularity and longevity of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and its autocommentary. It represents an intellectual high point of a process that was going on probably from the time the Buddha passed away: the effort to gather in a single systematic presentation the teachings of the Buddha and the Buddhist conception of how the world works.[1]

It is an encyclopedia of Indian Buddhism, and in the scope of its concerns, its comprehensive presentation of Buddhist psychology, cosmology, ontology, soteriology, ethics, karma theory and innumerable subsidiary topics, it provides the student with rare access to the gestalt that we might call the Buddhist world view. Clifford Geertz has written that for any religion or culture, "Their world view is their picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society. It contains their most comprehensive ideas of order."[2]

Geertz makes the point that the metaphysics and ethics (and, we can add, soteriology) of a religion are interdependent, in that "the source of [a religion's] moral vitality is conceived to lie in the fidelity with which it expresses the fundamental nature of reality."[3] To understand Buddhism in these terms, we must have a comprehensive grasp of the way the ultimate

goal, the cessation of suffering, is intertwined with the ethics, psychology, ontology, and all the other subjects that the *Kośa* presents.

This integrated view is what the Buddha was getting at when he presented his doctrine in terms of the Four Noble Truths. Taking the inescapable empirical reality of suffering for all living beings as the premise, he went on to describe the psychological, ethical and karmic causes of that suffering, in the context of a cosmological picture of cyclic existence. He then asserted a soteriology, based on his own experience, in which suffering could be transcended and a state of permanent, peaceful liberation could be achieved. And he laid out a path system, based on all of the above elements, designed to lead to that transcendental state.

The glory of the *Abhidharmakośa* rests on its status as the most elegant presentation of all these elements which together make up the doctrine of Buddhism.[4] In this way the student of the *Kośa* gains an opportunity to comprehend the Buddhist world view. That's the good news. The bad news is that the *Kośa* is huge, with a root text of some 600 ślokas and an auto-commentary that runs to several volumes; and although it is famed for its lucidity and organization, making it "an accessible source for an otherwise impenetrable mass of obscure doctrinal analysis,"[5] its very nature as an encyclopedia of Buddhist doctrine means that a comprehensive grasp of its world view is difficult to attain, except for those who are willing to

devote a significant few years of their life to it.[6]

For most western scholars, then, the approach to the *Kośa* has been to study its parts: focusing on one or the other "-ologies" mentioned above; mining it for what it reveals about sectarian disputes and the doctrines of obscure sects in India; and especially focusing on the unique doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins, and Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika critique of these.

A few scholars have tried to explain the *Kośa* as an integrated system, but owing to its vast size these attempts have been necessarily limited in scope.[7] Although the modern study of the *Kośa* and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma tradition began at the turn of the century with the work of La Vallée Poussin and Takakusu, to this day only one complete translation of the *Kośa* into a western language has been published.[8] This translation into French by Poussin remains one of the monumental works of Buddhist scholarship, but as a translation from Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation (with interpolated commentary), done before the Sanskrit text of the *Kośa* was discovered in Tibet, it is useful more as a guide or commentary to the *Kośa* than as a representation of the text itself.[9]

The problem of learning, and by extension teaching, the doctrines of the *Abhidharmakośa* is not a new one. The greatest of the Indian commentaries, those by Yaśomitra and Pūrṇavardhana are themselves vast, and therefore do not solve the problem for the modern student. The text

translated here, however, is an attempt by a Tibetan master to comment on the *Kośa* not by expanding on it, but by condensing it, and boiling it down to its essential teachings.

dGe 'Dun Grub (1391-1475) was one of the foremost direct disciples of Tsong Kha Pa, the founder of the dGe Lugs Pa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. He has been credited with having the energy and organizational talent that consolidated the new sect and established it as the fastest growing Tibetan order of its time. He established the monastery of Khra Shis Lhun Po (1445) in Tibet's second city, Shigatse, which eventually became the seat of the Pan Chen Lamas. He was one of the first dGe Lugs Pa Lamas to have a Tulku or reincarnation recognized after his death,[10] and it was the third generation of this lineage, bSod Nams rGya mTso, who was honored in 1578 by the Mongol Altan Khan with the title of Dalai Lama. Thus dGe 'Dun Grub became, retroactively, the First Dalai Lama, almost two hundred years after his birth.

dGe 'Dun Grub began his studies at sNar Thang Monastery in gTzang, Central Tibet. sNar Thang had a great tradition of Abhidharma studies, as mChims 'Jam Pa'i dByangs, the author of the greatest of all long Tibetan commentaries on the *Kośa*, had been abbot of sNar Thang for 36 years from about 1254-1290. With sNar Thang in his background, it is not surprising that later in his life dGe 'Dun Grub made a commentary on the *Kośa* one of

the three truly large commentarial writing projects of his career.

## The Scope of this Study

I began work on this dissertation with a simple idea: that a comprehensive narrative account of the doctrines presented in the *Abhidharmakośa* should be possible at a length and in a form that could be carried around and understood by a student or scholar of average size and (perhaps slightly better than average) intelligence. Heedful of the warnings of the folly of making a study of the entire *Kośa*,[11] I chose dGe 'Dun Grub's commentary because he has already taken us part-way down the road of compression and concision.

The value of such an accessible, condensed summary is twofold: First it can act as a useful reference to any scholar who wishes to access the *Kośa*'s thoughts on any particular subject of Buddhist doctrine, and of course, the *Kośa* deals with a large proportion of all subjects raised in Buddhist discourse. Second, taken as a whole, such a work could add to the Western academic understanding of Buddhism as a holistic system. A reader with the patience and interest to follow such a summary all the way through

might, under the best circumstances, emerge with a more profound sense of the world view of Buddhist civilization; a sense of reality that informs life in all Buddhist countries; that underlies as assumed background the many other abstruse philosophical texts that Buddhist scholars tend to favor; and that continues to offer the modern world a systematic religio-philosophical conception of the world that most of Asia has found existentially satisfying for millennia, and which shows no signs of withering before the analytic of scientific modernism.

That, anyway was my ambition. This dissertation is a presentation of the data I have gathered to date. I have completed the translation of the first five chapters of dGe 'Dun Grub's work, which are commentaries to the first five of the eight chapters of the *Kośa*. This represents four fifths of the text, and covers all the topics classified as contaminated phenomena, what I call "the elements of affliction." These subjects can also be subsumed under the first two Truths, the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of the Origination of Suffering. The last three chapters, which are not translated or explained in any detail here, cover the Truth of Cessation--the nature of the transformation that constitutes liberation, and the Truth of the Path, the path system to be followed in order to reach that goal.

In making sense of dGe 'Dun Grub's compact, often cryptic prose, I have found myself in the position of using the root text as a commentary on

the commentary. Thus, the main texts I have consulted in this work are Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in Sanskrit and Tibetan; the *Sphuṭārthā-Abhidharmakośavyākhā* by Yaśomitra, in Sanskrit and Tibetan; the *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā-lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* by Pūrṇavardhana, in Tibetan; and the foremost Tibetan commentary, by mChims 'Jam Pa'i dByangs, the *Chos mNgon Pa mDzod Kyi 'Grel Pa mNgon Pa'i rGyan*. These are the sources that dGe 'Dun Grub himself consulted in composing his work. I have also made extensive use of Poussin's translation (in its English rendering by Leo Pruden), the notes to which are invaluable for identifying the filiation of arguments, the sources of quotations, and in tracing the textual antecedents to the issues raised by Vasubandhu. Without taking anything away from Poussin's genius, much credit must be given in this regard to Kyokuga Saeki (1828-1891), the Japanese scholar-monk who published a richly annotated version of the *Kośa* known as the *Kando-bon Kusharon*, which was one of Poussin's main sources.[12]

In Part I of my introductory essay I discuss the nature of the Abhidharma enterprise and its sources in the process of religious systematization. I then contextualize dGe 'Dun Grub's commentary by looking at the history of Sarvāstivāda literature in India and what we know of the Abhidharma tradition in Tibet.

Part II is my summary of the elements of affliction, the first five

chapters of the *Abhidharmakośa*. I have reversed the order of the chapters in an effort to create a clearer picture of the world view and the concept of the person that the *Kośa* is presenting. Chapter Five on the polluting tendencies and Chapter Four on karma are explored in the greatest detail, as these two, working together, are the generative engine and fuel that create saṁsāra and impel sentient beings through suffering cyclic existence. In Chapter Three I have focused on the 12 links of dependent origination, which describes the causal process that perpetuates this experience. I then combined Chapters One and Two into a presentation of the various dharmas that make up the continuum of a person.

Just as dGe 'Dun Grub entitled his commentary *Elucidating the Path to Liberation*, the singular goal here has been to elucidate the *Abhidharmakośa*, to elucidate the Buddhist world view as a holistic conception of experience.

## NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. In fact, the *Kośa* represents the culmination of only one stream or lineage that was participating in this process--that of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika schools of Northwest India and their Sautrāntika critics. The *Vissudhimagga* of Buddhagosa holds a place of equal significance for the Theravādin tradition.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* by Vasubandhu's brother, Asaṅga, deals with the same material from a Mahāyāna perspective. It is however indicative of the widespread influence of the *Kośa* that in the Tibetan tradition, although they adhere to the tenets and path system described in the *ADS*, the *ADKB* is still universally studied, and it forms the core of the Abhidharma phase of the training for the dGe bShes degree. As Griffiths (1986 p.47) says, "the importance of this work for later Buddhist thought, even in schools which radically disagree with its basic pre-suppositions, can scarcely be overstressed."

As Collett Cox (1983 p.2) has pointed out, we must also be careful in calling the *ADKB* the culmination of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika thought. This is a title which rightfully belongs to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and to Vasubandhu's Vaibhāṣika critic, Saṁghabhadra.

But if we step back from the view of the *ADKB* as a sectarian document, and see it in its most significant aspect, as an encyclopedic presentation of the Buddhist view of the world, it remains the single most influential and widely used Abhidharma text in Buddhist history.

2. Geertz (1973) p.126.

3. Ibid.

4. Of course in the details of tenets, ontology, path system etc. the *ADKB* presents only the views of a few schools of Buddhism. But as a systematization of the sūtras, it is to a great extent a presentation of the fundamental teachings of Buddhism--teachings with which only the most unorthodox Buddhist sects would take issue. If this were not the case, its widespread popularity could never have been achieved.

5. Cox (1983) p.2.

6. In Tibet the tradition was to study the *Kośa* for up to eight years before finally taking the dGe bShes examination.

7. Stcherbatsky's *Central Conception of Buddhism* is still the most successful of these. Others that are interesting and/or successful in discussing the *Kośa* as an integrated world view are: Verdu (1985), Guenther (1976), Govinda (1974), Johansson (1978), and Conze (1970).

8. Artemus Engle completed a first draft of an English translation but this remains an unpolished work and is available only on microfiche. See the bibliography.

9. Poussin's translation has in turn been translated into English by Leo Pruden. This version, while not as felicitous in English as Poussin's seems in French, has benefitted by Pruden's effort to translate more of the *Kośa*'s technical jargon into English, instead of leaving it in Sanskrit a Poussin did to too great a degree. ( However the publication of Pruden's work by Asian Humanities Press is appalling, with typographical errors on almost every page.)

10. Snellgrove and Richardson (1980 p.182) suggest that this was no coincidence: "Appreciating the prestige which older sects had gained through the system of reincarnating lamas, dGe 'Du Grub may well have arranged before his death that the same means of succession should be adopted by the dGe Lugs Pa."

11. Griffiths (1986) p.47: "The size of these texts make any attempt at a complete study of the commentarial literature to the *Treasury* [i.e. the *Kośa*] quite impossible at this stage of scholarly investigation.

12. For the full background of Poussin's edition of the *Kośa* see Pruden's Introduction to his translation.

# PART I

# AN INTRODUCTION TO ABHIDHARMA

# CHAPTER ONE

# THE SOURCES AND MEANING OF ABHIDHARMA

## The Process of Systematization

The Buddha taught that, "All dharmas are without self."[1] In one way or another all subsequent Buddhist philosophical discourse represents the playing out of the ramifications and meaning of this idea.[2]

The view of anātman, non-self, differentiated the Buddhist tradition from the Vedic context in which it arose, and it formed the philosophical cornerstone of a religion that spread throughout most of Asia and continues to thrive and even to grow in the Western world.

But non-self has, from the beginning, presented a problematic premise, and the history of Buddhist philosophy can be described in terms of the systems that have been devised to make practical sense out of the idea that the self, as well as the external phenomena that surround one in the world, do not exist in the way that they appear to the senses. The siddhānta tradition that developed in India and was adapted in Tibet to organize and teach the Indian philosophical tradition is, in fact, just such an historical taxonomy, keyed to different schools' explanations of the meaning of ātman or anātman in terms of different levels of ultimate or conventional truth.[3]

The problem of describing the ramifications of non-self, and figuring out how a world of selfless beings and things actually works, was left by the

Buddha to his disciples by his method of teaching, as recorded in the sūtras. The Buddha apparently taught in anecdotal terms, and while he clearly laid out the premises of Buddhist thought--the four noble truths, the formula of dependent origination, the characteristics of suffering, impermanence and non-self--we never find him discoursing as a systematic philosopher, and in fact he was often reluctant to be drawn into philosophical speculation when he felt it was not directly pertinent to the ever-present goal of attaining liberation from suffering.[4]

What followed the Buddha's passing away was a process of systematization which we can find in all the world's religions--at least those with an identifiable founder and a textual tradition. Without an unimpeachable final authority to answer all questions, settle all disputes and misunderstandings, the followers were left to themselves to solve the problem: What did the Buddha mean when he said that all phenomena are selfless? So begins the process of systematizing the founder's teachings: the formulation of doctrine, ontology, soteriology, metaphysics--everything that makes up the religious world.

Systematization is the process of filling the doctrinal void, answering the questions left unanswered by the founder, and formulating the teachings in a way that makes them easier to learn, transmit and teach. The process itself often spins off new insights and discoveries which were previously

unaccounted for by the religious system as initially taught. It is essentially the process of answering the inevitable questions that arise as human beings reflect and try to understand themselves and their world, and as they try to make coherent sense out of the statements about that world that were left by the founder of their spiritual tradition.

The Buddhism that the Buddha taught as we know it from the sūtras was the foundation for everything that came after it, but it was an unwieldy mass of occasional teachings, and so among the first work of his disciples was the effort to systematize those teachings in order to make them more philosophically coherent and whole, as well as to make them transmittable as a pedagogically organized body of material.

Abhidharma is, in its most general sense, the result of this process: the teachings of the Buddha, coherently systematized and pedagogically organized.

**Orality and Sectarian Consolidation**

Two other historical factors had a bearing on this process. First was the orality of the Indian tradition and the influence this had on the structure of all Indian literature. This factor was particularly important at the earliest stage of the development of Buddhist literary forms, because, it is believed, nothing at all of Buddhist scriptures was written down until the second

century B.C.[5] Everything had to be memorized. To undertake this task monks specialized in memorizing particular types and parts of the canon. But a concise, encyclopedic, mnemonically organized summary of the doctrine must have appeared desirable at a very early stage.

The other factor in shaping the Abhidharma was the increasing scholasticism of Indian religions in general as evolving commentarial traditions, influenced by developments in logical philosophy, challenged each other to defend their premises and assertions with systematic and logically coherent arguments. The Indian tradition of public debate between representatives of different schools made it imperative that the schools organize their teachings into theories that could be defended by logical argument in a public forum.

Jaini has shown that the tendency to collect the most important and most often repeated terms used by the Buddha into formulaic lists is already found in the sūtras.[6] Although Buddhist sects initially splintered off based on divergent Vinayas, and non-Mahāyāna schools came to dispute the authenticity of the Mahāyāna canon--in fact there was never any unanimously agreed upon corpus of texts--still there remained a common core of teachings that were indisputably those of the Buddha and remained "the common heritage that held these schools together through centuries of discord and dissensions. The origin of Abhidharma is to be found in the

beginnings of the attempts of the earliest Buddhists to find such a common teaching."[7]

Three suttas[8] tell the story of the death of the Jain leader Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha and of the virulent dissension among his followers which led to schisms. In the *Pāsādika-sutta*, upon hearing of these problems among the Jains, the Buddha sums up his teachings and then exhorts his followers to get together and compile his true teachings:

> Wherefore, Chunda, do ye, to whom I have made known the truths that I have perceived, come together in company and rehearse all of you together those doctrines, and quarrel not over them, but compare meaning with meaning, and phrase with phrase, in order that this pure religion may last long...."[9]

The process of classifying teachings in formulaic terms is common to many suttas, but takes on a more nearly Abhidharmic form in a series of suttas in the Vibhaṅgavagga of the *Majjhima-nikāya*.[10] These texts show the characteristic Abhidharmic functions of collecting and classifying terms, and then elaborating their meanings. The *Aṅguttara-nikāya* bears a close resemblance to the proto-Abhidharma mātikās, in its format of pulling together subjects mentioned in various suttas and listing them in numbered tables.

Pruden describes a gradual but continuous refinement of technical classification in the evolving stages of Buddhist literature:

> The Āgamas, literally the "transmitted" (doctrines) were in a sense also Nikāyas (compilations): the transmitted doctrines were collected

> together, formalized, and their vocabulary became technical terms; these terms came to be analyzed through vibhaṅgas (long, explanatory definitions) and niruktas (etymologies); these same terms were also organized on the basis of numerical categories or on the basis of similarities (saṁyukta) into mātṛkās. So the tendencies that led ultimately to a systematic Abhidharma literature led in this same process to the systematization of the Āgamas (the traditions) into Nikāyas (formal literary compilations.)[11]

Furthermore, the categories of subjects in which the suttas sum up the teachings of the Buddha are, to a large extent, the dharmas and topics of the Abhidharma: khandha, dhātu, āyatana, indriya, paṭicca-samuppāda, kamma, kilesa, magga, the 37 bodhipakkiya-dhammas, jhāna, etc.[12]

Jaini points to the *Saṅgīti-suttanta* as marking "a definite start of the Abhidhamma literature proper, in the Sutta-piṭaka."[13] This suggestion is well-supported by the fact that an extended version of the text appears as one of the seven canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivāda school, where it is known as the *Saṅgīti-paryāya*, extant now only in Chinese.[14] Here again we find the story of schisms among the Jains following the death of their leader, prompting Śāriputra to compile the dharmas taught by the Buddha:

> Let us now unite ourselves and collect the Dharma-vinaya while our Master is still in the world, in order that there may be no dissension as to the teaching after the Buddha's death, and that the Brethren may live strictly in accordance with the Brahmacarya, and the Dharma-vinaya themselves may be handed down to a remote future, to the benefit of the people.[15]

There then follow ten sections classifying dharmas in sets of ones, twos,

threes, etc. The same format of lists of dharmas in progressive numerical order, but without the introductory story, is used in the *Dasuttara-sutta*, the last sutta in the *Dīgha-nikāya*. T. W. Rhys Davids, noting the Abhidhammic character of these two texts said,

> ...Each of them forms a sort of thematic index to the doctrines scattered through the four Nikāyas...In the two features they have in common, of catechism as a monologue by the catechuman; and of the absence of narrative, this further interest attaches to these last suttantas, that they become practically Abhidhamma rather than Sutta-piṭaka.[16]

It has been suggested that the original impetus for the creation of Abhidharmas was the experience of monks in meditation, where the process of observing, analyzing, deconstructing and labeling the mental events experienced in meditation naturally led them to organize and catalogue those experiences in an Abhidharma-like fashion.[17] This seems to be a better answer to how the Abhidharma texts were assembled than to why.

For this latter question we must look to the process of religious systematization. To hold the religion together in the early years after the passing of the founder a comprehensive doctrinal-metaphysical system was necessary in a form that could be readily understood, preserved and transmitted. Though the Buddha may have taught most of what was eventually included in the Abhidharma, the conceptual picture as well as the details of the system were hardly accessible in the narrative, anecdotal diversity of the vast sūtra literature. And it is the conceptual picture and the

details that make up a viable, transmittable religious doctrine. It was thus inevitable, if Buddhism was to survive the Buddha, that the Buddha's teachings would be culled from the sūtras and reformulated in a systematic manner that could serve this vital religious function.

**The Meaning of the Term: Abhidharma**

Western scholars have labored over the precise and original meaning of the term "Abhidharma".[18] The issue revolves around whether the upasarga "abhi-" gives the term the meaning of, 1) the higher, superior or ultimate teaching (dharma) of the Buddha, or 2) with respect to, in regards to, concerning the teaching of the Buddha.[19]

Without plunging into the etymological arguments, we can say that the former sense is at least implicitly held to be the case by those who propagate the Abhidharma as descriptive of the truth. dGe 'Dun Grub, commenting on *ADKK* {i.2a}, spans the two meanings by distinguishing between the ultimate Abhidharma, and the conventional Abhidharma which leads to it:

> If one asks: What is that Abhidharma?
>
> It is two-fold. From among which the three uncontaminated Paths of Seeing, Meditation and No More Learning are the subjects. They are ultimate Abhidharma, because they are "stainless wisdom along with its attendants (rJes 'Brang; anucara)." {i.2a}[20]

Here the point is made that Abhidharma includes the supermundane paths of the Āryans--those who have begun to have direct insight into the ultimate

truth, and have thus begun to eliminate obscurations--right up to the enlightened state of the Arhat, the Path of No More Learning. In this aspect then, its ultimate aspect, there is nothing higher, more complete than Abhidharma.

On the other hand, there is a great deal more to Abhidharma than the three uncontaminated paths, and this mass of ideas, teachings and texts, together with the wisdom that an individual brings to understanding them, is regarded as conventional Abhidharma:

> Whatever contaminated wisdom [that arises from] hearing, thinking and meditating which is undertaken in order to attain that holy [ultimate] Abhidharma; and whatever wisdom obtained from birth; and those commentaries which have these as their subjects--like the *Jñānaprasthāna* (*Ye Shes La 'Jug Pa*) etc.--these are conventional Abhidharma.
>
> ...There is a reason for designating these with the name "Abhidharma," because they are the method or cause for attaining ultimate Abhidharma. And the way in which they become the cause is: Based on inborn wisdom there is the wisdom that arises from hearing. From this, the wisdom of thinking arises; and from that the wisdom of meditation arises; from that uncontaminated wisdom grows.[21]

**Abhidharma as an Ontology and Soteriology**

In the discourse of western scholarship it is the second sense of Abhidharma--concerning the dharma or teaching of the Buddha--that the term is most generally used; and more precisely, to refer to a particular body of texts sharing certain ontological assumptions and a soteriological path, which are representative of a particular stage in the development of Buddhist

philosophy.

The ontology is characterized by the view that "selflessness" means that there is no permanent, partless and independent entity that forms an essence of a person, but in fact a person, as well as all external objects, is made up of a collection of basic units of being, or "dharmas." These dharmas are the building blocks of reality, out of which the experienced world and self are assembled. Our suffering and entrapment in saṁsāra is due to our misconceiving the self and objects in the world to be unitary permanent entities, when in fact they are mere aggregates of the smallest possible units, dharmas.

The soteriological path is then based on the analysis of experience, with the goal of seeing precisely how these basic units interact in different combinations to produce the world of experience. This undertaking is summed up by Vasubandhu in the statement,

> Aside from the discernment of dharmas, there is no means to extinguish the afflictions; and it is due to afflictions that the world wanders in the ocean of existence. It is for this reason that the Teacher taught this [Abhidharma,] they say.[22]

**Abhidharma as Encyclopedia**

No term has emerged as a successful translation of Abhidharma, and this is due to the very encyclopedic nature of the literature. As the product of the undertaking to systematize the thought of the Buddha, the most ambitious Abhidharma texts intend to describe and account for everything, or

at least everything that matters and needs to be said. The *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu has been described as "a kind of *Summa Buddhica*."[23]

Though it may be impossible to translate Abhidharma in a single English term, we can define it with a descriptive analysis of its contents. Such a schematic view reveals the encyclopedic nature of Abhidharma. The analysis can be subdivided into two parts: 1) a description of the formal elements or mode of discourse of Abhidharma literature; and 2) the content of that literature.

We can preface our description of the formal elements with Poussin's suggestion that style was the distinguishing characteristic of Abhidharma literature: "The first catechism had been incorporated into the Sūtra. The name Abhidharma was given to the new, more systematic, catechisms. It was a name which designated a special manner of presenting the Dharma..."[24]

**The formal characteristics of Abhidharma literature**

1. Presentation of the subject by way of definition.

In its broadest outlines, the Abhidharma presents subjects in terms of definitions.[25] These subjects are not only the dharmas, the elements of personal and material existence, of which there are 75 in the Vaibhāṣika system. The subjects include every term and concept mentioned in the sūtras

that was considered significant by the authors. These definitions are not always edifying to the Western reader because they are generally not phenomenological, and fail to deliver a full sense of the experiential meaning of a concept. Rather, they tend to be categorical, describing concepts by breaking them down into other terms which describe their various types and functions. Then each term that is used in the definition is itself to be defined. So for example, dGe 'Dun Grub explains at the beginning of Chapter Four:

> Karma is twofold, as there are the two types: Intention karma (Sems Pa'i Las; cetanā-karma); and karma-having-intended (Sam Pa'i Las; cetayitvā-karma) which is produced by that intention.
>
> If one asks: What are the natures of these? Intention is karma of the mind (Yid Kyi Las; manas-karma), because it is karma that is concomitant with mental consciousness.
>
> The karma-having-intended, which is produced by that intention, has two types: karma of body and karma of speech.
>
> Furthermore, each of these is twofold, having both revealing karma (rNam Par Rig Byed; vijñapti) and non-revealing karma (rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa; avijñapti).[26]

And then, 12 verses on we get a definition of non-revealing karma:

> Non-revealing karma should be understood to be of three types. It should be understood as restraint (sDom Pa; saṁvara), unrestraint (sDom Pa Ma Yin Pa; asaṁvara), and other than these.[27]

Of course many definitions are not so internally referential, and do provide clear statements of meaning:

> Revealing karma of speech is the sound of the voice. If one asks, why is it called revealing? Because it enables others to understand one's own motivation, it is called revealing.[28]

1a. Resolving disputes.

One of the characteristics of Abhidharma literature is its extensive indulgence in dialectics to resolve disputes between schools or between viewpoints within a school. In this it conforms to the style of scholastic Indian literature of its time. Resolving disputes appears as a subset of all the remaining types of discourse listed below.

2. Categorization.

It has been shown that in structure and in its categories of analysis the Abhidharma literature was based on earlier tabulated lists of topics called mātṛka's. In fact, Pruden points out citations from the literature of various sects where the terms mātṛka and Abhidharma were seen as synonymous.[29] In these lists, or indices as Poussin calls them, the most common and important topics discussed by the Buddha in his sūtras were compiled into sets of two, three or four terms, with each set describing certain characteristics, and thereby setting up a structure for classifying either all or some subset of dharmas. Although the pure mātikās that are extant are from the Pali literature--tabulations of the topics in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*[30]--and we have no Sanskrit mātṛkas, Jaini points out that it is possible to reconstruct such lists from the topics that are dealt with in the Sanskrit Abhidharma literature. A large proportion of the sets of pairs and

triads found in Asaṅga's *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, and the *Abhidharmadīpa* and its *Vṛtti*, are identical with the mātikās of the Theravāda school. Jaini concludes that, "Whatever the original contents of the mātikās may have been, there is no doubt that it formed the nucleus of the Abhidhamma literature, both Pali and Sanskrit."[31]

It is clear from the suttas that at an early stage of Buddhist practice, the foundation of studying the Abhidhamma was to learn well the mātikās. In the *Gulissāni-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* it is said that a bhikku in the forest should study the Abhidhamma and the Abhivinaya:

> He should apply himself to the study of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka and the Vinaya-piṭaka, together with their commentaries. As regards the Abhidhamma, he should at least know the Duka and Tika Mātikās together with the Dhamma-hadaya-vibhaṅga (last chapter of the *Vibhaṅga*). As regards the Vinaya-piṭaka, he must at least learn the two Pātimokkhas.[32]

In the context of a tradition as thoroughly oral as India's has always been, such mnemonically handy devices as lists of categories naturally developed as a structure for organizing a vast and complex body of teachings. Not only did the Buddhist monks have to memorize the teachings in order to preserve them for at least the first 200-300 years before they were committed to writing, but the Buddhist tradition, rooted in Indian orality, has maintained its orientation to the spoken transmission of "texts," and to the direct oral delivery of commentary from teacher to student. This continued in the Tibetan tradition, where many texts were conceived and

structured to be taught out loud. A good example is the text translated in Part Two of this dissertation, a text that was "written" orally, with a note-taker transcribing the author's words, and which could hardly be understood by a student merely by reading it, without an oral commentary from a teacher who brought to the text a previous understanding of what the text intends.

The consequent construction of an ontological and soteriological system by means of categorization becomes the hallmark of Abhidharma literature. The object is to discern the nature of dharmas, the elements of existence. We can do this by placing each dharma in its appropriate slot: contaminated or uncontaminated (sāsrava, anāsrava); compound or uncompounded (saṁskṛta; asaṁskṛta); virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral (kuśala, akuśala, avyākṛta); occurring in the Desire, Form or Formless Realm (kāma-, rūpa-, ārūpya-dhātu); to be abandoned on the Path of Seeing or the Path of Meditation or not to be abandoned (darśana-heya, bhāvanā-heya, aheya). These are a few of the most central categories, but there are many more used to describe the nature of dharmas.

This categorization is not merely a literary form, but can be seen as a coherent blend of style and content. Describing reality in terms of a cross-referenced file system of discreet items (dharmas), implies and presupposes a reality composed of elements, solid and real, with fixed and identifiable

positions within distinct sets of categories. The content and form are harmonious here in expressing a view of a world constructed out of discreet real elements, and a soteriological path in which the discernment of what each of these elements truly is, where it belongs in the system of classification, is the type of knowledge that can liberate one from ignorance and suffering.

How different in style from the non-analytical assertive discourse of the Prajñāparamitā literature, which, like a windswept grassfire, burns away all real phenomena and all Abhidharma categories in a blaze of Emptiness. And Nāgārjuna, who organizes the Prajñāparmitā assertions into analytical arguments, creates a discourse not of affirmation but of contradiction, fully coherent with the inherent contradictions he finds in the notion that Abhidharmic elements and categories can have any real existence.

So the format of Abhidharma, the classification of elements into sets of categories, can be seen not merely as the outgrowth and development of mnemonic lists and necessary systematization of the sūtra teachings, but as a formal expression of the world view of Buddhism at a particular phase in its philosophical development: the classifying discourse of Abhidharma literature as the embodiment of the substantial elementalism of Abhidharma Buddhism.

2a. Permutations.

Of course the various categories into which specific dharmas fall are not in any way mutually exclusive, but form overlapping sets and subsets in what appear to be dizzying and at times tedious lists of permutations.

Often the playing out of these permutations has the clear purpose of laying out the schema of the Abhidharma world. For example from dGe 'Dun Grub's commentary to {i.30}:

> Among the 18 dhātus, how many are included in the Desire Realm; how many are included in the Form Realm; how many are included in the Formless Realm; how many are not included in the realms?
>
> All 18 dhātus belong to the Desire Realm, because they are capable of nourishing (rGyas Su Rung Ba) the afflictions of the Desire Realm.
>
> In the Form Realm there are 14. And if one asks what are they? They are all the dhātus with the exception of smell, taste, nose-consciousness and tongue-consciousness. The two--smell and taste--are not in the Form Realm because they are morsel food, and those who are free of attachment to these take birth there....[33]

But the purpose of playing out some permutations is sometimes less apparent. For example this passage from the commentary to {iv.81}:

> If one asks: How many karmic paths arise together with [a particular] intention?
>
> From one up to eight non-virtues can arise together with one intention; but nine or ten can not arise together, because the three [non-virtues] of mind do not arise simultaneously.
>
> The case of one non-virtue arising together with an intention is the state of having any of the three [non-virtues] of mind.

> The case of two arising together is, for example, stealing while in a state of covetousness.
>
> The case of three arising together is, for example, when one with a harmful thought kills a living creature and then steals it....
>
> For virtues, from one up to ten can arise together with an intention. However, there is no arisal of one, eight or five together with [one intention.]
>
> There is no arisal together with one because [a virtuous mind] can not arise without non-covetousness and non-harmful thought....[34]

Though such passages may often appear to be mere scholasticism, they do have a pedagogical purpose. That is to familiarize the student with the system, to deepen his or her understanding of it, and to integrate all the details of the whole vast conception into the imagination. With some contemplation one (usually) finds that each question, however trivial it may at first appear, can highlight some aspect of the way the world fits together, and provide a particular perspective on how the system works. The learning process here is similar to that used in the tradition of Tibetan debate, where repetitious examination of small issues from many different angles accumulates into a familiarity and dexterous mental facility in conceptualizing and making connections between many details in a vast but integrated system.

3. Resolution of synonyms.

The sūtras are the source of the terms used in the Abhidharma. But because the sūtras are by nature unsystematic, and represent discourses by the Buddha spread out over the 45 years of his teaching career, there are many synonyms, or cases of different terms referring to the same phenomena. Sometimes the terms are exact synonyms; more often their meanings overlap and refer to congruent but not identical sets of phenomena. Many passages in the *ADKB* appear for the purpose of resolving questions over the relationship of terms used by the Buddha to each other. These synonyms are handled with the assumption that the Buddha did not use words idly, and if he used different terms on different occasions apparently to refer to the same phenomena, there must have been a reason. Once again, understanding how different terms can refer to the same phenomenon provides insight into the multivalent ramifications of that phenomenon within the system. From dGe 'Dun Grub's commentary to {i.7} we see how resolving the different terms used to describe saṁskṛta dharmas reveals their nature:

1) The list of synonyms for saṁskṛtas in general.

As it says {i.1}, "I will teach the commentary, *Abhidharmakośa*," since the Abhidharmikas are inclined to explain sūtras, in sūtra it says: "The paths of time (Dus; adhvan), the basis of discourse (gTam Gyi gZhi; kathā-vastu), having renunciation (Nges Par 'Byung bCas; saniḥsāra), and having a foundation (gZhi Dang bCas Pa; savastuka)." If one asks what are these?

These are a list of terms for saṁskṛtas....

There is a reason for calling these the paths of time, because they have gone in the past; are going; and will go.

There is a reason to call them the basis of discourse, because discourse (gTam; kathā) is the sound of language (Lung Du sTon Pa; vyākaraṇa), and the basis of that is words, and words together with their meanings are presented [in discourse....]

And they "have renunciation" because they are, without doubt, to be renounced. Or, renunciation is Nirvāṇa--[the passing beyond sorrow,] and the sorrow to be renounced is the saṁskṛtas. And because passing beyond them is the end of saṁskṛtas, they "have renunciation...."

As for "having a foundation", it is applied to entity, referent object, fetters (Kun sByor; saṁyojana), cause, and grasped object. But here, the saṁskṛtas are the subject. They have a foundation because they have a cause.[35]

Sometimes etymologies are referred to in order to derive meaning from the use of several terms to describe a single phenomenon, as we see in this commentary to {ii.34}:

If one asks: Since mind (Sems; citta), mentality (Yid; manas), and consciousness (rNam Shes; vijñāna) are spoken of as different, do they have the same meaning or are they different?

They have the same meaning, because they are synonymous terms.

And according to the Vaibhāṣikas: It is called mind (citta) because it distinguishes ('Byed; cinoti) virtue and non-virtue. It is called mentality (manas) because it knows (manute) the object. It is called consciousness (vijñāna) because it discerns (vijñānāti) a referent object. So they say.[36]

**The contents of the *Abhidharmakośa***

Thus far in our schematic view of Abhidharma literature we have pointed out some of its formal characteristics, in an attempt to define the modes of discourse that characterize Abhidharma literature in general.

We turn now to the content of the *ADKB*, and this, by its very encyclopedic nature, is hard to summarize. Sukomal Chaudhuri, who has written the most complete summary of the contents of the *ADKB* has called it, "a key to the knowledge of all that the ancient Buddhism represented in the entire field of ontology (science of reality), psychology, cosmology (the nature of the world process), discipline and the doctrine of karma, theory of salvation, mysticism, holiness, and the Buddhist doctrine of soul."[37]

Probably the most obvious way to summarize its contents is to list the chapter titles of the nine chapters that make up the *ADKB*.[38] Such an exercise would reveal that the contents of the *ADKB* can be generally summarized in a short list of Chaudhuri's categories: ontology, psychology, cosmology, the operation of karma and affliction, the path to liberation and the nature of its stages and attainments.

Here, however, in the following four points of our schematic view, we shall focus on portions of Abhidharma which are usually bypassed, and which suggest the encyclopedic and "scientific" nature of Abhidharma.[39]

1. <u>Psychology</u>.

It can be argued that all of Buddhism is, in the grand sense, a psychological system. The problem of life--suffering--is rooted in ignorance, a cognitive problem; and the solution is wisdom, a cognitive solution. Karmic action which is the energy that keeps us cycling through saṁsāra is, essentially, intention, a mental act. And the meditational practices that can purify our mind and lead us out of saṁsāric suffering are entirely mental acts.

Though the Abhidharma, as summarized in the *ADKB*, includes much more than a psychological system,[40] it does lay out a Buddhist model of the mind, as well as discuss common psychological states and their causes and effects.

The most significant contribution of Abhidharma to psychology is the model of the mind, which is presented primarily at {ii.23ff} where the mental factors are described, with additional discussion of the afflicted mental factors occurring at {v.46ff}. The psychological model as a whole will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

Here, we will merely point out some less-noted examples of psychological insights. For example the discussion at {iv.58} of deranged mind, where we learn that madness can occur not only as karmic fruition, but also from great fear, physical imbalances, or sorrow and grief:

> If one asks: From what causes does deranged mind occur?
>
> It arises through the fruition of the karma of causing others' minds to become deranged; being frightened by seeing the terrible

> form of a demon (Mi Ma Yin; amanuṣya), or by a demon doing one harm; when the elements of one's body, [wind, bile and phlegm] become imbalanced; and it can be produced by sorrow and so forth.[41]

2. Ethics.

The core of the Buddhist ethical system is discussed in the context of the "karmic paths" (karma-patha) at {iv.65}, and is elaborated in various ways in other parts of Chapters Four and Five. At {iv.103} we find a curiously modern ethical problem--who is the real mother in a surrogate birth--raised in the context of a discussion of the automatic transgressions (ānantarya-karma) such as killing one's father and mother:

> If one asks: If the embryo (Nur Nur Po; kalala) of one woman is inserted into the womb of another and is born from that womb, killing which of these two women would constitute an automatic transgression?
>
> Between these two, the first, from whose egg (Zla mTsan; śoṇita) one arises--she is one's mother; and therefore if one kills the first woman it becomes [an automatic transgression;] because she was principle in creating this body that is conducive to liberation. The second woman, who holds one in her womb, is not [one's mother,] because doing just what she does is not the principle [basis for motherhood.][42]

3. Mythology.

Although we tend to think of Abhidharma as comprised of analytical philosophical argument, the entire system is embedded in traditional Buddhist mythology, and a good deal of this material finds its way into the *ADKB*. Numerous references to sutra stories, mythological events and beings are

scattered throughout the text. The extended cosmological discussion in Chapter Three presents lengthy descriptions of mythological evolution, such as this excerpt from the discussion of the way human life evolved:

> Earlier sentient beings, the humans of the first kalpa, were similar to the gods of the Form Realm in that they were miraculously born, they could travel in space by means of supernatural power, and light radiated from their bodies. At that time the juice of the earth emerged, with a color like that of fresh butter and a taste like unboiled honey. Then one, with a craving for the taste, with an outstretched finger tip on the tongue, tried it. Then the others also tasted it in the same way. Gradually, because of attachment to taste, their bodies became solidified and heavy, the radiance of their bodies dimmed....[43]

4. Science.

The notion that the Abhidharma is encyclopedic, and attempts to tell us everything there is to know about the world in which we live, is particularly evident in the way it includes many details of the physical description of the world that today we would classify as science and mathematics. These are discussions of topics that do not have any apparent soteriological purpose, and are hardly connected to the declared undertaking of the discernment of dharmas.

We have already referred to the cosmological descriptions of Chapter Three which describe the process of creation and dissolution of the material world on a macrocosmic level. The *ADKB* also classifies and analyzes the atomic nature of matter at several points.

To summarize what is a complex system, the fundamental units of

matter are the great elements (mahābhūtā) {i.12}:

> The elements ('Byung Ba; bhūta) which are the cause are the earth element (Khams; dhātu), and the water, fire and wind elements; because from these arise the resultant forms. And because of the power of the karma of sentient beings, there has never been, since beginningless cyclic existence, the experience of their not arising.
>
> They are called "great" (Chen Po; mahā) because each enters into the respective functions [of the aggregates of earth, water, fire and air] to a predominant degree.

Though the theory of the four great elements is common to the Pali Abhidhamma, beginning with the *Mahāvibhāṣā* the Sarvāstivādins introduced an atomic theory as well.[44] According to this theory the smallest indivisible unit of the form aggregate (rūpa-skandha) is the subtle atom (paramāṇu),[45] and the smallest possible molecule of matter, out of which the world is constructed, is made up of eight types of subtle atoms {ii.22}:

> In the Desire Realm, the very smallest physical unit, which is a collection (bSags Pa; saṁghāta) of subtle atoms (rDul Phra Rab; paramāṇu) without an atom (rDul; aṇu) of sound or an atom of a faculty, is the simultaneous arising of atoms of eight substances: It is the simultaneous arising of the four elements ('Byung Ba; mahābhūta) and form, smell, taste and tangibility.[46]

These few examples demonstrate how Abhidharma includes topics that we would today classify as science. The following example might be described as engineering, as it involves a discussion of the terminology of measurements of space and time, which begins at {iii.85}:

> If one asks: How are krośas and so forth established from collections of subtle atoms which are the smallest final units of form?

> Subtle atoms (rDul Phra Rab; paramāṇu), atoms (rDul Phran; aṇu), loharajas (lCags rDul), abrajas (Chu rDul), śaśarajas (Ri Bong), eḍaka (or: avi; Lug), gorajas (Glang), chidrarajas (Nyi Zer), likṣā (Sro Ma); and what comes from that, yūka (Shig) and likewise yava (Nas), and aṅguli-parvan (Sor Tsigs); each equals the previous amount multiplied times seven.
>
> Twenty-four aṅgulis equals one hasta. Four hasta equals one dhanus (gZhu or 'Dom). Five hundred dhanus equals one krośa, which is the distance that a monastery should be situated from an inhabited place. Eight krośa equals one yojana.[47]

The inclusion of these topics suggests another way in which we can view the meaning of the Abhidharma literature to the Buddhists who composed it, studied it, and took it as the core literature of their world view.

To these practitioners, Abhidharma was science in the sense that the term science is commonly used today: it was the all-inclusive explanation of how the world works, the physics of reality.

Some modern writers[48] have translated Abhidharma as "metaphysics". While such a translation seems to suggest "physics that isn't true," it nonetheless yields an accurate sense of the encompassing range of Abhidharma, and its nature as the description of the natural laws of the universe.

It is "metaphysical" in the sense that it does not use the scientific method or physical experimentation to come to its conclusions, but relies on the authority of the Buddha, meditative experience, traditional "mythological" knowledge, and reasoned argument.

Nonetheless, Abhidharma represents the state of "knowledge" of its time. Not only mystical knowledge of spiritual paths and meditational states, but concrete knowledge of what the world consists of and how it works.

It was, like modern science, not a finished product, but a work in progress, subject to disagreement and debate and evolving thought. There were, in fact, many Abhidharmas, and the debates between teachers and schools are extensively recorded in many Abhidharma texts. We can see that these masters, the systematizers of the Buddhist description of the world, were fully aware and comfortable with the descriptive, hypothetical and creative nature of what they were doing. They were formulating models.

But once formulated they bought into their respective models and took them as holistic frameworks for their sense of reality, maps of their world view. Abhidharmas are not mere lists of dharmas. They are encyclopedic, scientific representations of reality, as that reality was experienced by the Buddhists who held that their Abhidharma literature held the key to "stainless wisdom" and the path to liberation.

# CHAPTER TWO

# THE LINEAGE OF SARVĀSTIVĀDA ABHIDHARMA AND THE CONTEXT OF DGE 'DUN GRUB'S COMMENTARY

## The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

The Buddhist tradition holds that there were 18 Hīnayāna sects, though in fact there were quite a few more.[49] Of these many early Buddhist lineages, today we have only two fairly complete canons: the Sarvāstivāda canon extant in Chinese, and the canon of the Sthavira or Theravāda sect in Pali. Two Abhidharma Piṭakas survive in their entirety, the Theravāda Abhidharma in Pāli; and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, originally in Sanskrit and now found only in Chinese, except for fragments in the original which were discovered in Central Asia.[50] There are also sections of the *Prajñapti-śāstra* in Tibetan.[51] We also have in Chinese the anomalous *Śāriputrābhidharma-śāstra*, uncertain in origin or sectarian point of view.[52]

Both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma canons contain seven texts, but aside from this numerical congruence the two sets of texts are not related to each other.[53] The seven texts of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma are:

1. *Jñānaprasthāna* by Ārya Kātyāyanīputra.

2. *Prajñaptiśāstra* by Ārya Maudgalyāana.

3. *Prakaraṇapāda* by Sthavira Vasumitra.

4. *Saṅgītiparyāya* by Mahākauṣṭhila (Tibetan tradition) or Śāriputra (Chinese tradition).

5. *Vijñānakāya* by Sthavira Devaśarmā.

6. *Dharmaskandha* by Arya Śāriputra (Tibetan tradition) or Mahāmaudgalyāyana (Chinese tradition).

7. *Dhātukāya* by Pūrṇa (Tibetan tradition) or Vasumitra (Chinese tradition).[54]

The *Jñānaprasthāna* of Kātyāyanīputra has been regarded as the most important of the seven, as it presents the orthodox Kashmiri Sarvāstivāda position and was known in the tradition as the body (kāya, śarīra) while the other six texts were considered the six feet (pāda).[55] Of the seven Abhidharma texts it is the one most often quoted by dGe 'Dun Grub, and is second only to the *ADKB*. It is generally thought to have been composed in the first century B.C., last among the seven texts.[56]

The *Dharmaskandha* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* are generally considered the earliest of the seven, based on their connections to the early sūtras. As already mentioned the *Saṅgītiparyāya* bears a close resemblance to the Pali *Sangītisuttanta*, and the relative antiquity of the *Dharmaskandha* is indicated

by the fact that it is quoted in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*.[57] The *Dharmaskandha* treats most of the fundamental subjects found in the later texts, but is not as clearly a sectarian Sarvāstivādin document as the *Jñānaprasthāna*.[58]

The remaining texts are considered to have been formulated during an intermediate period, in the probable order of the *Prajñaptiśāstra*; the *Vijñānakāya* and *Dhātukāya*; and the *Prakaraṇapāda*.[59] The dating of these texts must be considered speculative and is based on their relative adherence to the orthodox Sarvāstivāda doctrine. These intermediate-period texts are characterized by "doctrinal development and systematization that diverges from the simple exposition in the sūtras, a heightened sense of sectarian identity, the elaboration of taxonomic systems, and greater consistency and complexity in exegesis."[60]

The *Prakaraṇapāda*, alongside the *Jñānaprasthāna*, takes on a place of importance in subsequent Sarvāstivāda commentaries. Like the latter it is frequently cited in the *ADKB* and therefore by dGe 'Dun Grub.[61] It is, significantly, the source of the analysis of all dharmas into five groups, which is the central taxonomic framework of the *ADKB*. The five groups are rūpa, citta, caitasika, cittaviprayukta saṁskāra, and asaṁskṛta. These five groups, when analyzed further, yield 75 distinct dharmas.

However Vasubandhu was not concerned with totalling up this figure, or tabulating--for those who like charts and lists--all the dharmas under the

framework of the five groups. Mention of all the 75 dharmas, in various subsets, is scattered throughout the *ADKB*, but the scheme of the whole is never systematized or cited as a total number. It was P'u-kuang, disciple and scribe-editor (pi-shou)[62] to Hsüan-tsang, the Chinese translator of the *ADKB*, who subsequently pulled together all the dharmas mentioned in the *ADKB* and organized them under the five groups.[63]

**The Mahāvibhāṣā**

The final and full elaboration of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine appeared in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*,[64] a huge compendium of all the doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma as well as a record of disputes and dissenting opinions from masters of the Sarvāstivāda and other sects.[65] Composed as a commentary to the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the traditional account describes the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* at a council of 500 learned monks assembled by King Kaniṣka in the first to second century A.D. in, according to varying accounts, Gandhāra or Kashmir. The purpose of the council was to determine which of the proliferating interpretations of the dharma were to be accepted. The voluminous result of these deliberations included a record of opposing opinions expressed by various masters during the debate. Among the foremost Sarvāstivāda masters mentioned in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* are Pārśva, who instigated the convening of the council, Ghoṣaka, Dharmatrāta,

Buddhadeva, and Vasumitra, who acted as president of the council and chief editor of the final text.[66] This great text, which is today extant only in Chinese, became so central to one faction of the Sarvāstivāda school that they came to be known as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika, and Vasubandhu refers to them almost invariably as simply "the Vaibhaṣikas."

The orthodox view of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is that of the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas, but the various alternative opinions cited in the text are indicative of numerous viewpoints and lineages falling underneath the Sarvāstivāda umbrella. Among the most commonly mentioned dissenters, who turn up frequently in the *ADKB* are the Outsiders (Bahirdeśaka) and the Westerners (Pāścātya), who have been speculatively identified with the Sarvāstivādins of Gandhāra.[67]

The primary opponents mentioned in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* are Dārṣṭāntikas. This sect is of obscure origin, though they have been identified with the Saṁkantika (Pali) or Sāṁkrāntika (Sanskrit) mentioned in various lists of the Hīnayāna schools. The Sautrāntikas, have been identified with the same school, and therefore with the Darṣṭāntikas, but this identification is complicated by the fact that there seems to be a distinction made between the two in some references in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.

When we come to the *ADKB* the frequency of reference to the two schools is reversed, and the Sautrāntika clearly takes on the role of primary

critic of Vaibhāṣika positions. The best hypothesis based on the available data seems to be that the Dārṣṭāntikas were originally a breakaway sect of Sarvāstivādins, and the Sautrāntikas were either their successors, or another sect with a closely parallel doctrine, which, over time, either absorbed the Dārṣṭāntikas or overtook them as the preeminent exponents of that doctrine.[68]

Following the *Mahāvibhāṣā* the Vaibhāṣika tradition produced several summaries or manuals which diverged in structure from that great text and from the *Jñānaprasthāna* by dispensing with opposing interpretations and by organizing the material topically, in the manner of instructional manuals.[69]

The final stage in the development of Abhidharma texts was ushered in by Vasubandhu with his work, the *Abhidharmakośa*. As Cox describes it, "Vasubandhu, in writing the *Abhidharmakośa* adopted the structural innovations of previous texts, specifically those of the *Abhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra*. In content and style of argument, however, he returned to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*."[70]

Vasubandhu's masterly summary of the doctrines as well as the disputes recorded in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, together with his penetrating critiques of many of the most central Vaibhāṣika doctrines from his own Sautrāntika point of view, was so skillful, so lucid and so brilliantly organized, that for the rest of Buddhist history it became the centerpiece and the standard of

Abhidharma studies in all countries except where the Theravada Abhidhamma predominates.

Even the orthodox Vaibhāṣikas had to orient themselves to the challenge of Vasubandhu's work. Saṁghabhadra, the foremost defender of the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy against Vasubandhu's attacks seems to have spent the rest of his life writing treatises based on and countering Vasubandhu's text.[71] The other significant text from this stage of Abhidharma literature, the *Abhidharmadīpa* and its *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, is of unknown authorship, but is similarly based entirely on the *ADKB*, diverging only by expanding arguments or replacing verses where the author feels that Vasubandhu has strayed from the Vaibhāṣika way.[72]

## The Tradition of the *Abhidharmakośa* in Tibet

### Bu sTon and Early Traces of the *Abhidharmakośa*

The *ADKB* of Vasubandhu was translated into Tibetan at an early date, probably around 800 A.D., during the first propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. It appears in the catalogue of the canon preserved in the lHan Kar palace, the oldest catalogue of the Buddhist canon compiled in Tibet. This catalogue was compiled by dPal brTzegs and Nam mKha'i sNying Po, probably in 800 or 812 A.D.[73] The text was translated by the Indian Paṇḍita Jinamitra and the Tibetan Lotzāba dPal brTzegs,[74] who were active in the late eighth and early ninth century.

Bu-ston (1290-1364), the great scholar and systematizer of the Tibetan canon, tells us that it was the Paṇḍita Smṛti, known for initiating the translation of the "New Tantras", who introduced the study of the *Abhidharmakośa* to Tibet. He came to Tibet without knowing the language, and for a time was forced to work as a shepherd. Eventually he was invited to sMan Lungs by dPyal Se rTsab bSod Nams rGyal mTsan who wanted to study Dharma with him. After that he went to Khams and there "established the school of the *Abhidharmakośa* at 'Dan kLong Thang."[75] Smṛti was active in Tibet probably in the first half of the 11th century.[76]

gZhon Nu dPal, the author of the Tibetan history, *The Blue Annals*, says that the translation of the *Abhidharmakośa* as well as its commentaries

was associated with Bo Dong monastery, which he describes as "a remarkable place," but that the history of the lineage of its transmission has been lost.[77] Tucci, in *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* describes this monastery:

> The monastery of Po tong belongs to the sect of the same name. Its monks are ser khyim pa, viz. they marry. The temple is much damaged and of the ancient decoration very little is left. On the great road between Lha rtse and Tashilunpo, in the environs of Zabs dge lding, many times disputed on account of its position, it was exposed to frequent spoliations and ruin.[78]

The only other suggestion of a connection between this monastery and the Abhidharma tradition in Tibet appears in *mKyen brTze's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet* which says,

> At about one day's march from Phun Tsogs gLing there is the temple of Bo Dong, founded by the dGe Ba'i bShes gNyen Mudra Chen Po and residence of dPang Lotzāba Chen Po and his nephew, and of the Bo Dong Pan Chen etc. But today it is occupied by married monks (Ser Khyim).[79]

dPang Lotzāba bLo Gros brTan Pa (1276-1342) is mentioned in the colophon of the Tibetan translation of Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha-ṭīkā*, a commentary on the *ADKB*; his Indian manuscript of the text was one of two used by Dharmapālabhadra (1441-1528) to complete the Tibetan translation.[80] Furthermore, Bo Dong Pan Chen Phyog Las rNam rGyal (1306-1386) is the author of the massive *Encyclopedia Tibetica*,[81] of which volume 19 is a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa*.

After Bu-ston completed his great work of compiling the bsTan 'Gyur at Zha Lu Monastery, he put together an index, which was completed in

1335 A.D.[82] This Zha Lu bsTan 'Gyur catalogue[83] enumerates the *ADKB* and its commentaries in almost the same order as they are found in the Peking and Derge editions of the bsTan 'Gyur. Bu sTon's list is as follows:[84]

1. *Abhidharmakośa-kārikā*

*Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi Tsig Le'ur Byas Pa*

Author: Vasubandhu; dByig gNyen

Tranlators: Jinamitra, dPal brTzegs Rakṣita

Tohoku Catalogue #: 4089

2. *Abhdharmakośa-bhāṣya*

*Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi bShad Pa*

A. Vasubandhu; dByig gNyen

T. Jinamitra, dPal brTzegs Rakṣita

To. 4090

3. *Abhidharmakośa-śāstra-kārikā-bhāṣya*[85]

*Chos mNgon Pa mDzod Kyi bsTan bCos Kyi Tsig Le'ur Byas Pa'i rNam Par bShad Pa*

A. Sañghabhadra; 'Dus bZang

T. unknown

To. 4091

4. *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa-ṭikā*

*Chos mNgon Pa'i mDsod Kyi 'Grel bShad*

A. Rājaputra Yaśomitra; Grags Pa bShes gNyen

T. Viśuddhasiṁha, dPal brTzegs

To. 4092

5. *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā* (major)

*Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Ky'i 'Grel bShad mTsan Nyid Kyi rJes Su 'Brang Ba*

A. Pūrṇavardhana; Gang Ba sPel

T. Kanakavarman, Pa Tsab Nyi Ma Grags

To. 4093

6. *Upāyikā Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā*

*Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi 'Grel bShad Nye Bar mKho Ba*

A. Śamathadeva (from Nepal); Shi gNas Lha

T. Jayaśri, Khams Pa She Rabs 'Od Zer

To. 4094

7. *Marmapradīpa Abhidharmakośa-vṛtti*

*Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi 'Grel Pa gNad Kyi sGron Me*

A. Dignāga; Phyog Kyi gLang Po

T. rNal 'Byor Zla Ba, 'Jam dPal gZhon Nu

To. 4095

8. *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā* (minor)

A. Pūrṇavardhana; Gang Ba sPel

T. Kanakavarman, Pa Tsab Nyi Ma Grags

To. 4096

9. *Abhidharmāvatāra-sārasamuccaya*

*Chos mNgon Pa La 'Jug Pa rGya Cher 'Grel Pa sNying Po Kun Las bTus Pa*

A. unknown

T. Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Ye Shes sDe

To. 4097

10. *Abhidharmāvatāra-prakaraṇa*[86]

*Rab Tu Byed Pa Chos mNgon Pa La 'Jug Pa*

A. unknown

T. unknown

To. 4098

**kLong rDol bLa Ma and the Tibetan Commentarial Tradition**

kLong rDol bLa Ma Ngag dBang bLo bZang (1719-1805) was an encyclopedic scholar whose 32 volumes of collected writings encompass the vast range of Buddhism from the dGe Lugs Pa point of view.[87] His *Nang Rig Pa mNgon Pa'i sDe sNod Kyi Don bsDu Ba'i Ming Gi rNam Grangs* is an introduction to the study of the Abhidharma by way of explaining some key words and concepts found in each chapter of the *ADKB*.[88] The work opens with lists and essential descriptions of the Hindu philosophical schools, and

then the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhist schools. The author then presents a short bibliography of Indian Abhidharma works and their Tibetan commentaries. This list may serve as an introduction to the texts that have been studied in the Abhidharma lineage of Tibet, at least for the dGe Lugs Pa sect. Having mentioned Asañga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as the primary text of "the higher Abhidharma" (mNgon Pa Gong Ma), he gives the following list of treatises for the "lower Abhidharma" (mNgon Pa 'Og Ma):[89]

1. The root text of the *Abhidharmakośa*

    A. Vasubandhu

2. The autocommentary of the *Abhidharmakośa*

    A. Vasubandhu

3. "Kośa-vṛtti" (mDzod 'Grel)

    A. Rājaputra Yaśomitra

4. "Kośa-vṛtti"

    A. Pūrṇavardhana from Kāśmīr

5. *Marmapradīpa* Kośa-vṛtti

    A. Dignāga, one of four disciples of Vasubandhu

6. *Karakāśani* Kośa-vṛtti[90]

   mDzod 'Grel *gNam lCags Thog Zer*

    A. Sthiramati; bLos Gros brTan Pa, also one of Vasubandhu's disciples

T. Dharmapālabhadra

7. "Kośa-vṛtti"

A. Saṅghabhadra

8. "Kośa-vṛtti"

A. Śamatha[-deva], from Nepal

kLong rDol bLa Ma then goes on to present a list of Tibetan commentaries on the *ADKB*:[91]

1. *The Ornament of Abhidharma (mNgon Pa'i rGyan)*, a Kośa-vṛtti by mChims 'Jam dByangs of sNar Thang,[92] the student of mChims Thams Cad mKhyen Pa.
2. *Elucidating the Path to Enlightenment (Thar Lam gSal Byed)*, a Kośa-vṛtti by Pan Chen dGe 'Dun Grub.[93]

And there are many commentaries by the following authors and others:

3. *bLo gSal bLo'i Padmo Kha 'Byed*, by Drung Chen dNgos Grub Pa.[94]
4. Pan Chen bSod Nams Grags Pa.[95]
5. Khri Chen dKon mChog Chos 'Phel.[96]
6. *Chos mNgon Rin Chen 'Dren Pa'i Shing rTa*, by Ngag dBang bLo bZang rGya mTso, Dalai Lama V.[97]

7. 'Jam dByangs bZhad Pa.[98]

**The History of Abhidharma in Tibet According to Kong sPrul Bla Ma**

Another of the great Tibetan encyclopedists was Kong sPrul Yon Tan rGya mTso, whose work, the *Shes Bya Kun Khyab*, is the most comprehensive Tibetan study of the history, thought and practice of Buddhism collected in a single study.

Kong sPrul presents a quite full account of the Abhidharma lineages of India and Tibet in his section on The Teaching Lineages of Abhidharma.[99] He divides up the Abhidharma traditions into two lineages: the Mahāyāna lineage with Asaṅga's *Abhidharma-samuccaya* as its "explanatory treatise" ('Chad Byed bsTan bCos); and the Hīnayāna lineage, with its explanatory treatise, the *Abhidharmakośa* by Asaṅga's younger brother, Vasubandhu. These two texts are known as the upper and lower Abhidharma.

Kong sPrul lists commentaries to the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* composed by the Kāśmīri Sthiramati (Blo brTan)[100], Slob dPon rGyal Po'i Sras (Ācārya Jinamitra)[101] and others. For the *Abhidharma-kośa*, vṛttis ('Grel Pa) and ṭīkās ('Grel bShad) were written and propagated by: Vasubandhu's own teacher (Slob dPon; ācārya) Saṅghabhadra;[102] his students Dignāga[103] and Sthiramati--who was even more expert in the Abhidharma than Vasubandhu himself; Pūrṇavardhana,[104] Yaśomitra,[105]

Vasumitra (dByig Gi bShes gNyen),[106] and others.

Kong sPrul then describes the spread of these Abhidharma teachings in Tibet at the time of the early propagation of the Dharma.[107] Paṇḍita Jinamitra and Lotzāba sKa Ba dPal brTzegs and others translated and taught the following texts:

1. From the *Prajñapti-śāstra*:

   a. *Lokaprajñapti ('Jig rTen gDags Pa)*[108]

   b. *Kāraṇaprajñapti (rGyu gDags Pa)*[109]

   c. *Karmaprajñapti (Las gDags Pa)*[110]

2. The autocommentaries of the "higher and lower Abhidharmas":

   a. *Abhidharma-samuccaya*

   b. *Abhidharmakośa*

3. The commentary of Yaśomitra ('Grel Pa rGyal Sras Ma), *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā (Chos mNgon Pai' mDzod Kyi 'Grel bShad)*[111]

4. Other texts as well.

They had three disciples, sNa Nam Zla Ba'i rDo rJe, lHa Lung dPal Gyi rDo rJe, and dBes Ye Shes rGyal Ba. This last disciple travelled to Khams and taught the lineage to Grum rGyal Ba'i Ye Shes; and from him it spread west to the provinces of dBus and gTzang.

Here Kong sPrul quotes Kun mKhyen Dharmakara, who says:

> According to 'Gos Lo [tzāba][112] and others, the spread of this lineage from this point on is only of the higher Abhidharma. They say

> that the lineage of the teaching system of the *Kośa* did not have any succession. However, it may be that the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* was spread as more important than the [*Kośa*] teaching system, but there must also have been, besides that, a [teaching lineage] of the *Kośa* and its commentary. Because all scholars, the Omniscient [Bu sTon] and others, say that this [*Abhidharmakośa*] lineage source is itself the primary one.[113]

Kong sPrul mentions Do rJes Brang Ti Dar Ma sNying Po, dPang Lo Chen Po, and Pan Chen Shakya mChog, who carried on the *ADS* lineage, with the latter two writing commentaries. However, he says, after the intervening period between the two propagations of the Dharma, the teaching lineage of the *Kośa* was spread while that of the *ADS* was lost, so that today it no longer exists.[114]

Kong sPrul then turns to the spread of the main current teaching lineage of the *ADK* in Tibet. He says that when Paṇdita Smṛti-jñāna, a student of Nāropa, came to Tibet and gave a teaching on the *ADK* on the plain of 'Dan Klong in Khams, many scholars and monks assembled, and the lower Abhidharma was established as the foundation of the Teachings.[115] It was then his disciples, gYas Chen Po Shes Rab Grags and others, who spread the teaching in the three provinces of dBus, gTzang and Khams.

Brang Ti Dar Ma sNying Po received the lineage of both the higher and lower Abhidharmas. They were then dispersed widely by his lineage, which featured his disciples Rog Chos Kyi brTzon 'Grus and Go Bo Ye Shes 'Byung gNas; the latter's disciple 'Ban dKon mChog rDo rJe; his disciple Thog Gar

gNam lDe--also known as Tho Kun dGa' rDo rJe.

It was mChims brTzon Seng Ge who composed the first Tibetan ṭīka which was known as *Nag 'Jam*. Following that, many scholars composed and propagated commentaries, including mChims Nam mKha' Grags, bSam gTan bZang Po, bCom lDan Rig Ral, and Red mDa' Ba, as well as their lineage holders.

Kong sPrul terminates his lineage with Sa sKya Paṇḍita (Sa sKya Paṇ Chen), who received the teaching of the *Kośa* from Paṇ Chen Shākya Shrī, and also had the extraordinary experience of hearing teachings directly from Vasubandhu for one month in dreams.[116]

**Tsong Kha Pa and the dGe Lugs Pa Lineage of Abhidharma**

The dGe Lugs Pa lineage branches off from that of the Sa sKya, as we find in the biography of rJe Tsong Kha Pa that he initially received the teachings on the *ADK* from his "principal teacher" Red mDa' Ba.[117] Tsong Kha Pa travelled all over Tibet seeking teachings from all of the greatest lamas of his time. At a fairly early stage of his career we learn that,

> rJe Rinpoche [Tsong Kha Pa] developed tremendous respect for Red mDa' Ba's method of teaching the *Abhidharmakośa* and its auto-commentary. Tsong Kha Pa asked many searching questions on certain points to the amazement of his teacher, who was sometimes unable to answer immediately. This master had innumerable spiritual qualities and Tsong Kha Pa later came to regard him as his principal teacher. Their relationship became such that simultaneously they were each other's Master and disciple.[118]

The following year Tsong Kha Pa was in Lhasa where,

> the great translator and scholar of Abhidharma, mKhan Chen Lotzawa Byang Chub rTze Mo[119] was to give teachings on Abhidharma... When he arrived in Lhasa Tsong Kha Pa went to this great guru and requested teachings. However, this Lama was old and in delicate health and was going to leave for Tsang soon.[120]

Tsong Kha Pa was not satisfied with these brief teachings and so he returned to mNyes Thang where he studied the Vinaya as well as Abhidharma with the Abbot Ka bZhi Ba bLo gSal Ba.[121]

It seems that it was about a year later, while he was confined to the monastery at Na Nying due to a bitterly cold winter, that Tsong Kha Pa gave his first teachings.

> Scholars had asked for Abhidharma teachings, especially a text written by Asañga called the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*. Abhidharma is divided into two parts, the upper and the lower. The lower is called the Abhidharmakośa. Tsong Kha Pa was studying higher, and, even though he had not studied this text in detail, he nevertheless gave perfect teachings.[122]

Tsong Kha Pa once again returned to Red mDa' Ba at Sa sKya where he spent the next 11 months studying Abhidharma, logic, Mādhyamika and receiving other oral teachings. In the following years Tsong Kha Pa took examinations on the "Five Treatises", which includes the *ADK*, at both sNar Thang and Sa sKya, and received further teachings on the Five Treatises from Red mDa' Ba.[123]

**dGe 'Dun Grub: Author of *Elucidating the Path to Liberation***

dGe 'Dun Grub, the First Dalai Lama (1391-1475), is considered one of the foremost disciples of rJe Tsong Kha Pa, and Snellgrove and Richardson credit him with the "energy and ability which was mainly responsible for building up Tsong Kha Pa's school into an active expansive order ready and anxious to compete with the others on an equal footing."[124]

There is no question of the influence that the life and thought of Tsong Kha Pa had on dGe 'Dun Grub and his own practice and writings. This influence was poetically expressed in his hymn to Tsong Kha Pa, *Song of the Eastern Snow Mountains*, where he refers to "my spiritual father, Blo bZang Drag Pa [Tsong Kha Pa] and his two chief disciples," and says,

> That I, dGe 'Dun Grub, who tends to be lazy,
> Now have a mind somewhat propelled by Dharma,
> Is due solely to the great kindness of this holy teacher and his chief disciples.
> O perfect masters, your compassion is indeed unsurpassed.[125]

dGe 'Dun Grub met rJe Tsong Kha Pa for the first time in 1415, only four years before the great Lama's death. It is said that on their first meeting Tsong Kha Pa tore off a piece of his robe and gave it to the 25 year old monk with the prophecy that he would have a great influence in preserving the pure Vinaya in Tibet.[126] The first three works listed in dGe 'Dun Grub's Collected Works (gSung 'Bum) are Vinaya works, and in particular his commentary to Guṇaprabha's *Vinaya-sūtra* remains a widely used text.[127]

In Kun dGa rGyal mTsan's biography of dGe 'Dun Grub[128] we learn

that the First Dalai Lama studied with more than sixty teachers, but "three were particularly kind to him. In the beginning of his spiritual career this was the sNar Thang Abbot Grub Pa Shes Rab; in the middle, it was the omniscient Lama Tsong Kha Pa; and in the last phase of his training the most kind was the accomplished sage rJe Shes Rab Senge."[129]

Grub Pa Shes Rab was the abbot of sNar Thang monastery from 1375-1417, and when the seven year old dGe 'Dun Grub (born Pad Ma rDo rJe) was placed in sNar Thang by his widowed mother, the abbot became his preceptor (mKhan Po; upādhyāya). Recognizing the "sensitive and highly intelligent" qualities of the boy, the abbot took him under his wing and "from this time onward he watched over him with extreme care, protecting him like one protects one's own eyes."[130]

It was at sNar Thang, the seat of the bKa' gDams lineage of Atiśa, and under the tutelage of the abbot Grub Pa Shes Rab, that dGe 'Dun Grub undertook his study of the *Abhidharmakośa*. sNar Thang had a great tradition of Abhidharma studies, going back at least to mChims 'Jam Pa'i dByangs, the abbot of sNar Thang for 36 years from 1254.[131] Thus dGe 'Dun Grub's guru was the direct successor of the greatest Tibetan commentator on the *Kośa*, and in light of this connection to sNar Thang and his position in this lineage, it is not surprising that later in his life dGe 'Dun Grub made a commentary on the *Kośa* one of the three truly large commentarial writing

projects of his career.[132]

In the biography of dGe 'Dun Grub by his disciple Ye Shes rTze Mo we learn how he came to study the *Abhidharmakośa* according to the lineage of dMar sTon:

> At that time rJe Shes Rab Seng Ge sent a letter of request to the "father and son" of dMar sTon saying, "This dGe bShes is my brightest student. Please train him until he is a complete expert in the Vinaya and Abhidharma." [dGe 'Dun Grub] then spent two years listening closely to the teachings on the *Vinayasūtra* [of Guṇaprabhā][133] and the *Abhidharmakośa* from [the father] dMar sTon dPal lDan Rin Cen Pa and [his spiritual son] rGya mTso Rin Cen Pa.[134]

It was later, at Nye sNying Monastery that he studied the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* with Tsong Kha Pa's disciple rGyal Tsab Dharma Rin Chen. In his teachings he "constantly emphasized the importance of the great Indian treatises....With the *Abhidharmakośa* he strongly recommended both the extensive and abbreviated treatises of Lama mChims Jam dPa'i dByangs as important tools in assessing the validity or invalidity of specific points of doctrine."[135]

This latter point is a confirmation of what is obvious to the reader of the *Thar Lam gSal Byed*, which is that large portions are lifted with little or no alterations from mChims' great commentary. However, dGe 'Dun Grub only refers by name to the Indian commentators he is drawing upon, specifically Yaśomitra and Pūrṇavardhana, but following in the tradition of Tibetan writers, never refers to another Tibetan commentator by name.

The Collected Works or gSung Bum of dGe 'Dun Grub, the First Dalai Lama, is today extant in an edition of 'Bras sPungs dGa' lDan Pho Brang blocks that were carved in 1894-95.[136] This edition was reproduced and published in 1978 by Patshang Lama Sonam Gyaltsen, Tibetan Bonpo Monastic Centre, and this reproduction has been made available to specialized libraries under a purchase of the Federal Government's PL 480 program which purchased foreign texts for American libraries. In my footnotes I refer to this as the 'Bras sPungs Edition.

This gSung 'Bum contains an edition of the *mDzod Tik Thar Lam gSal Byed* which was originally published under the auspices of the Seventh Dalai Lama, bLo bZang bsKal bZang rGya mTso, in the Wood Pig year, 1755, according to the colophon.[137]

The most widely available edition of the *mDzod Tik Thar Lam gSal Byed* is that published in book form by the dGe Lugs Pa Students Welfare Committee, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, originally in 1973; and a second, corrected edition in 1982. This edition was based on a "gTzang Edition" (gTzang sPar) of the text which is, to my knowledge, unavailable in xylograph in India or the West. I have used the revised 1982 edition, which I refer to as the Sarnath Edition in my notes. Throughout the translation of the text I cite page numbers of the Sarnath Edition first, then the 'Bras sPung Edition.

**The Composition of the *Thar Lam gSal Byed***

In the final verses of the text, before the dedication prayers begin, we learn that the *Thar Lam gSal Byed* falls into the Tibetan literary form of Zin Bris, which means that it was dictated by its author to a scribe. (Sometimes Zin Bris consists of notes taken during a public teaching.) In this case the scribe's identity is not revealed, but he has attached his own dedication prayer:[138]

> The only door to view the ocean of the Buddha's teachings,
> this commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa*,
> has been arranged in exact accordance with the spoken words of the Venerable Holy Omniscient One [dGe 'Dun Grub.]
>
> By the virtues of writing this down, may I, in all future lives,
> at the feet of the matchless Blo bZang Grags Pa
> who has completed all the virtues of the levels and the paths,
> place all beings in the state of Buddhahood.

We have only one tantalizing but cryptic hint as to who the Zin Bris Pa might have been, which appears in a verse of a dedication prayer from the gTzang Edition which does not appear in the 'Bras sPung Edition:[139]

> This well-explained crown ornament of commentaries to that [*Abhidharmakośa*,]
> was spoken to the supreme disciple of Byang Chub dPal
> by the one who is renowned on the earth as dGe 'Dun Grub,
> who possesses what is meant by the supreme epithet, Omniscient One.

Though we may not be able to identify the scribe from this thin evidence, we do occasionally detect his presence by errors he has made. These occur in the occasional appearance of a word which does not make

sense in its context until it is substituted with a homonym, which puts the meaning right. Such errors are highly suggestive of a dictated process of composition. One example is at {v.6} where the term Byis Pa--immature beings, is substituted for the *ADKB*'s Phyi [Rol] Pa--Outsiders or non-Buddhists:

> According to the Sautrāntikas: Outsiders[140] do not eliminate the objects to be abandoned by Seeing, because for the outsider who is separated from attachment [of the Desire Realm, such] attachment still arises.[141]

In the standard curriculum of the dGe Lugs Pa monasteries, Abhidharma is either the fourth or the last of the five subjects that is studied before one takes the dGe bShes examinations. Aside from the manuals of the individual colleges (Yig Cha) of each monastery, the standard textbooks for the study of Abhidharma for the dGe Lugs Pa tradition are the long commentary of mChims 'Jam Pa'i dByangs, the *mChims mDzod Chen Mo mNgon Pa'i rGyan*, commonly known as the "mChims Chen"; and for those who want to study or teach from a condensed version of the *ADKB*, the *mDzod Tik Thar Lam gSal Byed* is the commentary of choice.

## NOTES TO PART I

1. *Dhammapada*, v.279 or Chapter 20, v.7: sabbe dhammā anattā.

2. As Conze puts it, "Among all the tenets of Buddhism none has occasioned more controversy and misunderstanding than the anātman theory, which suggests that nowhere can a 'self' be apprehended."
*Buddhist Thought in India* p.122.

3. Bhāvaviveka's (C.490-570) *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya* and its autocommentary the *Tarkajvālā*, as well as the *Mādhyamakālaṁkāra* by Śāntarakṣita are key sources among extant Indian texts of this tradition. For the Tibetan developments, see Sopa and Hopkins, *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*. For a good summary of the historical and philosophical background of the siddhānta tradition see Jones, *Buddhist Theories of Existents: The Systems of Two Truths*, in M. Kiyota ed., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice*.

4. As for example in the 14 indeterminate (avyākṛta) questions. See Warren (1972) p.120.

5. Bechert (1973) p.10:

> We do not know exactly when the writing down of the sacred texts took place in India, but we know from the Ceylonese chronicles that in Ceylon it took place under King Vaṭṭagāmaṇī Abhaya, 2nd century B.C....If my conclusions from a comparative study of early avadāna texts are correct, the writing down of the texts took place in India about the same time.

6. Jaini presents his research into the nature and sources of Abhidharma in the Introduction to his edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa* (1977), p.22ff.

7. Jaini (1977) p.29.

8. *Pāsādika-sutta*, Dn, sutta 29, Vol.III, p,117.
*Sāmagāma-sutta*, Mn, sutta 104, Vol. II, p.243.
*Saṅgīti-suttanta*, Dn, sutta 33, Vol.III, p.272.

9. *Dn*, III. p.127; PTS, 1889-1911.
Here the Buddha goes on to summarize his teachings by listing the 37 bodhipakkhiyās (Bodhipakṣyāḥ dharmāḥ). Pointing out the universality of this

encompassing teaching, Jaini says,

> Almost all major works on Buddhism, both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, contain this list. This, therefore, was the supreme dharma, acceptable to all. It marks the beginning of the Abhidharma. (Jaini 1977, p.32)

10. Mn, suttas 135-142, Vol. III, pp.202-257.
These are the *Cūlakamma-vibhaṅga*, *Mahākamma-vibhaṅga*, *Salāyatana-vibhaṅga*, *Uddesa-vibhaṅga*, *Araṇa-vibhaṅga*, *Dhātu-vibhaṅga*, *Sacha-vibhaṅga*, and *Dakkhiṇā-vibhaṅga*.

11. Pruden (1986) Introduction, p.xlii.

12. Jaini (1977) p.35.

13. Ibid. p.35.

Pruden (1986) Introduction p.xliii, sees this text as the final transitional phase of a continuing process:

> Thus abhidharmic tendencies are clearly seen in many texts in both Pāli and Chinese, so far advanced in many cases that it is merely a short step to real Abhidhamma literature, as the *Saṁgīti-sutta* has led to the *Saṁgīti-paryāya*. There is in fact very little internal change from abhidhammic āgamas to Abhidhamma works; indeed, greater internal changes have come about in later Abhidharma works at a subsequent period...

14. Nanjio #1276. Jaini (p.37) is mistaken in saying that the text is preserved in Chinese and Tibetan, probably misunderstanding Takakusu (1904-5) who discusses its authorship based on Bu sTon, but never actually says the text is extant in Tibetan.
In fact, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Piṭaka is extant only in Chinese, except for one fragment in the original Sanskrit found at Bamiyan in 1930 (see Pruden p.lv for details), and sections of the *Prajñapti-śāstra* in Tibetan. (See Anacker, 1975, p.60.)
The Tibetan tradition, following Yaśomitra, attributes this text to Mahākauṣṭhila; the Chinese believe that Śāriputra was the author, possibly because he is a primary actor in the text.

15. Translated from Chinese in Takakusu (1904-5), p.101.

16. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III. p.199. Quoted in Jaini (1977) p.36.

17. See Anacker (1975), p. 59. Griffiths (1986), p. 54 says:

> It is arguable, though by no means certain, that the abhidharmic taxonomic enterprise had its origins in the practice of certain types of introspective analytical meditation which were highly valued in the early Buddhist tradition and which essentially require the practitioner to deconstruct the gestalt of everyday experience into its component parts and to learn to label and identify the separate and transient mental events from which Buddhist theory thinks the continuities of everyday experience are constructed. Once the importance of such meditational practices was assumed by the tradition, a corresponding significance was granted to the intellectual enterprise of developing a systematic metaphysic which was adequate to the task of classifying the mental events perceived by introspection.

18. For the most complete summary of this debate see Pruden's Introduction to his translation of Poussin's ADKB; see also Watanabe (1983), p.19ff; and Cox (1983), p.4 fn.#1 for a list of Japanese sources.

19. Cox (1983) points out that the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (p.4a12) presents 24 interpretations of the term Abhidharma.

20. *GDD* p.9.

21. *GDD* p.11, Translation {i.2b}.

22. *ADKB* {i.3}, p.14; *rTza Ba* p.140. Note that Vasubhandu inserts "they say" (Lo; kila) here to indicate that he does not agree with the Vaibhāṣika view that the Buddha taught the Abhidharma.

23. Mejor (1991) p.18.

24. Poussin, Introduction, Vol. I, p.1.

25. Mrs. Rhys Davids has foreshadowed my analysis below, writing in Hastings' *Encyclopedia*:

> The burden, then, of Abhidhamma is not any positive contribution to the philosophy of early Buddhism, but analytic and logical and methodological elaboration of what is already given...The chief methods of that training were: first, the definition and determination of all names or terms entering into the Buddhist scheme of culture; secondly, the enunciation of all doctrines, theoretical and practical, as

formulas, with coordination of all such as were logically interrelated; and finally, practice in reducing all possible heterodox positions to an absurdity....

26.*GDD* p.215, Translation {iv.1}.

27. *GDD* p.224, Translation {iv.13}.

28. *GDD* p.217, {iv.3}.

Another good example is at *GDD* p.257, Translation {iv.73}:

> As for stealing (Ma Byin Par Len Pa; adattādāna): It is, in accordance with one's intention and unmistakenly, to take possession of another's wealth by power, superior authority, stealth or secrecy.

29. Pruden Introduction p.xxxix.

30. Jaini (1977) p.40. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* edited by P.V. Bapat, Poona, 1940.

31. Jaini (1977) p.45.

32. *Majjhima* A.III, p.185. Translated by Jaini (1977) p.40.

33. *GDD* p.57, Translation {i.30}.

34. *GDD* p.260, Translation {iv.81}.

35. *GDD* p.26, Translation {i.7}

36. *GDD* p.110, Translation {ii.34}.

37. Chaudhuri (1983) p.15.

38. Chapter Nine, the "Pudgala-nirdeśa" does not appear in the Tibetan translations. Below, in Chapter Three of this Introduction we discuss the contents and relationship of the eight (Tibetan) chapters.

39. Poussin, Introduction p.2, uses similar language when he points out that "the Abhidharma did not remain a stranger to scientific research and philosophy; it concerns itself with questions whose relationship with the Dharma properly so-called are quite loose."

40. Anacker (1975) p.60 goes too far when he says, "Because almost all entities are in Abhidharma discussed as factors of consciousness (materiality itself being discerned primarily by tactile consciousness), Abhidharma comprises what we would call a psychological theory."

Though in general, Abhidharma is a psychological theory, it does assert the substantial existence of material elements and recognizes them as distinct (in being obstructive) from mental elements. As it also includes cosmology, mythology, physics etc. as discussed below, we would avoid reductionist labels.

41. *GDD* p.249, Translation {iv.58}.

A similar type of commonplace psychological insight appears at *ADKB* {v.59}(*ADKB* p.852; *bShad Pa* p.64) where we learn that sleep and torpor can be caused by, among other things, depression:

> What is the nourishment of torpor and sleep: drowsiness (rMya Ba; tandrī); unhappiness; physical exhaustion (Bya sMyangs; vijṛmbhikā); inability to stop eating (Kha Zas Kyi Drod Mi Zin Pa; bhakte'samatā); and mental depression.

42. *GDD* p.275, Translation {iv.103}.

43. *GDD* p.210, Translation {95-98}.

The discussion of the Bodhisattva path towards the end of Chapter Four {iv.108ff} (*GDD* p.281) also relies in an extended manner on mythological events. Here is a brief excerpt:

> In previous times the Buddha known as the Great Śākyamuni, like this [current] Teacher, arose during a period of strife. His life-span, the size of his following and so forth were also the same as this [current Buddha,] and his teaching lasted 1000 years. The current Teacher was the son of a potter with the name Prabhāsa (sNang Byed). Having offered a cup full of rice, shoes and fragments of cloth (Ras Kyi Kha Tsar), he made the prayer, "Oh Tathāgata, may I have a body just like yours..." and so forth, [praying for the same size of following, life-span, etc.]

44. See Chaudhuri (1983), p.103.

45. There are 14 types of paramāṇu: five atoms of the five sense-faculties, five atoms of the five sense-objects, and four atoms of the four great elements.

Poussin (Pruden fn#95) quotes Saṁghabhadra (Taisho 29, p.799a24-29):

> Among the rūpas "susceptible of resistance" (sapratigha), the most subtle part, which is not susceptible of being divided again, is called paramāṇu; that is to say: the paramāṇu is not susceptible of being divided into many parts by another rūpa, or by the mind. This is what is called the smallest rūpa; as it has no parts, it is called the "smallest..." An agglomeration of these aṇu which is not susceptible of disaggregation is called saṁghātāṇu. In Kāmadhātu, a minimum of eight things (dravya) arise together in order to constitute a saṁghātāṇu which is not sound, nor an organ. What are these things? Four mahābhūtas and four upādāyas, namely, rūpa, rasa, gandha and sprasṣṭavya.

46. *GDD* p.101, Translation {ii.22}.

47. *GDD* p.203, Translation {iii.85}.

48. For example Paul Griffiths (1986).

49. Bareau (1955) p.7-30.

50. See Mejor (1991) p.18 fn#77 for a list of sources that discuss these fragments.

51. This appears as three fragments in the Tohoku Catalogue, To. 4086, 4087, 4088. See Poussin's analysis of the first two parts in *Cosmologie bouddique* (1914-19); the third is briefly summarized in his Introduction p.24. See also Mejor (1991) p.18 fn#76 for other references.

52. To.1548. Anacker (1975) p.60, speculates that it may be Dharmaguptaka, probably based on the observation by Poussin (Introduction p.42) that its four parts, sapraśnaka, apraśnaka, saṁpryukta-saṁgraha correspond to the first four sections of the Abhidharma of the Dharmaguptas-Haimavata.

Poussin concludes that the text is of unknown sectarian affiliation, that "it is a very extensive and old treatise, much in the style of the Pāli *Vibhanga*," and "it appears that what we are encountering here is a terminology alien to the Abhidharma and to the Sarvāstivāda."

Nakamura (1987) p.108, says that though its "sectarian standpoint is not clear, [it] has a close relation to the Vibhajjavādins. [Kimura op. cit.] This treatise seems to have been composed and enlarged by the Vātsiputrīyas after Aśoka. Some connection with the Mahāsaṅghikas is evident because it sets forth the theory that the mind (citta) is originally pure."

53. Junjiro Takakusu, "The Abhidharma Literature, Pali and Chinese," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (January 1905), p.160-162.

Poussin in his Introduction p.23, is not convinced of this. He says that, "The relation between the Pāli and the Sanskrit Abhidharma treatises is close." But he refers mainly to the fact that they discuss some of the same issues, which is no surprise since such ideas as the Pudgalavāda were central philosophical problems in all corners of Indian Buddhism. He also notes some "similarity of arguments and "striking coincidences of phraseology."

Nonetheless, the main point is that there is no parallelism or common ancestors between the seven texts of the two traditions.

54. This list, with the names as quoted in the Tibetan, is from Yaśomitra, *SAKV* p.15. Purṇavardhana maintains that *Saṅgītiparyāya* was composed by Śāriputra.

For summaries of the contents of these works see Takakusu (1905); very brief descriptions are also found at Anacker (1975) p.60; Pruden (1986) p.xlvii. See also Watanabe (1983) p. 47; Banerjee (1957) p.51.

55. This tradition is first located in a note at the end of vol. xxiii (book vi) of the Chinese translation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, and was repeated by Yaśomitra. See Takakusu (1905) p.78; *Index* p.XXIX.

Passages of the Sanskrit are preserved In the *ADKB* and *SAKV*.

56. *Index* p.XXIX; Cox p.15.

57. See Takakusu (1905) p.112; *Index* p.XXIX; Cox (1983) p.15.

58. Takakusu (1905) p.112 and p77 fn#1, points out that this text bears no relationship to a Tibetan text titled *Dharmaskandha* cited at To.245: *'Pags Pa Chos Kyi Pung Po Zhes Bya Ba Theg Pa Chen Po'i mDo*.

59. See *Index* p.XXIX.

60. Cox (1983) p.16.

61. Pruden (1988) Introduction p.l:

> The *Prakaraṇa-pāda*...is noteworthy in three respects: a) in form it is the first purely śāstra work of this literature; b) in doctrine it is the first purely Sarvāstivādin sectarian work; and c) it is the first work to divide the dharmas into five major divisions.

62. For a description of the process of translation used by Hsuan-tsang and the roles of his assistant editors see Cox (1983) p.26.

63. See *Index* p.XII, or *CCB* Appendix II, for charts of the traditional systematic layout of the 75 dharmas.

64. Taisho 1545.

65. Pruden (1988) Introduction p.lii points out that,

> in one place, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* devotes some 76.5 pages to commenting on one passage in the *Jñānaprasthāna* of only 100 characters. The work also raises new issues, issues not raised previously in the *Jñānaprasthāna*. Much new doctrine is introduced, and in addition, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* quotes differing opinions on topics from outside orthodox Sarvāstivādin ranks. Also many non-Buddhist theories are quoted at length....in the main, it follows the *Jñānaprasthāna's* internal organization.

66. Modern research shows that at least some parts of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* are of a later date than Kaniṣka. See Zurcher (1968), "The Yueh-chih and Kaniṣka in the Chinese sources", pp.374-387; Lamotte (1970), p.xxi.
See Bareau (1955) for a discussion of the council and composition of the text, and a fuller list of masters mentioned in the text. Poussin Introduction p.28ff gives thumbnail summaries of the views of these masters. See Cox (1983) (p.17, fn#25) for discussion of the difficulty of historically identifying these individuals.

67. See Bareau (1955), p.133; and Cox (1983) p.16 fn#24 for other opinions.

68. To shed a little light on this cloudy picture see Bareau (1955) p.155-166; Dutt (1970) p.53, 186; and Cox (1983) p.17 and fn#28.

69. These texts include:
1. *Abhidharmāmṛta-rasa-śāstra*, Taisho 28 #1553, attributed to Ghoṣaka.
2. *Abhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra*, Taisho 28 #1550, attributed to Dharmaśrī.
3. *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra*, Taisho 28 #1552, attributed to

Dharmatrāta. (It has been suggested that the proper Sanskrit translation of the Chinese title should be *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra*; see Ryose, 1987, p.28.)
4. *Abhidharmāvatara-śāstra*, Taisho 28 #1554, attributed to Skandhila.
Some scholars maintain that some of these texts actually preceeded the *Mahāvibhāṣā*; see Cox (1983) p.19, fn#30.

70. Cox (1983) p.20.
On the similarity of structure between the *ADKB* and the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* and its two commentaries, and the likelihood that Vasubandhu relied on these, see *Index* p.XXX, which is based on Taiken Kimura, *Abidatsumaron no Kenkyū*, (Tokyo: Meiji Shoin, 1937). See also Griffiths (1983) p.194 and (1986) p.44, p.164 n.4; De Jong (1980) p.155.

71. His *Nyāyānusāra* is an attempt to reestablish the validity of the Vaibhāṣika system in the light of Vasubandhu's powerful arguments. His *Abhidharma-piṭaka-prakaraṇa-śāsana-śāstra* (Taisho 29 #2154) is merely a summary of the parts of the *ADKB* that he agreed with.

72. Edited and with a thorough introduction by Jaini (1977). See p.133 for Jaini's hypothesis that the author of the *Dīpa* is Vimalamitra, mentioned by Hsuan-tsang in his *Travels*.

73. The catalogue is edited by M. Lalou (1953) as, *Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-sroṅ-lde-bcan*.
See Frauwallner (1961) p.146 for the date.
See Mejor (1991) p.20-21, fn#93-94 for discussion of the name "lDan dKar", and other sources on the probable date of the catalogue.

74. See colophon, Peking Edition Ngu 109a7.

75. Bu-ston, tr. Obermiller (1986) p.214.

76. See Mejor (1991) p.22; Snellgrove and Richardson (1980) p.113.

77. *The Blue Annals* by gZhon Nu dPal, tr. Roerich (1988), p.346.
Here he is referring specifically to the lineage of transmission of the text. He does however provide a lineage of the Abhidharma in general (p.346), as does Kong sPrul bLa Ma, as we see below.

78. Tucci (1949) p.205.

79. Ferrari, *mKhyen brTze's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet*, p.67; quoted in Mejor (1991) p.22 fn#102.

80. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya-ṭīkā-tattvārtha-nāma* (To.4421), is found in the Miscellaneous (sNa Tsogs) section of the bsTan 'Gyur.

For a full discussion of this colophon see Mejor (1991) p.94. Mejor says of the text, "Evidently, the *Tattvārtha* in its present form is a compilation prepared by the Tibetan translator....Moreover, it is by no means an easy task to determine what precisely Sthiramati wrote himself."

81. *Encyclopedia Tibetica*, ed. New Delhi 1969-1975, 137 vols. Also see Ferrari (1958) p.156 fn#571.

82. Ruegg (1966) p.30 fn#2.

83. *bsTan 'Gyur Gyi dKar Chag Yid bZhin Nor Bu dBang Gi rGyal Po'i Phreng Ba*, ed. Lokesh Chandra: *Collected Works of Bu sTon*, Part 26, fol.401-644

84. Ibid. vols. Gu-Ngu, fol. 608.2.

85. See Cox (1983) p.24 and Nakamura (1987) p.112, fn#88 for various theories on reconstructing the Sanskrit title of this text. Although the Tohoku Catalogue cites these Nanjio and Taisho numbers, The Tibetan is a different text than Nanjio 1266 and Taisho 1563 according to Cox and Alex Wayman (p.25, fn#50) and Nakamura (p.112, fn#88).

86. Taisho 1554, Nanjio 1291. This text was translated by Hsuan-tsang in 658 A.D. (Cox p.19) and is attributed in the Chinese tradition to Skandhila. It falls into the category of condensed manuals written after the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. See Cox (1983) p.19, fn#30; and Nakamura (1987) p.112, fn#94.

87. *Collected Works of Longdol Lama*, ed. Lokesh Chandra. To.6532-6561. See also Lokesh Chandra, *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature (MHTL)*, Part 3, p.9.

Cf. *University of Washington--Tibetan Catalogue* by E. Gene Smith (p.26), which includes an outline of kLong rDol bLa Ma's work.

88. To.6544. See also E. Gene Smith (1969) p.31.

89. kLong rDol bLa Ma, fol. 595.1.

90. This is Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha-ṭīkā*, To.4421. In the colophon it says that this commentary was originally called in Tibet, "gNam lCags Thog Zer"

(Karakāśani), which is the title under which Bu sTon cites it (Obermiller p.148). Bu sTon also says that Sthiramati was a personal disciple of Vasubandhu and surpassed his master in the field of the Abhidharma (Obermiller p.147).

For a full discussion of this text see Mejor (1991) p.90ff.

91. kLong rDol bLa Ma, fol. 595.4

92. According to E. Gene Smith (1969) p.17, there were two important figures of the mChims clan connected with sNar Thang Monastery:

mChims Nam mKha'Grags, abbot of sNar Thang in 1251, d.1289

mChims bLo bZang Grags Pa, abbot of sNar Thang in 1334, d.1374.

Smith suggests that mChims 'Jam Pa'i dByangs should be equated with mChims Nam mKha' Grags.

See also To.6854; and Golzio, *Regents*, p.103 where it is said mChims lived 1250-1288 A.D.

93. This is the text translated in Part II of this work. Note that the citation in the Tohoku Catalogue No. 5525 is erroneous in its description of this text as, "compiled by bLo bZang bsKal bZang rGya mTso based on the view and teaching of dGe 'Dun Grub Pa." This error was also picked up and repeated by Mejor (1991) p.25.

The error results from a misreading of the colophon found at the end (p.227a1) of the 'Bras sPungs Edition:

> Ces Pa 'Di Ni Shing Phag Lo Dam Pa'i Chos mNgon Pa mDzod Kyi rNam bShad Thar Lam gSal Bar Byed Pa'i bsTan bCos Chen Po Chos sByin rGya Cher sPel Ba'i Slad Par Du bsPrun Pa'i sMun Tsig Tu Sha' Kya'i dGe sLong bLo bZang bsKal bZang rGya mTsos sByar Ba'o //

The Tohoku editors have misread "sByar Ba" to mean that bLo bZang bsKal bZang rGya mTso, Dalai Lama VII (1708-1757), "compiled" the text. In fact, it only means that he "appended" the dedication prayer for the printing of the text (bsPrun Pa'i sMun Tsig), which he probably sponsored.

94. To.6852.

95. Lived 1478-1554. Abbot of dGa' lDan 1529-1536. See Mejor (1991) p.25 fn#115; Golzio, *Regents* p.105.

96. Abbot of dGa' lDan 1626-1637; Golzio, *Regents*, p.108.

97. To.5650. Lived 1617-1682.

98. Lived 1648-1721, see Lokesh Chandra, *The Life and Works of 'Jam dByangs bZhad Pa*, Central Asiatic Journal, VII:4, 1962, pp.264-269; Lokesh Chandra, *MHTL* I, p.45 No.28. See also, anything written by Jeffrey Hopkins.

99. This section begins at *Shes Bya*, vol.1, p.445. The outline for this section is on p.442.

100. It is not clear what text Kong sPrul is referring to here. We have cited above Sthiramati's *Tattvvārtha* (To.4421), which is a commentary on the *ADKB*.

101. *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya* To.4053; *Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā*, To.4054.

rGyal Po'is Sras is the common Tibetan nickname for Yaśomitra, but the author of these Yogācāra commentaries is not to be confused with Yaśomitra. See Mejor (1991) p.42.

102. To.4091.

103. To.4095.

104. To.4093, 4096.

105. To.4092.

106. In his introductory remarks Yaśomitra says that he has relied on the commentaries of Guṇamati and his disciple Vasumitra. He then cites these masters in at least five places. Tāranātha (*History of Buddhism in India* p.227) tells us that there was a Vasumitra, a master of Abhidharma, who wrote a commentary on the *ADK*. For a discussion of the difficulties in identifying Vasumitra, and the mention of Vasumitra by Yaśomitra, see Mejor (1991) p.49ff.

107. *Shes Bya* p.446.

108. To.4086.

109. To.4087, gives translators as Jinamitra, Prajñavarma, Ye Shes sDe.

110. To.4088, gives translators as Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Prajñāvarma, Ye Shes sDe.

111. To.4092, gives translators as Viśuddhasiṁha and dPal brTzegs.

112. 'Gos Lotzāba gZhon Nu dPal (1392-1481), the bka' brGyud Pa translator who wrote the *Blue Annals (Deb Ther sNgon Po)* in 1476.

113. Quoted in *Shes Bya* p.446.

114. *Shes Bya* p.446:
Bar sKabs Nas mDzod Kyi 'Chad Nyan Dar Zhing Kun bDus Kyi 'Chad Nyan bShol Bas Deng Sang rGyun Mi bZhugs So //

115. *Shes Bya* p.447:
...mNgon Pa 'Og Ma'i bsTan Pa gZhi bZhengs Su bTang /

116. *Shes Bya* p.447:
Sa Paṇ Gyis mNal Lam Du dByig gNyen Las Zla gCig Bar Du gSan Pa'i Thugs Myams Byung...

117. "A Short Biography of Je Tzong-k'a-pa", taught by Geshe Ngawang Dhargey at the Tibetan Library in Dharamsala, translated by Khamlung Tulku and Sharpa Tulku; published in *A Short Biography and Letter of Je Tzong-k'a-pa*, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1975. An edited version of this biography is also available in Thurman (1982). The major source for this commentary was the short biography by mKhas Grub rJe (1385-1438) which usually appears at the beginning of editions of Tsong Kha Pa's gSung 'Bum.

118. Thurman (1982) p.8.

119. A great Kalachakra scholar. See *Blue Annals* p.787.

120. "A Short Biography" (1975) p.12.

121. *Blue Annals* p.83: Tsong Kha Pa studied with him at the monastery of sKyor Mo Lung.

122. "A Short Biography" (1975) p.12.

123. "A Short Biography" (1975) p.13.

124. Snellgrove and Richardson (1980) p.182.

125. To.5542/23, *Shar Gangs Ri Ma*, translated by Glenn Mullin in *Selected Works of the Dalai Lama I* (1985), p.119.

126. Mullin (1985) p.25.

127. dGe 'Dun Grub's three Vinaya works are:
1. To.5522: *'Dul Ba gLeng 'Bum*, a collection of nidāna and avadāna tales from the Vinaya.
2. To.5523: His commentary to Guṇaprabha's *Vinaya-sūtra* (To.4117).
3. To.5524: A commentary on the *Pratimokṣa-sūtra* (To.2).

128. To.5532; translated in Mullin (1985) p.203.

129. Mullin (1985) p.207.

130. Mullin (1985) p.205.

131. According to *Blue Annals* p.282-283. Golzio (1985) p.103 lists him as abbot from 1250-1288.

132. The other two I refer to here are To.5523, his commentary on the *Vinaya-sūtra*, and To.5528, his commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

133. To.4117.

134. Ye Shes rTze Mo, *rNam Thar* p.13b1.

135. Mullin (1985) p.217.

136. A xylograph (and not very legible) copy of this edition is held at the Beineke Rare Book and Manuscript Library of Yale University, in the "Bernard Collection." The *Thar Lam gSal Byed* Call No. is: Bernard 14, Vol. 3.

137. As mentioned earlier, this colophon was misunderstood by the Tohoku Catalogue editors (To.5525) to imply that the text was "compiled by Blo bZang bsKal bZang rGya mTso based on the view and teaching of dGe 'Dun Grub." In fact, he merely attached (sByar) a dedication prayer on the occasion of the printing.

138. *GDD* p.408; 226a6:

> gSung Rab rGya mTzo lTa Ba'i sGo gCig Po /
> Chos mNgon mDzod Kyi rNam Par bShad Pa 'Di /
> rJe bTzun Dam Pa Thams Cad mKhyen Pa yis /
> Ji lTar gSungs Pa'i gSung Ngag Ji bZhin bKod //

'Di Bris dGe Bas Tse Rabs Kun Tu bDag /
mTsungs Med Blo bZang Grags Pa'i Zhabs Drung Du /
Sa Dang Lam Gyi Yon Tan mThar Son Te /
'Gro Kun Sangs rGyas Sa La 'God Par Shog //

139. Sarnath Edition p.408:

De Yi 'Grel Pa'i gTzug rGyan Legs bShad 'Di /
Thams Cad mKhyen Pa'i mTsan mChog Don lDan Pa /
dGe 'Dun Grub Ces Sa sTeng Grags Pa Des /
Byang Chub dPal Gyi sLob Ma mChog La bShad //

140. *GDD* (p.297) reads Byis Pa = immature beings, i.e. non-Āryans. But *ADKB* p. 769; *bShad Pa* p.7 has bāhyaka (Phyi Rol Pa) = outsiders, i.e. those who do not follow the uncontaminated path of the Buddhists.

141. *GDD* p.297; 165a5.

Another example occurs in dGe 'Dun Grub's commentary to {i.3} (Translation, p.14):

> If one asks: Why are they called Vaibhāṣikas? Because they examine (dPyod Pa) only the commentary *Vibhāṣā*, or because they learn the *Vibhāṣā*, they are called Vaibhāṣika.

In this paragraph the sPyod Pa (caranti)--"they engage in the *Vibhāṣā*" found at *SAKV* p.15; *'Grel bShad* 11a7, has been replaced by the homonym dPyod Pa--"they examine" at *GDD* p.14: "Bye Brag Tu bShad Pa Tzam Zhig dPyod Pa..." An easy aural mistake to make since both verbs make sense in the context. That this took place during dGe 'Dun Grub's composition of the text is suggested by the fact that mChims p.11a7 retains Yaśomitra's sPyod Pa (caranti).

# PART II

# THE ELEMENTS OF AFFLICTION: THE PERSON AND THE PROCESS OF BECOMING IN THE ABHIDHARMAKOŚA

# CHAPTER ONE
# AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXT

## The relationship of the eight chapters

dGe 'Dun Grub begins his presentation of saṁskṛta phenomena, the main subject of the *Abhidharmakośa*, by laying out the eight chapters of the text in terms of the subject matter covered in each chapter, and the relationship of each chapter to those preceding and following it.

This is a commentarial tradition that illustrates how the soteriological purposes of the *Abhidharmakośa* are embedded in the very structure of the text, in the very order in which the complex web of Abhidharma doctrines are presented. In the Tibetan tradition this particular subject of the "laying out the eight chapters" is seen as a key to grasping the import and religious purpose of the *Kośa*.

dGe 'Dun Grub cites Pūrṇavardhana as saying that Vasubandhu created eight chapters in order to explain in detail his declaration at {i.4} that, "Phenomena are contaminated and uncontaminated."[1]

The first two chapters, the chapters on the dhātus and the faculties, were taught in order to explain contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena in general, and to lay out what they are.

The purpose of the next three chapters is to give a more detailed explanation of contaminated phenomena.

The third chapter, the Presentation of the World, explains <u>who</u> is

afflicted (Nyon Mongs Can; kliṣṭa) by describing the animate world (Sems Can Gyi 'Jig rTen; sattva-loka) of the three realms and the five types of rebirth ('Gro Ba; gati). It explains where they are afflicted by describing the inanimate vessel world (sNod Kyi 'Jig rTen; bhājana-loka) in which these beings live out their lives. And it explains how they are afflicted by describing the four birth-sources (sKye gNas; yoni) and, most importantly, by explaining the process of the twelve limbs of Dependent Origination.

The fourth chapter--the Presentation of Karma, and the fifth chapter--the Presentation of the Polluting Tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya), proceed with the detailed explanation of contaminated phenomena by explaining what it is that actually afflicts the animate world of sentient beings: contaminated karma together with the polluting tendencies which are the fundamental afflictions which propel that karma.

The last three chapters then explain uncontaminated phenomena in detail:

The sixth chapter, the Presentation of the Paths and Individuals, explains the types of individuals who are purified, the places where they are purified and the stages of realization, that is, the process by means of which they are purified.

The seventh chapter, the Presentation of Wisdom, presents that wisdom which is the element that does the purifying.

The eighth chapter, the Presentation of the Absorptions (sNyoms 'Jug; samāpatti), is presented last in order to explain the meditative equipoise which acts as the support of wisdom.

dGe 'Dun Grub then lays out the relationship of these eight chapters to each other. The first chapter, he says, is taught to explain the primary subject of the Abhidharma: contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena.

The second chapter then follows in order to elaborate on the faculties (dBang Po; indriya) which were merely mentioned in the first chapter; and in order to explain the process of arisal of the saṁskṛta phenomena.

The third chapter is taught in order to give an extensive description of the three realms, which were mentioned but not elaborated in the previous chapters.

The question of what causes this world of the three realms is addressed in Chapter Four, which also aims to refute the notion that the world was created by a unitary creator God, and to demonstrate that what has been described in the previous chapters actually arises due to karma.

The fact that karma is motivated by the polluting tendencies is shown in Chapter Five.

Chapter Six then demonstrates how these polluting tendencies, which motivate karma and afflict the beings of the world, are to be removed by the path.

Chapter Seven gives a detailed explanation of the "knowledges" (Shes Pa; jñāna) which were mentioned but not fully discussed in the previous chapter.

And Chapter Eight elaborates on the statement of the previous chapter that the Buddha has both common and uncommon qualities, by providing an extensive explanation of the qualities of the Buddha that may be common to other practitioners, namely the absorptions.

**The elements of affliction in five chapters**

The success of Vasubandhu's organizational structure is attested by the *Kośa's* universal status as the foremost Buddhist encyclopedia in all except Theravādin Buddhist countries. Although the broad structural outlines may have been influenced by previous Vaibhāṣika commentaries, such as Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmahṛdaya*,[2] the devil is in the details. The challenge of presenting all the elements of existence and classifying them in a coherent pedagogical model certainly reached its climax with the *Abhidharmakośa*; after its appearance, even the opponents of its Sautrāntika perspective paid it the highest form of flattery by imitating its structure and lifting verbatim whole passages of its language.[3]

A further indication of the terrible complexity of the work is the fact that in almost a century of western scholarship on the *ADKB* very few

scholars have ventured to summarize at any length its contents. Reams of paper have poured forth in monographs and dissertation introductions over the date of Vasubandhu and whether we should speak of him in the singular or dual.[4]

There have also been many articles, monographs and book chapters focusing on particular issues raised in the *Kośa*, and especially on the doctrinal disputes surrounding key tenets of Sarvāstivāda such as prāpti, non-revealing form (rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa'i gZugs; avijñapti-rūpa), the three times, and the formative forces not associated with mind (Sems Dang lDan Pa Ma Yin Pa'i 'Du Byed; citta-viprayukta-saṁskāra).

But today, the standard summary of the big picture, of the world-view depicted in the *ADKB*, remains Stcherbatsky's *Central Conception of Buddhism*, first published in 1922. Though brilliant in its concision and analysis, at 112 pages it was necessarily limited in its scope. Another fascinating attempt at dealing with the *Kośa* as world-view was *Early Buddhist Philosophy* by Alfonso Verdu (1985). Provocative in the creative interpretation of Abhidharma teachings, this work, like Stcherbatsky's, focuses on a few of the most important concepts in the system and does not attempt to present a summary or broad overview. The only full attempt at this undertaking has been Sukomal Chaudhuri's *Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa* (1983). This book is a useful reference, concisely

summarizing the contents of each chapter, subject by subject. The converse of the previous two books, though comprehensive in summary, it provides little or no analysis in attempting to tie together and make sense of the entire system.

Obviously, any overview of the *ADKB* must involve a process of selection. One is attempting to summarize the meaning, not expand upon it. dGe 'Dun Grub's *Ellucidating the Path to Liberation* is an excellent starting point for such an undertaking because his commentary is itself an attempt to present the teachings of the *Kośa* at a concise and wieldy length.

Here, in Part II of this Introduction, we will present a survey of the first five chapters of the *Kośa*, which present the details of contaminated phenomena or "the elements of affliction," based on the summary commentary of dGe 'Dun Grub.

In an effort to create a more vivid image of the world-view and the concept of the person that the *Kośa* is promulgating, we have turned the order of the chapters upside down. Chapter Five on the polluting tendencies and Chapter Four on karma are explored in the greatest detail, as these two, working together, are the generative engine and fuel that create saṁsāra and impel sentient beings through suffering cyclic existence. In Chapter Three, we focus on the 12 links of dependent origination which describes the causal process that perpetuates this experience. Having seen how beings are driven

to take their various forms of rebirth, we combine the presentation of Chapters One and Two into a presentation of the various dharmas that make up the continuum of a person. Here we focus on the skhandas, dhātus, faculties, mental factors, and formative forces not-associated with mind.

One naturally embarks on a process of "rewriting" Vasubandhu, or even the First Dalai Lama, with a good dose of humility. The challenge of summarizing such a vast and complex system is daunting, but in light of the absence of such a useable summary, the effort seems worthwhile. The readers' indulgence is requested in that this is a first attempt at a large project, and is bound to have its ommissions and short-comings. It is the author's hope, however, that after reading this summary one will come away, perhaps not knowing everything that is in the text, but with an understanding of its view of the world and the way it works, and a sense of how to read the *Abhidharmakośa*, how it is organized, and how it thinks.

Although any broad-based exposition of the *Abhidharmakośa* must sooner or later, somewhere or other, get bogged down in the interlocking web of details, in the end the purpose of making the effort for the modern student is not really different than that outlined by Ācārya Yaśomitra 1500 years ago:

> The purpose of teaching Abhidharma is in order to become expert in the aggregates and so forth. By this expertise two beneficial qualities will be obtained: by one's own attentiveness single-pointed concentration and so forth will develop; and in dialogues with others

one becomes fearless in giving answers to all questions.[5]

## The Basic Concepts of the *Abhidharmakośa*

### The concept of dharma

The Abhidharma is the analysis of dharmas, the fundamental elements of existence. A dharma is defined as "that which can bear its own definitive characteristic."[6] Dharmas are substantially existent (rDzas Su Yod Pa; dravyasat) in that they exist without depending on anything else; they can not be analyzed further into parts out of which they are constructed.[7]

The particular definitive characteristic of each dharma is its self-nature (svabhāva), which can be identified with its unique function, and it is this self-nature which distinguishes one dharma from another.[8]

In their manifest form, arising in the aspect of performing their functions, dharmas are momentary: by the force of the four characteristics of arising, duration, aging and impermanence, a dharma arises and instantaneously passes away; however by the process of homogenous cause, in its wake it produces a similar subsequent dharma.

However, in their self-nature, in their own unique, essential natures, they exist at all times (sarva-asti), the past, present and future, at least in potentiality.[9] In the future they exist as potential; when the causes and conditions come together, they arise in the present; and in the past they still perform functions, because how else could past karma produce results in the

present or future? We are left then with a picture vividly described by Stcherbatsky:

> The elements of existence are momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source. Just as they are disconnected, so to say in breadth, not being linked together by any pervading substance, just so are they disconnected in depth or in duration, since they last only one single moment (kṣaṇa). They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be followed the next moment by another momentary existence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (dharma), two moments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point in time-space.[10]

Out of the ever-fluctuating concatenation of groups of these momentary dharmas, reality is shaped and experienced by means of the physical faculties and mental states of the individual being, which are themselves dharmas or combinations of dharmas. Here Verdu illustrates the interlocking ontological and soteriological thrust of this analysis:

> The Ego and its world of experience exhibit only an appearance of permanence and fixity, and consists of nothing but the serial stream of subjective-objective events....An illusion of continuing, self-standing reality takes place on the basis of discrete, momentary aggregations of a diversity of color-, shape-, and sound-manifolds as these are coordinated within the frames of instantaneously appearing single pictures. Thus, individual existence, together with the whole realm of its world-object, is only the illusory outcome of momentary "quantum-like" aggregates of dharma-elements simultaneously cooperating together on the basis of causative principles, and being successively projected from the potential future into the extinguished past through that indivisible and punctiform door of the present. We are nothing but temporal, down-the-line streams of such manifolds of momentary projections of "dharmic" factors: no permanent Ego underlies such a stream as the substantial support of experience.[11]

**Asaṁskṛta dharmas**

There are however, three dharmas that do not share in this nature of arising and passing away, because they are unproduced, unchanging and permanent. They are called the asaṁskṛta dharmas and they are: space; analytical cessations; non-analytical cessations.

Space is a permanent phenomenon that is non-obstructive. Its nature is to not obstruct the presence of a physical object.[12]

An analytical cessation is a separation from contaminated phenomena (or contaminated states) obtained by means of the wisdom that analyzes the Four Truths.[13] The process of the Path is a process of eliminating one's contaminated dharmas by means of analytical cessations, the supreme of which is Nirvāṇa.

Non-analytical cessations are all other cessations which permanently block the arising of their objects; however these cessations occur due to an insufficiency of conditions and are not obtained by the power of analytical wisdom. So, for example, the non-arising of a jar that has fallen on the ground and smashed, is a non-analytical cessation.

**Contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas**

All phenomena are subsumed in two categories: they are either contaminated (Zag bCas; sāsrava) or uncontaminated (Zag Med; anāsrava).

Only four types of phenomena are uncontaminated: the three

asaṁskṛta dharmas, and those included in the Truth of the Path.

All other saṁskṛta phenomena are contaminated. Contamination means that they nourish or increase contaminated or afflicted or deluded states of mind--states of mind which lead to suffering and do not lead to liberation--either by being objects, or by being concomitant with other states of mind.

For an ordinary individual, one who has not attained the level of an Āryan by seeing the Truths on the Path of Seeing and thereby transforming contaminated states into uncontaminated states, a mental factor such as memory is contaminated because it nourishes contamination by means of concomitants: as a man remembers a beautiful woman contamination increases as concomitant mental factors such as attachment arise together with the memory.

But even the eye faculty of an Arhat is contaminated, because it is capable of nourshing the afflictions of someone else who takes it as an object, for example, someone who sees the Arhat's eye and feels jealousy and attachment toward it.

The soteriological intent of dividing all phenomena into these two categories is implicit. As dGe 'Dun Grub says:

> By teaching the afflicted (Kun Nas Nyon Mongs; saṁkleśa) and purified phenomena (rNam Byang; vyavadānika), he wished [beings] to attain the ultimate good (Nges Legs; niḥśreyas) by virtue of taking up or abandoning these.[14]

**Virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral minds**

Closely allied with the notion of contamination but not synonymous with it is the distinction of virtuous (dGe Ba; kuśala) and non-virtuous (Mi dGe Ba; akuśala) action. As we shall see in the chapter on karma, virtue is what leads to happiness by being consistent with the path of liberation, and non-virtue is what leads to suffering.

Only intentional acts of mind, and physical actions that flow from those mental intentions, are morally qualifiable--they are the mental intentions or karma which will yield a pleasant or unpleasant result. Virtuous minds are concomitant with virtuous mental factors, non-virtuous minds are concomitant with afflicted mental factors.

There are also two types of neutral minds. Obscuring neutral minds are accompanied by the mental factors in the category of the "six great grounds of great afflictions",[15] and so, although they are neutral and will not yield karmic fruition, they still obscure or impede progress on the path. The non-obscuring neutral mind does not have this obscuring or impeding effect, because it is not concomitant with the afflicted mental factors.

However, it must be born in mind, that until one attains the state of an Āryan and has begun to transform ones dharmas into the Truth of the Path, all of the dharmas in one's continuum, including virtuous mental factors, are contaminated. We ordinary individuals in the Desire Realm are capable of

contaminated virtue, but uncontaminated virtue is only found in the mental continuum of an Āryan.

# CHAPTER TWO

# POLLUTING TENDENCIES: THE ROOT OF EXISTENCE

## Entering the cycle at the root of existence

The first problem one faces in trying to simplify the vast web of interlocking details in the Abhidharma, is where to start. The famous opening lines of the fourth chapter of the *ADKB* are suggestive, as they point to karma as the force that creates the world:

> Then who made this tremendously variegated animate and inanimate world that has been described? It was not made by anyone with premeditation. How then? THE MANIFOLD WORLD ARISES FROM KARMA of sentient beings.[16]

We are not looking for a first cause here, Buddhism rejects such a notion, but rather a place to break into the cycle of creation which makes sense as a starting point. The world arises from karma, but does karma arise from anything else?

Vasubandhu asks the same question at the beginning of Chapter Five and here, as summarized by dGe 'Dun Grub, we find "the root of existence":

> As it says {iv.1}, "The manifold world arises from karma..." If one asks: Does this manifold animate and inanimate world arise exclusively from karma?
>
> It does not. Because THE ROOT OF EXISTENCE (Srid Pa; bhava) IS THE POLLUTING TENDENCIES (Phra rGyas; anuśaya). It is due to karma that cyclic existence arises, and the afflictions that act as the source of that [karma] must precede it; because karma alone, without afflictions, will not yield fruit.[17]

Here then is as good a place as any to understand how this Buddhist world comes to be constructed and how the individual perpetuates his or her migration from one suffering existence to another.

**The nature of the polluting tendencies**

Chapter Five of the *ADKB* opens with an extended debate over the nature of the polluting tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya), which revolves around their relationship to the afflictions (Nyon Mongs Pa; kleśa).[18] For the Vaibhāṣikas they are one and the same--the polluting tendencies are mental forces that perform the functions of the afflictions.

Vasubandhu takes an explicit stand for the Sautrāntika view that the polluting tendencies are afflictions that are in a dormant or latent (Nyal Ba; prasupta) state: In their latent form the afflictions are called polluting tendencies. They are latent in that they are not manifest; they are in a state of being a seed. That is, they have the capacity to generate affliction, but they are not actively doing it now.

When they are manifest, in their fully awakened or activated state, they become fully entangling (Kun Nas dGris Pa; paryavasthāna).

As is the case throughout this essay, on this point as on many others, the Sautrāntika view may be more appealing to the modern mind, and may have had a more lasting impact on the subsequent development of Buddhist

thought. But the *ADKB* is an exposition of the Vaibhāṣika view of things--with intermittent Sautrantika critiques--and we will be following the same rules here. So for our purposes, afflictions and polluting tendencies will be interchangeable terms.

**The operation of afflictions**

The *ADKB* {v.1} tells us that when an affliction swings into action it performs ten operations: it makes its roots firm--so it is not easily uprooted; it establishes itself as a continuum or a continuing series; it establishes its field--making its host, the mind of the being in which it lodges, suitable to be contaminated; it sets in motion its naturally flowing results (rGyu mThun Pa; niḥṣyanda)--which are the subsidiary afflictions {v.46}; it causes the action that establishes one in cyclic existence; it holds onto its assemblage--that is it establishes an ongoing cause of an afflicted and mistaken awareness; it causes one to be deluded with respect to the object of consciousness; it leads the continuum of the consciousness towards its object or towards rebirth; it steers away from the side of virtue; it acts as a bond ('Ching Ba; bandhana) {v.45} by preventing one from transcending one's realm of existence.

With such extensive activity on the side of afflicting the mind, it is easy to see why the polluting tendencies are called "the roots of existence."

**The root polluting tendencies**

There are six root polluting tendencies: attachment ('Dod Chags; rāga); anger (Khong Khro; pratigha), pride (Nga rGyal; māna), ignorance (Ma Rig Pa; avidyā), view (lTa Ba; dṛṣṭi) and doubt (The Tsom; vicikitsā).

The polluting tendency of attachment can be divided in two: There is attachment to desire which arises with respect to Desire Realm objects such as form, smell and taste. And then there is attachment to existence, which is the form of attachment that is found in the two upper realms, where it manifests primarily as attachment to meditative equipoise (mNyam gZhag; samāhita). On these two upper levels beings have their minds directed inwards; they are absorbed in their own meditative states and in themselves. Because many beings mistake these blissful states for liberation, the Buddha labeled this form of attachment "attachment to existence," in order to warn beings that these states remain within suffering cyclic existence.[19]

If these "roots of existence" themselves have a root it is attachment. Because all the others focus on and are increased or nourished by their objects, due to attachment {v.1}.

The six root polluting tendencies become ten when the polluting tendency of view is subdivided into five types of erroneous views: view of the transitory collection ('Jig Tsogs La lTa Ba; satkāya-dṛṣṭi); wrong view (Log Par lTa Ba; mithyā-dṛṣṭi); the view holding to the extremes (mThar 'Dzin

Pa'i lTa Ba; antagrāha-dṛṣṭi); esteeming [unworthy] views (lTa Ba mChog 'Dzin; dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa); and esteeming [mistaken] morality and asceticism (Tsul Khrims Dang brTul Zhugs mChog Tu 'Dzin Pa'i lTa Ba; śīla-vrata-parāmarśa).

The view of the transitory collection is the view that grasps at the aggregates--the collections of dharmas which come together to make up a functioning individual--as I or mine. The point is made {v.7} that since we impute a permanent, partless and independent existence to virtually every phenomenon that we perceive with an afflicted mind, everything we perceive is a kind of view of a transitory collection. But that title is given specifically to this action of grasping at our own aggregates and experiencing them as a fixed "I" and its objects as "mine", in order to emphasize this as a perverted view of the way things truly are, and to point it out as fundamental to the dilemma of our existence. As dGe 'Dun Grub says:

> Speaking of it that way has the purpose of eliminating the grasping at a mistaken notion of self of persons: because by speaking of it that way, [as transitory and as a collection,] grasping at the self as permanent and unitary will be eliminated; and the grasping at a mistaken notion of self of persons has as its precursor the grasping at the self as permanent and unitary.[20]

Seeing those aggregates as either non-existent or as eternal is the view holding to the extremes.

Wrong view is the view that there is no karma, cause and effect.

Esteeming unworthy views is considering inferior views to be superior.

Esteeming mistaken morality and asceticism is a view that considers practices and moral injunctions which do not work to be the cause or the path leading to liberation.

Three of these views produce four mistaken conceptions (Phyin Ci Log; viparyāsa) upon which we base our actions: Our sense of permanence from the view holding to the extremes makes us mistake the impermanent for permanent. Due to esteeming unworthy views we mistake the impure for pure and we mistake suffering for pleasure. And due to our sense of self in the view of the transitory collections we mistake non-self for self.

Pride, which is a polluting tendency operative in every realm and to be abandoned both by Seeing and by Meditation, is elaborated according to two modes of exegesis, the first describing seven types of pride and the second describing nine types {v.10}.[21] Here we will summarize the seven types of pride:

The seven types of pride are: 1. pride (māna), a puffed up mind that thinks, "I am superior." 2. adhimāna, a puffed up mind that thinks oneself is superior to one's equals. 3. mānātmāna, a puffed up mind that thinks oneself is more superior than one's superiors. 4. asmimāna, a puffed up mind which, when directed at the appropriating aggregates thinks "I". 5. abhimāna, a

puffed up mind that thinks oneself has attained virtues that one has not attained. 6. ūnamāna, a puffed up mind that thinks oneself just a little bit inferior to those who are greatly superior. 7. mithyāmāna, a puffed up mind which thinks that oneself has acquired virtues when one has acquired faults that are not virtues.

So when we speak of the ten polluting tendencies these are the ten: 1. Attachment. 2. Anger. 3. Pride. 4. Ignorance. 5. Doubt. 6. View of the transitory collection. 7. Wrong view. 8. The view holding to the extremes. 9. Esteeming unworthy views. 10. Esteeming mistaken morality and asceticism.

At {v.32} the *ADKB* lays out a scheme of origination, the order in which the ten polluting tendencies arise, one from the other. This can be taken not as a normative standard for the way they arise in all cases, but as an illustration to provide a general sense of the way these fundamental afflictions relate to one another.

> Initially, from ignorance regarding the meaning of the Truths, doubt arises, which wonders whether there is or is not suffering. From that, relying on an inferior spiritual friend, one engages in erroneous teaching and learning, which produces the wrong view that suffering does not exist. From that is produced the view of the transitory collections, which grasps the aggregates as I and mine. From that is produced the view holding to the extremes, which grasps at the permanence or annihilation of the aggregates. From that is produced the view esteeming morality and asceticism, which grasps at the belief that there is purification from holding those extreme views. From that, esteeming views is produced, because what was believed to provide purification becomes esteemed as the supreme view. From that one feels pride and attachment for one's own views. And hatred arises which despises the views of others.[22]

We can see from this scheme how ignorance of the four Noble Truths is the root of the whole process of affliction, and how doubt about the reality of suffering, the first Noble Truth, leads to the other mistaken views. These views are themselves interrelated, as the wrong view that there is no suffering deludes us into a false sense of security and confidence in our aggregates, which we grasp at as a dependable, solid unitary "I", instead of the collection of transitory phenomena that actually constitutes our being. From that erroneous sense of a solid "I" we tend to one or the other extreme, experiencing it either as indestructible and permanent, or believing it to be ultimately non-existent. Then seeking some sort of purification, some salvation, we take on spiritual practices that are in fact incapable of yielding any type of stable happiness. Nevertheless, we come to esteem the philosophy or views behind our chosen road to salvation and hold it up as the supreme view. We take pride in it. We grow attached to it. And we come to despise or hate those who disagree with us.

Obviously, pride, attachment and hatred arise based on many other objects. But the description of the process of development of our afflictions as they grow out of a system of tenets, a religion or a world-view that underlies the way we interface with the world, is a vivid picture. It is a picture that is illustrated time and again in world history, in places like Palestine, Northern Ireland and Iran. And more subtly, on the individual level,

in our tendency to grasp tightly to our own view of things and to shut out or resent any information or ideas that threaten our world-view.

**The ten polluting tendencies categorized by their levels of abandonment**

Now things begin to get complicated. These ten polluting tendencies are categorized in terms of how they are abandoned, and in which of the three realms they operate; that is, whether they are abandoned on the Path of Seeing or on the Path of Meditation; and on the Path of Seeing, by seeing which of the four Truths. When they are organized this way, the Vaibhāṣikas hold that there are 98 polluting tendencies or afflictions. Here is how they are distributed:

**In the Desire Realm:**

All ten are to be abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering: attachment, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, the view of the transitory collection, view holding to the extremes, wrong view, esteeming unworthy views, esteeming morality and asceticism.

Seven are to be abandoned by seeing the Truth of Origination: attachment, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, wrong view, esteeming unworthy views.

Seven are to be abandoned by seeing the Truth of Cessation: the same seven.

Eight are to be abandoned by seeing the Truth of the Path: attachment, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, wrong view, esteeming unworthy views, esteeming morality and asceticism.

Four are to be abandoned by Meditation: attachment, anger, pride, ignorance.

Total: 36 to be abandoned in the Desire Realm.

**In the Form Realm:**

The pattern is the same, however there is no anger in the upper realms, so there is one less to be abandoned at each of the five stages:

Nine are to be abandoned by seeing Suffering.

Six are to be abandoned by seeing Origination.

Six are to be abandoned by seeing Cessation.

Seven are to be abandoned by seeing the Path.

Three are to be abandoned by Meditation.

Total: 31 to be abandoned in the Form Realm.

**In the Formless Realm:**

Exactly the same as the Form Realm.

Total: 31 to be abandoned in the Formless Realm.

Grand total: 36 + 31 + 31 = 98.

In general, the distinction between objects to be abandoned by Seeing and those to be abandoned by Meditation is that the former are grosser, rougher, more easily counteracted. These are afflictions that can be eliminated by the first mere seeing of the particular Truth that is the appropriate antidote.

Those to be abandoned by Meditation, on the other hand, are those which require continuous contemplation based on the concentrated power of meditative equipoise. Objects to be abandoned by Seeing are, to a large extent, those polluting tendencies that come from tenets, or are there by the force of a temporary or adventitious understanding. Among these we find the five views and doubt--we can see how these are more intellectualized or conceptualized. While attachment, anger, pride and ignorance are not adventitious, but are inborn or innate, and so are to be abandoned by Meditation.

**The root polluting tendencies as the roots of non-virtue**

In the Desire Realm the three polluting tendencies of attachment, anger and ignorance are roots of non-virtue (Mi dGe Ba'i rTza Ba; akuśala-mūla) because they are non-virtuous by their very nature, without depending on

other factors {iv.8}, and they are the roots of other non-virtues.[23] They are firm and they are fundamental, and so they qualify as roots.

In the upper realm, where there is no non-virtue, all the afflictions are neutral. There are then three neutral roots: craving, ignorance and wisdom. Craving is the desire or attachment for things of the upper realms. Wisdom here refers to afflicted or wrong wisdom and is roughly equivalent to the polluting tendency of view. It is intellectual understanding which leads to more affliction rather than toward liberation.

## Terms for Polluting Tendencies Found in the Sūtras

The second part of Chapter Five is taken up with the resolution of synonyms, first from the sūtras and then from the commentarial literature, the śāstras. These are terms used by the Buddha in the sūtras, or by subsequent canonical commentators, to categorize the afflictions.

From the sūtras four such terms are considered: the contaminants (Zag Pa; āsrava); the floods and yokes (Chu sByor; ogha-yoga); and the clingings (Nyer Len; upādana).

### The contaminants

There are three contaminants {v.35}: the contaminant of desire ('Dod Pa'i Zag Pa; kāmāśrava), the contaminant of existence (Srid Pa'i Zag Pa;

bhavāśrava), and the contaminant of ignorance (Ma Rig Pa'i Zag Pa; avidyāsrava).

The contaminant of desire refers to the afflictions of the Desire Realm and includes 41 afflictions: the 36 polluting tendencies of the Desire Realm enumerated above, minus the five types of ignorance (which will be counted separately as the contaminant of ignorance.) In addition to this 31 polluting tendencies there are the ten full entanglements which will be described below {v.47}.

The contaminant of existence consists of the 52 polluting tendencies that arise in the Form and Formless realms. There are 31 in each realm, minus the five types of ignorance, equals 26 polluting tendencies in each realm. The contaminants of the two upper realms are combined together into one category, "the contaminant of existence" for two reasons: First of all the afflictions of the two upper realms are similar to each other in several ways: they are both obscuring neutrals--that is, although there is no non-virtue in these two realms they still obstruct progress on the path; and they are similar in that they are directed inwards rather than toward external objects; and they are based on levels of meditative equipoise (mNyam gZhag; samāhita).

The more profound reason for combining the afflictions of the two upper realms and calling them the contaminant of existence was to make it clear that those two (blissful) states are not liberation, but are in fact levels

of existence. The term existence (Srid Pa; bhava) is, in other contexts, translated as rebirth, and it is always to be kept in mind that the whole purpose of the Buddhist project of eliminating the afflictions is to escape from this suffering state of existence. Existence is the opposite of liberation. The Buddha explained these afflictions this way in order to make clear that the nature of these contaminants of the upper realms was an interest in or an attraction to existence, and not to liberation.

The contaminant of ignorance is made up of the 15 types of ignorance of the three realms. It has been pulled out of the other two categories and made into its own contaminant in order to emphasize that ignorance is the root of cyclic existence; when ignorance is eliminated the other afflictions will be eliminated as well.

**The floods and yokes**

The next terms, the floods and yokes, consist of the same afflictions so they can be handled together. dGe 'Dun Grub deals with them in a particularly cryptic, shorthand manner, but we can refer to the *ADKB* {v.37} for the complete description. There are four floods and yokes. (The yokes are the same as the following description of the floods.) Like the contaminants there is a flood of desire, a flood of existence and a flood of ignorance; but in addition there is a flood of views.

The flood of desire is made up of the five types of attachment, five types of anger, five prides, four doubts (there is no doubt to be abandoned by Meditation), and ten full entanglements--all in the Desire Realm; 29 in all.

The flood of existence is made up of ten attachments, ten prides, and eight doubts--from the Form and Formless Realms; 28 in all.

The flood of views is made up of 12 views in each of the three realms; 36 in all.

The flood of ignorance is made up of five types of ignorance in each of the three realms; 15 in all.

The same is true for the yokes.

The reason that there was no fourth type of contaminant--a contaminant of views, stems from the root of the Sanskrit word for contaminant, āsrava, which means that the contaminants establish or seat themselves--āsayanti. However the views can not establish themselves without being associated with other afflictions.

**The clingings**

Next is the explanation of the clingings {v.38}, which follows the same scheme as the floods and yokes except that ignorance is not taught as a separate category and views is divided into two categories. So there are four clingings:

The clinging of desire consists of the same 29 afflictions as the flood of desire plus the five types of ignorance of the Desire Realm; total, 34.

The second clinging is called the clinging to a belief in a self (bDag Tu sMra Ba Nye Bar Len Pa; ātma-vāda-upādāna). It consists of the same 28 afflictions as the flood of existence, plus the ten types of ignorance in the Form and Formless Realms; total, 38.

The third is called the clinging to views. It consists of the same 36 afflictions as the flood of views except that the six types of esteeming morality and asceticism (i.e. two in each realm) have been separated out to form a separate clinging; total, 30.

The fourth clinging is the clinging to morality and asceticism, which consists of the six types of that affliction.

dGe 'Dun Grub explains why esteeming morality and asceticism has been singled out here as its own clinging:

> It is an opponent of the Path, because it views what is not the Path to be the Path; and because it deceives householders and renunciates (Rab Tu Byung Ba; pravrajita). It deceives outsider householders by holding up as the path the application of the five fires, immersion in water and so forth. It deceives outsider renunciates by holding up as the path living naked, having given up [luxuries such as] a hundred foods, a hundred thousand [different] clothes, and 500 houses.[24]

The reason ignorance is combined with other afflictions and is not taught as a separate clinging is that the meaning of clinging is something that grasps or holds on to existence. Ignorance, which is by nature stupid, is not

capable of grasping or clinging onto existence unless it is associated with other afflictions.

**Etymologies of the terms for polluting tendencies**

The section on the synonyms that appear in the sūtras concludes with etymologies of these terms {v.39-40}. The etymologies presented in the *ADKB* may at times be questionable as etymologies, but they often provide the clearest statement of the meaning of technical terms.

The polluting tendencies are called anuśaya because: they are subtle (aṇava) and difficult to comprehend; they are attached (anugata) to the mental continuum by obtainment (prāpti) since beginningless time; they are nourished (anuśerate) in two ways, by their objects and by concomitants; because they continually pursue (anubadhnanti) by returning even after they are eliminated.

These afflictions are called contaminants (āsrava) because they cause one to be established (āsayanti) in cyclic existence; and they flow from (āsravanti) the wounds of the six āyatanas.

They are called floods (ogha) because they carry one away (haranti).

They are called yokes (yoga) because they attach (śleṣayanti) one to rebirth.

They are called clingings (upādāna) because they grasp (upagṛhnanti)

at cyclic existence.

## Terms for Polluting Tendencies Found in the Śāstras

In the śāstras five terms are used to refer to the afflictions in their different aspects: the connections (Kun Tu sByor Ba; saṁyojana); the bonds ('Ching Ba; bandhana); the subsidiary afflictions (Nye Ba'i Nyon Mongs; upakleśa); the full entanglements (Kun dKris; paryavasthāna); and the polluting tendencies.

### The connections

There are nine connections {v.41-42}. dGe 'Dun Grub describes them as the six root polluting tendencies plus esteeming [unworthy objects] (mChog Tu 'Dzin Pa; parāmarṣa), jealousy (Prag Dog; mātsarya) and miserliness (Ser sNa; īrṣya).

The list as given in the *ADKB* uses slightly different terminology: affection (rJes Su Chags Pa; anunaya) instead of attachment ('Dod Chags; rāga) to indicate that it is desire of all three realms. Three of these afflictions, anger, jealousy and miserliness arise only in the Desire Realm.

In this method of organizing the afflictions the last two views, esteeming unworthy views and esteeming morality and asceticism are taught together, as a separate affliction: esteeming unworthy objects. The reason

for this is that the first three views--which constitute the connection of view--are similar; and the last two views--which constitute the connection of esteeming--are similar. They are similar in that they are both made up of 18 parts;[25] and they are similar in that the first three are the objects which are esteemed, while the last two are the agents that esteem the first three.

Jealousy and miserliness are isolated from the list of ten full entanglements and counted as connections because both are exclusively non-virtuous and they are independent.[26]

**The bonds**

The bonds {v.45} are the three root afflictions in their aspect of being nourished by the three types of feelings. Attachment is nourished by the feeling of pleasure. Anger is nourished by the feeling of suffering. And ignorance is nourished by neutral feeling.

**The subsidiary afflictions**

The subsidiary afflictions {v.46} are all contaminated mental factors which are included in the aggregate of formative forces but are not counted as afflictions (Nyon Mongs; kleśa). The difference is that the afflictions are fundamental, basic to the state of contamination, while the subsidiary afflictions are close to the afflictions in the nature of their action but they

are, simply, subsidiary. The *ADKB* cites a list in the *Kṣudraka-vastu* (*gZhi Phran Tsegs*).[27]

**The full entanglements**

However, for the rest of Chapter Five the term "subsidiary afflictions" is used to refer to 16 other mental factors which fall into the categories of the ten full entanglements and the six impurities (Dri Ma; mala).

Sukomal Chaudhuri translates paryavasthāna as "outbursts," suggesting that they are afflictions in full flower, as opposed to subtle propensities which remain latent.[28] Such a distinction is more appropriate to the Sautrāntika definition than to the Vaibhāṣika view that the polluting tendencies are identical to the afflictions.

What we can say is that the ten polluting tendencies are fundamental, underlying the afflicted condition of existence, while the full entanglements, which are subsidiary afflictions but not afflictions in that fundamental sense, are mental states characterized by the acting out of our obscured minds. Such states as jealousy, miserliness, spite and resentment are in that sense "outbursts," and are afflicted states that are more manifest, up front, and active.

The ten full entanglements are:

1) Shamelessness (Ngo Tsa Med Pa; manapatrāpya) is not having respect for virtue and those who have virtuous qualities.

2) Immodesty (Khrel Med Pa; āhrīkya) is what does not regard disgraceful conduct (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; avadya) with fear.

3) Jealousy (Phrag Dog; īrṣyā) is being mentally upset (Khrug Pa; vyāroṣa) over another's success.

4) Miserliness (Ser sNa; mātsarya) is the possessiveness of mind which opposes the giving of Dharma, material objects, or skills.

5) Excitement (rGod Pa; audddhatya) is the non-tranquility of mind.

6) Regret ('Gyod Pa; kaukṛtya).

7) Torpor (rMugs Pa; styāna) obscures the mind.

8) Sleep (gNyid; middha) is the gathering in of the mind which leaves one incapable of controlling the body. This mental factor and regret are full entanglements only when they constitute afflicted states of mind.

9) Belligerence (Khro Ba; krodha) is all animosity (mNar Sems; āghāta) directed towards sentient beings and non-beings, with the exception of harmful thoughts (gNod Sems; vyāpāda) and harmfulness (rNam Par 'Tse Ba; vihiṁsa).

10) Concealment ('Chab Pa; mrakṣa) is the hiding of disgraceful conduct (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; avadya).

In terms of how these full entanglements affect our progress on the path: shamelessness and immodesty are inconsistent with morality; jealousy and miserliness are inconsistent with benefitting others; excitement and regret are inconsistent with wisdom; and sleep and torpor are inconsistent with meditative stabilization.

In terms of which polluting tendencies they are close to, or which give rise to them: Attachment gives rise to shamelessness, excitement and miserliness. Ignorance gives rise to torpor, sleep and immodesty. Doubt gives rise to regret. Anger gives rise to belligerence and jealousy. As for concealment, there is debate over whether it comes from ignorance or attachment or both.

**The six impurities**

The six impurities {v.49-51} are a subset of the full entanglements and a subset of the subsidiary afflictions. They are:

1) Deceit (sGyu; māyā) is to mislead others.

2) Dissimulation (gYo; śāṭhya) is a crookedness of mind due to which one does not present things as they really are; it makes one respond in a distorted or unclear manner.

3) Haughtiness (rGyags Pa; mada) is a mind which is the culmination (Yongs Su gTugs Pa; paryādāna) of attachment to one's own qualities of long life

and so forth.

4) Spite ('Tsig Pa; pradāśa) is holding firmly to disgraceful behavior due to which one does not accept proper advice.

5) Resentment (Khon 'Dzin; upanāha) is repeatedly considering despised (mNar Sems Kyi; āghāta) objects.

6) Harmfulness (rNam Par 'Tse Ba; vihiṁsā) is injuring (rNam Par Tho 'Tsam Pa; viheṭhana) due to which one injures another with weapons or harsh words.

Deceit and haughtiness arise from attachment. Resentment and harmfulness arise from anger. Spite arises from esteeming views. Dissimulation arises from wrong view.

**The full entanglements categorized by their levels of abandonment**

To categorize the ten full entanglements in terms of their levels of abandonment {v.51-52}: Shamelessness, immodesty, torpor, sleep and excitement are objects to be abandoned both by Seeing and by Meditation, because they can be concomitant with either type of afflicted mind. Shamelessness and immodesty are the non-virtuous great grounds (Sa Mang Po Pa; mahābhūmika) {ii.26}, which means they are concomitant with all non-virtuous minds. Torpor and excitement are great grounds of great

afflictions {ii.26}, which means they are concomitant with all afflicted minds. And sleep is not incompatible with any type of mind, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral. Therefore, these [five] can be both concomitants of objects to be abandoned by Seeing and concomitants of objects to be abandoned by Meditation.

The five others, jealousy, miserliness, regret, belligerence and concealment, are only objects to be abandoned by Meditation, because they constitute a wrong conception of the characteristics of objects of knowledge; and they are independent, which means they can function without being concomitant with any other affliction other than ignorance. For the same reasons, the six impurities are also objects to be abandoned by Meditation.

To categorize them according to which realms they occur in: Eleven of the 16 subsidiary afflictions are non-virtuous and so they arise only in the Desire Realm. Dissimulation and deceit also occur in the first concentration because we know of a case in which the god Brahmā misrepresented his knowledge.[29] Torpor and excitement are great grounds of great afflictions, so they are concomitant with all afflicted minds; and haughtiness is not incompatible with any type of mind.

**Which afflictions come with which feelings**

The *ADKB* moves on to describe which polluting tendencies and which subsidiary afflictions are concomitant with which feelings {55-58}.

Of the ten polluting tendencies: Attachment is concomitant with the two feelings of pleasure and mental happiness. Anger is concomitant with suffering and mental unhappiness. Ignorance is concomitant with all feelings.

Wrong view is concomitant with both mental happiness and mental unhappiness: If one has the view that there is no fruit of non-virtuous action it makes one happy, thinking there will be no adverse consequences to one's actions. If one has the view that there is no fruit of virtuous action it makes one unhappy, thinking that there is no hope for things to improve.

Doubt is concomitant with mental unhappiness, because when doubt arises for one who is seeking certainty it makes one unhappy.

The other four views and pride are concomitant with mental happiness. Because they are mental states which by nature generate their own form of happiness or satisfaction. Pride, for example, is clearly a sense of happiness about oneself.

The analysis just given refers to polluting tendencies that arise in the Desire Realm and have a strong or clear mind. When they are fuzzy or indistinct, they are all concomitant with neutral feeling.

The polluting tendencies of the upper realms are concomitant with their respective feelings according to the above pattern, but of course they

are restricted to those feelings which exist in each realm.[30]

As for the subsidiary afflictions: regret, jealousy, belligerence, harmfulness, resentment and spite are concomitant with mental unhappiness, because they are mental states which have a natural aspect of dejection or depression (lKyo Ba; dainya).

Miserliness is concomitant with the mental happiness. Since it arises from attachment, it has an aspect of satisfaction.

Dissimulation, deceit, concealment and sleep are concomitant with both mental happiness and mental unhappiness. Because, for the first three, if they do not accomplish their purpose they are unhappy, and if they do, they are happy. Sleep, of course, is compatible with all three feelings.

Haughtiness arises on all levels: In the third concentration it is concomitant with pleasure;[31] below that it is concomitant with mental happiness and above that it is concomitant with neutral feeling.

All of the subsidiary afflictions can be concomitant with neutral feeling, which, like ignorance, is compatible with all of them.

The remaining four full entanglements, shamelessness, immodesty, torpor and excitement, are concomitant with all five feelings. Because the first two are non-virtuous great grounds, and the latter two are among the great grounds of great affliction.

**An alternative classification: The five hindrances**

The *ADKB* {v.59} quotes the *Saṁyuktāgama*[32] concerning another way of classifying the afflictions, as the five hindrances (sGrib Pa; nivaraṇa): desire for pleasure; harmful thought; sleep and torpor; excitement and regret; and doubt.

The sūtra describes all five of these hindrances as non-virtuous, "These are unadulterated and completely non-virtuous aggregates; and thus they are the five hindrances."[33]

Here the meaning of hindrance is specifically that these afflictions obstruct the attainment of meditative equipoise or the trance states of the concentrations.

How do these particular afflictions harm meditative stabilization? Three different answers to this question are offered:

The Vaibhāṣikas say that desire for pleasure and harmful thoughts harm the aggregate of morality; sleep and torpor harm the aggregate of wisdom; excitement and regret harm the aggregate of meditative stabilization; and doubt causes uncertainty concerning the Truths.

The Sautrāntikas say that this presentation contradicts the standard order in which these three aggregates are presented. They maintain that it is torpor and sleep that harm meditative stabilization while excitement and regret harm the aggregate of wisdom. Sleep and torpor destroy one's interest

in meditative stabilization while excitement and regret destroy one's efforts at examining phenomena.

A third opinion, attributed to the Cittamātrans by dGe 'Dun Grub, says that these five afflictions are hindrances to three stages of meditative stabilization, the preparation, the actual action and the subsequent stage. In the preparation stage, before a monk or nun sits down to engage in meditation, worldly things can distract from the practice, in the form of desiring pleasures or as aggravations which produce harmful thoughts. While actually engaging in meditation sleep and torpor are the hindrances to concentration, while excitement and regret create obstacles to special insight which realizes the Truths. Following the meditation session, in the subsequent stage, while reflecting on the teachings and the nature of phenomena, doubt can create obstacles.

## THE EXISTENCE OF DHARMAS IN THE THREE TIMES

### The Sarvāstivāda position

It is also in Chapter Five {v.25ff} that Vasubandhu takes on the Sarvāstivādin theory of the substantial existence of the three times.[34] We shall follow the argument here as it is summarized by dGe 'Dun Grub.

The Vaibhāṣikas have distinguished, on the one hand, afflictions with specific characteristics which only arise when their objects are present; and

on the other hand general afflictions, such as ignorance doubt, and views, which arise with respect to objects of all three times.

Having laid out the typically abstruse variations of how certain phenomena exist or don't exist in the three times, Vasubandhu raises the issue:

Do the three times substantially exist or not? If they do exist then phenomena would be permanent. If they don't exist then how are phenomena, such as karmic seeds, retained over time so that they will eventually yield a result?

The Vaibāṣikas respond: The three times do substantially exist; but still, phenomena are not permanent because they are subject to the four characteristics of all saṁskṛta phenomena--arising, duration, aging and impermanence {ii.45}.

That the three times exist can be proven based both on scripture and on reasoning. Based on scripture, it says in the sūtra:[35]

> It is because forms (gZugs; rūpa) of the past exist that [it is possible for] the learned Ārya Śrāvaka to not take heed of the forms of the past....Because the forms of the future exist [it is possible for] the learned Ārya Śrāvaka to not delight in the forms of the future.

Based on reasoning, the three times exist because phenomena of the past and future exist as objects of a present mind. Since a consciousness arises in dependence on both an object and a faculty, those past and future objects must exist.

A further reason is that past actions produce results in the present. If the past did not exist, how could an action performed in the past produce a result much later, in the present. If the past did not exist, the cause of that present result would be long gone in the past.

This school, because it holds this view that everything exists--sarva asti--is called the Sarvāstivāda.

There is another school which makes the distinction that phenomena of the past that have not yet yielded their fruition do exist; but those phenomena of the past that have already produced their fruition, and future phenomena, do not exist. This school is called the Distinguishing School or Vibhajyavādins.[36]

In fact there are four varieties of Sarvāstivādins, based on how they interpret the way in which the three times exist:

The first is the system of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (bTzun Pa Chos sKyob), called the Bhāvānyathika (dNgos Po gZhan Du 'Gyur Bar sMra Ba) because it holds that there is a change in existence (bhāva-pariṇāma). In this system, when a phenomenon shifts from future to present or from present to past, it gets rid of its future existence and takes on a present existence, but it does not lose the existence of its essence or nature; it does not become another substance. For example: It is like a gold vessel--when it is destroyed and an ornament is fashioned from it, it does not change to another color,

however it does change to another shape. Or it is like when curds are changed into butter, its flavor and strength become different but its color does not change.

The second is the system of Bhadanta Ghoṣaka (bTzun Pa dByangs sGrogs), called the Lakṣaṇānyathika (mTsan Nyid gZhan Du 'Gyur Ba) because it holds that there is a change of characteristic or aspect (lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma). In this system a phenomenon possesses the characteristics of all three times, but it is established as past, present or future by way of whichever set of characteristics is strongest. It is like when a man has great desire for a woman, although he is not thereby free of desire for other women, based on the strength of his desire for that one woman it is said that he desires that woman.

The third is the system of Bhadanta Vasumitra (bTzun Pa dByig bShes), called the Avasthānyathika (gNas sKabs gZhan Du 'Gyur Ba) because they hold that there is a change of condition (avasthā-pariṇāma). In this system a phenomenon is designated as past, present or future based on its change in condition or state of activity: When a phenomenon is in a condition in which it does not perform its function it is called future; when it is performing its function it is called present; when, having performed its function it ceases it is called past. So it is based on the change in the state of activity of the phenomenon, but not on a change in its substance. It is

like, for example, a counting token, when it is put in the units place it is designated as one, in the hundreds place it becomes 100, and in the thousands place it is designated as 1000.

The fourth is the system of Bhadanta Buddhadeva (bTzun Pa Sangs rGya Lha) called the Anyathānyathika (gZhan Dang gZhan Du 'Gyur Bar sMra Ba), because they hold that there is a change in the relative relationship (apekṣā-pariṇāma). In this system the time periods are posited by way their relative relationships. A phenomenon is designated as past, present or future depending on whether it is a previous, subsequent or intermediate moment. A phenomenon is future with respect to previous--past or present--moments. It is present with respect to previous--past, or subsequent--future, moments. It is past with respect to subsequent--present or future--moments. It is like one woman, who is posited as a daughter in relation to her mother, and as a mother in relation to her daughter.

**The Sautrāntika critique**

Having laid out the various Vaibhāṣika positions Vasubandhu responds with the Sautrāntika critique:

The first system, he says, is equivalent to the non-Buddhist Sāṁkhya position because it holds that the state of being of a phenomenon changes, but its nature or essence or substance does not change. This amounts to the

Sāṁkhya view that there is one eternal substance and it merely changes its manifestations.

The second system merely confuses all the three times, since it says that all the characteristics of all the three times are going on at all times. How does one then tell the difference?

In the fourth system each moment would at the same time be all three, past, present and future; because each moment would be past relative to some moments, present relative to others and future relative to others.

So, Vasubandhu concludes, the third system, that of Vasumitra is the best of the four. He proceeds to discredit it:

If the times are determined based on whether a phenomenon has already, is now, or has not yet performed its function, then an eye that is not now performing its function of looking can not be present.

Vaibhāṣika response: It is present because although it does not perform its function of looking, it is performing its other function of acting as the cause of its naturally flowing result, the next moment of its existence.

Vasubandhu: In that case take homogenous cause of the past. It too must be present, because it too performs its function of causing its naturally flowing result in the present. And the same can be said for other past causes.

If the time is designated based on the efficiency of the phenomenon,

there arises a total confusion of the three times: "An element may be past inasmuch as its power of determining the general character of a remote result belongs to the past, and it may be present nevertheless, since it produces the result of the present moment. Thus a confusion of the characteristic signs of all the three times will arise, and I maintain that you are guilty of such confusion."[37]

If a phenomenon of the past or future is substantially existent in the present, what is to prevent it from performing the activities of a present phenomenon? What is it that induces a present phenomenon to perform its function in the present and not in the past or future.

You say that the time of a phenomenon is based on its efficiency or activity. But how can the activity be other than its time? If it is other than time, it is asaṁskṛta, and therefore permanent. On the other hand, how can the activity not be other than time? If the activity is not other than its time, then an activity of the present could not possibly be an activity of the past and future, because it is not other than the present. The Vaibhāṣikas reply: The function is performed when all the conditions are met.

Sautrāntika: But according to your theory these conditions are always present.

"Vaibhāṣika: An element that has not yet appeared is future; one which has appeared and not yet disappeared is present; one which has

disappeared is past. What is it you find unfounded in this explanation?

"Sautrāntika: The following point needs here to be established: If the past and future exist in the same sense as the present, as realities, why is it that, being existent in the same sense, they are future and past? If the substance of the same element is alone (permanently) existent, what is the reason that it is spoken of as 'having not yet appeared' or 'gone'? What is it that does not appear later on and whose absence makes us call it 'past'?

"Thus it is that the notion of three times will altogether have no real foundation, as long as you don't accept the view that the elements appear into life out of non-existence and return again into non-existence after having been existing. (Your theory implies eternal existence of the elements.)"[38]

The Vaibhāṣikas close out the argument with the ever-reliable resort to scriptural authority: "Because the natures (Chos Nyid; dharmatā) of phenomena are profound, one can not twist one thing into another with ordinary reasoning (rTog Ge'i Blo). And since it comes from reliable scripture, our system of tenets is not to be cast aside."[39]

# CHAPTER THREE

# KARMA: THE ENGINE OF EXISTENCE

Existence in the Buddhist imagination is conceived as a wheel or a cycle. The individual travels through a beginningless cycle of births and deaths trapped in an incessant experience of suffering or unsatisfactoriness. Saṁsāra, the cycle of suffering existence, manifests in a vast variety of forms in which we can experience an infinite range of degrees of suffering and pleasure, from the fiery tortures of the hottest hells, to the uninterrupted bliss of the highest formless absorptions--so pleasant that even Āryans can mistake these states for liberation.

But there is no liberation within saṁsāra, because even such blissful states are pervaded by a most subtle form of suffering, which is rooted in the impermanent nature of that happy state, and in the still-afflicted quality of the mind that is experiencing that happiness. As long as our mind remains contaminated by any of the three root afflictions, attachment, anger or ignorance, these afflictions remain as motivating factors, directing our minds, and hence our bodies, toward actions that will perpetuate our wandering journey through the cycle of existence.

In Chapter Four of the *Abhidharmakośa* Vasubandhu examines what it is that keeps this wheel of saṁsāra turning; what keeps individuals moving

through the cycle of existence. For any wheel to turn a source of energy is required. For a world to manifest, for vitality to emerge in the form of consciousness that can experience that world, a source must be identified.

We have identified the afflictions as the potential motivations for entrapment in existence--for example attachment to desire is a clear enough cause to keep beings clinging to the Desire Realm. But the afflictions are themselves passive states, contaminants or stains on what might otherwise be a purified consciousness. They do not in themselves have the power, the energy to make things move, to create or transform reality, to shape experience, to drive the cycle of existence.

To find that driving force, the essential form of energy that causes the world and experience to manifest in the ways that it does, the Buddhists identified action, called karma in Sanskrit from the root √kṛ = to do, or to act. Action is the engine, the driving force that pushes us through the cycle of existence. In this metaphor we can conceive of the afflictions as the fuel, the ingredient that makes the engine go (motivates), and without that fuel the engine will not start: "The root of existence is the polluting tendencies. It is due to karma that cyclic existence arises, and the afflictions that act as the source of that [karma] must precede it; because karma alone, without afflictions, will not yield fruit."[40]

But conversely, without the energy of the engine of karma, afflictions

alone do not have the power to drive us through cyclic existence. Without karma, there would be no energy to create the world, and no causal basis for a consciousness to arise that can experience the various forms of that world.

**Karma: the creator of worlds**

Vasubandhu begins Chapter Four with the question: What is it that produces this variegated inanimate world and the animate life that inhabits it? dGe 'Dun Grub condenses into one sentence the essential Buddhist arguments against theism on the one hand and causeless arisal on the other. If the world arose without a cause, or based on causes that were not consistent or concordant with their effect, then any world could arise at any time in any form--there would be no logic or order to the universe whatsoever, and we evidently do live in an ordered universe.

The argument against a single cause, God, is fully laid out at {ii.64}. The main argument is that if things were produced by a single cause they would arise all together at the same time, and it is clear that things evolve progressively. If God desires different things at different times then God is not unitary--God's will or desires would be something separate from her essence. If God sets things in motion but evolution takes over, then there is no single unique cause.

Furthermore, for what purpose does God create such a world? If it is

for God's pleasure, it could hardly be an all-sovereign God who requires external means to experience pleasure. And what kind of a God is it that would create a world so infected with misery and pain!

The world is multiform, and it must therefore arise from multiform causes, and the cause of the manifold inanimate and animate world is karma, the actions of sentient beings.[41]

**Karma is intention**

What then is this thing called karma? It is intention (Sems Pa; cetanā). It is a mental act of volition. It is a factor of mind concomitant with every mental state, whose function is to move the mind to its particular object {ii.24}.

There is a second type of karma, a second-order form of karma which is produced by that intention, called karma-having-intended (Sam Pa'i Las; cetayitvā-karma). We thus have two types of karma, the purely mental intentional karma, and the physical karma that arises from that intention, called karma-having-intended.

This physical karma, karma-having-intended, can be divided into two distinct types of action: karma of body, and karma of speech.

Furthermore, say the Vaibhāṣikas in the *Abhidharmakośa*, karma of body and karma of speech are each two-fold: they each can be either

revealing karma (rNam Par Rig Byed; vijñapti) or non-revealing karma (rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa; avijñapti).

To understand the purpose and context of the distinction between revealing and non-revealing karma we must return to the Buddhist understanding of karma as the force that creates the individual, his experience and the world in which he lives.

A karma, an intentional act, is committed at a moment in the present life; it will, with certainty, bring about a result or fruition at some time in the future--on this the Buddha is quite clear: "Karma does not perish, even after hundreds of millions of eons. Meeting the complex [of conditions] and the [favorable] time, it bears fruit for its author."[42]

The karma may ripen in this life or future lives, and that fruition will be consistent with the moral character of the original intention: if the original karma was virtuous, the fruition will be a form of pleasant experience; if the karma was non-virtuous, the fruition will be unpleasant or suffering.

Thus we see, as Alfonso Verdu puts it, "Karma, as individual action, carries within itself the genetic mechanism whereby it will yield its own retribution, either as punishment or as reward."[43] But for the Buddhist philosophers, engaged in the project of systematizing a coherent picture of the world from the discreet teachings of the sūtras, a sticky problem arose which has remained a central problem throughout the history of Buddhist

thought, and has instigated several of the philosophical moves that eventually evolved into whole new schools of Buddhism.[44]

**The problem of the retribution of karma**

The problem is an obvious one, and it arises at the most elementary stage of thought about the basic ideas of Buddhism: The question is how, in the absence of a continuing self that transmigrates, can karma be carried forth from the action, as a cause, to a future effect as retribution?

The Vaibhaṣika's solution, elaborated in the *Abhidharmakośa*, relied on three concepts to explain the process by which a past karma could be carried forth to a future retribution.

First, they maintained that the three times exist--a theory that we have discussed in the previous chapters. They hold that all saṁskṛta phenomena substantially exist in the three times, and thus past acts remain as existents and retain a potentiality or latent efficacy which can become activated at some time in the future.

The Vaibhāṣikas also posited among the formative forces not-associated with mind (Sems Dang lDan Pa Ma Yin Pa'i 'Du Byed; citta-viprayukta samskāra) a force called obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti), which acts as a kind of subtle karmic glue to bind the action to the continuum of the agent. Every act creates, for the one who performs it, an obtainment of that

act. By means of the obtainment of the karma the karma adheres to the mental continuum of the agent and is conserved until the conditions coalesce for the eventual ripening and yielding of the fruit of the karma.

**An introduction to non-revealing karma**

Since the Vaibhāṣikas hold that all dharmas--the fundamental units out of which the world and the individual are constructed--are substantially existent; and since they conceive of karma-having-intended, physical karma, as based on substantially existent material elements ('Byung Ba; mahā-bhūta); a third piece in their mechanism of karmic retribution was required. It is fine to say that intentional karma, which is purely mental, plants seeds on the continuum of the agent which will ripen at some time in the future. But how can karma of body and speech, physical acts based on material elements, be carried forward on a purely mental continuum?

In order to solve this problem the Vaibhāṣikas maintained that karma-having-intended, karma of body and karma of speech, were twofold: revealing karma and non-revealing karma. Non-revealing karma is itself a material form of extreme subtlety, which is initiated by a karma of body or speech, and then persists in the agent's psycho-physical continuum, carrying forward the force of the initial material act, until the conditions appear for this karma to ripen.

Alfonso Verdu has described non-revealing karma as a second carrier of karmic seeds; that is, while the seeds of intentional karma are carried forward within the consciousness, on the mental continuum, the material seeds--based on the physical elements--of karma-having-intended, are carried forward as non-revealing form. While the *Abhidharmakośa* and other traditional texts do not describe the mechanism in such explicit terms as a secondary carrier of karmic seeds, Verdu's analysis illuminates the purpose and importance of the mechanism of non-revealing form in Vaibhāṣika karma theory:

> It becomes clear that the main "stumbling block" for the Sarvāstivādins in their conception of "passive karma" [i.e. karma in its dormant state, after it is performed but before it ripens] lies in their irreducible, dualistic and total segregation of the nature which is proper to purely mental acts and the nature which is proper to materially expressed or executed acts....Such a rigorous distinction between the mental and the material compels them to the total dissociation between two different carriers of "karmic seeds," corresponding to the total and unabridged distinction between the nāma-bījas (mental seeds) and rūpa-bījas (material seeds); hence their postulation of the avijñapti as a separate rūpa (material factor) which provides the basis for the accumulation of "material seeds." Avijñapti-rūpa stands therefore in sharp contrast with the nature of manas (mind) as citta which accumulates the mental seeds deriving from its purely mental intentions.[45]

In the following discussion, it is important to keep in mind that non-revealing karma is a physical or material form, the eleventh dharma included in the rūpa-skandha {i.9}, which includes the five sense faculties, their five sense objects, and avijñapti--non-revealing form. Like the other ten dharmas

in the rūpa-skandha it is material in that it is constructed by agglomerations of the four elements ('Byung Ba; mahā-bhūta)--earth, water, fire and air--which are the indivisible building blocks of material existence. Non-revealing form also "has the great elements as its cause" {i.11}, but only in the sense that it depends on the elements as its initiating cause. Unlike the other ten dharmas in the rūpa-skandha it is "not a physical [thing] that exists as an aggregation of [atoms]."[46] So, although it is generated from elements, that is, from the elements of the body (rTen; āśraya) that commits the revealing karma that sets the non-revealing karma in motion, it remains based on those past elements, and it does not continue to be supported or made up of present physical elements {iv.4-5}. This is why it is so utterly subtle and non-obstructive to other matter.

This lays the groundwork for the context in which we can understand the distinction between revealing and non-revealing karma. It is an important one because the discussion of non-revealing karma takes up a large portion of Chapter Four in the *ADKB*.

What do the terms revealing and non-revealing mean? A karma is revealing if it "enables others to understand one's own motivation."[47] That is, when we act physically, either with our bodies or with speech, we provide information to others concerning the state of mind, our attitude, our motivation--ultimately the intention--that lies behind and drives that physical

act. In this sense physical karma reveals or informs others of our inner motivating states.

Non-revealing karma, on the other hand, reveals nothing to nobody. Because, although it is form--a material substance based on the four elements, it is supremely subtle, invisible and even non-obstructive. It is instigated, set in motion by a physical, revealing action of body or speech, but once arisen it remains entirely inaccessible to our senses.

**Revealing karma**

Before embarking on the lengthy discussion of non-revealing karma, dGe 'Dun Grub summarizes a multi-party dispute over the nature of revealing karma of the body.

The Vaibhāṣikas hold that "revealing karma of the body is a shape of the body when, motivated by intention, it is in a state of action,"[48] such as at the moment of making prostrations (a virtuous revealing karma) or of killing (a non-virtuous one.)

The Vātsīputrīya school,[49] on the other hand, holds that revealing karma is a continuous movement of the body, issuing from an intention and informing of that intention.

The Vātsīputrīya position is criticized by both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas because it violates the principle of momentariness (sKad Cig Ma;

kṣaṇika), whereby no real continuous movement of the body is possible because all the elements of the body arise and decay each moment, so in the second moment the same body is not there that was there in the first moment.

The Vātsīputrīyas however do not adhere to the natural, causeless momentariness of phenomena. Phenomena arise, they say, and they subsequently decay due to causes, not automatically or naturally. The decay depends on a cause that arises subsequent to the production of the phenomena.

This view is attacked on the grounds that if decay required a cause, then some phenomena would not decay, and this would violate the principle of impermanence. Also, certain causes of production would also be causes of destruction, such as fire, which creates a clay pot by baking it, and will also destroy the same pot by over-baking it.

The Sautrāntikas then attack the Vaibhāṣika view that revealing karma is shape. If revealing karma is shape, then shape is itself a substantial existent. But shape is not the kind of thing that could be substantially existent: we can cognize shape by both seeing it and by feeling it, and if such an object existed substantially it would violate the definition in scripture that the āyatana of form is what is grasped only by the eye faculty. It would also be the case that a collection of the smallest unit of matter, subtle atoms

(paramaṇu), would have shape, and this would violate the Vaibhāṣika view that subtle atoms are partless and directionless.

For the Sautrāntikas, shape is merely a designation given to various configurations of color. A large amount of color in a single direction is designated as long; color spread equally in all directions is designated as a circle, and so forth.

Fortunately, all can agree that revealing karma of speech is the sound of the voice, or articulated sound.

**Does non-revealing karma exist?**

The first order of business is to establish whether such a form exists, and the initial arguments are proofs from scriptural authority. We can not here deal with all of them, but we will look at a few which highlight the reason for the whole concept of non-revealing karma, the need for a mechanism to carry forward karmic potentials from action to retribution.

The Vaibhāṣikas point out that sūtra teaches that for those who acquire the merit [i.e. positive karmic potentials] of doing such virtuous acts as making offerings to the saṅgha or aiding the sick, "whether they are sitting, or walking, whether sleeping or not sleeping, that merit will always and without interruption increase."[50] These merits are "derived from the substances" of the offerings, and what could possibly retain such merits in

the individual's psycho-physical complex other than non-revealing form.

**The Sautrāntika alternative**

In response to this argument Vasubandhu lays out the basic Sautrāntika conception of the karmic mechanism. Karma is intention. It is the mental volitional act that determines the moral qualification--virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral--of a karma. The physical, revealing karma, is merely the carrying out of that intention and is not itself a separate substance. As Etienne Lamotte explained it in his introduction to Vasubandhu's *Karmaprasiddhi-prakaraṇa*:

> For the Vaibhāṣikas, Vātsiputriyas, Sauryodayikas, one needed two things to be a murderer: an intention to kill (karma of mind) and an action of killing (karma of body) proceeding from the intention to kill, but distinct in itself from the intention, being shape, movement or wind. The Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, distinguish two intentions in one murderer: the intention to kill (karma of mind) and the intention that moves the killing arm (karma of body). If the action to kill was not essentially an intention, it would not be a morally qualifiable act, in as much as volition is at the base of morality.[51]

The Sautrāntika theory of karma is based on the notion of seeds that are planted in a mental continuum where they perfume the continuum or act as subtle propensities (Bag Chags; vāsanā) and are transmitted forward in a succession of momentary transformations until the conditions are met in which this seed-potential ripens into a fruit. The mechanism of bringing the karma to fruition is found in the interior evolution of the mental continuum,

rather than in the artificial construct of a material karma producing a non-revealing form. The intention, a mental karma, plants seeds which pervade the mental continuum and act as subtle propensities which bring about a special transformation of the continuum (rGyud Yongs Su 'Gyur Ba'i Khyad Par; saṁtati-paṛināma-viśeṣa). This process of transformation continues moment by moment until the conditions are met in which the karma comes to fruition as a future experience of the transformed continuum that performed the original action.

In his presentation of these arguments in the *ADKB* Vasubandhu sums up his position with this exchange:

> [Vaibhāṣikas:] Now what is your antipathy which causes you to reject non-revealing [form] (rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa; avijñapti) but to admit the special transformation of the continuum (rGyud Yongs Su 'Gyur Ba'i Bye Brag; santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa), which is equally difficult to comprehend?
>
> [Sautrāntika:] I do not have any antipathy at all. However, to say that when an action is achieved by an exertion of the body which arises from the mental continuum, another dharma arises which is separate from the agent who made the exertion does not produce satisfaction.
>
> But to say that there is a transformation of the mental continuum for the one who made the exertion, for the very reason that the action is accomplished--that is satisfactory. [It is also satisfying because it means that] the fruition will arise in the future from the continuum of the mind and mental factors.[52]

This theory of seeds (Sa Bon; bīja) is at the heart of the Sautrāntika conception of how the mental continuum can continue to posses qualities (dharmas) when they are not active or evident; it accounts for dharmas

persisting in the continuum in a latent state, such dharmas as karma while it is waiting to ripen, and the polluting tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya) when they are not active or fully entangling (Kun dKris; paryavasthāna). Padmanabh S. Jaini, drawing on two texts written as Vaibhāṣika responses to the *ADKB*, the *Abhidharma-dīpa* and its commentary, the *Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti* summarizes the Sautrāntika theory this way:[53]

> When a kleśa (like rāga) is dormant, it is called anuśaya. When it is awakened, it is called paryavasthāna. When it is dormant it does not appear but persists in the form of a seed. This form of seed is simply an inherent power of mind to produce a (new) passion which is itself born of a past passion. It is comparable to an inherent power of yielding rice found in a sprout which is also born of rice.

In the *ADKB* at {ii.36} the Vaibhāṣikas ask their opponents, "What is this thing called 'seed'?" The definition follows:

> It is that nāma-rūpa [i.e. a phenomenon consisting of the five aggregates] which is capable of producing a result either directly or indirectly due to a special transformation of the mental continuum.
>
> What is it that you call transformation?
>
> It is the changing of the state of the mental continuum.
>
> And what is the mental continuum?
>
> It is the saṁskāras of the three times acting as cause and effect.[54]

And in the ninth chapter of the *ADKB* (which is not extant in Tibetan) Vasubandhu gives us another elaboration of the santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa:

> And what is the mental continuum? What is the transformation? And what is special?

> The mental continuum is that continuous generation of mind (citta) which is initiated by action (karma).
>
> That [mental continuum] arising in a different state is transformation.
>
> Because the last moment of this transformation has the special quality of being capable of directly producing a result, it is called a special transformation.[55]

The Sautrāntikas have a fundamental disagreement with the Vaibhāṣikas which underlies their differing approaches to constructing a model of the process of karmic retribution. They reject the Vaibhāṣika metaphysic which reifies every operative force and some purely nominal concepts into substantially existent dharmas. Chief among these objectionable reifications is the concept of "obtainment" (Thob Pa; prāpti) and the substantial existence of the three times.

The Vaibhāṣikas are literalists. They read in sūtra that, "By means of the production, the acquisition and the possession (Kun Tu lDan; samanvāgama) of the ten dharmas of No-more-learning one becomes an Āryan who has abandoned the five limbs,"[56] and they understand it to mean that "possession" is itself a separate substance, which they then call prāpti. Without such a substance how can passive karma be held in the continuum until it ripens? Without prāpti how can polluting tendencies (which are identical with active afflictions) be held in the continuum when they are not evidently active? Without prāpti how can a mind, which can not be both

virtuous and non-virtuous at the same moment, still possess non-virtuous dharmas when it is in a virtuous state?

The Sautrāntikas respond that this is creating substantial phenomena out of mere concepts or designations:

> Thus this "possession" (lDan Pa; samanvāgama) and its negation "non-possession" is in every case a nominal entity (bTags Pa'i Chos; prajñapti-dharma) and not a substantial entity.[57]

The key to the Sautrāntika solution is that the bīja or seeds within the mental continuum are not substantially existent dharmas at all, but potentialities, capacities for particular future states to arise. They admit that their own concept of "seeds" is also just that, a concept. The seed is not itself the mind nor is it a "thing" which the mind "possesses." It is the capacity of a certain action (karma) to produce a particular result in the psycho-physical continuum of an individual.

This sense of seed as a force or capacity or potential is made clear by Yaśomitra who says, "a seed is just a special potential (Nus Pa'i Khyad Par; śakti-viśeṣa); there is no thing called a seed, because it exists [only] nominally (bTags Pa'i Yod Pa; prajñapti-sattva)."[58]

And Vasubandhu, in arguing that there are such things as latent polluting tendencies says at {v.1}:

> What is the meaning of the term, "in the state of being a seed" (Sa Bon Gyi dNgos Po; bhīja-bhāva)? It is the capacity to generate affliction which arises from [previous] afflictions of the person; like the capacity of memory to arise from experiential knowledge (Nyams Su

> Myong Ba'i Shes Pa; anubhavajñāna); and like the capacity of the sprout etc. to produce rice grains which are born from rice grains.[59]

It may be noted here that the solution of *saṁtati-viśeṣa-pariṇāma* was only a temporarily satisfying solution for Vasubandhu. Later, in the Yogācāra phase of his career, he came to adopt the concept of the store-house consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), an encompassing repository for karmic seeds, as a more viable model for the preservation of karmic potentials. The ālaya is the repository of all the karmic seeds and it is the fundamental consciousness from which all of our experience arises. Since all phenomena are of the nature of mind for the Yogācāras, actions--karma--are not only the product of mental volition but are in themselves mental events. As mental events they in turn affect, as karmic seeds, the consciousness that produced them, the ālaya. Thus the karmic cycle is set up whereby actions (of the nature of mind) plant their seeds on the ālaya, which transforms consciousness and affects all future experience and generates future actions. But such considerations lead us far afield from the texts at hand.[60]

We can now look at the Vaibhāṣika arguments from sūtra in favor of non-revealing form, and the Sautrāntika responses, and understand them in the context of the two opposing models of the karmic process.

The Vaibhāṣikas ask, if not for non-revealing form how is it possible that one who orders another to commit an action such as murder, himself accumulates the karmic path? The answer, say the Sautrāntikas, is that by

intending the action to be committed one accumulates the subtle propensities (Bag Chags; vāsanā) which condition the mental continuum and will definitely yield fruition in the future.

If not for non-revealing form, how is it, ask the Vaibhāṣikas, that one who has taken a vow is still restrained by that vow, even when the mind is distracted by other things? The Sautrāntikas answer, it is by the intention that accepts the vow that one is restrained from the negative actions; and even when the mind is distracted by other things, due to that intention the mental factor of mindfulness remains close by, maintaining a vigilant watch against actions that break the vows.

**Virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral karma**

Almost a third of chapter on karma is taken up with explaining the three types of non-revealing karma. But before proceeding to that presentation we must familiarize ourselves with another way of categorizing karma, which lies at the heart of the Buddhist ethical and soteriological system.

The first verse of the fourth chapter tells us that, "The manifold world arises from karma." What is it that creates the vast diversity of life forms and infinite diversity of life experiences. If it is our actions, karma, planted as seeds and ripening in the future that creates our world and our experience,

what quality of karma is it that distinguishes one act from another and eventually yields the diversity of the world?

This critical quality of karma, the quality that makes karma meaningful as an ethical guidepost and plants it as the fundamental concept on the soteriological path, is its moral qualification: Every karma can be qualified as one of three types, virtuous (dGe Ba; kuśala), non-virtuous (Mi dGe Ba; akuśala) and neutral (Lung Ma bsTan Pa; avyākṛta).

Intentional karma and revealing karma can be any of these three, but non-revealing karma can only be virtuous or non-virtuous. This is because non-revealing karma is set in motion only by very strong revealing karma, and neutral actions are, by definition, not strong, not powerfully motivated nor directed to highly significant objects. It is in virtue of their very weakness of intention or moral quality that neutral karmas are neutral.

What are the definitions of virtue and non-virtue? The definitions are simple, pragmatic, and they illuminate the entire Buddhist ethical system as a phenomenology of human happiness. Virtuous action is action that leads to happy or pleasant or satisfying results. Non-virtue is action that leads to suffering. As dGe 'Dun Grub summarizes it:

> Karma that yields comfort (bDe Ba; kṣema) is virtuous karma. Karma that yields the discomfort (Mi bDe Ba; akṣema) of suffering is non-virtuous karma. The other karma, which creates a neutral feeling, is the other, neutral (Lung Ma bsTan Pa; avyākṛta) karma.[61]

The Buddha's teachings begin with and revolve around the universal

life reality of suffering. It is the first of the Four Noble Truths under which all of the Buddha's teachings can be organized. Lama Govinda has clearly expressed the importance of the truth of suffering as the cornerstone of the Buddhist system:

> As a real thinker [the Buddha] tried to find an axiom, a self-evident formulation of truth, which could be universally accepted. Descartes, the famous French philosopher, started his philosophy with the formula: "Cogito, ergo sum," "I think, therefore I am." The Buddha went one step further in starting with an even more universally established principle, based on an experience that is common to all sentient beings: the fact of suffering.
>
> ....There exists no experience which is equally universal. Not all sentient beings are thinking beings, and not all thinking beings reach the stage in which this faculty conceives its own nature and importance; but all sentient beings endure suffering, because all are subject to old age, decay and death.[62]

Virtuous karma, good action, is action that produces experience that is not characterized by suffering; and in particular, karma that creates the potential to experience the ultimate good, liberation from saṁsāra. Non-virtuous karma is action that leads to further suffering states, and the badness of an action can be determined by understanding the degree of suffering that it can lead to. Gaining such an understanding is one purpose of studying such subjects as the Abhidharma, the Vinaya and the sūtras.

In a further elaboration of the nature of virtue the *ADKB* {iv.8-9} describes four types of virtue and non-virtue:

Liberation is the "ultimate virtue (Don Dam Pa; paramārthatas),

because it is supreme happiness free of all suffering without exception."[63]

The second type of virtue is "virtue by nature (Ngo Bo Nyid; svabhāvatas)." This category consists of five mental factors which are inherently virtuous, without depending on the motivation that gives rise to them or the other mental states that they are associated with. These five mental factors include the three roots which act as the basic motivations of virtue, non-attachment, non-anger and non-ignorance (or wisdom); as well as two mental factors which play a central role in encouraging an individual to perform virtue and avoid non-virtue--shame (Ngo Tsa Shes Pa; hrī) and embarassment (Khrel Yod Pa; apatrāpya).

Then there are those minds and mental factors which are virtuous because they are concomitant with (mTsungs Par lDan Pa; saṁprayogatas) the above five naturally virtuous mental factors.

Finally, those actions of body and speech which are motivated by these naturally virtuous states and their concomitants are virtuous by way of their origin (Kun Nas sLong Ba; samutthānatas) or what motivates them.

We can then, by analogy, determine the opposite, four types of non-virtue:

Cyclic existence is the ultimate non-virtue because it is the supreme unhappiness, bound up with suffering.

The three roots of non-virtue, shamelessness and immodesty are non-

virtue by their very nature.

The mind and mental factors which are concomitant with these are non-virtues by being concomitant with the above five.

The karmas of body and speech which are motivated by these are non-virtue by way of their origin. It is this last type of non-virtue which once again highlights the relationship between polluting tendencies or afflictions and karma. The source or origin or motivation of the non-virtuous actions which result in our suffering experience is the afflicted states of mind, especially the five naturally non-virtuous states.

**The divisions of non-revealing karma**

Non-revealing karma results only from powerful actions; actions which, by virtue of their strong motivation or significant object, have the force to set in motion a non-revealing form which will continue until it reaches fruition. The *ADKB* explains that there are three types of non-revealing karma deriving from the three types of action that can produce it. They are restraint (sDom Pa; saṁvara), unrestraint (sDom Pa Ma Yin Pa; asaṁvara), and the in-between non-revealing karma which is neither restraint nor unrestraint.

Restraint is then further subdivided into three types: the prātimokṣa restraint; uncontaminated restraint; and the restraint that arises from concentration.

**The pratimokṣa restraint**

As dGe 'Dun Grub defines prātimokṣa {iv.13}, it is a restraint (or vow) which is characterized by morality (adopting of virtue and eschewing of non-virtue) which derives from a motivation of renunciation of cyclic existence for the sake of personal (prāti-) liberation (mokṣa). It is restricted to the Desire Realm, because in the upper realms there is no non-virtue, the rejection of which is the rationale for taking such restraints.

Of course prātimokṣa is well-known to students of Buddhism as the system of vows (restraints) by way of which an individual becomes a fully-engaged Buddhist lay-person (dGe bsNyen; upāsaka) or an ordained Buddhist monk or nun.[64] In fact there are four types of prātimokṣa restraint, which become eight by distinguishing three of the types by whether they are taken by males or females. The eight types of pratimokṣsa are: bhikṣu and bhikṣuṇī (dGe sLong); śikṣamāṇā (dGe sLob Ma); śrāmaṇera and śrāmaṇerikā (dGe Tsul); upāsaka and upāsikā (dGe bsNyen); and upavāsa (bsNyen gNas).

To briefly summarize the contents of each of these restraints:

The upāsaka/upāsika restraint or lay vows involves five precepts: abandoning killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying and alcohol, for as long as one lives.

The upavāsa restraint or "one day vows" involve eight precepts: abandoning the basic five mentioned above, plus abandoning three other sets

of activities--dance, song, music, and wearing flower garlands, perfume and ointments; using a large or high bed; and eating in the afternoon; in this restraint these eight vows are taken for one full day.

The śrāmaṇera/śrāmaṇerikā restraint involves ten precepts, taken for life: the basic five; dance, song and music; flower garlands, perfume and ointments; using large or high beds; eating after noon; and taking gold or silver.

The bhikṣu/bhikṣuṇi restraint involves "accepting the precepts of abandoning all things to be eschewed of body and speech for as long as one lives...That is also called the one who approaches completion (bsNyen Par rDzogs Pa; upasaṁpad). If one asks, why is it also called the one who approaches completion? The completion (rDzogs Pa) is Nirvāṇa which is free of all the harms of cyclic existence; and because they are approaching that they are called the ones who approach that completion."[65]

These are called restraints because they restrain non-virtuous actions of body and speech. Vasubandhu {iv.16} makes a distinction between prātimokṣa and prātimokṣa restraint, which highlights the nature of restraint as a non-revealing karma that is set in motion by a previous, strong, revealing karma, which is also called a karmic path:

> The revealing [karma] of having accepted a restraint correctly, and the initial non-revealing [karma] are called prātimokṣa, because by that, one is released from sins (So So Thar Pa'i Phyir; pratimokṣaṇāt). Which means they are abandoned.

> They are also called prātimokṣa restraint because they restrain the body and speech.
>
> They are also called karmic paths because they include the fundamental [actions.]
>
> The second instant onward are only prātimokṣa restraint, not prātimokṣa, because they are the aftermath, not the actual karmic paths.[66]

The prātimokṣa restraints are obtained "from the revealing karma of another" {iv.26}, which means by way of ordination from an authoritative source, when a preceptor (mKhen Po; upādhyāya) or master (sLob dPon; ācārya) performs the revealing action of the ordination ceremony to the ordainee and the latter in turn performs the revealing action of the ceremony to the preceptor. The restraints of bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī and śikṣamāṇā must be received from "the saṅgha," which means at least four bhikṣus; the others can be acquired from "an individual," which would include at least a preceptor or a master. In fact, ten forms of ordination are mentioned based on accounts from the sūtras.

**The restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint**

The other two restraints are the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint. These are forms of restraint that occur automatically upon the acquisition of certain attainments.

The restraint of concentration arises as soon as one attains the

meditative level of the first concentration, or even its preparatory level (Nyer bsDogs; sāmantaka) {iv.26}. There is no more non-virtuous action from the first concentration onward. And from the second concentration on, there is no more revealing karma {iv.7-8}. As the levels of meditative stabilization become more subtle, the grosser functions of the mind fall away. Above the first concentration there is no longer any investigation (rTog Pa; vitarka) or analysis (sPyod Pa; vicāra). These are the discriminating or determining functions that isolate and identify an object or purpose of action, and thus give the intentional action a forceful motivation. So above the first concentration, although beings do act, the actions are more spontaneous and lacking in strong motivations, and therefore they do not constitute revealing karma.

The uncontaminated restraint is the natural restraint that arises for those who attain the Āryan path by completing the Path of Seeing. The nature of this restraint is uncontaminated because it arises with the attainment of the uncontaminated path of the Āryan.

These two restraints, however, are "attendants of mind" {iv.17}, in that they are only present when the particular mind--a concentration or Āryan path--are present. And thus they can come and go with such minds. The prātimokṣa restraint, on the other hand, exists even when the mind is

distracted.

**Unrestraint**

Unrestraint (sDom Pa Ma Yin Pa; asaṁvara) is pretty much what it sounds like. It consists of lack of restraint in body and speech. It is explained at {iv.24} by means of its synonyms:

> Because it is scorned by the wise it is called bad conduct (Nyes sPyod; duścarita); because it is the opposite of morality (Tsul Khrims; śīla) it is called degenerate conduct ('Chal Ba'i Tsul Khrims; dauḥśīlya); because it is in the nature of action it is called karma; and because it is the path of that action it is called [karmic] path.[67]

Unlike restraint, unrestraint is not acquired by means of a ritual, but is acquired when one performs a particular non-virtuous action with the intention of continuing to perform that action. One does not have in mind a particular length of time, as in the case of the upavāsa restraint where one takes vows for one full day; in general unrestraint is open-ended and is considered to be for one's entire life, or until one abandons that evil intention.

The classic example of unrestraint is the butcher, who commits himself to a lifetime of making his living by killing, and then goes about killing animals. He creates an abiding, invisible karma called unrestraint or what Lamotte called "assent to non-virtue"[68] which makes of him a butcher, a killer, even when he is not physically practicing his trade.

For the Sautrāntikas unrestraint does not exist as a substantial entity in itself, but is merely the ongoing intention to continue to commit evil actions. The *ADKB* explains:

> The Sautrāntikas say: Unrestraint, like non-revealing [karma,] does not exist as a separate substance. Unrestraint is just the intention to commit a sin along with the factors associated [with the intention.] So, as long as that [intention] is not eliminated, even when a virtuous mind arises, one still possesses [the unrestraint.][69]

Unrestraint is given up or terminated by the taking of a restraint {iv.41}. So, for example, taking a prātimokṣa restraint, which includes the precept of not killing, will terminate the unrestraint of a butcher. It is also given up at the time of death because the body that formed the basis of the unrestraint is destroyed. It is also given up when the two sex organs occur at the same time, because the basis is damaged.[70]

**"In-between" non-revealing karma**

The last form of non-revealing karma is called "the in-between state" (Bar Ma; madhyama). It is acquired by taking actions in relation to especially powerful fields, such as the seven merits that arise from substances; or from actions that are done with very powerful motivations. And it is acquired through taking miscellaneous vows which are not systematized within the tradition like the prātimokṣa vows, such as pledging, "I will not eat before paying homage to the Buddha." {37c-d}

This in-between state non-revealing karma can be terminated in six ways: by the termination of the motivating affliction; by the termination of the pledge to do the action; by not doing the action even though it was pledged; by the disappearance of the powerful object, such as a stūpa or a weapon, which gave the action its force; by death; and by cutting the roots of virtue, which would put one into a state of unrestraint.

**Details of the pratimokṣa vows**

Having laid out the nature of the three types of non-revealing karma, the *ADKB* takes up some incidental points related to the taking of the various prātimokṣa vows. A few of these are of some interest and we will mention them here.

There is some mention in sūtra of lay-people who take only one or two etc. of the five precepts of an upāsaka; these are called the ekadeśakārin (sNa gCig sPyod Pa) and so forth.[71] The question then arises whether it is actually possible for an upāsaka to take the restraint of upāsaka with less than all five of the precepts {iv.30}.

The Vaibāṣikas maintain that one must take all five precepts included in the restraint, but that the ekadeśakārin etc. are those who, having taken all five precepts, degenerate and only observe one or more.

The Sautrāntikas disagree with this analysis and point to the sūtra

which, they say, shows that the Buddha taught that in the case of the upāsaka restraint one could take it without taking all of the precepts, although this is not true for the other forms of ordination.

In the vows related to the monastic levels of ordination one abandons all sexual activity; but the lay-person taking the upāsaka restraint only pledges to abandon sexual *misconduct*. Why is that? {iv.33}

Sexual misconduct is condemned by society because it is a violation of another person's spouse, and because it causes bad migrations. But this is not the case for sexual activity.

Āryans obtain a definite restraint from ever committing sexual misconduct in future lives, but it is not definite that they will never again have sexual activity.

Finally, it is not difficult for householders to refrain from sexual misconduct, but not at all easy for them to refrain from all sexual activity.

Lying and taking intoxicants are also singled out for particular reasons. Among the four non-virtues of speech, lying is included in the upāsaka restraint because if one does not lie one will have to confess one's other transgressions when asked. In this way, by not lying the other precepts are protected.

The same rationale applies to not drinking. Drinking is a misdeed of disobedience (bCas Pa'i Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya),[72] which is to say it is not inherently non-virtuous, and alcohol can be taken with a good motivation, for example as medicine. But drinking alcohol is forbidden for the sake of safeguarding the other precepts. Because when one is intoxicated one is more likely to break them.

**The nature of the Three Jewels of Refuge**

In order to take one of the prātimokṣa restraints one must take refuge in the three jewels. The question arises, in what does one take refuge? {iv.32}

One does not take refuge in the body of the Buddha but in the dharmas of No-more-learning which produce the enlightened state of Buddhahood. The body of the Buddha is, after all, the same body he had before he attained Buddhahood.

Does one take refuge in one Buddha, or in all the Buddhas of all times? One takes refuge in all the Buddhas, because their paths are the same.

The analysis is similar for the sañgha, although in the case of the sañgha one takes refuge in their dharmas of Learning as well as No-more-learning which produce the sañgha; but it is not in the bodies of the members of the sañgha that one takes refuge.

Refuge in the dharma means taking refuge in Nirvāṇa, the Truth of

Cessation.

**Who possesses non-revealing karma**

Finally, the *ADKB* {iv.43-44} discusses the type of individuals who possess these types of non-revealing karma. Humans have both restraint and unrestraint, except for natural-born eunuchs (Za Ma; ṣaṇḍha), those of confused gender (Ma Ning; paṇḍaka), hermaphrodites (mTsan gNyis Pa; ubhaya-vyañjana), and the Uttarakurus.[73]

The Uttarakurus, who live in the Northern continent, do not undertake prātimokṣa restraints, and they lack meditative stabilization from which the other two restraints might arise. On the other hand, these beings are even-tempered, so no strong negative actions arise to create unrestraint.

The eunuchs, those of confused gender and hermaphrodites are a special case among humans in our own world. They are excluded by the scriptures from taking any of the prātimokṣa vows because they have the strongest afflictions of both genders, they can not bear to do practices such as meditation which would act as antidotes to those afflictions, and they do not have strong shame or embarassment.[74] On the other hand, these same individuals are incapable of unrestraint because of that same weak-willed quality of mind--they simply lack the firm disposition of mind (bSam Pa Mi brTan Pa; sthira-āśaya) to take strong virtuous or non-virtuous actions.

Restraint and unrestraint are in opposition to each other; there can be unrestraint only in those for whom there can be restraint.[75]

Although Leonard Zwilling has written that, "this view of the paṇḍaka as lascivious, shameless, unfilial, and vacillating is based on the social disabilities incurred by the paṇḍaka as a member of a stigmatized and outcasted group;"[76] it also serves to point up the importance placed on having a fully intact body or basis of action, and a strong focused intentional mind in carrying out an action, in order to create a non-revealing karma.

Above the Desire Realm there is no unrestraint; but Desire Realm gods can have, and gods of the Form Realm invariably have the restraint of concentration. Gods of the Form and Formless Realms, except for those in the special first concentration and beings in the two non-conscious absorptions have the uncontaminated restraint.[77]

**Other ways of classifying karma**

The remainder of Chapter Four of the *ADKB* is taken up with the resolution of synonyms, or what we might call congruent categories. These are the different ways in which karma is classified and analyzed in the sūtras and śāstras.

We have already mentioned the central three-fold division of karma as virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral. We now find two parallel three-fold

classifications of karma {iv.45}: meritorious (bSod Nams; puṇya), demeritorious (bSod Nams Ma Yin Pa; apuṇya), and immoveable karma (Mi gYo Ba; aniñjya).

And, karma that is to be experienced as pleasure (bDe Ba Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; sukha-vedanīya), to be experienced as suffering (sDug bsNgal Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; duḥkha-vedanīya), and karma to be experienced as neither pleasure nor suffering (bDe Ba Yang Ma Yin sDug bsNgal Yang Ma Yin Pa Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; aduḥkha-asukha-vedanīya).

Meritorious karma is virtuous karma of the Desire Realm, whereas immoveable karma is virtuous karma in the two upper realms. In the Desire Realm karma is slightly malleable in its precise retribution. For example, karma to be born as a god could lead to a rebirth in a variety of god forms, and due to various causes and conditions it could even take fruition in a human or animal rebirth.

But on the upper levels karma is immoveable: it can not possibly take fruition on a level other than the level which is appropriate to it.

"Demeritorious," says Vasubandhu, "is non-virtuous karma. It is renowned in the world. What need is there [to expand] here on something whose meaning is well understood in the world?"[78]

**The ways in which karma is to be experienced**

The word karma means action. In common discourse, however, we tend to use the word slightly differently: when we drive the brand-new car we have just purchased out of the show-room and we are immediately hit by oncoming traffic, we console ourselves with the thought, "It's my karma." What we mean here is that the collision was the result of my karma. This usage is a case of giving the name of the cause to the result. In this way we tend to use the term karma to refer to the mechanism whereby our actions (karma) produce and determine our future experience, rather than to the actions themselves, which are, properly our karma. In the *ADKB* the results of karma are dealt with in a section on the ways in which karma is to be experienced.

At {iv.49} Vasubandhu tells us that there are five ways in which karma "is to be experienced (Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; vedanīya)." The most important of which, for our purposes, is karma to be experienced as fruition (rNam sMin Gyis; vipāka), such as virtuous and non-virtuous karma; this is "karma to be experienced in this life and so forth" which is expiained at great length.

Karma to be experienced as fruition is of four types {iv.50}: There is karma that is certain (Nges Pa; niyata) to be experienced, and karma that does not necessarily come to be experienced (Ma Nges Pa; aniyata). There are three types of certain karma: karma to be experienced in this life, that is,

in the life in which it was performed (mThong Chos La Myong 'Gyur Gyi Las; dṛṣṭa-dharma-karma); karma to be experienced after rebirth (sKyes Nas; upapadya) in the next life; and karma to be experienced in subsequent existences (Lan Grangs gZhan La; aparaparyāya), which will be experienced in the life after next and those lives following.

Karma that is certain to be experienced as fruition is a strong karma, an action that has the force to project ('Phen Pa; akṣepa) a future rebirth, to determine the type of being--god, human, animal, etc.--that will constitute the psycho-physical aggregates in the next life or in some subsequent life. For every rebirth, then, a projecting karma determines the psycho-physical form, the realm of rebirth of the being. (The circumstances in which that being finds herself will be filled in by "completing karma," which will be discussed below.)

This karma can be strong in terms of its motivation, deriving from intense afflictions or intense purity; it can be strong in terms of the object or field, for example devotion to the Three Jewels, or on the other hand, killing one's father or mother; or it can be strong in that it was an action done habitually, such as a professional thief or an obsessive liar.

Other karma to be experienced as fruition, if it is not as strong as these examples, may project a future rebirth, but its form is not certain.

As for karma to be experienced in the present life, this is karma that

has an almost immediate effect on one's physical form, in the very life in which the action is committed, due to a special quality of the field, or of the intention. This type of karma seems almost miraculous in the examples supplied by the *ADKB*: In a previous life of the Buddha he was a trouble-maker who insulted another bhikṣu by telling him, "A woman should pacify a woman's quarrel." Due to that karma he became a woman in that very life and was born as a woman for the next 500 years.

Then we are told a story of a king's eunuch who comes across a herd of bulls about to be castrated. Out of his sympathetic compassion he freed the bulls, and thereby recovered his sex organs.[79]

But this is also the type of karma that might be used to account for "miraculous" cures, for example the spontaneous recovery of a dying person due to extremely powerful and sincere religious devotions.

**Can one karma project more than one rebirth?**

An important disagreement concerning this mechanism of projecting karma arises between the Vaibhāṣikas on the one hand and the Sautrāntikas (as well as all Mahāyāna schools) on the other. The issue occurs at {iv.95} and concerns the question of whether one karma projects only one rebirth or can it project more than one.

The Vaibhāṣikas insist that one karma can only project one rebirth.

Furthermore, each rebirth is projected by only one karma; if this were not the case, a rebirth, an homogenous existence (Ris mThun Pa; nikāya-sabhāga), would have to be projected in parts.

The argument on this issue revolves around a sūtra citation:

> The Sthavira Aniruddha (Ma 'Gags Pa) said to the bhikṣus, "Oh Venerables. When I was born in Varanasi as a poor man who lived by collecting grass, I offered alms to the Pratyekabuddha Āsādya (sTeng Nas Sam) or to the Pratyekabuddha Tagaraśikhin (sPyi gTzug Me Tog Ta Kar lTa Bu). By the fruition of that single offering of alms that I made, I was born seven times among the gods of the Thirty-three, and seven times I became a Cakravartin King, and now I am born into the lineage of the wealthy Śākyas."[80]

The Vaibhaṣikas deny that their view is in contradiction to this passage. They interpret the meaning of the passage to be that based on that original act of giving Sthavira Aniruddha continued to gain good rebirths and continued to perform virtuous karma. They say it is similar to a person who has become rich by investing and compounding a single coin. That person would say, "I became rich with one penny."

The Vaibhāṣikas also point out that the act of giving was accompanied by a whole complex of intentional actions, joy, rejoicing and so forth, and each of these may project a rebirth.

One rebirth is projected by only one karma, but the qualities of that existence, the beauty or ugliness of form, the wealth or poverty, the power and position, all these external factors that contribute to the happiness or unhappiness of a particular existence are determined by completing karma. It

is like a painter, say the Vaibhāṣikas, who draws the outline of his painting with one brush--projecting karma, and then completes the picture with various colors using other brushes--completing karma.

To illustrate this point dGe 'Dun Grub presents the four possibilities of good and bad projecting and completing karma:

1) Virtuous projecting but non-virtuous completing karma is, for example, being born as a human or a Desire Realm god; happy rebirths but still subject to a variety of forms of suffering.

2) Non-virtuous projecting but virtuous completing karma is, for example, beings who are born in bad migrations but with good conditions, such as Dharmarāja Yama (Chos Kyi rGyal Po gShin rJe), the lord of death, who resides in hell but does not experience all the sufferings of hell. We can also include here many domestic pets, who are in dumb, bad migrations, but are well fed and comfortable.

3) Virtuous projecting and completing karma is, for example, the gods of the Form Realm, who have happy rebirths during which, in general, they do not experience gross forms of suffering.

4) When both projecting and completing karma is non-virtuous one experiences such extreme forms of suffering as Avīci hell.

The Sautrāntikas and the Mahāyāna schools hold that one powerful karma can project many future rebirths, based on the above sūtra and other

sūtra passages.

## Introduction to the ten karmic paths

From {iv.65} to {iv.86} the *ADKB* elaborates a discussion of the "karmic paths" (Las Lam; karma-patha), which have been described, with some accuracy, as the Buddhist equivalent to the Ten Commandments of Judaism. These are the ten non-virtuous actions which form the core of the Buddhist ethical system and as such are the main actions that are to be avoided in the practice of abandoning non-virtue and cultivating virtue.

There are three karmic paths of body, four of speech, and three of mind and they will be defined below. Why are they called karmic paths {iv.78}?

> From the three of mind the intention embarks ('Jug Pa) on its path, so they are paths. The seven of body and speech are also action (karma), and because they are the paths upon which the intention embarks, they are called karmic paths.[81]

These ten were culled out of the various virtuous and non-virtuous actions that are discussed in sūtra and put together in a list of the "most prominent from among the good conducts and the bad conducts." {iv.66}

## The three stages of a karmic action

Before we proceed to examine the ten karmic paths we need to understand the framework of analysis that is applied to each karmic act.

There are considered to be three stages to every karma: the preparation (sByor; maula), the actual action (dNgos; prayoga) and the subsequent stage (rJes; pṛṣṭha). Each of these stages is itself a karma, or a collection of karmas, and when they all come together in an action, that action is a fully complete karma, a karmic path.

In the case of killing, for example, in the preparation stage one buys a gun, buys bullets, follows the victim, makes a plan and so forth. In the actual act, one kills the victim. The subsequent stage requires that the killer actually cognize the death, the completion of the action, and take satisfaction in its completion, not regretting it immediately after the actual action.

The preparation and subsequent stages are not themselves karmic paths because they are both rooted in and performed in relation to the actual action; and they are not among the most significant virtuous or non-virtuous actions {iv.78}. The *ADKB* tells us here that karmic paths are those actions whose "increase and decrease brings about an increase or decrease of inner and outer things in the world."[82]

**Defining the ten karmic paths**

**Killing**

What are the ten karmic paths?

Killing (Srog gCod Pa; prāṇātipāta) is killing another unmistakenly in

accordance with one's intention. If one kills accidentally it is not the full karma, the karmic path, of killing. One must kill the actual being that one intended to kill; if you kill a different person from the one you intended to kill it is not a complete karmic path, because you did not fulfill your intention. You must kill someone other than yourself; suicide is not complete because the agent of the actual act of killing is not around to complete the subsequent stage.

Similarly, if the killer dies at the same time as, or before the victim, the actual action is not complete {iv.72}. Because upon death the killer takes a new body, which is different from the body that performed the preparation for the killing.

On the other hand, for a group of soldiers working together to execute a war, when one kills, they all have the karmic path of killing, because they are all there with the same purpose or intention to kill.

In connection with the concept of killing, the *ADKB* asks an interesting question {iv.73}: If the aggregates are momentary, how can there be killing or destruction of life (Srog; prāṇa)? Life is explained as a wind ('Jug Pa'i rLung; vāyu) which depends on the body and mind. Killing is the destruction (gCod Pa; atipāta) of that. Life is terminated like the extinguishing of a flame or the stopping of the sound of a bell. Or else, life is the faculty of life (Srog Gi dBang Po; jīvitendriya), and killing is the termination of that. In that case

killing would be constituted by the obstruction of the arisal of a moment of the faculty of life.

But to whom does that life belong? Who is dead when that faculty of life is gone?

The question of "who" possesses life will be examined by Vasubandhu in the Ninth Chapter on the Refutation of the Pudgala. But here he points out that the Bhagavan has said:

> When life, heat and consciousness quit the body,
> it lies abandoned, like a piece of wood without mind.

Therefore, one says "it is alive" of a body that is endowed with the faculties; without the faculties, it is dead.[83]

**Stealing and sexual misconduct**

Stealing (Ma Byin Par Len Pa; adattādāna) is, in accordance with one's intention and unmistakenly, to take possession of another's wealth by power or stealth.

There are four types of sexual misconduct ('Dod Pas Log Par gYem Pa; kāma-mithyā-cāra): To have sexual intercourse with an unsuitable object: the wife of another; or with ones own female relatives, mother or sister or those related to ones father and mother out to the seventh line of cousins. To have sex by an unsuitable limb: through the avenue of the mouth or the anus. To have sex in an unsuitable place: in an open area or in the presence of a stupa

or a temple. To have sex at an unsuitable time: with a woman who is nursing, who is pregnant, or with one who has taken the one-day vows of upavāsa. Again, these actions must be intentional and unmistaken for a karmic path to arise.

It must be said that a large part of the rationale for the injunction against having sex with certain categories of women derives from the notion that one is stealing the woman from her rightful owner, guardian or protector. This is evident in the *ADKB* commentary to {iv.74}, where we learn that having sex with a young maiden is a violation committed against the man to whom she is promised; if she is not engaged, it is against her guardian; if there is none, it is against the ruler of the land. Similarly, having sex with a bhikṣuṇi is committing sexual misconduct with respect to the ruler of the land, for whom such deeds are not to be tolerated. The notion of sexual misconduct as stealing a woman from her owner is most explicit at {iv.82} where we learn that there is no stealing or sexual misconduct in the hells nor in Uttarakuru because, "there is no sense of ownership of material things or of women."[84]

However, we do get some sense that the mere act of contravening the vows is inherently a violation, irrespective of who "is in control of" the woman, because the commentary goes on to say that even for the king himself, when his own wife has taken vows, she is a forbidden sexual

object.[85]

**The four karmic paths of speech**

Lying (rDzun Tsig; mṛṣā-vaca) is when one intentionally and unmistakenly changes another person's discrimination from what is actually the case, when the other person understands the meaning of the words you speak.

The above four karmic paths are called the "four roots," and the following six are called the "six branches" by dGe 'Dun Grub.

Slander (Phra Ma; paiśunya) is to intentionally and unmistakenly say words, with an afflicted mind, intended to alienate people who have friendly relations, when those words are understood by the others.

Harsh words (Tsig rTzub; pāruṣya) is to intentionally and unmistakenly say unfriendly words, when the meaning is understood by the other person.

All afflicted speech is idle chatter (Ngag Kyal Pa; saṁbhinna-pralāpa). However, the *ADKB* {iv.77} says that other schools maintain that only afflicted speech that is other than the three described above is idle chatter. For example: a bhikṣu who boasts of his attainments (Kha gSag; lapanā) as an improper means of gaining a living (Log Pas 'Tso Ba; mithyā-jīva), or one who sings out of passion; or actors who, in order to entertain others during a performance, tell a story (gTam rGyud); or to recite inferior scriptures of non-

Buddhists with enthusiasm.

**Covetousness, harmful thoughts and wrong view**

Covetousness (brNab Sems; abhidhyā) is, having wrongly and inappropriately craved another's wealth, to desire to make it one's own. The commentary {iv.77} points to another opinion according to which all craving (Sred Pa; tṛṣṇā) of the Desire Realm is covetousness. Vasubandhu concludes that although all craving of the Desire Realm may be covetousness, it does not all constitute a karmic path, because the karmic paths are a collection of the most prominent forms of bad conduct.

Harmful thoughts (gNod Sems; vyāpada) are desiring to do harm by dwelling in a state of hatred toward sentient beings.

Wrong view (Log Par lTa Ba; mithyā-dṛṣṭi) is the view that there is no virtue nor non-virtue, no giving, no offering, no fire offering, no good action, no bad action, no Arhats in the world and so forth. So false view consists of denying karma and its results, the Āryans, and all the essential elements of the Buddhist path system.

**The three root afflictions as motivations for the ten karmic paths**

In terms of the motivation that initiates the preparation stage of a karmic path, all ten can be motivated by any of the three root afflictions,

attachment, anger or ignorance {iv.68-69}.

For example, killing obviously can be motivated by anger; but it can also be motivated by the desire for meat (attachment); or by ignorance, as in ritual animal sacrifice, where one (wrongly) believes that the killing is beneficial.

Stealing can obviously be motivated by attachment; but it can also be motivated by hatred, as in stealing to harm an enemy; and by ignorance, such as Communists taking away property because they believe it is right.

Sexual misconduct can be motivated not only by attachment, but also by hatred, as in rape in order to humiliate someone; or by ignorance, as in the case of those who say that, "Women are like flowers, fruit, well-made food, the ford of a river or a road--they are there to serve everyone."[86]

The same analysis can be applied to the four karmic paths of speech.

The three karmic paths of mind, covetousness, harmful thoughts and wrong view can be said to arise from any of the three root afflictions because each one can immediately follow all three in the mental continuum.

The preparations of the ten virtuous karmic paths are motivated by non-attachment, non-anger and non-ignorance.

On the other hand, in terms of the actual root affliction that accomplishes the actual action of the karmic path, that is, the state of mind

at the moment of performing the actual action, there is a more restricted rule {iv.70-71}:

The three, killing, harmful thoughts and harsh words are actualized (mThar Phyin Par Byed Pa; niṣṭhā) by hatred.

The three, sexual misconduct, covetousness and stealing are accomplished (rDzog Par Byed; samāpana) by attachment.

Wrong view is accomplished by ignorance, because wrong view arises from extreme ignorance.

The remaining three, lying, slander and idle chatter can be accomplished by any of the three poisons.

**The three types of results of karmic paths**

To conclude his discussion of the karmic paths dGe 'Dun Grub describes the results of these actions {iv.85}. All non-virtuous karmic paths yield three types of results: sovereign result, naturally flowing result and fruitional result.

The fruitional result of a karmic path is the type of rebirth that the action will cause one to have in a future rebirth. The fruitional result of the greatest non-virtues--those that are "assiduously performed, habitually done or repeatedly practiced"[87]--is rebirth in the hells. For the karmic paths that are not as strongly practiced there is rebirth as an animal; for still weaker

non-virtues there is rebirth as a hungry ghost.[88]

The naturally flowing result is a result that is similar to its cause. Examples of naturally flowing results of karmic paths are: By taking life, one's life will be short. By stealing, one will be devoid of material enjoyments. By wrongful sexual activity, one will have a wife who is an enemy. By harsh words, one will be greatly insulted by others. By idle chatter, one's own words will not be valued. By covetousness one will have intense desires. By harmful thoughts one will have intense hatred. By wrong view one will have profound ignorance.

The sovereign result includes all the external conditions in which one finds oneself in the new rebirth produced as the fruitional result. By killing, external objects have little vitality. By stealing, one is born in an environment that has many dangers such as hail and rain etc. By sexual misconduct the place is filled with dirt. By lying the place is of foul odor. By slander the place is uneven. By harsh words the place is barren, dry, inferior and inhabited by evil persons. By idle chatter the place has an unbalanced climate. By covetousness the crops are small. By harmful thought the crops are sour. By wrong view the crops are few or non-existent.

There is some dispute as to how these three types of results relate to the actions that produce them. According to the opinion just described, each karma has three types of results. According to another opinion, the fruitional

result is due to the preparation and the naturally flowing result is due to the actual action.

Vasubandhu, however, suggests that these distinctions are purely nominal, and that the karmic path of killing means the entire complex of actions involved in killing, and the three types of result are similarly of a piece, and inseparably resulting from the whole act of killing. Naming the results as three types of results is purely descriptive:

> What is called naturally flowing result does not exist separately from fruitional result and sovereign result. It is expressed in that way [as naturally flowing result] because of the similarity [between the cause and its result.][89]

**The five automatic transgressions**

As a subset of the ten karmic paths there are five particular actions which are so powerful in their negative consequences that they yield fruition that is certain to be birth in the hell realms in the very next life. These are referred to as the five automatic transgressions (mTsams Med Pa'i Las; ānantaryam karma). These five actions are: killing one's mother; killing one's father, killing an Arhat; causing a schism in the saṅgha; causing blood to flow from the body of a Tathāgata with malicious intent.

The first three of these involve killing, and the fifth is preparation for killing, so they are karma of body. Causing a schism in the saṅgha is a form of lying, so it is karma of speech.

These karmas become especially powerful because the field or object

upon which they are carried out is a special field of benefit {iv.103}. Killing one's father or mother is an automatic transgression whereas killing a stranger is not, because father and mother have bestowed the extraordinary benefit of creating one's body which is suitable for attaining liberation. Similarly, the Arhat, sañgha and Buddha are special fields of merit.

The *ADKB* proceeds with various esoteric permutations of this issue, such as the question whether killing one's father who has changed his sex and become a woman is an automatic transgression. (It is.) But among the issues raised here is one that is striking for its relevance to modern day disputes between "natural" and "surrogate" mothers. As dGe 'Dun Grub explains it:

> If the embryo (Nur Nur Po; kalala) of one woman is inserted into the womb of another and is born from that womb, killing which of these two women would constitute an automatic transgression?
>
> Between these two, the first, from whose egg (Zla mTsan; śoṇita) one arises, she is one's mother; and therefore if one kills the first woman it becomes [an automatic transgression;] because she was principle in creating this body that is conducive to liberation. The second woman, who holds one in her womb, is not [one's mother,] because doing just what she does is not the principle [basis for motherhood.][90]

The automatic transgression of drawing the blood of a Tathāgata with malice requires that one's intention is to kill him, not merely to wound him or do him harm. {iv.104}

**Causing a schism in the sañgha**

But among the five automatic transgressions, lying in order to cause a schism in the sañgha is the most serious, because:

> It injures the Dharma-body (Chos Kyi sKu; dharma-śarīra) of the Tathāgatas; and until the divided sañgha is once again reconciled, in the world there will be an obstacle to entry into the path (Nges Pa; niyāma), to the obtainment of fruits, to being freed from attachment, and to the extinction of contamination.[91] And also [people] will not engage in the concentrations, in reading, reciting prayers, or [virtuous] mental karma; and so it obstructs [the attainment] of higher states and emancipation (Byang Grol; apavarga).[92]

The *ADKB* {97-102} goes into extensive discussion of the true nature of the automatic transgression of causing a schism in the sañgha.

In the Vaibhāṣika view the automatic transgression is not found in the schism per se, in the dividing into two factions of a monastic unit; this they see as a substantial dharma which is included among the dharmas which are not associated with the mind (Sems Dang lDan Pa Ma Yin Pa; citta-viprayukta), and is possessed by the two sides of the sañgha which divides. The active karma that is the automatic transgression is the lie which causes the schism.

Only a very special person can cause such a schism, and only at a particular time period and place. It must be a bhikṣu, and one with sharp faculties and a reputation for high moral standards, because this fellow (and it must be a man) is going to be perceived by one segment of the sañgha as a rival to the Buddha. Therefore, among the two types of weakness that the

sañgha is susceptible to, this bhikṣu is one who indulges in views (lTa Ba sPyad Pa; dṛṣṭi-carita) which are wrong, or contradictory to the dharma--the teaching of the Buddha and the way things truly are; but it is not a monk who indulges in desire (Sred Pa sPyad Pa; tṛṣṇa-carita) and thereby lets his morality or restraints degenerate.

The minimum number of bhikṣus involved is nine: there must be two sets of four to constitute two separate sañghas, plus the schismatic monk.

The schism can only occur in Jambudvipa, on a continent where a Buddha is living, but only in a locale where the Buddha is not present. If the Buddha were in fact on the scene, his majesty would be so powerful that no other members of the sañgha would follow the schismatic monk in opposition to the Buddha.

Also, in the course of the Buddha's career, there are six time periods when schism can not occur: shortly after his initial turning of the wheel of the dharma, because all his disciples are united in their great enthusiasm; and at the end, when the Buddha is close to Parinirvāṇa, when all can perceive the Buddha as a rare jewel, and they are aware of impermanence at that time. It can not occur after the Buddha is gone, because he is not there to be opposed. It can not occur in the early years of the Buddha's teaching when no faults of view or of morality have yet arisen among the disciples. The Buddha's two foremost disciples, Maudgalyāyana and Śāriputra, must be

present, because they are the ones who reconcile the split. The extent of the boundaries of the religious community must be clearly defined, because a schism is the division of one religious community, and without clear boundaries that could not be determined.

Such a schism can only last one night and the saṅgha will be reconciled by the following morning.

Only monks who are ordinary individuals and not Āryans can be divided, because Āryans have directly experienced the truth of the teachings of the Buddha, and from this their faith is strong.

The schism technically occurs when one portion of the saṅgha willingly accepts the rival--in the particular instance in the sutras it was Devadatta--as their teacher instead of the Buddha, and accepts his interpretation of certain rules in contradistinction to the rules laid down by the Buddha.

Such a schism in the saṅgha is held to be a "schism of the wheel of the dharma" (Chos Kyi 'Khor Lo'i dByen; dharma-cakra-bheda). Because, for as long as the saṅgha is divided and not reconciled, the path cannot arise in anyone's mental continuum.

This type of schism is an automatic transgression, but there is another type of schism which is not an automatic transgression:

A ritual schism (Las Kyi dByen; karma-bheda) occurs when one

religious community (mTsams; sīmā) divides so that two groups perform ritual actions (Las; karma) such as the bimonthly confession (gSo sByong; poṣadha) separately. This type of schism can occur in the three continents other than Uttarakuru. It requires that the Buddha's teaching be present but the Buddha himself is not present. It requires a minimum of eight bhikṣus to make up two separate saṅghas of four each, but no ninth individual is required to instigate it.

As mentioned above, causing a schism in the saṅgha is the gravest of the automatic transgressions, and the fruition of this karma is to be born in Avīci for one intermediate kalpa. After that, their ranking, in descending order of seriousness is: causing the blood to flow from a Tathāgata; killing an Arhat; killing one's mother; killing one's father. For these other automatic transgressions, the fruition is to be born somewhere in the hells, but it is not definite that one will be born in Avīci. {iv.99} However, it is always the case that automatic transgressions result in rebirth in hell in the very next life.

**The five near automatic transgressions**

There is a further set of five actions which are called transgressions similar to the automatic transgressions (mTsams Med Pa Dang Cha 'Dra Ba; ānantarya-sabhāga) or near transgressions. The fruition of these actions is to be born in hell although it is not definite that this fruition will arise in the next

life. {iv.106-107}

These five are described as being analogous to the five automatic transgressions: To sexually violate one's mother who is also an Arhat is analogous to killing one's mother. To kill a Bodhisattva who has reached the predestined stage (Nges Par rTogs Pa; niyati-patita)[93] is analogous to killing one's father. To kill any of the seven types of individuals who are Āryan Learners is analogous to killing an Arhat. To steal the property ('Du Ba'i sGo; sukhāya-dvārika) of the saṅgha is analogous to causing a schism in the saṅgha. To destroy, with malicious motivation, a stūpa or an image of the body, speech and mind of the Buddha, is analogous to drawing the blood of a Tathāgata with malice.

At {iv.107} the *ADKB* concludes this discussion of the heaviest of negative karmas with the hopeful message that there are three karmas which "impede" the fruition of other certain karmas: The attainment of the level of Patience on the Path of Preparation impedes all future rebirth into a bad migration {vi.23}. The attainment of Non-returner impedes future rebirth in the Desire Realm. And the attainment of Arhatship impedes future rebirth in the three realms of saṁsāra.

**The Bodhisattva ideal in the *ADKB* and Vasubandhu's doctrinal development**

Having mentioned the killing of a Bodhisattva as a near transgression, the *ADKK* takes the opportunity to embark on four verses of discussion of the nature and karmic causes of a Bodhisattva {iv.108-112}. This leaves dGe 'Dun Grub's discussion of the Bodhisattva path falling anomalously under the outline rubric of, "The explanation of the five near transgressions," an illustration of the limits of the Tibetan art of outlining when dealing with encyclopedic Indian texts such as the *ADKB*.

For non-Mahāyāna Indian schools of Buddhism the Bodhisattva path is the path that is followed only by Buddhas and differs from that of the Arhats in that it includes an extraordinary accumulation of merits carried out over three countless eons, which leads to a particularly rapid traversing, in a final meditation session, of the Paths of Seeing, Meditation and No-more-learning. This is the path followed by Buddhas who appear in order to set in motion the wheel of the Dharma, and in particular it was the path followed by the Śakya prince who became the Buddha of our age.

It should not be too surprising, then, that Vasubandhu describes with the highest praise and the most profound admiration, the Bodhisattva ideal. Still, it must strike the reader of the *ADKB* that in his presentation of the views of the Vaibhāṣikas--a school which could not be more conservatively "Hīnayānist"[94] in its philosophical view--Vasubandhu is uninhibited in his reverence for a path which lies at the heart of the Mahāyāna system.

Here, in the *Abhidharmakośa*, which all scholars agree represents the Vaibhāṣika view with a Sautrāntika critique, we find the bodhisattva praised for his unswerving efforts on behalf of sentient beings, which he undertakes because he is under the influence of great compassion {iv.108}. The power of this motivation to benefit all sentient beings is evident in the commentary on the nature of giving {iv.117}, where we see that the highest form of giving is the giving by one who is liberated to another who is liberated; but of similar weight to such an exalted act of giving is giving performed by a bodhisattva:

> Among all types of giving, THE HIGHEST IS BY ONE WHO IS LIBERATED TO ONE WHO IS LIBERATED. The gift given by one who is free of attachment to another who is free of attachment is said by the Bhagavan to be the best type of giving among material gifts. OR BY THE BODHISATTVA. Or, that gift which the Bodhisattva gives for the purpose of benefitting all beings, is the best type of giving by one who is not liberated to those who are not liberated.[95]

At {iv.111} the question is asked, "What were the circumstances in which the bodhisattva fulfilled the perfections (Pha Rol Du Phyin Pa; pāramitā)?" And the next seven verses are devoted to explaining the perfection of giving. This portion of our Hīnayāna text could have turned up in almost any Mahāyāna sūtra.

On the one hand we should not overstate the significance of this: clearly the context of praise for the bodhisattva is that the Buddha followed this path, and there is no exhortation to the rest of us to follow suit, as we

would expect in a Mahāyāna text. And although we find praise of great compassion (Thugs rJe Chen Po; mahākaruṇā) there is no mention of bodhicitta per se.

On the other hand we find here central features of Mahāyāna doctrine thoroughly interwoven into a Hīnayāna schema, and we find the Hīnayānists absolutely comfortable with those ideas. As Bechert points out, holders of Hīnayāna tenets often lived together in the same monasteries with holders of Mahāyāna tenets, and they were able do so because they shared a common vinaya rule (vinaya-karma).[96]

The study of Abhidharma is itself a testament to the porous and variable nature of Buddhist tenet systems; even within the single school of the Vaibhāṣikas we find numerous interpretations of very central points, for example the four different interpretations of the way in which the three times substantially exist, which are presented in the *Vibhāṣā*.[97]

The essence of Abhidharma is exegesis of sūtra. Although schools undoubtedly formed around critical philosophical points, exegesis and argument is by nature a dynamic process. The scholarly and historical tendency to define and delimit schools by imputing certain views to certain names is hard to resist, and the Tibetan exegetes were particularly susceptible to this temptation. But it can easily lead us into conceptions of reified structures, where in fact, philosophy was always an ongoing dynamic

process, and in the Indian context ideas were constantly being challenged, shared and traded within and between various schools.

In this context, it hardly comes as a surprise that Vasubandhu became a Mahāyānist. His efforts to solve the problems of karmic theory, which can be traced from the *ADKB* through the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and into his Yogācāra texts, has been pointed out as one cause of his philosophical development.[98]

But we might add to that the other side of the Mahāyāna equation, the bodhisattva ideal and the transcendent power of compassion, which Vasubandhu describes enthusiastically in the *ADKB*, and which would have seemed an appealing path to any Vaibhāṣika or Sautrāntika monk seeking to emulate the Buddha and attain his highest realizations.

**The karma of the Bodhisattva**

The *ADKB* tells us that one is a bodhisattva who is predestined to attain Nirvāṇa (Nges Par rTogs Pa; niyati-patita)[99] from the point at which one begins to project the karma whose fruition will be the 32 marks of a Buddha. Such a bodhisattva possesses six special qualities: from then on he will be born in happy migrations; he will only be born into high castes; his faculties are complete; he is male; he remembers his past lives in all of his births; he will attain Buddhahood in 100 kalpas without being deterred.

The cause for acquiring such extraordinary virtues is that these Great Souls (bDag Nyid Chen Po; mahātma) are, "motivated by great compassion, not disheartened by any type of suffering or opposition [in their pursuit of] the purpose of others; for all sentient beings, without pride, they take responsibility for the welfare of others."[100]

We then find a description of the special qualities associated with the accumulation of this karma which ripens into the 32 marks {iv.109}. Because it requires the sharpest faculties it is accumulated only by males born in Jambudvipa. It must be accumulated in the presence of a Buddha, with the Buddha taken as the intentional object. He accumulates this karma when there are no more than 100 great kalpas before his enlightenment. Each of these 32 marks arises from 100 merits. Those 100 merits are equal to, according to one opinion, the amount of merits having its result in the enjoyment of all sentient beings; according to others it is equal to the karma of sentient beings which causes the creation of the universe; others say it is so vast that only Buddha can comprehend it.

In verses {iv.111-112} the *ADKB* explains how the Bodhisattva fulfilled the six perfections. Stories from the *Jātakas* and other sūtras are mentioned to illustrate how he fulfilled the Perfections of Giving, Patience, Morality and Persevering Effort. Immediately before his enlightenment, when he was in the Vajropama meditative stabilization he fulfilled the Perfection of

Concentration and his cognition (bLo; dhī) fulfilled the Perfection of Wisdom.

They are called perfections (Pha Rol Tu Phyin Pa; pāramitā) because for each perfection one has gone to (Phyin Pa; gamana) the father shore (Pha Rol; pāram) of its fulfillment (Phun Sum Togs Pa; sampad).

**The three occasions of meritorious action**

**Giving**

Having made the transition from negative karmas to the perfections of a bodhisattva, the *ADKB* continues in a positive vein with an explanation of the three occasions of meritorious action (bSod Nams Bya Ba'i gZhi; puṇya-kriyā-vastu)--arising from giving, morality and meditation. {iv.112-123} They are meritorious in that desirable results arise from these actions.

Giving is defined as transferring something one possesses to someone else with a virtuous motivation such as devotion, or in order to aid the needy. It is not giving if it is motivated by fear or the desire for something in return. It is karma of body or speech together with the concomitant mental states which act as the motivation. The result of such giving will be worldly material enjoyments.

The act of giving is made superior when it is distinguished by a superior donor, a superior gift and a superior recipient. A superior donor is one who is controlled by an attitude of faith and other virtuous mental

factors. A superior object is one with excellent qualities such as beauty, fragrance, taste or texture.

The field or recipient of the gift can be superior in a number of ways. It can be superior by way of rebirth, which means the higher the rebirth of the recipient, the greater will be the fruition. It can be superior by way of suffering, which means that giving to beings who are in greater suffering, the sick, the cold and so forth, will have greater fruition. It can be superior by way of being a benefactor, like giving to one's father or mother or teacher. Finally, the field can be superior by way of its virtuous qualities, such as giving to an Āryan. As dGe 'Dun Grub summarizes the concluding verse on giving {iv.118}:

> Even though they are not Āryans, the merit of giving offerings (Yon; dakṣiṇā) to fields of benefit such as father and mother, to fields of suffering such as the ill, to preachers of the Dharma, to Bodhisattvas in their last rebirths, is without measure [even compared to those acts of giving whose fruition was] multiplied 100,000 times.[101]

The superior act of giving is also distinguished by four qualities: it is performed with respect; one gives the gift with one's own hand; it is given at the very time it is needed; the gift does no harm, either to the recipient--for example giving poison, or to a third party--as in giving something that was stolen.

**The gravity or lightness of karma**

In the discussion of giving we have seen some of the factors that determine the weight of a karma. Here, at {iv.119} we find an explanation of how six factors determine the gravity or lightness of a particular karma. The six factors are: subsequent action, field or recipient of the action, basis or type of action, preparation, intention, and attitude.

It is always to be kept in mind that the heaviness of a karma is measured in terms of its fruition or retribution: the degree of its happy or suffering quality, the length of time and so forth.

A karma is made heavier when one continues to perform the action in the subsequent stage; or when it is performed with respect to a field of benefit, such as a parent, a teacher or an Āryan. In terms of the bases (gZhi; adhiṣṭhāna), the heaviest karma of the body is killing; for karma of speech it is lying; for karma of mind it is wrong view. In the same way an action can be made heavier or lighter by a strong intention, a powerful motivating attitude, or elaborately made preparations. When it is heavy in terms of all the factors it is known as a very grave karma.

Another way to look at this issue is in terms of, "karma that is committed (Byas; kṛta) and accumulated (bSags; upacita) and karma that is committed but not accumulated."[102] Karma with the above six aspects is called karma that is both committed and accumulated. It is action done deliberately; not things done impetuously or without forethought, or actions

that one is coerced into doing. After the action one does not regret it and there is no other antidote, such as confession, that counteracts the karma. Furthermore, one feels satisfied or rejoices in the action; this is called its retinue. Such an action is complete in that by itself it is capable of sending one to a bad migration, and the fruition of such a karma will definitely be experienced. Without these factors, a karma is committed, but it is not accumulated.

There is also karma that is accumulated although it is not committed, such as when a king orders someone to be killed. He does not commit the action himself, but he intends it and approves of it and causes it, so he accumulates the karma.

Finally, it is important to realize that the result of any virtuous action such as giving will always be a desirable fruition of one form or another. As dGe 'Dun Grub says, "the fruit of giving to an inferior field is exclusively desirable fruition. However, by the influence of the inferior field the fruitional result will be smaller or there will be none at all. It is just like planting in an inferior field, the fruit will not ripen in season or it will be smaller and so forth."[103]

**Meritorious action arisen from morality and meditation**

The other two forms of meritorious actions are described succinctly

{iv.122-124}. Morality is the cessation of immorality, which is non-virtuous revealing and non-revealing form. Morality includes not only the discontinuance of performing natural misdeeds, which are by nature non-virtuous, but also discontinuing actions that were prohibited by the Buddha, such as eating at improper times.

Meritorious action arisen from meditation is the virtue of meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi) together with its mental concomitants, which arises from a mind that is in meditative equipoise (mNyam Par bZhag Pa; samāhita) upon its object. As the *ADKB* explains,

> Why is this called meditation (bsGom Pa; bhāvanā)? BECAUSE IT PERVADES THE MIND (Sems La sGo Phyir Ro; citta-vāsanāt). The meaning of virtuous meditative equipoise is that: by means of the virtuous qualities [of meditative stabilization] the mental continuum is made to assume that same nature, and thus it pervades the mind. Just like sesame is pervaded by [the fragrance] of flowers.[104]

**The purpose of studying the *Presentation of Karma***

dGe 'Dun Grub concludes the Fourth Chapter, the *Presentation of Karma* with this advice:

> If one desires to understand well what creates ('Grub Byed) the world--intentional karma and karma-having-intended, the various categories of karma and its results, revealing and non-revealing, restraints, non-restraints, in-between [karma] and so forth, attend to this chapter.[105]

# CHAPTER FOUR
# THE DEPENDENT ORIGINATION OF THE WORLD

We have described the afflictions and karma as the fuel and engine that drive cyclic existence. The animate and inanimate world are created by the force of karma which is fueled by the afflictions. We have seen how chapters four and five of the *Kośa* lay out in elaborate detail the elements, processes and dynamics of karma and kleśa.

We can now focus on the world that is actually described in the *Kośa*, the world that has been created by the karma of sentient beings. In particular we shall be concerned with the way an individual living being who inhabits this world perpetually passes through it by the power of karma and kleśa, the processes of generation as described in the 12 links of dependent origination, and the elements or dharmas that constitute the psycho-physical aggregates of the person who inhabits the world of the *Abhidharmakośa*. To sketch the life and makeup of this person we turn to selected passages from the first three chapters of dGe 'Dun Grub's commentary.

## The Dependent Origination of Sentient Beings

Before elaborating the process of dependent origination, by which beings perpetually cycle through lives, Vasubandhu found it necessary to answer the perennial question of how rebirth is possible in a Buddhist scheme that does not allow for a self.

The non-Buddhist says, if you admit that a being goes from one life to another, than you must admit to the existence of an ātman. No says dGe 'Dun Grub, "there is no self of persons, because there is no permanent, partless and independent person."[106] There is no internal agent who possesses the aggregates, abandons the aggregates of one existence and takes up the aggregates of a new existence, independently of the causal relationships that rule the dharmas that make up the psycho-physical aggregates.

The person is "the mere continuum of aggregates."[107] As the *ADKK* clearly states,

> THERE IS NO ĀTMAN. IT IS ONLY THE SKANDHAS, CONDITIONED BY THE AFFLICTIONS AND KARMA, WHICH, BY WAY OF THE INTERMEDIATE EXISTENCE, PROCEED TO A WOMB. IT IS LIKE A LAMP.[108]

A lamp-flame is an ever-changing continuum of moments; nevertheless it can transfer to another place, just as one lamp lights another. In the same way the ever-changing continuum of aggregates, conditioned by afflictions and karma, goes to a womb of rebirth by way of the intermediate existence. There, in accordance with what kind of karma has projected that rebirth, it grows and develops and is eventually born into the world. It is this process of generation that is described in the *ADKB* as the "dependent origination of states."

The *ADKB* mentions four forms of explaining dependent origination:

Momentary (sKad Cig Ma; kṣaṇika) dependent origination is when all twelve limbs are present in a single moment. Interrelated ('Brel Pa Can; sāṁbandhika) dependent origination is when the twelve limbs arise serially as the interconnection of cause and result. When the states of the five aggregates arise without interruption over three lifetimes, it is continuous (rGyun Chags Pa; prākarṣika) dependent origination.

**The dependent origination of states**

The exposition presented in the *ADKB* is according to the fourth mode of explanation, the dependent origination of states (gNas sKabs Pa; āvasthika), which describes all five aggregates at 12 stages or in 12 states of their development. This account also has characteristics of "continuous dependent origination" because the twelve states that are described are spread over three lifetimes.

The 12 limbs of dependent origination are: Ignorance. Formative forces. Consciousness. Name and form. The six āyatanas. Contact. Feeling. Craving. Grasping. Existence. Birth. Old age and death.

We see in the definitions of these limbs that they are stages of development of an individual being. According to this mode of explanation only a being of the Desire Realm who lived a life to maturity would actually reach all of these stages.

The definitions also describe the process of origination spread out over the course of three lifetimes. The first two limbs, ignorance and formative forces are seen as causal factors, acting in the previous life; the next eight factors, from consciousness up to existence, are active in the present life as the results of the karma of the previous life, and in turn developing into the causes of the future life; that future life is summarized in the two final factors, birth, and old age and death, which are resultant factors. However, dGe 'Dun Grub makes clear that showing only causal factors in the previous life and resultant factors in the future life is merely an abbreviated or short-hand description and is meant to imply that the entire sequence of cause-effect-cause is equally present in those lives, just as it is shown to be in the current life.[109] Here are dGe 'Dun Grub's definitions of the 12 limbs:[110]

> The limb of ignorance is the five aggregates, in a previous life, in a state in which the afflictions are active.[111]
>
> The formative forces are the five aggregates, in a previous life, in a state of collecting karma that is meritorious and so forth.[112]
>
> Consciousness is the aggregates upon conception in the womb in this life.
>
> Name and form are the five aggregates from that conception on, up to the formation of the six āyatanas.[113]
>
> The six āyatanas are the aggregates from then on until the three, object, faculty and consciousness meet.
>
> Contact is the aggregates from the meeting of the three until one is capable of experiencing the causes of [the feelings of] pleasure, pain and so forth.

Feeling is the aggregates from the time of being able to experience the causes in this way, until there is the capacity for copulation but before that activity begins.[114]

Craving is the aggregates from then on, having desire for the state of engaging in sensual enjoyments and copulation.[115]

Grasping is the five aggregates from the time of having the capacity [for copulation,] in a condition of racing around in order to obtain the sensual enjoyments of sex, food, clothing and so forth.

The five aggregates in the state of creating the karma, the fruit of which will become the future existence of the individual, that is existence.[116]

The conception in the future [life] is birth.[117]

From that until feeling is old age and death.[118]

The purpose of teaching the 12 limbs as spread out over the course of three lives is to provide a clear picture of the cyclic and perpetual nature of saṁsāra. Once one grasps how these factors continuously condition and generate each other, there will be no more questioning of whether one was born in a past life or whether one will be born again in the future. It becomes clear that the very process of birth and of living a life is causally bound up with previous and subsequent lives.[119]

If we want to summarize this process in its most concise form, the entire process of the origination of the individual in cyclic existence boils down to the activity of affliction and karma:[120]

If the 12 limbs of dependent origination are condensed, in how many can they be subsumed? When condensed they are subsumed in three: Because they are subsumed in the three [groups,] afflictions,

karma, and bases.

> In afflictions there are three: Ignorance, craving and grasping.
>
> In karma there are two: Formative forces and existence.
>
> The remaining seven are bases because karma and afflictions arise from them. Likewise they are also result, because they arise from karma and afflictions.

Now the process becomes clear. At the root is the first factor, ignorance, the root affliction, active in a previous life. It conditions formative forces, which here means karmic actions in the previous life. That karma then projects into the present life a series of bases: consciousness, name and form, the six āyatanas, contact, and feeling. These are called "bases" (gZhi; vastu) because they are the support (rTen; āśraya) or the basis upon which the next round of afflictions and karma will arise.[121] So, from the basis factor of feeling, arise the next two affliction factors of craving and grasping. And once again, from affliction arises karma, this time under the title of existence, which is defined above as, "the five aggregates in the state of creating karma, the fruit of which will become the future existence of the individual." And from this final karmic link in the chain of this present life, the bases of the future life arise, birth, old age and death.

Afflictions are like a seed: Just as the stalk, leaves and fruit grow from a seed, afflictions and karma arise from afflictions, and from karma the bases arise. Afflictions are also like a tree, because just as the leaves and fruit will

grow again and again from a tree, so karma and the bases will arise again and again from afflictions.

Karma, on the other hand is like medicine which yields its effect only one time, because a particular karmic action only yields its fruition one time. In the same way the seven bases are like food and drink that has been prepared for a meal. Just as the food is only to be eaten and experienced one time, and can not be produced again, in the same way, once the bases are produced as fruition of a previous karma, they are finished, and will not appear again as another fruition in another life.[122]

**The world of sentient beings**

Most of Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośa* is taken up with a description of the structure of the world into which sentient beings are born. This is divided into two parts: a description of the inanimate "receptacle world" with its seven rings of mountains and seas surrounding the central peak, Mount Meru; and a description of the types of sentient beings who inhabit that universe.

These descriptions are relatively straightforward in the text of the translation portion of this dissertation, so the interested reader can turn to those pages for all the details of the world and its inhabitants.

However, it is useful to take a brief look at the outline of the world

and its inhabitants as described in the *Abhidharmakośa*, as this will set the stage for a closer look at the elements that make up the individual being, which are set out in Chapters One and Two.

**The three realms and the afflictions of sentient beings**

All the beings in the world live in one of three realms: The Desire Realm, the Form Realm or the Formless Realm. As we have seen, it is affliction and karma that produce the world in this manner; and the factor that distinguishes the Desire from the Form from the Formless Realm is the nature of the afflictions of the beings that are born there. The Form Realm is the place where the afflictions of the Form Realm are capable of being nourished or increased. In a sense, the afflictions and the realms define each other. A being with afflictions of a certain quality and subtlety will, by virtue of those afflictions, be born into the appropriate realm where afflictions of that quality are nourished.

In the same way, we have seen that the categorization of the polluting tendencies is in terms of how and where they are abandoned: to be abandoned by Seeing one of the Four Truths, or to be abandoned by Meditation, and in which of the three realms.

A simple example of this can be seen in the polluting tendency of anger. Beings of the Form and Formless Realms are not afflicted with anger,

or to put it another way, these upper realms are places that are not suitable to nourish the polluting tendency of anger. A being afflicted with anger at the time of death could not, by definition, be born into an upper realm. Though a being of the Form Realm may well be afflicted with the other polluting tendencies such as attachment, pride and doubt, they would be the specific attachment, pride and doubt of the Form Realm.

What is notable here is the interdependent relationship of the objects and environment of each realm with the afflictions of the beings born into it. We are humans born into the Desire Realm because our afflictions lead us to be attached to (or to hate) objects that arise in the Desire Realm; and conversely, those objects arise in the Desire Realm due to the afflictions and karma of the beings who are born there.

**The Desire Realm**

The Desire Realm has many different subdivisions or abodes where different types of beings live, but to distinguish it by its most basic divisions there are five types of beings:

1) The hells (dMyal Ba; naraka), which are "without joy."

2) The hungry ghosts (Yi Dwags; preta) who are extremely hungry and thirsty.

3) The animals (Dud 'Gro; tiryañc) who move in a horizontal position.

4) Humans, whose minds are developed.

5) The six types of Desire Realm gods who have their homes in the sky.

This level of existence is called the Desire Realm for the simple reason that "it is a realm that possesses desire." And what is desire? It is the craving (Sred Pa) that pursues sexual intercourse and material food.[123]

**The Form and Formless Realms**

The Form Realm is divided into 17 levels, and upon each level a particular type of gods reside. It is called the Form Realm because of the excellent and subtle quality of form that exists there. The basic division of the Form Realm is the four concentrations (bSam gTan; dhyāna). The first three concentrations each has three levels, and the fourth concentration has eight levels.

One is born into one of the levels of the Form Realm by attaining particular absorptions in ones meditative practice. From meditating on either a weak, medium or strong causal absorption of the first concentration one is born in the next life in one of the three levels of the first concentration, and so on up through the various levels of the concentrations. The first three levels of the fourth concentration are abodes of ordinary individuals, but the last five levels are called pure levels (gNas gTzang Ma; śuddhāvāsika) and can be attained only by Āryans, who have attained insight into the Four

Truths on the Path of Seeing.

The abodes of the Desire Realm gods and those of the Form Realm are actual physical places which begin on Mt. Meru and continue above Mt. Meru at progressively higher levels of space. The Formless Realm, however, is not a physical place, because beings there are, as one might suspect, formless. When an individual has attained a meditative stabilization of the Formless Realm and then passes away, his or her four mental aggregates are born into the Formless Realm "right there."[124] Of course, in a sense, there is no there there, because there is no obstructive form associated with that being. Still, depending on the quality of their meditative absorption, they are born into any of the four levels of the Formless Realm.

**The types of rebirth and the birth-sources**

Within those three realms there are five types of rebirth ('Gro Ba; gati); that is, five types of beings that inhabit them. All five can be found in the Desire Realm: hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods. The Form and Formless Realms are inhabited only by gods, and of course it is a different type of god at each level of each realm.

For these five types of beings there are four modes of birth or birth-sources (sKye gNas; yoni):[125] birth from an egg, birth from a womb, birth from moist heat, and miraculous birth.

Humans have all four types of birth-sources, and various mythological events from sūtra are cited as examples of humans born from moist heat and from eggs. At the very beginning of a kalpa all humans are miraculously born.[126] Of course most humans nowadays are born from wombs.

Animals also have four types of birth-sources.

Hell beings, gods and intermediate state beings are born miraculously, because they have very strong karma.

Most hungry ghosts are miraculously born, but there are also those born from wombs.

Miraculous birth is considered best, with the others, in descending order: birth from moist heat; birth from a womb; birth from an egg. The basis for this qualification is that they are, respectively, births that do not harm either oneself or others; do not harm others; cause oneself to experience suffering one time; cause the experience of suffering twice.

However this raises the question: If miraculous birth is the best, then why didn't the Bodhisattva Prince Siddhārtha, who, in his last existence had obtained control over his rebirth, take birth by means of miraculous birth instead of from a womb?

In the answer to this query we get a strong suggestion of Mahāyāna docetism:

> It was in order to lead the Śākya clan to the teachings; and in order to encourage human disciples; and in order to dispel the

conception that might arise if we saw the Teacher displaying great magical emanations or extraordinary powers, and we wondered, who is this, a magician or something?

Some say: It was in order to favor (rJes Su gZung; anugraha) his disciples by revealing his bodily relics, because those who are miraculously born do not leave a corpse when they die.[127]

**The intermediate existence**

There is one other mode of existence to be mentioned, which is not, however, a rebirth. That is the intermediate existence, a kind of temporary staging area between death in the previous life and birth into the subsequent life. This is not considered a separate type of rebirth because it is projected by the same projecting karma as the future rebirth.

In fact, it was a major issue of contention between various sects as to whether there actually is an intermediate existence. The Mahāsaṁghikas denied it as do the Theravādins today. Vasubandhu presents a lengthy argument both from reason and from scripture to defend it.[128]

Upon death one is miraculously born in the intermediate existence in the shape of the type of rebirth you are headed to in your next life, except usually smaller. Desire Realm gods and humans are the size of a child of five or six.

Intermediate existence beings bound for hell are the color of the stump of a tree burned by fire. Animals are like smoke. Hungry ghosts are like water. Intermediate existence humans and Desire Realm gods are the color of

gold. Form Realm intermediate existence beings are white in color. These beings eat odors rather than material food.

For the Formless Realm there is no intermediate existence because there is no form there. There is instantaneous miraculous rebirth into the Formless Realm.

The length of time one stays in the intermediate existence is a matter of diverse opinions. The Sautrāntikas say that, "It's duration is indefinite because it survives up until the conditions for it's birth come together."[129] Bhadanta Vasumitra says that they survive for seven days and if they do not find a suitable rebirth they pass away and are born there again.

Still others say that they can survive up to 49 days in the intermediate existence, which is the view that is generally held in the Tibetan tradition.

**The process of rebirth**

The function of the intermediate existence is to allow time for the opportunity to present itself to be conceived in a type of rebirth and circumstances that are consistent with one's karma. The Vaibhāṣikas, emphasizing the point that it is the karma that brings about the conditions of one's rebirth, say that one needn't stay in an intermediate state very long:

> Because it is disposed to search for a birth existence it does not remain long but is quickly re-conceived. Furthermore, if it is definite that one is to be reborn in a particular place, even though the conditions for birth [in that place] have not come together, the

collection of conditions will be brought about by karma and one will be born there. If it is not definite that one will be born there [in that particular place] one will be born in a different place.[130]

When the opportunity presents itself, the being is driven by affliction and karma to seek its new birth. dGe 'Dun Grub's description is evocative:

> For a human intermediate existence being: when, from a far distance it sees it's father and mother in coitus, with a mind confused [by attachment or anger,] with thoughts of sexual sport and pleasure, it goes to the place of its rebirth, in the uterus between the stomach and intestines. Furthermore, if it is to be born as a male it lies to the right of the mother's belly, and faces the rear, and [is born] squatting. If it is to be born a female it lies to the left of the mother's belly, facing the front. If it is to be born as a being of confused gender (Ma Ning; napuṁsakaṁ), it is situated according to whether male or female sexual desire predominates.
>
> As for the others: in birth from moist heat, they go [to their rebirth] because of their desire for odor. For beings of miraculous birth they go from their desire for an abode.
>
> If one asks: But how can there be a desire for an abode in hell? There is. Because the mind has become confused.[131]

# CHAPTER FIVE
# THE ELEMENTS OF BEING

The cyclical process of dependent origination entraps the individual in the rounds of birth and death that is the mire of saṁsāra. Driven by karma and affliction the individual is born into a world constructed out of irreducible, momentary, substantially existent elements or dharmas. These dharmas may be either contaminated or uncontaminated, and it is in the first two chapters of the *Abhidharmakośa*, the chapters on the Dhātus and the Faculties, that Vasubandhu lays out what these contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas are, and how they fit together to create the individual as a psycho-physical construct.

Without pursuing the endless inquiry into the ramifications of this dharma system, we shall aim to summarize these two chapters by presenting the dharmas that constitute an individual who has been born into this world; and examining how they function individually and together, in such a way that the Abhidharmikas can claim to be offering a coherent picture of being.

Though the first chapter is entitled *The Presentation of the Dhātus*, it presents three schema for organizing the dharmas: the five aggregates, the 12 āyatanas and the 18 dhātus.[132] dGe 'Dun Grub explains that there are three reasons why the Buddha taught three different ways of describing the same group of dharmas. First, there are three types of delusion: grasping at either mental factors, or at form, or at both mental factors and form, as a

unitary self. Second, there are three types of disciples: those with sharp faculties who understand the teaching right away, those with middling faculties who need more elaboration, and those with dull faculties who need extensive elaboration. Third, there are those who prefer the teachings condensed, or fully stated, or greatly elaborated. The teaching of the aggregates is directed to those disciples who grasp at the mental factors, who have sharp faculties, and who prefer concise teachings. The teaching of the 12 āyatanas is directed to the second type, and the teaching of 18 dhātus is for the benefit of the third type of disciple.[133]

The following summary will be organized primarily around the description of the five aggregates. Not only because the reader is certain to be a person of sharp faculties, able to quickly grasp the meaning, but also because this is the most traditional Buddhist description of what makes up a person, and it provides the most concise framework for the description of dharmas. We will then turn to a discussion of the 18 dhātus in order to elaborate other important points about the nature of the various dharmas.

## The Five Aggregates

In his introductory commentary to the first verse of the *Kośa* dGe 'Dun Grub points out that the five aggregates are in fact synonymous with cyclic existence itself, "because they cycle through one birth and death to

another."[134] It is important to keep in mind that there is no distinction between the elements of being in saṁsāra and the manifestation of saṁsāra.

Furthermore, the five aggregates are "the illusory bases of self-grasping",[135] in that our ignorance causes us to grasp at these impermanent and constantly changing factors as a unitary, solid and essential self. This self-grasping is a fundamental cause of our perpetual suffering in cyclic existence.

The five aggregates are: Form (gZugs; rūpa), feeling (Tsor Ba; vedanā), discrimination ('Du Shes; saṁjñā), formative forces ('Du Byed; saṁskāra) and consciousness (Sems; citta).

**The form aggregate**

dGe 'Dun Grub explains that the term "form" refers to "what can be damaged by the physical (gZugs Can; rūpin) or can be caused to change by the physical."[136]

The Form Aggregate includes 11 dharmas: the five sense faculties--the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body faculties; and their five external objects--visible form, sound, smell, taste and tangible objects. The eleventh dharma is non-revealing form, which was discussed at length in the chapter on karma.

The five sense faculties are very subtle and specialized substances which are described as clear matter (gZugs Dang Ba; rūpa-prasāda), and

which functions as the support or basis by means of which a particular sense consciousness is able to make contact with and thereby cognize its own particular sense object.[137] It is not at all unlike the modern conception of nerves, which act as the sensory interface between our minds and the physical world.

In general, the sense objects are straightforward, though in its encyclopedic efforts to tabulate every type of color, sound, taste and tangible objects, the *ADKB* displays the limits of a purely observational science.

Visible forms are considered by the Vaibhāṣikas to consist of color and shape. The Sautrāntikas, however, believed that visible form was merely color, and shape was merely a mental construct imputed to a mass of color.[138]

All five of these sense objects exist in the Desire Realm, but in the Form Realm beings do not eat morsel food, nor do they experience gross types of suffering, so smell, taste, and the tangible objects of hunger and thirst do not exist there.

**The four great elements and the atomic theory of matter**

All of these forms are actually based upon the fundamental material units, the four great elements ('Byung Ba Chen Po; mahābhūta): earth,

water, fire and wind. These are not to be taken literally as atoms of those particular substances, but as material atoms which perform their respective functions: earth supports without letting fall down; water makes cohesion; fire ripens; wind increases and expands. These are established as their function. The natures of these elements are respectively: solidity, moisture, heat, and movement.[139]

In practice, these four elements always arise together and the particular quality of the resultant complex matter ('Byung Gyur; bhautika) that is manifested is dependent on the predominance of one or the other.[140] These molecules of complex matter then combine into "collections of subtle atoms" (rDul Phra Rab bSags Pa; saṁghāta-paramāṇu). It is massive conglomerations of these collections of subtle atoms that we actually experience as matter in the world.

In the Desire Realm, the smallest possible unit of such matter (i.e. a collection of subtle atoms) consists of eight substances: the four elements, plus four derived forms (rGyur Byas Pa'i gZugs; upādāya-rūpa)--form, smell, taste and tangibility. If it has an atom of a faculty or of sound it may have nine, ten or 11 substances.[141]

Most significant for our purposes is dGe 'Dun Grub's comment concerning the four great elements, that, "because of the power of the karma of sentient beings, there has never been, since beginningless cyclic

existence, the experience of their not arising."[142]

Once again we see the generative power of karma, but especially highlighted in this context is the dramatic power of a mental intention (karma) to bridge the gap between mind and matter: It is due to the karma, the intentional acts of sentient beings, that we experience a material world of form.

**The aggregate of feeling**

The next two aggregates are also classified by the *ADKB* as mental factors, which are included in the dhātu of phenomena. But because they play such a significant role as causes of cyclic existence, they are established as separate aggregates. It is the process of discriminating the qualities of objects, and then feeling attraction or aversion to them, that leads individuals to fight over objects of desire or against objects of aversion. Even more fundamentally, it is due to attachment to the feeling of pleasure, based on discriminations, that beings act with desire and gather karma. Therefore these two mental factors are among the main causes of cyclic existence, and they are taught as separate aggregates.

A further reason why these two are singled out is indicated at {i.22} where we find the reason for teaching the five aggregates in the traditional order of form, feeling, discrimination, formative forces and consciousness. A

number of reasons are given, we will quote here the first two:

> The order of the five aggregates is presented by way of their subtlety and coarseness. Since most of the forms are obstructive they are [the most] coarse. Among the non-physicals, as we say "my hand feels, my foot feels," since feeling is thus coarse, [the next is] feeling. Then since it grasps definitive marks, discrimination is [the next most] coarse. Then formative forces [which wish,] "May I be happy, may I not suffer," is [the next most] coarse. Consciousness, being merely aware of the object's entity, is subtlest.
>
> Or they are taught according to the stages of the arisal of the afflictions. From beginningless time, beings like form; so, at first they look at form. From the beauty or unattractiveness of forms, happy and suffering feelings arise. From that, mistaken discrimination arises. From that the formative forces like attachment and hatred arise. From that the consciousness becomes afflicted.[143]

"Feeling," says dGe 'Dun Grub,"is what experiences an object through its own power."[144] There are five types of feeling: pleasure, suffering, mental happiness, mental unhappiness and neutral feeling.

When mind (Sems; citta) arises, it is accompanied by a group of concomitant mental factors (Sems Byung; caitta). It is by means of the mental factor (or the aggregate) of feeling that the object is experienced in its quality of being pleasurable, disagreeable or neutral.

**The aggregate of discrimination**

Discrimination is the mental factor (or aggregate) which "has the nature of grasping the characteristic marks of an object."[145] It is by means of the mental factor (or aggregate) of discrimination that the mind and other

mental factors discern and identify an object.

**The aggregate of formative forces**

This aggregate is explicitly a grab-bag category for all the dharmas that make up a person which are not included in the other aggregates. Specifically, these are all the mental factors other than feeling and discrimination, and the non-associated formative forces (lDan Min 'Du Byed; viprayukta-saṁskāra), such as obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti) and so forth; all of which will be discussed below.

**The aggregate of consciousness**

Consciousness (rNam Par Shes Pa; vijñāna) is a mere awareness (Rig Pa; vijñapti) of an object. There are five types of sense objects plus abstract mental objects (concepts, words, names, ideas and so forth); accordingly there are six types of consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness and mental consciousness. Each one cognizes or is aware of its own appropriate type of object.

In the schema of the dhātus these six types of consciousness each constitutes a separate dhātu, but here they are grouped together as the consciousness aggregate.

## The 18 Dhātus

In the framework of the 18 dhātus all the dharmas are laid out in an elaborated form which makes the discussion of their attributes somewhat more accessible. The 18 dhātus consist of three sets of coordinated factors:

I. Six faculties (dBang Po; indriyas)

1. Eye-dhātu (Mig; cakṣu)
2. Ear-dhātu (rNa Ba; śrotra)
3. Nose-dhātu (sNa; ghrāṇa)
4. Tongue-dhātu (lCe; jihva)
5. Body-dhātu (Lus; kāya)
6. Mental faculty-dhātu (Yid; manas)

II. Six objects (Yul; viṣaya)

7. Form-dhātu (gZugs; rūpa)
8. Sound-dhātu (sGra; śabda)
9. Smell-dhātu (Dri; gandha)
10. Taste-dhātu (Ro; rasa)
11. Tangibles-dhātu (Reg Bya; spraṣṭavya)
12. Phenomena-dhātu (Chos; dharma)

III. Six consciousnesses (Sems; vijñāna)

13. Eye consciousness-dhātu

14. Ear consciousness-dhātu

15. Nose consciousness-dhātu

16. Tongue consciousness-dhātu

17. Body consciousness-dhātu

18. Mental consciousness-dhātu

In this schema, ten of the eleven material dharmas in the aggregate of form are established as individual dhātus: the first five faculties and the first five objects.

Non-revealing form, the eleventh dharma in the aggregate of form, is included in the dhātu of phenomena. The aggregates of feeling, discrimination and formative forces are also included in the dhātu of phenomena. The dhātu of phenomena, then, contains 64 of the total 75 dharmas: it includes all 46 mental factors; the 14 formative forces not associated with mind; non-revealing form; and the three asaṁskṛtas.[146]

**The nature of the mental faculty**

Here, the consciousness aggregate (a single dharma) is broken down into seven dhātus: the five sense consciousnesses, the mental faculty and

the mental consciousness.

In Buddhist epistemology, a cognition arises when three factors meet: an object, a faculty and a consciousness. The dhātu framework is then a means of categorizing all dharmas into one of these three types of factors of cognition. However, the mental consciousness, which cognizes non-material objects from the dhātu of phenomena, obviously does not rely on a material faculty as a support of cognition. Nevertheless, to maintain the symmetry of the system, a mental faculty is posited.

What is that mental faculty? The last moment of a faculty consciousness or a mental consciousness, just prior to the arising of a mental consciousness, is the support and cause of that mental consciousness, and that last moment is designated as the mental faculty (mana-indriya) or mind dhātu (mano-dhātu). To state it another way: A faculty consciousness or mental consciousness in its function as the immediately preceding cause of a mental consciousness is designated as the mental faculty or mind dhātu. Thus the preceding moment of consciousness is to the consciousness that follows what the eye faculty is to the eye consciousness.[147]

Of the 18 dhātus, 12 are called internal, which means they are included in the continuum of sentient beings. The external dhātus, which are not included in the continuum of a sentient being, are the five sense objects, plus part of the dhātu of phenomena--some of the non-associated formative

forces and the asaṁskṛtas. The mental factors, of course, are internal.

**The ten obstructive dhātus**

The ten material dhātus, the five faculties and the five objects, are "obstructive" (Thogs Pa; pratighāta) in that they obey the law of impenetrability of matter: when they occupy a space, nothing else can occupy that same space. This however can not be said of non-revealing form, which is based on the elements in that it results from some type of physical action, but it is extremely subtle and non-obstructive.[148] These ten physical dhātus are collections of subtle atoms while the remaining eight are not.[149]

**Virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral dhātus**

In terms of their moral qualities, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral, eight are morally neutral. Here it must be kept in mind that all fruitions, all dharmas that are the fruitional result of a previous karma, are morally neutral. That is, they are out of the control and totally undetermined by the current moral intention of the being who experiences them. They are the result of a previous intention, and as we saw in the karma chapter, karmic results ripen one time, and then the karmic energy is spent; otherwise there would be no end to the results of every action. If a fruitional result were morally virtuous

or non-virtuous, it too would have to have a result.

The eight dhātus that are always neutral are the five faculties, smell, taste and tangible objects. However, form and sound can be either neutral, virtuous or non-virtuous, because intentional acts of the body and speech, called "revealing form of body and speech," are morally qualifiable.

The seven mental dhātus can also be any of the three, depending on whether they are concomitant with virtuous or non-virtuous mental factors. The many dharmas in the dhātu of phenomena are various in their moral qualities and we can not go into all the details here, but as dGe 'Dun Grub says, "some by nature, some by concomitants, some by motivation, and some ultimately, are virtuous, [non-virtuous or neutral.][150]

**Arisen from fruition and arisen from development**

We have seen that the five sense faculties are arisen from karmic fruition. However fruition is not the only cause that determines the condition of a person's faculties. They can also be developed by means of the four causes of development, in which case they are called arisen from development (rGyas Pa Las Byung Ba; aupacayika). The four causes of development are: food; the health practices (Legs Par Bya Ba; saṁskāra)[151] of applying ointments (bSku mNye; abhyaṅga) and bathing (Dril Phyi; snāna) etc.; sleep; and meditative stabilization.

**How many dhātus exist in each realm**

All 18 dhātus exist in the Desire Realm, because they are capable of nourishing the afflictions of the Desire Realm.

In the Form Realm there are 14, because there is no smell, taste, nose-consciousness or tongue-consciousness. These are characteristic of morsel food, and only beings who are without attachment to morsel food are born in the Form Realm.

Only beings who are separated from attachment to form take birth in the Formless Realm, so all the dhātus of form are absent, as well as the sense consciousnesses necessary to cognize those objects. Only the dhātus of mind, phenomena and mental consciousness exist in the Formless Realm, because they are capable of nourishing the afflictions of the Formless Realm.

## The Faculties

The second chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa* was entitled by Vasubandhu the "Presentation of the Faculties" (Indriya-nirdeśa; dBang Po bsTan Pa), though this only describes the first topic presented there, and does not suggest the other very important subjects taken up in this section. It is noteworthy that Dharmatrāta, in his *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, upon which, many have suggested, Vasubandhu based the structure of his work, calls his second chapter a presentation of Saṁskāras.[152] This broad term, which

can be taken to mean the saṁskāra-skandha, or more generally, "the constituents of an individual being," provides a better picture of the scope of Chapter Two of the *Kośa*, which includes the major presentation of the mental factors as well as the formative forces not associated with mind.

The entire theory of the 22 faculties seems to be one of those classifications in the *Kośa* whose purpose is not especially clear, but is pursued in order to maintain a consistent explanation of sūtra. In fact, the tradition itself debated the reason why these 22 factors were singled out to be identified as faculties. Faculties are defined as factors which "exercise special authority" over their objects.[153] But the question arises:

> Don't these have authority [over their respective objects:] The voice over talking; the hand over taking; the feet over taking steps; the penis over pleasure; and the anus over excreting waste? Then why is it certain that the number of faculties is 22?[154]

Both the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas offer rationales for this number, but both have the ring of ad hoc retrofit explanations. Be that as it may, the discussion of the faculties includes a number of elements which we must include as we build up our picture of a person as depicted in the *Abhidharmakośa*. First, a list of the 22 faculties:

<u>The five sense faculties</u>

1. Eye (Mig; cakṣu)
2. Ear (rNa Ba; śrotra)

3. Nose (sNa; ghrāṇa)

4. Tongue (lCe; jihva)

5. Body (Lus; kāya)

6. Mind (Yid; manas)

7. Female (Mo'i dBang Po; strīndriya)

8. Male (Po'i dBang Po; puruṣendriya)

9. Life (Srog; jīvita)

<u>The five feeling faculties</u>

10. Pleasure (bDe Ba; sukha)

11. Suffering (sDug bsNgal; duḥkha )

12. Mental happiness (Yid bDe Ba; saumanasya)

13. Mental unhappiness (Yid Mi bDe Ba; daurmanasya)

14. Neutral feeling (bTang sNyoms; upekṣā)

<u>The five pure faculties of faith etc.</u>

15. Faith (Dad Pa; śraddhā)

16. Diligence (brTzon 'Grus; vīrya)

17. Memory (Dran Pa; smṛti)

18. Meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi)

19. Wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā)

The last three

20. Knowing all that is not known (Kun Shes Par Byed Pa; anājñātam-ājñāsāymi)

21. Knowing all (Kun Shes Pa; ājñā)

22. Endowment with knowing all (Kun Shes Pa Dang lDan Pa; ājñātāvi)

**The male and female faculties**

Besides the five sense faculties there are two other physical faculties, the male and female faculties. These, say the Vaibhāṣikas, have authority over the classification of, and differences between, sentient beings. Here, the Vaibhāṣikās suggest that the faculty is not merely the sex organ, but the entire complex of male or female characteristics: "It is by way of having male or female faculties that the differences in sentient beings are distinguished, such as the size of breasts and amount of facial hair, tight or loose skin, high or low tone of voice, and so forth."[155]

The Sautrāntikas disagree with this analysis. They say that the male and female faculties are merely "one part of the body faculty" and they do

not exercise authority over the categories and differences of sentient beings, but only over "the nature of masculinity and femininity."

**The five faculties of feeling**

We saw in the discussions of the 12 links of dependent origination and the five aggregates that feeling plays a critical role in the perpetuation of cyclic existence. Here, in the discussion of the five faculties of feeling, we find the *ADKB*'s most detailed discussion of the nature of the five types of feelings that beings can experience.

dGe 'Dun Grub says that, "the five faculties of feeling have authority over affliction, because from the feelings of pleasure and mental happiness attachment develops; from suffering and mental unhappiness anger develops; from neutral feeling ignorance develops. And so by these the afflictions develop."[156]

There are two types of bodily feeling, which are based on the sense faculties: Suffering, which is a disagreeable bodily feeling which experiences pain; and pleasure, which is an agreeable bodily experience.

There are also two types of mental feeling: Mental happiness is an agreeable mental experience; mental unhappiness is a disagreeable one.[157]

Finally, there is neutral feeling, which is described as an experience in between agreeable and painful. Neutral feeling can be either physical or

mental.

**The faculty of life**

The Vaibhāṣikas say that the faculty of life "has authority over two concerns: It has authority over subsistence as same type (Ris mThun gNas Pa; nikāya-sabhāga-sādhāraṇa) and conjunction of same type (Ris mThun mTsams sByor Ba; nikāya-sabhāga-saṁbandha)."[158]

Since all phenomena are momentary, and don't persist for more than an infinitesimal moment, the Vaibhāṣikas have posited a non-associated formative force called homogeneity (sKal mNyam; sabhāgatā), which transmits the similarity in the activities, thought, and nature of sentient beings.

Here, the Vaibhāṣikas are saying that it is the faculty of life which has authority over this force in maintaining the continuance or subsistence of an individual as "same type" throughout the duration of a lifetime; as well as at the time of rebirth, at the moment of "conjunction", when it controls the continuation of the mental continuum as it takes up its new physical form.

The Sautrāntikas disagree on this latter point, maintaining that it is the mind itself which has authority over conjunction of same type at the time of rebirth.[159]

The faculty of life is always a fruition, because the nature of one's

existence in a good or bad migration is determined by the virtuous or non-virtuous karma of a previous existence. In this respect, this faculty also represents the longevity or potential length of life in a particular existence.

This then leads to a discussion of how it is possible for Arhats to extend or shorten their own lives by their own powers, if longevity is a karmic fruition. The most interesting outcome of this discussion is the strong element of docetism found in the descriptions of the Buddha's control over his own death. In answer to the question, what was the purpose of the Buddha's giving up and extending his longevity, both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas demonstrate a view of the Buddha as entirely in control of his own physical state:

> The Sautrāntikas say: It was in order to show he had mastery over death that he gave up the saṁskāras of longevity. And it was in order to show that he had mastery over longevity that he extended (Byin Gyis Rlab; adhiṣṭhita) the saṁskāras of longevity for three months. But not more than [three months,] because beyond that there was no one to be subdued by [the Buddha] himself. And it was in order to fully accomplish his pledge that, "If I wish, by meditating on the [four] feet of supernatural powers (rKang Pa; ṛddhi-pāda), I can remain for an eon (bsKal Pa; kalpa) or more than an eon." So they say.
>
> The Vaibhāṣikas say: It was in order to demonstrate that He had vanquished the four Māras. On top of the vajra-throne, in the first watch [of the night] he conquered Devaputra-Māra; in the third watch he conquered Kleśa-Māra. At Vaiśālī, by extending the saṁskāras of longevity for three months, he conquered Maraṇa-Māra. At Kuśīnagar (Gyad Yul), by attaining perfect Nirvāṇa in the sphere without remainder of aggregates, he conquered Skandha-Māra.[160]

At the time of an individual's conception in a new rebirth in the Desire

Realm, two new faculties which are karmic fruitions, are newly obtained: these are the body faculty and the life faculty. The other sense faculties are not yet developed. Although there is mind and neutral feeling, these are not fruitions because they are afflicted at the moment of conception.[161]

The three faculties of life, neutral feeling and mind, are, in fact, inseparable. They are, in a sense, the fundamental elements of sentient existence in that all living beings will have at least these three faculties.

Beings who have a supernatural birth in the Desire Realm, and beings of the Form Realm newly gain six faculties that are fruitions, because they are born fully developed and thus have all five sense faculties plus life. In the Formless Realm, only the faculty of life is newly gained.

**The last eight faculties**

These are considered faculties because they have authority over the process of purification, by means of subduing and abandoning the afflictions.

The five faculties of faith, diligence, memory, meditative stabilization and wisdom are all virtuous mental factors which counteract and root out the afflictive mental factors.

The last three faculties actually consist of a group of nine other faculties when they are in transformed states on, respectively, the Path of Seeing, the uncontaminated Path of Meditation, and the Path of No More

Learning. These nine are the five faculties of faith etc., the mental faculty, pleasure, mental happiness and neutral feeling. These nine faculties can be contaminated when they are in the aggregates of an ordinary individual; or they become uncontaminated when they are included in the Truth of the Path. It is in this transformed state that they become the three faculties of "knowing all that is not known," "knowing all" and "endowment with knowing all."

Thus, those nine faculties can be either contaminated or uncontaminated. The three last faculties are always uncontaminated. The remaining 10--the seven physical faculties, life, suffering and mental unhappiness are always contaminated because they are never included on the Truth of the Path.[162]

**Virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral faculties**

The seven physical faculties and life are exclusively neutral because they are fruitions.

The last eight faculties are virtuous because they only yield pleasant results.

Mental unhappiness can be either virtuous or non-virtuous: virtuous when one is unhappy about performing a non-virtuous action, and non-virtuous when one is unhappy about doing a virtue.

Mind and the other four feelings can be any of the three, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral.[163]

**How many faculties are in each realm**

The last three pure faculties are not included in the realms because they are uncontaminated.

In the Desire Realm, the remaining 19 faculties are found.

In the first concentration of the Form Realm there are 15, because there are no male and female faculties, suffering, or mental unhappiness.

The reason there are no male and female faculties is that, "they have separated from attachment to sexual intercourse, and the male and female faculties make the body unattractive."[164]

There is no suffering there because there is no non-virtue, and the body is clear, like light. There is no mental unhappiness because they have abandoned anger and ill-will.

These 15 faculties exist in the first concentration of the Form Realm; however as one moves up into higher concentrations, one's being becomes more subtle: In the second concentration there is no faculty of pleasure. In the fourth concentration (as well as in the a special first concentration) there is neither pleasure nor happiness, but only neutral feeling.

In the Formless Realm there are none of the seven physical faculties,

nor is there pleasure or mental happiness, so there are eight faculties: mind, life, neutral feeling and the five faculties of faith etc.

## The Mental Factors

The next major section of the second chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa* describes the mental factors, which are called the concomitants of mind. Mind and mental factors always arise together, because they are the "simultaneous causes of arisal for each other." Here dGe 'Dun Grub quotes sūtra to emphasize this point:

> Without mental factors, the mind will never arise,
> like the sun and its rays.
> Therefore these arise simultaneously.[165]

Mind, in Abhidharma psychology, is the mere awareness of an object. But in every moment of cognition the mind is accompanied by ten mental factors which carry out the work of sustaining cognition, identifying and reacting to the object, choosing an object and turning the cognitive apparatus towards it.

Every moment of cognition may also be accompanied by other mental factors which are either virtuous or non-virtuous, and which give that moment of mind its morally qualifiable character. There are five types of mental factors which are by their nature either virtuous or non-virtuous. Then there are others, such as sleep, which are indeterminate; their moral quality

will depend on the context of what other mental factors arise concomitantly.

*The five modes of concomitance*

The relationship of concomitance (mTsungs Par lDan Pa; saṁprayoga), or the co-arising of the mind and mental factors, is defined by the five ways in which they are identical (mTsungs Pa rNam Pa lNga; pañcabhiḥ samatā-prakāraiḥ): they have the same support (rTen; āśraya) in that they are based on the same body and faculties; they have the same object (dMigs Pa; ālambana); they have the same aspect (rNam Pa; ākāra) because they grasp the specific characteristics of the same object; they have the same time (Dus; kāla) because they are simultaneous; they are the same in substance (rDzas; dravya) in the sense that for each single moment of mind, one each of the concomitant mental factors such as feeling, discrimination and intention arises.[166]

Given these modes of identity, simultaneity and indivisibility of the mind and mental factors, there is a strong temptation to view the mental factors as attributes or qualities of mind, rather than distinct dharmas which can carry the burden of their own natures. This is precisely the temptation that the Vaibhāṣikas must resist, as it undermines the entire dharma edifice as a solution to the problem of no-self. As Waldron explains,

> What the concept of dharmas are specifically designed to avoid is familiar "substance/attribute" ontology, in respect to either objective

phenomena or subjective experience. Consistent with the rejection of a reified sense of "self" is the parallel rejection of "something" possessing qualities, there being no real distinction in dharma terms between the characteristic, the distinguishing mark, the svalakṣaṇa, of a dharma, and the dharma itself. Whether or not this has been successful is another story.[167]

*The Abhidharma model of the mind: towards an ultimate therapy*

Putting aside their ontological status, what is clearly at work here is an attempt by the Abhidharmikas to construct a model of the mind by identifying and characterizing all of its states. This is an introspective empirical psychology par excellence. And just as modern schools of psychology from Freud to cognitive psychology construct theoretical models of the mind and then invent therapies based on those models; so the Abhidharmika soteriological undertaking is an ultimate therapy, with Nirvāṇa seen as perfect mental health at the end of the course of treatment.

The therapy is to discern the dharmas: to deconstruct the ignorance of our wrong view, our view of our own aggregates as a permanent, partless and unitary self, by comprehending how this "self" is in fact merely an ever-changing concatenation of instantaneous dharmas. Driving this ongoing process is karma, in the form of the ever-present mental factor cetanā--intention. In each moment we are taking intentional mental action, and then physical actions based on that intention. Each moment may be virtuous or non-virtuous depending on whether the intention is concomitant with virtuous mental factors such as faith, or non-virtuous factors such as

harmfulness. By cultivating and bringing to bear upon this process the ever-present mental factors of meditative stabilization and wisdom--which discerns dharmas--together with other combinations of virtuous mental states, the entire cognitive process is, piece by piece, transformed from a state of contamination to a purified, uncontaminated state, from the Truth of Suffering, to the Truth of the Path.

Though the tabulated lists of mental elements suggests a fragmented picture of the mind, with mental attributes and processes reified into substantial free-standing entities (dharmas), the purpose and virtue of this approach is to identify and name those attributes and processes so that they can be studied, intellectually comprehended, and then meditated upon. In the context of meditating on the Four Noble Truths the function of each factor in generating suffering, or pacifying suffering, is realized, ignorance is gradually supplanted by wisdom, and the ultimate therapy is effected.

*The mental factors*

The mental factors tend to arise in groups of concomitant factors and they are presented in the context of these groups together with their definitions. The *ADKB* {ii.24-27} speaks of five types of mahābhūmikas or great grounds, sets of mental factors that always accompany certain types of minds. We summarize this presentation below.

There are ten great grounds of mind (Sa Mang Po Pa; mahābhūmika) which accompany every moment of consciousness:

1) Feeling. (Tsor Ba; vedanā)

2) Intention, which makes [the mind] move to the object. (Sems Pa; cetanā)[168]

3) Discrimination. ('Du Shes; saṁjñā)

4) Predilection, which seeks the object. ('Dun Pa; chanda)

5) Contact, which utilizes the object after the three--object, faculty and consciousness--have assembled. (Reg Pa; sparśa)

6) Intelligence, which distinguishes phenomena. (Blo Gros; mati)[169]

7) Recollection, which doesn't forget the referent object. (Dran Pa; smṛti)

8) Mental Engagement, which directs the mind to a particular referent object. (Yid La Byed Pa; manaskāra)

9) Appreciation, which grasps the referent object in its qualities. (Mos Pa; adhimokṣa)

10) Meditative Stabilization, which is single-pointedness of mind. (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi)

The ten virtuous great grounds (dGe Ba'i Sa Mang Po Pa; kuśala-mahābhūmika) are the mental factors that invariably arise in all virtuous

minds, but do not arise in other types of mind:

1) Faith, which clears the mind of afflictions and secondary afflictions. (Dad Pa; śraddhā)[170]

2) Conscientiousness, which esteems virtue. (Bag Yod; apramāda)

3) Pliancy, which is a serviceability of mind. (Shin Tu sByangs Pa; praśrabdhi)

4) Equanimity, which is an effortless arising [of mind] without [letting it] go under the influence of drowsiness or excitement. In general there are three "bTang sNyoms" (upekṣā): the formative force equanimity, neutral feeling of the feelings, and equanimity of the immeasurables. From among these, this is the first. (bTang sNyoms; upekṣā)

5) Shame, the opposite of shamelessness. (Ngo Tsa Shes Pa; hrī)

6) Embarrassment, the opposite of immodesty. (Khrel Yod Pa; apatrāpya)

7) Non-attachment a mind which, by its own nature (Rang sTobs) is without attachment to its object. ('Dod Chags Med Pa; alobha)

8) Non-hatred a mind which, by its own nature, engages its own object without hatred. (Zhe sDang Med Pa; adveṣa)

9) Non-harming, which does not engage others in an injurious manner. (rNam Par Mi 'Tse Ba; avihiṁsā)

10) Persevering Effort, which is a mind that delights in virtue. (brTson 'Grus; vīrya)

The six great grounds of great afflictions (Nyon Mongs Chen Po'i Sa Mang Po Pa; kleśa-mahābhūmika) are the mental factors which arise in all afflicted minds, but not in others:

1) Delusion, which is ignorance. (rMongs Pa; moha)

2) Non-conscientiousness, which is the opposite of conscientiousness. (Bag Med; pramāda)

3) Laziness, which is the opposite of persevering effort. (Le Lo; kauśīdya)

4) Non-faith, which is the opposite of faith. (Ma Dad Pa; āśraddhya)

5) Torpor, which obscures the mind. (rMugs Pa; styāna)

6) Excitement, which scatters outwards. (rGod Pa; auddhatya)

The two great grounds of non-virtuous mind are the mental factors that arise in all non-virtuous minds, but not in others:

1) Immodesty is what does not regard disgraceful conduct (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; avadya) with fear. (Khrel Med; āhrīkya)

2) Shamelessness is not having respect for virtue and those who have virtuous qualities. (Ngo Tsa Med Pa; manapatrāpya)[171]

The ten great grounds of minor afflictions (Nyon Mongs Chung Ngu'i

Sa Mang Po Pa; parītta-kleśa-mahābhūmika) are mental factors which are minor in three ways: they are abandoned only by Meditation and not through the Seeing of the Truths; they are concomitant only with the mental consciousness and not with the five other consciousnesses; and they do not arise with all minds and can arise individually. These are discussed in more detail in the fifth chapter:

1) Belligerence, which is ill-will other than covetousness or malice. (Khro Ba; krodha)

2) Resentment, which increases ill-will in the wake of belligerence. (Khon Du 'Dzin Pa; upanāha)

3 ) Dissimulation, which is the deceit of a dishonest mind. (Gyo; śāṭhya)

4) Jealousy, which is intolerance of others' good fortune. (Phrag Dog; īrṣyā)

5) Obstinacy, which is holding firmly to sin. ('Tsig Pa; pradāsa)

6) Concealment, which hides faults. ('Chab Pa; mrakṣa)

7) Avarice, which doesn't give dharma, material things, and so forth to others, and is an attitude that is contradictory to giving. (Ser sNa; matsarā)

8) Deceit, which misleads others by pretending to have qualities which one does not have. (sGyu; māyā)

9) Haughtiness is a mind which is the culmination (Yongs Su gTugs Pa; paryādāna) of attachment to one's own qualities of long life and so forth.

(rGyags Pa; mada)

10) Harmfulness, which injures others. (rNam 'Tse; vihiṁsa)

There are then eight mental factors which are indefinite in that they may accompany either a virtuous, a non-virtuous or a neutral mind:

1) Investigation is an investigating mind with an aspect of coarseness. (rTog Pa; vitarka)

2) Analysis is an analyzing mind with an aspect of subtlety. (dPyod Pa; vicāra)

3) Regret is the feeling of remorse towards wrongdoing. ('Gyod; kaukṛtya)

4) Sleep is a mental factor which makes the mind unclear and gathers the sense consciousnesses inwards. (gNyid; middha)

5) Anger agitates the mind by being unable to bear, or intending to harm, the object. (Khong Khro; pratigha)

6) Attachment exaggerates the attractiveness of an object, then takes an interest in and desires it. (Chags; rāga)

7) Pride is a mind with an aspect of being puffed up (Khengs Pa; unnati).[172] (Nga rGyal; māna)

8) Doubt is a wavering and indecisive state of mind. (The Tsom; vicikitsā)

So for example, for a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm, 22 mental factors arise: the ten great grounds of mind, the ten virtuous great grounds; and since it is a mind of the Desire Realm, it arises together with investigation and analysis. If there is regret, or sleep, 23 mental factors arise.

**The Formative Forces Not Associated with Form or Mind**

The *ADKB* next takes up 14 dharmas which are neither of a mental nature and therefore concomitant with mind; nor are they material, and therefore classifiable as form. These 14 are grouped in the catch-all aggregate of formative forces. This makes sense because most of them are forces which fulfill functions necessary to make the Vaibhāṣika conceptual edifice work by solving functional problems in that system; primarily problems brought on by the premises of momentary, substantially existent dharmas which exist in the three times.

To Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas, as well as nearly every other Buddhist sect, establishing these elements as substantially existing dharmas was reification, attributing substantial reality to mere designations (prajñapti), taking functional processes and making of them independent things.

As Paul Griffiths notes, there is, to any non-Vaibhāṣika observer, an ad

hoc quality to these concepts:

> This is an extremely miscellaneous list. The only obvious common factor among the categories presented here is that none of them can easily be placed within the basic division between matter and mind and that they are all ad hoc creations, categories designed to deal with a specific problem internal to the system rather than categories required by the tradition.[173]

In fact, the sense of this list as ad hoc or even arbitrary is reinforced by Vasubandhu himself, who, in verse {ii.35} includes a "ca" which means, according to Yaśomitra and dGe 'Dun Grub, that this category "also" includes other factors that are not associated with mind such as "causing a schism in the saṅgha" (dGe 'Dun dByin; sangha-bheda).[174]

Collette Cox[175] has presented a full treatment of the functions of these dharmas and the arguments for and against their existence. Here, we will merely define them and briefly describe the roles they played in the Vaibhāṣika concept of a functioning person.

The 14 non-associated formative forces are:

1) Obtainment. (Thob Pa; prāpti)

2) Non-obtainment. (Ma Thob Pa; aprāpti)

3) Homogeneity. (sKal mNyam; sabhāgatā)

4) Non-discrimination. ('Du Shes Med Pa; āsaṁjñika)

5) The absorption of non-discrimination. ('Du Shes Med Pa'i sNyom 'Jug; asaṁjñi-samāpatti)

6) The absorption of cessation. ('Gog Pa'i sNyom 'Jug; nirodha-samāpatti)

7) Life. (Srog; jīvita)

8) Arising. (sKye Ba; jāti)

9) Duration. (gNas Pa; sthiti)

10) Aging. (rGa Ba; jarā)

11) Impermanence. (Mi rTag Pa; anityatā).

12) The collection of words. (Ming Gi Tsogs; nāma-kāya)

13) The collection of phrases. (Ngag; pada)

14) The collection of phonemes. (Yi Ge; vyañjana)

**Obtainment and Non-obtainment**

Obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti) is defined by the *ADKB* as both the acquisition of what has not been obtained and the possession of what has been obtained.[176] Obtainment is the mechanism whereby dharmas which are independently existing are connected in an orderly manner to the psycho-physical continuum of an individual which has no self-nature, and is conceived as nothing but a collection of these dharmas.[177]

The process of purifying the afflictions is that, by the cultivation of knowledge, which acts as the antidote to an affliction, one eliminates the obtainment of that affliction, and obtains the abandonment (visaṁyoga) or the analytical cessation of that affliction. At that point the afflictive dharma,

past, present or future, is no longer associated with one's mental continuum. But because cessations are asaṁskṛtas it can not be that this analytical cessation arises due to causes and conditions. How then does someone possess an affliction one moment, but only the cessation of that affliction the next moment, without that cessation arising? The Vaibhāṣikas say it is because the asaṁskṛta cessation becomes newly associated with one's continuum by means of a new obtainment of the cessation.

Similarly, obtainment solves other problems for the Vaibhāṣikas: Since minds are momentary, and by the action of homogenous cause each moment of mind produces the subsequent similar moment of mind, how can a virtuous mind ever be followed by an non-virtuous mind? Because obtainment is not associated with mind, a non-virtuous obtainment of a non-virtuous mental factor can remain within the continuum even during moments of virtuous mind, when otherwise no factors of contradictory moral quality could persist. Thus the non-virtuous mental factor is preserved and accessible to the continuum though not actually manifest during moments of virtuous mind.

**Homogeneity**

Homogeneity is the dharma that causes the similarity in "the activities, thought and nature of sentient beings."[178] It is a substance which, by

causing mutual similarities within groups, such as gods, humans, animals and so forth, it enables us to distinguish and identify these groups as distinct groups. This is specific homogeneity (Tha Dad; bhinna).[179] Generic homogeneity (Tha Dad Min Pa; abhinna) is a substance that causes the similarity among all sentient beings. It is the substance that distinguishes sentient beings from non-sentient things.

Vasubandhu criticizes this concept, first of all by pointing out that everything should have homogeneity, because otherwise how could we distinguish rice from barley? Concepts like "human beings" are mere designations of things that have similar properties. Humans are designated as humans not because of a substantially existent substance called homogeneity; but because all humans have in common a similarity of saṁskāras, due to a similarity of karmic causes.

Furthermore, Vasubandhu points out, the Vaibhāṣika position is in line with the Vaiśeṣika tenets which maintain that there is a generality (sPyi; sāmānya) which is a different substance from the particular case (gSal Ba; vyakta), and establishes essential nature.[180]

**Non-discrimination, the Absorption of Non-discrimination and the Absorption of Cessation**

Non-discrimination is a substance that arrests mind and mental factors

in the continuum of an individual born on the level of non-discrimination which is in the fourth concentration. It is the karmic fruition to be born on that level due to practicing the meditative absorption of non-discrimination. When the karma to abide there is exhausted, which, according to the *Prajñapti-śāstra*, may be five hundred great eons, one will definitely be born back in the Desire Realm.

The absorption of non-discrimination is the level of meditative practice, the attaining of which will have the karmic fruition to be born on the level of non-discrimination in the fourth concentration. It is, likewise, a substance that arrests the mind and mental factors from the moment of entering the absorption until one arises from it.[181]

This absorption is practiced by ordinary individuals who mistake this totally pacified state for the path to liberation. Thus, the motivation for engaging in it is virtuous, that is seeking the path of liberation. Āryans, however, avoid this state because they see that it is not liberation, and entering into such a state for so many eons, only to be reborn in the Desire Realm, is seen by them as a pitfall.[182]

The absorption of cessation is a similar but still higher state of arrested mental function. It is part of the level of the Peak of Existence, because by

cultivating this absorption one will be reborn in the Peak of Existence. One engages in this absorption with the motivation to abide in a peaceful state where all the desires and troubles of this life are pacified, so it too is considered virtuous. It can only be attained by Āryans because one can only attain it by means of the supermundane path. One can not reach the level of the Peak of Existence by the mundane path because that requires meditation comparing the subtler qualities of a higher level with the coarser qualities of a lower one, and there is no level higher than the Peak of Existence.

Another reason why ordinary individuals do not generate the absorption of cessation is their fear of annihilation. Since the Peak of Existence is in the Formless Realm, where beings already have no body, ordinary individuals mistake the cessation of their mind and mental factors for total annihilation, which makes them fearful. The absorption of non-discrimination does not have this effect since it is in the Form Realm and one still has a body to provide a sense of existence. In fact, while in the absorption of cessation one still possesses homogeneity, life and other formative forces not associated with mind.[183]

**Life**

We have discussed life at some length above. Here at {ii.45} the discussion centers around the precise relationship of the three most

fundamental and inseparable elements of existence: life--which is synonymous with longevity (Tse; āyus) or the time one has to live; warmth; and consciousness.[184]

Some say that longevity is the support of warmth and consciousness, and that warmth and consciousness are the support of life. The Sautrāntikas object to this interdependence, pointing out that it logically leads to immortality: "There is the consequence that longevity, warmth and consciousness would not be ended (lDog Pa Med Pa; anivṛtti). By being the supports of each other, until longevity is eliminated, warmth and consciousness will not end. And until those two are eliminated, longevity will not end."[185]

The Vaibhāṣikas respond that karma is actually the support of longevity, because longevity remains to the extent that it has been projected by previous karma.

But why, ask the Sautrāntikas, is it necessary to consider life/longevity as a separate substance. It is merely the projection by karma due to which the continuity of an individual continuum remains for a given period of time: the karmic force by which the skandhas renew themselves for a determined length of time in a homogenous series. That karmic projection is what we call longevity; it is merely a designation, not a substantially existent substance.[186]

**The meaning of death**

The cessation of these three is what constitutes death, because a being can still be alive without mind, like the beings abiding in the non-conscious absorptions; but one can not survive without the supports of consciousness, based upon which consciousness can return to the unconscious being, and living will be sustained. The question of whether death is due exclusively to the exhaustion of longevity leads to an interesting set of four possibilities (catuṣkoṭi) for causing death.

The two basic causes of death are the exhaustion of longevity and the exhaustion of merits. Longevity is the result of projecting karma; whereas merit is a function of other secondary karmic causes due to which one finds "the objects of enjoyment" which are in fact the necessities for life--food, clothing, shelter and so forth.

Thus one can die from the exhaustion of longevity while one still has merit, and therefore the necessities of life.

One can die from the exhaustion of karma that ripens in the objects of enjoyment even though one has not exhausted longevity. Such a death might be from famine or severe poverty leading to one's freezing to death.

Of course one can die from the exhaustion of both types of karma.

And finally, most interesting of all, there is death which is neither, called untimely death (Dus Ma Yin Par 'Chi Ba; akāla-maraṇa), when neither

the karma that ripens in longevity nor that which ripens as the objects of enjoyment is exhausted. This type of death seems to take the form of carelessly subjecting oneself to unhealthy conditions which can lead to an untimely death.[187]

**The four characteristics**

These four dharmas are the defining characteristics of saṁskṛta phenomena. They are defined as:

> Arising is what causes [a phenomenon] to arise.
> Duration is what causes [a phenomenon] to persist.
> Aging is what causes [a phenomenon] to decay.
> Impermanence is what causes [a phenomenon] to perish.

As the definitive characteristics of saṁskṛta dharmas, these are the qualities that distinguish the saṁskṛtas from the asaṁskṛtas.

Although it is said that saṁskṛta dharmas arise due to causes and conditions, Collette Cox has described the four characteristics as forces that lend to dharmas a "susceptibility" to arising, duration and so forth, without which the causes and conditions would be insufficient to bring about their effects. In this sense they act as the predominant causes among the assembly of other causes which enable saṁskṛta dharmas to "manifest their nature as impermanent or as constructed."[188]

dGe 'Dun Grub's presentation of Vasubandhu's attack on the substantial existence of the four characteristics focuses on three points: First

of all, the Sautrāntikas say that since the dharma of arisal must itself have the four characteristics of arisal and so forth, the concept leads to infinite regression.

The Vaibhāṣikas cite sūtra to prove that the Buddha taught the four characteristics with the words, "These three are the definitive characteristics of saṁskṛtas: The arisal of saṁskṛtas is known...etc." The Sautrāntikas reply that this is, typically, Vaibhāṣika reification of merely descriptive language. The Buddha was describing the arisal, impermanence and so forth of a "continuum of produced phenomena ('Du Byed; saṁskāra)," the psycho-physical continuum that makes up an individual life stream. The Vaibhāṣikas misinterpret this statement to mean that all four characteristics participate in every moment of a dharma. No, say the Sautrāntikas, the Buddha "did not teach arisal etc. in terms of a single moment."[189] The individual continuum does arise, and continue, and age, and pass away, a process that is due to causes and conditions. Dharmas pass away because impermanence is the inherent nature of all phenomena. There is no need to reify separate substances to account for such processes.

**The collections of words, phrases and phonemes**

dGe 'Dun Grub's treatment of the *Kośa* discussion of the nature of language is brief and elides an extended Sautrāntika refutation of the

Vaibhāṣika concepts. Perhaps his disinterest in these factors reflects the apparent anomaly of finding three linguistic elements in a classification of forces that mold the individual continuum. The question of why they are here and why words, phrases and phonemes are substantially existing dharmas is one that jumps out at any non-Vaibhāṣika observer of the system.

Buddhist discussion of the nature of language falls within the context of such concerns by Indian grammarians and the Mīmāṁsā school, which were a major influence on the discussion.[190]

The Vaibhāṣika concern with language was has been traced to their interest in the nature of the words of the Buddha.[191] The dichotomy emerged between the Buddha's teachings being of the nature of speech (vāk), and therefore included in the form aggregate; or of the nature of nāma--non-material expression or meaning.

It is this distinction that forms the main point of discussion in the *ADKB*. The Vaibhāṣikas consider speech as mere sound to be inadequate to the task of conveying meaning. The verbal sound sets into operation the substantial dharma called word (nāma) which is the entity which actually conveys meaning. They acknowledge the conventionality of language in that nāma can only function when set into operation by collections of phonemes, which are established by convention so that certain sets of phonemes correspond to certain words (nāma). But it is the nāma which actually

performs the function of generating the idea (saṁjñā) (which is the meaning of the word) in the mind of the recipient of the communication. Words then, are not form, but are to be included as formative forces not associated with mind.

Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas maintain that this intermediate mechanism is totally unnecessary. Although it is true that mere sounds alone can not convey meaning, by virtue of the agreed upon conventions of language, verbal sounds can and do convey meaning. And since even the Vaibhāṣikas admit that such conventions are necessary to make their theory of nāma work, of what use is the intermediate step. Words (nāma) are sound, and therefore are included in the form aggregate.[192]

## NOTES TO PART II

1. *GDD* p.23. In this explanation he follows very closely mChims (p.17a1) who also cites Pūrṇavardhana.

2. Taisho 1552. On this see *Index* p.XXX; Taiken Kimura (1937); Frauwallner (1971); and Cox (1983).

3. We refer here to Saṁghabhadra and the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa*. See Cox (1983); Jaini (1977); and Part I, Chapter 2 of my Introduction.

4. Frauwallner began this controversy by asserting in *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu* (1951) that the works attributed to Vasubandhu by the tradition should be distributed between two Vasubandhus: Vasubandhu the Elder who was a Yogācārin and the brother of Asañga whose dates were 320-380 A.D.; and Vasubandhu the younger, who wrote the *Kośa* circa 400-480 A.D.

Without going into the details of the dispute, which has been taken up in numerous venues, it must be said that most scholars in the field have found Frauwallner's thesis to be mistaken, and the latter dates for Vasubandhu, author of both the *Kośa* and the later Yogācāra texts, are widely considered to be the most probable.

The most trenchant refutations of Frauwallner are found in Anacker (1970); Le Manh That (1974); Wayman (1961); Jaini (1958); Ryose (1987); and Mejor (1991).

5. Quoted in *GDD* p.17.

6. *ADKB* {i.2}, p.12

7. For a full elaboration of this Sarvāstivāda ontology see Williams (1981); and Cox (1983) p.81ff.

8. See *ADKB* {i.18}, {vi.14}.

9. See Williams (1981); Cox (1988) p.88; *CCB* p.41.

10. *CCB* p.37.

11. Verdu (1985) p.13.

12. *GDD* p.20, Translation {i.5}.

13. *GDD* p.21, Translation {ii.6}.

14. *GDD* p.18, Translation {i.5}.

15. See below Chapter 5 where the mental factors are defined and categorized.

16. *ADKB* p.567; *bShad Pa* p.350.

17. *GDD* p.295; 164a1.

18. This argument is summarized in Chapter Five fn#1 of the Translation.

19. This subject will be elaborated below in the discussion of the contaminants of existence.

20. *GDD* p.298; 165b2, Translation {v.7}.

21. The explanation of seven types of pride is found in the *Prakaraṇapāda*, Taisho 26, p.693a29; the explanation of nine types is from the *Jñānaprasthāna*, Taisho 26, p.1028b26.

22. *GDD* p.312; 173a5, Translation {v.33}.

23. However ignorance that is concomitant with the view of the transitory collections and the view holding to the extremes is neutral, and not non-virtuous. Because, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, "the view of transitory collections observes morality for the sake of one's own pleasure, and undertakes the activity of giving. The view holding to the extremes is concordant with liberation, because liberation is contrary to the aggregates, and the view holding to the extremes is also a view that is always opposed to the aggregates." (*GDD* p.303; 168a6)

24. *GDD* p.315; 174b6, Translation {v.38}.

25. The first three are view of transitory collections; wrong view; view holding to the extremes.

The last two are esteeming unworthy views; esteeming morality and asceticism.

There are 18 types of the first three because: There is view of the transitory collections and view holding to the extremes (to be abandoned by seeing Suffering) in each of the three realms = 6. Then there is wrong view to be abandoned by each of the four Truths = 4, in each of the three realms = 12. 12 + 6 = 18.

There are 18 types of the last two because: There two types of esteeming morality and asceticism (to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and the Path) in each of the three realms = 6. Then there is esteeming unworthy views to be abandoned by each of the four Truths = 4, in each of the three realms = 12. 12 + 6 = 18.

26. *SAKV* p.839; *'Gral bShad* p.149b8 explains that these two are pulled out of (Phyung Nas; niṣkṛṣya) the group of full entanglements and taught separately because they are the only ones that are both exclusively non-virtuous, and independent. Independent (Rang dBang Can; svatantra) means that they can arise concomitant only with ignorance and no other full entanglement. Yaśomitra goes on:

> Although shamelessness and immodesty are exclusively non-virtuous, they are not independent, because they are concomitant with attachment and other [afflictions.]
>
> Although regret ('Gyod Pa; kaukṛtya) is independent because it can be concomitant with only ignorance, it is not exclusively non-virtuous, because it can also be virtuous.
>
> Torpor (rMongs Pa; styāna), excitement (rGod Pa; auddhatya) and sleep (gNyid; middha) are not independent because they are concomitant with attachment and so forth, and they are also not exclusively non-virtuous because they can be virtuous and neutral.

27. This list is given in the Translation, Chapter Five fn#71.

28. Chaudhuri (1983) p.168.

29. The story is found at *GDD* p.320;177b3, Translation {v.53}.

30. For an analysis of this see {ii.12} and the Translation, Chapter Five fn#79.

31. This refers to the special case where pleasure replaces mental happiness in the third concentration; see {ii.8}.

32. *Saṁyuktāgama*, Taisho 2, p.189c17. Also at *Ekottara*, Taisho 2, p.674a15.

33. Quoted in *GDD* p.322; 178b4, Translation {v.59}.

34. This passage of the *ADKB* is translated by Stcherbatsky, *CCB* Appendix I, p.76.

Within the *ADKB* the issue is also taken up at {i.7}, {i.34}, {iv.35} and {v.62}. For further discussions of the issue see Williams (1981); Cox (1983) p.76; and Bareau (1955) p.137. For other sources that discuss this issue see Pruden fn#89.

35. *Samyuktakāgama*, Taisho 2, p.20a11. See Pruden fn#91 for other sources.

36. See Bareau (1955) p.167ff; Dutt (1970) p.223-226.

37. *CCB* p.82, from Stcherbatsky's translation of *ADKB* {v.27}.

38. *CCB* p.83, from Stcherbatsky's translation of *ADKB*. For a more sympathetic presentation of Saṁghabhadra's point of view see Cox (1983) p.76.

39. *GDD* p.310, paraphrased from *ADKB* {v.27d}. See Pruden Chapter 5, fn#112 for Hsuan-tsang's version.

40. *GDD* p.294, Translation {v.1}.

41. For a trenchant philosophical critique of the theory that karma can be a cosmogonic creator see Griffiths (1982). Among his other arguments he points out that for karma, as intention, to create the inanimate world, minds must predate that world. Buddhists hold that mind and intention are beginningless, and therefore they will always be around to create a world. But, says Griffiths, science has led us to "the reasonably well-established conclusion that [the material universe] is several thousand million years old, and that life forms capable of volitional action did not appear anywhere in it until at least several hundred million years subsequent to its origin."

Griffiths, however, gives no consideration to the Buddhist conception of the cyclical nature of dependent arising, by means of which minds come to manifest in the way they do. For Buddhists minds are beginningless, as is the creation and destruction of the infinite worlds in the universe. Though beginninglessness is, at first look, a foreign concept, it leaves no more questions unanswered than the question: If the universe is, say, three billion years old, what was the universe in the year three billion and one?

The very fundamental cyclical world-view of Buddhism is easy to poke holes in standing on linear western ground. But before setting up his other propositions Griffiths might ask which cosmogonic theory is more rational and which accounts more adequately for the currently known data--a cyclical world view, or one that holds to a beginning?

42. From Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa*, translated into French by Lamotte (1936), Deuxieme Partie, 15; p.225.

43. Verdu (1985), p.69.

44. For a full examination of the way these problems pushed Buddhist thinkers to new solutions, and thus developed new philosophical schools, see Waldron (1990).

45. Ibid. p.86. Verdu goes on to say that the way in which these two disparate depositories of different types of seeds "coordinate and cooperate with one another in order to bring about a unitary 'retribution' in a future life remains a mystery never solved by the Sarvāstivādins."

46. *GDD* p.220, Translation {iv.5}.

47. *GDD* p.217, Translation {iv.3d}.

48. *GDD* p.216, Translation {iv.2}.

49. See Bareau (1955) p.114; and Lamotte (1936) Introduction.

50. Quoted from sūtra at *GDD* p.217, Translation {iv.4a-b}. See the same section of the Translation as well as {iv.113} and Pruden fn#22 for explanations of the seven acts of merit. See that footnote also for citations of the sūtra quote.

51. Lamotte (1936), p.165. My translation. This monograph has been translated into English by Leo Pruden, *Karmasiddhi Prakaraṇa, The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu*, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988.

52. *ADKB* p.587; *bShad Pa* p.362.

53. Jaini (1959), "The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja," p.242.

54. *ADKB* p.217; *bShad Pa* p.115.

55. *ADKB* p.1230. See also Stcherbatsky (1976), p.72.

56. *Madhyama-āgama* 49.16, Taisho 1, p.735b29; quoted at *ADKB* p.212; *bShad Pa* p.113.

57. *ADKB* p.218; *bShad Pa* p.116.

58. *SAKV* p.219; *'Gral bShad* p.156b3.

59. *ADKB* p.763; *bShad Pa* p.3.

60. The philosophical and structural weaknesses of the various models of the karmic mechanism and how they contributed to the evolution of the Buddhist schools and, in particular, led to the concept of the ālaya-vijñāna, is given comprehensive treatment in Waldron (1990).

61. *GDD* p.243, Translation {iv.45}.

62. Govinda (1974), p.47.

63. *GDD* p.221, Translation {iv.8-9}.

64. Prebish (1975) in "The Vinaya Piṭaka" says:

> Many scholars now agree that Prātimokṣa, as a technical term in the Buddhist lexicon, seems to have undergone at least three related stages of development--as a simple confession of faith recited by the monks and nuns at periodic intervals, as a bare monastic code employed as a device insuring proper monastic discipline, and as a monastic liturgy, representing a period of relatively high organization and structure within the saṅgha.

65. *GDD* p.226, Translation {iv.15}.

66. *ADKB* p.610; *bShad Pa* p.379.

67. *GDD* p.230, Translation {iv.24c-d}.

68. Lamotte (1936), p.157.

69. *ADKB* p.621; *bShad Pa* p.388.

70. See Translation Chapter 2, fn#2 for a discussion of this concept.

71. *Mahānāma-sūtra*, *Saṁyuktāgama*, Taisho 2, p.236b.

One who observes two precepts: pradeśakārin; Phyogs gCig sPyod Pa.

One who observes three or four precepts: yadbhūyaskārin; Phal Cher sPyod Pa.

One who observes all five precepts: paripūrṇakārin; Yongs Su rDzogs Par sPyod Pa.

72. Pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya are transgressions by virtue of contravening the rules laid down by the Buddha, in contrast to prakṛti-sāvadya--transgressions by nature. See {iv.122}.

73. For a discussion of these terms see the Translation, Chapter 2, fn#2.

74. See *ADKB* p.650; *bShad Pa* p.412; *SAKV* p.650; and the above cited fn#2, Translation Chapter 2.

75. Ibid.

76. Zwilling p.206.

77. Only Āryans have uncontaminated restraint, and the special concentration and the states of non-discrimination are not levels on which Āryans arise.

For the gods of the Formless Realm, they can possess the restraint, but it is never manifest (mNgon Sum Gyur Pa; sammukhī-bhāva), because the restraint is form. (*ADKB* p.651; *bShad Pa* p.414).

78. *ADKB* p.652; *bShad Pa* p.415.

79. These stories are found at *SAKV* p.662; *'Gral bShad* p.52a3, and in *GDD* p.247, Translation {iv.55}. Poussin (Pruden fn#230) quotes Hsuan-tsang's comment, "Such stories are numerous."

80. *GDD* p.267, Translation {iv.95}; fn#160 for references.

81. *GDD* p.258, Translation {iv.78d}.

82. *ADKB* p.696; *bShad Pa* p.452.

83. Paraphrased from *ADKB* p.685; *bShad Pa* p.443.

84. *GDD* p.261, Translation {iv.82}.

85. See *ADKB* p.688; *bShad Pa* p.445.

86. *GDD* p.255, Translation {iv.69}.

87. *ADKB* p.710; *bShad Pa* p.462.

88. Geshe Donyo points out that these are general guidelines, not pervasions.

In the Tibetan teaching tradition sometimes the last two are given in reverse: by the medium strength actions one is born as a hungry ghost; by the weakest, one is born as an animal.

89. *ADKB* p. 711; *bShad Pa* p.463.

90. *GDD* p.274, Translation {iv.103}.

*ADKB* p.731; *bShad Pa* p.478 adds:

> But the second [woman] performs all the activities of a mother: gives the child milk, nourishes it, and raises it.

91. Geshe Donyo comments that these four attainments correspond to the four fruits:
1. Entry into the path = higher rebirths as gods, humans, etc.
2. Obtaining fruit = Stream-enterers and Once-returners.
3. Freedom from attachment = Non-returners.
4. Extinction of contamination = Arhatship.

92. *GDD* p.276, Translation {iv.105}.

93. See {iii.44} and {vi.34}. This is an Āryan who is certain to attain Nirvāṇa.

94. I avoid as far as possible the term Hīnayāna, as it is rightly considered derogatory by many, especially those who follow the Theravādin path. However in the following discussion I have felt compelled to resort to the outdated term for lack of an alternative with the same recognizable semantic range.

95. *ADKB* p.744; *bShad Pa* p.489.

96. Bechert (1973) p.13.

97. See {v.25}.

98. See Waldron (1990).

99. See {iii.44} and {vi.34}.

100. *GDD* p.279, Translation {iv.108}.

101. *GDD* p.287, Translation {iv.118}.

102. *GDD* p.288, Translation {iv.120}.

103. *GDD* p.290, Translation {iv.121}.

104. *ADKB* p.750; *bShad Pa* p.496.

105. *GDD* p.294, Translation, conclusion to Chapter Four.

106. *GDD* p.263, Translation {iii.18}. This discussion in the *ADKB* is at p.432.

107. Ibid.

108. *ADKB* p.432; *rTza Ba* p.166.

109. *GDD* p.166, Translation {iii.26}.

110. *GDD* p.164-5.

111. *ADKB* p.436; *bShad Pa* p.246:

> IGNORANCE IS THE STATE OF PREVIOUS AFFLICTION. Whatever is [included in] the state of affliction in a previous life, is called here, ignorance; because they act in concert, and it is the force of that [ignorance] that motivates those [afflictions.]

Poussin (Pruden p.402) emphasizes the point that ignorance here does not refer to an isolated state of ignorance, nor merely to the totality of the afflictions. Rather it is the very condition of being afflicted of the aggregates in a previous life.

112. *ADKB* p.437; *bShad Pa* p.246:

> THE FORMATIVE FORCES ARE PREVIOUS KARMAS. The word "occasion" (gNas sKabs; daśa) is to be added. Those occasions of meritorious etc. karma in previous lives, are here called formative forces; the karmas of which this [life] is the fruition.

113. The six āyatanas here refers to the six sense faculties. The *ADKB* p.437 (*bShad Pa* p.247) points out that it should say "up until the four āyatanas are developed" because the mental faculty and the body faculty already exist from the moment of conception; but, "Six āyatanas is said because at that

time they are [all found to be] arranged [as a group of six."]

114. *ADKB* p.438; *bShad Pa* p.247:

> The state of feeling lasts for as long as the desire for sexual intercourse is not activated.

115. *ADKB* p.438; *bShad Pa* p.247:

> The state in which the desire for sensual pleasures and sexual intercourse is activated, up until one engages in seeking out those objects, is called craving.

116. *MOE* p.281:

> The tenth member, existence, is a case of giving the name of the effect to the cause. For it is the potency established by the second member, action, when it has been thoroughly nourished by attachment and grasping and has become empowered to develop into the next life.

117. *ADKB* p.439; *bShad Pa* p.248:

> What is the limb of consciousness here [in this life,] is, in another life, [the limb of] birth.

118. *ADKB* p.439; *bShad Pa* p.248:

> What are the four limbs of name and form, six āyatanas, contact and feeling in this life, are aging and death in another life.

119. This is discussed at *ADKB* {iii.25c-d}, p.441.

120. *GDD* p.165, Translation {iii.26}.

121. *ADKB* p.442; *bShad Pa* p.650:

> SEVEN ARE BASES. The seven limbs that have the nature of bases are: consciousness, name and form, the six āyatanas. contact, feeling, birth, old age and death; because they are the support (rTen; āśraya) of afflictions and karma. And just as these seven limbs are bases, LIKEWISE THEY ARE RESULTS. The seven limbs are results. The remaining five are causes, because they are of the nature of karma and affliction.

122. *GDD* p.171, {iii.36}.

123. *GDD* p.148, Translation {iii.1}.

124. *GDD* p.149, Translation {iii.3}.

125. See Pruden fn#61 for various sources of this theory.

126. See {ii.14} and {iii.98}.

127. *GDD* p.155, Translation {iii.8-9}.

128. Se *ADKB* {iii.11-12}, and *GDD* p.156-158 for this discussion.

129. *GDD* p.159, Translation {iii.13}. This opinion is from the *Vibhāṣā*, Taisho 27, p.361b14.

130. *GDD* p.160, Translation {iii.13}.

131. *GDD* p.161, Translation {iii.15}.

132. The most effective summary of these schema and their interrelationship is still to be found in Stcherbatsky's *Central Conception of Buddhism*.

133. *GDD* p.40, Translation {i.20}.

134. *GDD* p.6.

135. *GDD* p.42, Translation {i.22}.

136. *GDD* p.29, Translation {i.9}.

137. For a provocative exploration of the nature of this substance and how it becomes sensitive to it is respective object see Verdu (1985) p.21ff.

138. See *SAKV* p.32; *CCB* p.11.

139. Verdu (1985) p.21ff presents the most thoughtful treatment of the *Kośa* atomic theory. On the mahābhūtas he says:

> The four mahābhūtas (great elements) should be considered as simple primordial dharmas of materiality, each one carrying its own specific kind of activity or energy and thus establishing the basis for each one of the fundamental states which can characterize or affect any of the

appearing things in the material world...

140. The process by which one element predominates over the others is a matter of dispute between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. See {ii.22}.

141. See {ii.22} for the *ADKB* discussion of this and Verdu (1985) p.21ff for further insight.

142. *GDD* p.33, Translation {i.12}.

143. *GDD* p.43, Translation {i.22}. However, GDD seems to have turned around the causes and effects of this sequence, *ADKB* p.66; *bShad Pa* p.26:

> From beginningless cyclic existence men and women delight in each other's form. And this is because of the desire for the experience of [pleasurable] feelings. That desire is because there is mistaken discrimination. That mistake is due to afflictions. And mind becomes afflicted by these [afflictions.] So, the order is in accordance with the stages of affliction.

144. *GDD* p.28, Translation {i.14}.

145. *GDD* p.35, Translation {i.14}.

146. The three asaṁskṛtas are not included in the five aggregates.

147. *ADKB* p.125; *bShad Pa* p.61 elaborates on how the last moment of the mental faculty also acts as a support for the sense consciousnesses:

> "THE SUPPORT OF THE LAST IS PAST." The support of the mental consciousness dhātu is the [mental faculty] which has just ceased. "[THE SUPPORT OF] THE FIVE IS ALSO WHAT ARISES SIMULTANEOUS WITH THEM." The term "also" means that [their supports] are also of the past. Here, the support that arises simultaneous with the eye consciousness is the eye [faculty; and likewise] up to the body [faculty being the support] of the body consciousness. And their support in the past is the mind [faculty.] Thus those five collections of consciousness each has two faculties for support.

148. *GDD* p.56, Translation {i.29}.

At {i.11} we read: "What is caused by the great elements, that is called non-revealing form."

149. *GDD* p.64, Translation {i.35}. On collections of subtle atoms see also {ii.22}.

150. *GDD* p.58, Translation {i.30}.

151. *SAKV* p.98; *'Grel bShad* p.74a7:

> saṁskāra = abhyañga-snāna-ānuvāsanādi-svabhāva//
> Legs Par Bya Ba Ni Lus bsKu Ba Dang sMan Par bTang Ba La Sogs Pa'i Ngo Bo Nyid Do//

152. See above, Chapter 2 of my Introduction. Also the *Index* p.XXX; and the major source for this theory, Taiken Kimura, *Abidatsumaron no Kenkyu*, Tokyo: Meiji Shoin, 1937.

Translations and studies of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* include:

I. Armelin, *Le Coeur de la Loi Supreme*. Librairie Orientaliste Paul Guethner, Paris, 1978

Wataru S. Ryose, *A Study of the Abhidharmahṛdaya: The Historical Development of the Concept of Karma in the Sarvāstivāda Thought*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987.

Charles Willemen, *The Essence of Metaphysics*, Publications de l'Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Bouddhiques, Serie "Etudes et textes" No.4, Bruxelles, 1975.

See also the article reviewing Armelin and Willemen by De Jong (1980).

153. *GDD* p.82, Translation {ii.1}.

154. *GDD* p.84, Translation {ii.5-6}.

155. *GDD* p.83, Translation {ii.1}. A full discussion of the importance of having intact male or female faculties is found in the Translation, Chapter 2, fn#2.

156. *GDD* p.83, Translation {ii.4}.

157. There is an unusual exception to this: In the third concentration, the mental feeling which has agreeable experience is the faculty of pleasure. The reason for this is given at *ADKB* p.146; *bShad Pa* p.75:

> In the third concentration, because one is separated from attachment to joy (dGa Ba; prīti), there is only the faculty of pleasure and there is no mental happiness; because joy is mental happiness.

See *SAKV* p.146; *'Grel bShad* p.103b6 and {viii.9} for further comment.
Above the third concentration there is neither pleasure nor mental happiness, only neutral feeling.

158. *GDD* p.84, Translation {ii.4}. For details of nikāya-sabhāgatā see {ii.41}.

159. *GDD* p.84, Translation {ii.4}.

160. *GDD* p.89-90, Translation {ii.10}.

161. *ADKB* p.163; *bShad Pa*.

162. *GDD* p.87, Translation {ii.9}.

163. *GDD* p.91, Translation {ii.11}.

164. *GDD* p.92, Translation {ii.12}.
See discussion at {i.30}. Here, the *ADKB* p.161; *bShad Pa* p.84 explains that the Form Realm gods are considered males despite not having male organs:

> How do they come to be called males? As it says in sūtra, "That a woman should become Brahmā, it does not happen and is impossible. That it should be a male does happen." There are [in the Form Realm] the other qualities which males have in the Desire Realm.

165. *GDD* p.102, Translation {ii.23}.

166. This is according to the interpretation of Yaśomitra at *SAKV* p.209:

> āśrayālambanākārakāladravyasamatābhiriti / yenāśrayeṇa cittamutpadyate, tenaivāśrayeṇa vedanāsaṁjñācetanādaya utpadyante //

There is more discussion of the five types of identity of mind and mental factors at {ii.53}.

167. Waldron (1990) p.147. Stcherbatsky (*CCB* p.26) is also instructive on this point:

> There is no "inherence" of qualities in substance; in this respect all real elements are equally independent....To every unit of quality there is a corresponding subtle element (dharma) which either directly manifests itself or, according to the Sarvāstivādins, remaining for ever a transcendental reality, produces a reaction (kāritva, lakṣaṇa) which we wrongly interpret as being a quality. All sense-data (rūpa) are substances in that sense that there is no stuff they belong to. If we say "earth has odor, etc.", it is only an inadequate expression; we ought to say "earth is odor, etc.", since beside these sense-data there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to. The same principle is applied to the mental sphere; there is no spiritual substance apart from mental elements, or faculties, that are conceived as subtle realities or substances sui generis, very much on the same pattern as the elements of matter. There is no soul apart from feelings, ideas, volitions, etc. Therefore an element technically means "non-self".

168. *ADKB* p.187 ; *bShad Pa* p.97:
cetanā citta-abhisaṁskāro //
Intention is that which conditions the mind.

*SAKV* p.187; *'Grel bShad* p.131a4:
cetanā cittābhisaṁskāra iti / cittaprasפandaḥ //
"Intention is that which conditions the mind," means it is what moves the mind.

169. *ADKB* p.187 ; *bShad Pa* p.98:

matiḥ prajñā dharmapravicayaḥ //
Intelligence is wisdom that discerns dharmas.

*SAKV* p.187; *'Grel bShad* p.131b2:

It should be called wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā) because it is recognized as that, but in order to conform to the arrangement of the śloka it is called intelligence (Blo Gros; mati) in the kārikās.

170. *ADKB* p.188; *bShad Pa* p.98:

Others say that it is belief in the Truths, the [Three] Jewels, and karma

and results.

171. *GDD* p.108, {ii.32}:

> Some groups say: Not refraining from non-virtue in regard to oneself is shamelessness. Not refraining from transgression in regard to others is immodesty.

172. Pride has been more thoroughly defined in the chapter on the polluting tendencies.

173. Griffiths (1986) p.57.

174. *SAKV* p.210; *'Grel bShad* p.148a5:

> The term "also" is in order to indicate [other] non-associated things that are consistent with [the formative forces] like these. Things not associated with mind such as causing a schism in the saṅgha and so forth are considered to be substantially [the same.]

175. Cox's dissertation, *Controversies in Dharma Theory: Sectarian Dialogue on the Nature of Enduring Reality*, Columbia University, (1983), is the most thorough treatment of the non-associated forces, and is especially strong in presenting Saṁghabhadra's Vaibhāṣika counter-arguments for their existence. Jaini's series of articles (see Bibliography) also focus on these issues. And Waldron (1990) illuminates how the problems that led the Vaibhāṣikas to posit some of the non-associated factors ramified throughout the history of Buddhist thought, and led Buddhist thinkers toward certain Yogācāra solutions.

176. *GDD* p.111; *ADKB* {ii.36}, p.211. See also Cox p.37 for the history of this definition and discussion of various interpretations.

177. Obtainment has also been dealt with at some length above in Chapter Three, in the context of its role in Vaibhāṣika karma theory.

178. *GDD* p.117, Translation {ii.41}.

179. 179. *ADKB* p.230 ; *bShad Pa* p.122:

> If there were no such substance with a uniform nature as homogeneity, there would not be a conception or an expression distinguishing "this being from that being" among beings who are

separate from each other by being different.

180. *GDD* p.118, Translation {ii.41}.

181. Paul Griffiths' *On Being Mindless* is a close examination of the philosophical problems concerning the continuity of mind that are presented to the tradition by the notion that there are two states in which mind is arrested and then reawakens.

182. *GDD* p.119, Translation {ii.42}.

183. *GDD* p.120; *ADKB* p.237; *bShad Pa* p.126.

184. *ADKB* p.248; *bShad Pa* p.133:

> The Blessed One has said this:
>
> When longevity, warmth and consciousness throw the body away,
> having abandoned it; then what remains is without mind, like a piece of wood.

185. *GDD* p.123, Translation {ii.45}.

186. *ADKB* p.249; *bShad Pa* p.134; Pruden p.234.

187. *ADKB* p.250 *bShad Pa* p.134:

> The fourth is from not avoiding adverse conditions.
> caturthī--viśamāparihāreṇa //

*SAKV* (p.250):

> Not avoiding adverse conditions such as overeating (atyaśana) etc.

188. Cox (1983) p.92. Cox's discussion of the four characteristics is in the context of an excellent clarification of the Sarvāstivāda ontology of the substantial existence of dharmas and their existence in the three times. On this see also Williams (1981).

189. *GDD* p.125, Translation {ii.45-6}.

190. See *CCB* p.24 fn#1; Jaini (1959). Cox (1983):

The extensive treatment of the problem of language in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, however, indicates the early date of the development of linguistic theories within Buddhism. A more extensive analysis of the theories of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* in comparison to those of the early grammarians is warranted.

191. See Jaini (1959) p.96.

192. For a full treatment of this controversy see Jaini (1959) and Cox (1983) p.94.

# PART III

# ELUCIDATING THE PATH TO LIBERATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE ABHIDHARMAKOŚA

by rGyal Ba dGe 'Dun Grub

# CHAPTER ONE

# THE PRESENTATION OF THE DHĀTUS

## Outline to Chapter One

I. The meaning of the title.
A. The translation of the title.
B. The explanation of the title.

II. The salutation [for the successful completion] of the translation.

III. The meaning of the text.
A. The branches of undertaking the composition of the commentary.
1. Making the pledge to compose the text after offering salutations.
a. Salutations.
(2) The condensed meaning.
(3) The literal meaning.

b. The pledge to compose.

2. Explaining the meaning of the title after rejoicing.
a. Explaining "Abhidharma".
(1) The actual explanation.
(2) The ancillary analysis of the meaning of attendants.
(a) Analyzing the meaning of the attendants of ultimate Abhidharma.
1) Analyzing on what levels they are supported.

2) Analyzing the meaning of the support and what is supported.

3) Analyzing how many aggregates [stainless wisdom] has, when together with retinue.

(b) Analyzing the meaning of the attendants of conventional Abhidharma.

b. Explaining "Treasury".

3. Establishing the text as the teaching of the Buddha, after stating its purpose.

B. The actual body of the composed commentary.
1. Identifying the subject.
2. Establishing [the subject] extensively.
a. Explaining asaṁskṛtas extensively.
b. Explaining saṁskṛtas extensively.
(1) The general meaning.
(a) Laying out eight chapters.
(b) Laying out the relationship of the eight chapters
(c) Showing which subject is taught in which chapter.

(2) The meaning of the text.
From among the eight chapters, in the first chapter, Explaining the Dhātus, there are three topics:
(a) The group of the saṁskṛtas.
(b) The list of synonymns.
1) The list of synonymns for saṁskṛtas in general.
2) The list of synonymns for contaminated phenomena in particular.

(c) The extensive explanation of the aggregates, dhātus and āyatanas.
1) The natures of the aggregates dhātus and āyatanas.
a) The actual explanation.
i) Laying out the form aggregate.
(A) The actual explanation.
(i) The condensed presentation.
(ii) The extensive explanation.
(I) The presentation of the five faculties by way of their definitive characteristics.

(II) The presentation of the five external objects by way of examples.

(III) The explanation of non-revealing form.

(B) How many dhātus and āyatanas the [form aggregate] includes.

ii) Laying out the three middle aggregates.

iii) Laying out the aggregate of consciousness.

iv) Clarifying [which are] substantial phenomena.

b) The literal meaning and the purpose of each one of the three.

c) The reason for positing feeling and discrimination as separate aggregates.

d) The way of arranging the order of aggregates, dhātus and āyatanas.

e) Understanding the two āyatanas.

2) How they include other phenomena.

a) How the dharma aggregate is included [in these categories.]

b) Applying this to other [phenomena] as well.

3)The detailed classification of dhātus and aspects.

a) The five, the one that can be pointed out etc.

b) The divisions of having investigation and having analysis etc.

c) The five, having a referent object etc.

d) The detailed classification of the three originations.

e) The five, having substance etc.

f) The detailed classification of the objects to be abandoned on the Path of Seeing etc.

g) The detailed classification of view and non-view.

h) The three, what can be known by two etc.

With reverence I prostrate to the feet of those reverend holy beings
who posses great compassion.

With his excellent complexion, a shade of gilded copper blended with
the lustre of coral,
he knows clearly every object of knowledge without exception.
Lord of perfect wisdom, Mañjuśri, refuge of sentient beings,
Supreme protector please grant the all-pervading wisdom.

As the eye sees variegated forms,
Into the diverse aspects of all the Lord's excellent teachings,
He applied his pure wisdom without hindrance,
I bow at the feet of Asañga and his brother.

Vajradhara, all the Conquerors combined in one,
Who takes the form of a spiritual friend for the benefit of disciples,
I prostrate to glorious bLo bZang Grags Pa,
Supreme leader of all beings of the three realms.

The spread of the wisdom of his good teachings extends like the sky,
Meditating continually with compassion for beings as if he were their
mother,
Possessing the extensive activities of the precious Sage's teachings,
I bow to the feet of rGyal Tsab, the Dharma Regent.

To accomplish the two purposes, he has accumulated all the perfect
white virtues,
By merely offering the pure prayer.
Glorious master of the spontaneously arisen activity,
I bow with reverence to my spiritual instructor.

In order to benefit myself and others,
Without exaggeration or depreciation, I will write these notes
On the streams of nectar of excellent instruction that flows
From the excellent vessels, the mouths of these holy ones.

Here then, I will explain the *Abhidharmakośa* which arranges the five basic subjects[1] within eight chapters of explanation. [p.2; 2a5] There are four topics:

I. The meaning of the title.

II. The salutation [for the successful completion] of the translation.

III. The meaning of the text.

IV. The meaning of the conclusion.

I. The meaning of the title.

There are two topics:

A. The translation of the title.

B. The explanation of the title.

A. The translation of the title.

The title of this commentary in Sanskrit is *Abhidharmakośakārikā*. This in Tibetan is *Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi Tsig Le'ur Byas Pa*.

B. The explanation of the title.

Here, "abhi" means mNgon Pa; "dharma" means Chos (phenomena); "kośa" means mDzod (treasury); "kārikā" means Tsig Le'ur Byas Pa (verses).

One states the title of the commentary in Sanskrit because one must show the text to be authentic. Since the place of enlightenment of all the Buddhas of the three times is the Vajra Throne [Bodhgaya], India is the place where wisdom arises.

When the [title] is stated in Sanskrit one thinks that [the text] is Indian, and although, in reality it may not more than one mere commentary, since its source is good, we undertake to listen to it and explain it. For example, if traders say they have barley from the river valley, since the source is good, people will buy it.

If no Sanskrit [title] is given, even though, in reality the commentary may be excellent, thinking that it is Tibetan, people will not undertake to listen to it and explain it. For example, if one says he has barley from the uplands of a valley (Phu gSum Pa), even though the barley itself may be good, people--thinking that it is bad--will not buy it.

Also, we need to place subtle propensities [in order to acquire] good Sanskrit [in future lives.] Since all the Buddhas of the three times, having become enlightened, teach the Dharma in Sanskrit, now, by merely assimilating this much, by this propensity, in the future our understanding of the language will come naturally. Also, it is needed for expertise [in translating] terms back and forth [between Tibetan and Sanskrit.]

And if one asks: Why is it necessary to state the title at the beginning? It is needed in order to find the volume with the least difficulty, and it helps to easily identify it. [p.3; 3a4]

As for the need to juxtapose the Sanskrit and the Tibetan, it is in order to acknowledge the kindness of the translators, and to repay it.

The actual meaning of the title will be explained below.

II. The salutation [for the successful completion] of the translation.

As it says, "Prostrations to youthful Mañjuśrī."[2] The ancient translators, in accordance with the [Tibetan king's] command, [made these salutations:] At the beginning of sūtras, "Prostrations to the Buddha and Bodhisattvas." At the beginning of the Vinaya Piṭaka, "Prostrations to the Omniscient One." At the beginning of the Abhidharma Piṭaka, "Prostrations to Mañjuśrī". Such was the command.

III. The meaning of the text.

There are two topics:

A. The branches of undertaking the composition of the commentary.

B. The actual body of the composed commentary.

A. The branches of undertaking the composition of the commentary.

There are three topics:

1. Making the pledge to compose the text after offering salutations.

2. Explaining the meaning of the title after rejoicing.

3. Establishing the text as the teaching of the Buddha, after stating its

purpose.

1. <u>Making the pledge to compose the text after offering salutations</u>.

There are two topics:

a. Salutations.

b. The pledge to compose.

a. <u>Salutations</u>.

As it says {i.1}, "The one..." (Gang Zhig; yaḥ). This should be understood by means of three methods:

(1) The meaning of the purpose.

(2) The condensed meaning.

(3) The literal meaning.

(1) <u>The meaning of the purpose</u>.

There are four purposes: They are the three temporary (gNas sKabs) purposes--understanding the greatness of the Teacher; increasing merits; conforming to the activity of the Holy Ones. The ultimate purpose is the attainment of liberation.

And this agrees with what the commentary says:[3] "Wishing to

compose a commentary, in order to make known the greatness of his Teacher, the author, first enunciating His virtues, performs obeisance."[4] This statement complies with [the first temporary purpose.]

There is also a reason for understanding His greatness: Having generated reverence for Him, we will undertake to listen to His teachings. [p.4; 3b6] And by listening, and having gradually generated the wisdom that comes from hearing, thinking and meditating, we will attain liberation.

By reverence for the Buddha's teachings, reverence for the commentaries that explain His thought is implicitly established. This is because they explain the meaning of His teachings.

(2) The condensed meaning.

This verse shows the making of prostrations to the Teacher in consideration of his three excellent qualities, and [Vasubandhu's] pledge to explain the text.

(3) The literal meaning.

[As it says {i.1},] "I pay homage..." To whom? To the Teacher, the Blessed One (bCom lDan 'Das; bhagavan) who has three excellent qualities.

By whom? By Vasubandhu.

At what time? At the beginning of composing the text.

How? By means of reverence from three doors.

The purpose is for oneself to conform to the activities of the Holy Ones and in order to fullfill many temporary and ultimate purposes.

Then if one asks: In what way does the Bhagavan have three excellent qualities? The [Bhagavan] is the subject. He has three excellent qualities because He has the excellence of his own purpose; the excellence of others' purposes; and the excellence of the method of attaining these purposes.

The Bhagavan, who is "The one..." {i.1}, is the subject. He has the excellence of his own purpose because he has attained the ultimate abandonment of "having entirely destroyed the obscuration (Mun Pa; andhakhāra) of all things." {i.1}

If someone says, it is incorrect to understand "The one..." as the Bhagavan because it is just a general term. There is no mistake. Because, although this is a general term, general terms can be applied in particular ways. They can be applied for particular occassions, or they can be applied in relation to particular words, and in many other ways.

Here the general term is applied by means of its relation with the particular words, "entirely destroyed the obscuration of all things." [p.5; 4b2] This is a pervasion because: "entirely destroyed the obscuration of all things" does not apply to anyone other than the Buddha. It is like, for example, if one says, "Give this to the white (dKar Sham; gaura) Brahman wearing white

clothes," it is understood as referring to the Brahman Devaśarma (Lha sKyid).[5] Moreover, from the Commentary: "'The one who,' is said in reference to the Buddha Bhagavan."[6]

By saying [he has destroyed the obscuration] "of all things," it subsumes the phenomena of the twelve āyatanas. From sūtra: "Oh Brahman, when one says 'everything', it means however much there is in the twelve āyatanas."

As for "obscuration", it refers to the obscuration of afflicted ignorance,[7] the ten polluting tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya) together with their concomitants, which are rooted in grasping at a mistaken notion of self (bDag Tu 'Dzin Pa); and non-afflicted ignorance, the four causes of not knowing and so forth. Just as it is commonly understood in the world that obscurations obstruct the seeing of forms; these two ignorances obstruct the seeing of reality as it is.

Then, if one asks: What are these four causes of not knowing?

1) Not knowing the profound and subtle qualities (Chos) of the Buddha. Like the statement [in sūtra:] "The Teacher said to Śāriputra: 'Śāriputra, do you know the aggregate of ethics (Tsul Khrims; śīla) and so forth of the Tathāgata?' Śāriputra replied: 'That I do not know.'"[8]

2) Not knowing extremely remote objects. Like Maudgalyāyana not knowing that his own mother had taken birth in the Northern realm of the

Marīcis ('Od Zer Can; marīci-loka-dhātu).

3) Not knowing things extremely remote in time. As when Śāriputra did not ordain the householder dPal sKyes, because he did not know that he had the roots of virtue harmonious with liberation. Then the Buddha said: "I see the very subtle seeds of his liberation, hidden like gold in the interstices of a mass of rock."[9] Having said that, he allowed his ordination. [p.6; 5a4]

4) Not knowing the endless variety of things. This is ignorance of details that are difficult to comprehend: The realms, the types of sentient beings, the birth-sources, rebirths and so forth. It is like, for example, ignorance of the causes of the variety of colors in the eye of a peacock feather (mDongs; candraka). As it says [in sūtra:] "The Sthavira Rāhula said, 'A single eye of a peacock's feather has a variety of causes, they are not to be known by the non-omniscient, knowing these is the power of omniscience.'"

So, this text, by clearly presenting the excellent abandonment, implicitly demonstrates the excellent realizations; because when there is abandonment, there is no mistaking that there is wisdom.

Stating it as a syllogism (sByor Ba): The Bhagavan is the subject. He has the excellence of his own purpose; because he has the excellences of abandonment and realization.

This shows that he has superior abandonment to the Śrāvakas and so

forth. Because they have only the abandonment of the afflicted obscurations (Nyon sGrib), but it is possible for them to degenerate; and they have not abandoned in every respect non-afflicted ignorance.

The Bhagavan is the subject. He has the excellence of others' purposes; because he leads sentient beings from the mire of saṁsāra according to their capacities (sKal Ba Ji lTa Ba bZhin Du; yathā-bhavyam).

These five appropriating aggregates (Nyer Len Gyi Phung Po; upādāna-skandha) are the subject. They are called cyclic existence ('Khor Ba; saṁsāra), because they cycle through one birth and death to another. There are reasons to call cyclic existence a "mire" ('Dam; pañka): a mire is a place in which corpses of various creatures (sBa sBur) become stuck (Kun Chags Pa; āsañga), it is difficult to cross, and one must depend on others in order to cross it. This cyclic existence is also a place where [beings] become stuck, it is difficult to cross because of the moisture of attachment (Sred Pa; tṛṣṇa), and we have to cross by depending on the Buddha. [p.7; 5b4]

If someone objects: "According to their capacities" does not appear in the root text, so it is not correct.

There is no fault. It is explicitly mentioned in the commentary,[10] and it has that sense. As Ācārya Pūrṇavardhana (Gang sPel) explains it:

> If you ask: If all sentient beings are led according to their capacity, why are we still in saṁsāra? It is because all those <u>with</u> capacity <u>are</u>

led, and all those without capacity are not led. From sūtra: "As fully-ripened lotuses blossom when the sun shines; so also when the Tathāgata comes, only those with fully ripened minds are purified."

If one asks: Based on what method? He extricates by showing with a compassionate mind, in a non-mistaken manner, what should be taken up and what should be rejected; and not through supernatural powers and giving of boons (Dam Pa; vara).

Moreover, in the *Udānavarga* (Ched Du brJod Pa'i Tsoms):[11]

> I will show you the path that cuts the misery of existence. The Tathāgata will teach the way, but you yourself must accomplish it.

And in it's commentary:

> Sages do not clean defilements with water, nor will the sufferings of sentient beings be cleared away by their hands. It is not by shifting to others their own realizations; they liberate by teaching the peace of ultimate reality.

And also from Nāgārjuna:

> Extending the hand of the teaching with kindness, He extricates from bad migrations and the cycle of existence, sentient beings who have produced the seeds of liberation.

And again, the Bhagavan is the subject. He has the excellent means of achieving the benefit of others, because he has taught to the disciples, accurately (Don Ji lTa Ba bZhin; yathārtham), the path that he himself has realized (gZigs). [p.8;6a5]

If one asks: In that case, why does he demonstrate supernatural powers to the disciples?

He shows supernatural powers to ordinary beings at first, in order to generate faith; but it is not the actual means of liberation from cyclic existence.

If one asks: Have the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Arhats abandoned or not abandoned the non-afflicted ignorance that was mentioned before? If they have abandoned it, there would be no difference between their abandonment and that of the Buddha. If they have not abandoned it, the consequence is that they would not have put and end to suffering. The pervasion is, from sūtra:

> I am saying that one has not come to the end of suffering if there is still even one object (Chos) not known directly and not known completely. I am saying that one has not come to the end of suffering if there is still even one object not known completely and abandoned.

In reply to this the commentary says:

> Because Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas are also separated from the afflicted ignorance (rMongs Pa; saṁmoha), we accept that they have destroyed the obscurations to all things; but not entirely. So they still have the non-afflicted ignorance--of the Buddha's qualities, of extremely remote objects, of things extremely remote in time, and the endless variety of things.[12]

Pūrṇavardhana says: [Śrāvakas and Pratyekabudhas] do not have the fault that they have not put an end to suffering, because they have abandoned afflicted ignorance. But there is not an absence of distinction between their and the Buddha's abandonment, because they have not

abandoned the non-afflicted obscurations.[13]

And Ācārya Yaśomitra (sLob dPon rGyal Sras) says there is not the fault that they have not put an end to suffering, because they have abandoned afflicted ignorance by means of severing its obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti). The ignorance which is not [afflicted] is abandoned by means of separation from attachment to ones predilictions ('Dun Pa; chanda). [p.9; 6b6] Even so, there is not a lack of distinction between their and the Buddha's abandonment, because although the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Arhats have abandoned these, they may appear again; while the Buddhas have abandoned these in the sense of them being things that will not arise again.[14]

This latter one is a good explanation. As in sūtra it says: "Bhikṣus, you should abandon by means of separating from attachment to the predilictions of the eye; in that way the eye will be completely abandoned." {1a-c}

b. <u>The pledge to compose</u>.

Having saluted the Teacher who has the three excellences, "I will explain the commentary, the *Abhidharmakośa*." The subject is the pledge to compose at the beginning of composing the commentary. It has a purpose: Its temporary [purpose] is for the completion of the commentary; ultimately,

it is for the attainment of Nirvāṇa. {1d}

2. Explaining the meaning of the title after rejoicing. There are two topics:

a. Explaining "Abhidharma".

b. Explaining "Treasury".

a. Explaining "Abhidharma".

There are two topics:

(1) The actual explanation.

(2) The ancillary analysis of the meaning of attendants.

(1) The actual explanation.

As it says {i.1d}, "I will explain the commentary, the *Abhidharmakośa*," if one asks: What is that Abhidharma?

It is two-fold. From among which the three uncontaminated Paths of Seeing, Meditation and No More Learning are the subjects. They are ultimate Abhidharma, because they are "stainless wisdom along with its attendants (rJes 'Brang; anucara)." {i.2a}

(2) The ancillary analysis of the meaning of attendants.

There are two topics:

(a) Analyzing the meaning of the attendants of ultimate Abhidharma.

(b) Analyzing the meaning of the attendants of conventional Abhidharma.

(a) Analyzing the meaning of the attendants of ultimate Abhidharma.

There are three topics:

1) Analyzing on what levels (Sa; bhūmi) they are supported.

2) Analyzing the meaning of the support (rTen; āśraya) and the supported (brTen; āśrita).

3) Analyzing how many aggregates it has when together with retinue. [p.10; 7b1]

1) Analyzing on what levels they are supported.

Then if one asks: On what levels are those three [paths] supported?

The Path of Seeing is supported on any one of the six levels of concentrations (bSam gTan; dhyāna).[15] Because the supreme [mundane] dharma of the Path of Preparation can be supported on any of these six levels of concentrations; and the Path of Seeing is of the same level as the supreme dharma. As it says {vi.27}: "It is of the same level as the supreme dharma."

The first reason is established because it says {vi.20}: "[The states conducing to insight (Nges 'Byad Cha mThun; nirvedha-bhāgiya)] arise from meditation. Their levels are the Not Unable (Mi lCogs Med; anāgamya), and the special first concentration (Khyad par bSam gTan; dhyānāntara)."[16]

It is not supported on the remaining preparatory levels (Nyer bsTogs; sāmāntaka), because it is uncontaminated; whereas the remaining preparatory levels possess the contaminated aspect of [meditation on] the coarse and subtle.

It is not supported on the the Desire Realm, because it is of the level of meditative equipoise (mNyam Par bZhag Pa'i Sa Pa; samāhita-bhūmika), whereas the Desire Realm is not a level of meditative equipoise.

It is not supported on the first three levels of the Formless Realm, because those three do not observe (dMigs) [phenomena] of the Desire Realm; whereas the Path Seeing does observe [phenomena] of the Desire Realm.

It is not supported on the Peak of Existence, because the Peak of Existence has unclear discrimination.

The uncontaminated Path of Meditation and Path of No More Learning are supported on any of the nine uncontaminated levels.[17]

2) Analyzing the meaning of the support and what is supported.

And the meaning of "supported" is that the path arises in the nature of [a certain] level; "the support" and "what is supported" do not have different meanings, as in "a juniper tree (rGya Shug) that is supported in a pot."

3) Analyzing how many aggregates [stainless wisdom] has, when together with retinue.

If one asks: How many aggregates does it have, when together with retinue?

It has five aggregates, because in the retinue of uncontaminated wisdom there is the non-revealing form (rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa; avijñapti) that is included in the uncontaminated vow.[18]

And there is [feeling, because] when it is supported on the first two concentrations there is [the feeling of] mental happiness (Yid bDe; saumanasya); and when supported on the third there is pleasure of mind

(Sems bDe).[19] When it is supported on any of the others, [the fourth concentration and above,] which are levels of neutral feeling, the feeling will be neutral feeling.

There is discrimination, which arises in the retinue of [all] mental consciousness.

The mental factors [other than feeling and discrimination] are the aggregate of the formative forces ('Du Byed; saṁskāra), or any of the non-associated formative forces (lDan Min 'Du Byed; viprayukta-saṁskāra).

And they are [all] together with mental consciousness. [p.11; 8a3]

If someone objects: It is not correct to speak of mental consciousness as in the retinue of uncontaminated wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā), because the main mind (Sems) is more important than the mental factors [such as wisdom.]

There is no fault: Generally it is that way, but in the context of analysis of phenomena, wisdom is more important. It is like, for example, faith (Dad Pa; śraddhā) is more important in the case of confidence (Yid Ches Pa).

In the Formless Realm, since there is no attendant of form, [the Paths of Meditation and No More Learning] have only four aggregates. {2a}

(b) Analyzing the meanings of the attendants

of conventional Abhidharma.

Whatever contaminated wisdom [that arises from] hearing, thinking and meditating which is undertaken in order to attain that holy Abhidharma; and whatever wisdom obtained from birth; and those commentaries which have these as their subjects--like the *Jñānaprasthāna* (*Ye Shes La 'Jug Pa*) etc.--these are conventional Abhidharma.[20]

These are the subject. There is a reason for designating these with the name "Abhidharma," because they are the method or cause for attaining ultimate Abhidharma. And the way in which they become the cause is: Based on inborn wisdom there is the wisdom that arises from hearing. From this, the wisdom of thinking arises; and from that the wisdom of meditation arises; from that uncontaminated wisdom grows.

There is a purpose in designating them as [Abhidharma.] It is in order to understand that to obtain ultimate Abhidharma we have to depend on these methods or causes.

There is a refutation (gNod Byed) [of why these are not] the actual [ultimate Abhidharma,] because they are contaminated.[21]

Then if one asks: On which levels are these three?

Inborn wisdom is in all three realms.

The wisdom that arises from hearing is in the two lower realms but is

not in the Formless Realm because there is no sound heard there. The wisdom that arises from thinking is in the Desire Realm but is not in the two upper realms, because in those two the mere effort of thinking turns [immediately] into meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi). [p.12; 8b3] The wisdom that arises from meditation is in the two upper realms but not in the Desire Realm, because the Desire Realm is a level of non-meditative equipoise.

As for the commentaries, if it is taken to mean their own character as the sound of speech, then it is in the Desire Realm but not in the two upper realms. Because, as it says {iv.7}: "Revealing [karma] exists where there is analysis (dPyod Pa; vicāra)."[22]

If the [commentaries] are held to be the three--words (Ming; nāman), phrases (Tsig; pada) and phonemes (Yi Ge; vyañjana); it is in the two lower realms, but not in the Formless Realm. Because, as it says {ii.47}: "They are included in the Desire and Form realms; they are indicative of a sentient being (Sems Can Du sTon Pa; sattvākhya)."[23]

The wisdom that arises from meditation in the Form Realm has [all] five aggregates, because it has the non-revealing form that is included in the restraint of concentration (bSam gTan Gyi sDom Pa; dhyāna-saṁvara).[24]

If one asks: Why is it called Abhidharma? A dharma is what bears

('Dzin; dhāraṇa) a definitive characteristic. And because it attains or approaches (mNgon Du Phyogs; abhimukha) the ultimate dharma--Nirvāṇa--it is called "abhi" (mNgon Pa). {2b}

b. Explaining "Treasury".

As it says {i.1}, "I will teach the commentary, *Abhidharmakośa.*" If one asks: What is that "Treasury" (mDzod; kośa) of Abhidharma? We should call this commentary a treasury of Abhidharma, because here, in this commentary, the essential meanings of the seven texts of Abhidharma are accurately included with respect to the meaning of the contents.

It is like, for example, the sheath into which a sword is put is called "the sheath of a sword;" and the place into which jewels are put is called a "treasury of jewels."

Or, those seven texts of Abhidharma should be called the "Treasury of Abhidharma", because they are the source or basis of this commentary. For example, it is like the place from which the sword is drawn out is called the "sheath of a sword." {2c-d}

3. Establishing the text as the teaching of the Buddha after stating its purpose. [p.13; 9a4]

There is a purpose in explaining the Abhidharma, because there is no

means of completely pacifying the afflictions without the wisdom that discerns phenomena. And it is because of these afflictions that worldly beings wander in this ocean of existence. Therefore, there is the purpose of generating in the mental continuums of the disciples the wisdom that discerns phenomena. And that is the purpose [of explaining Abhidharma.]

There is a reason why the Ācārya [Vasubandhu] has respect for the teaching of Abhidharma, because it generates in the mental continuums of the disciples the wisdom that discerns phenomena; and because this was taught by the Buddha.

However, if one asks: Weren't the seven texts of Abhidharma composed by the Arhats? Then why do you say this was taught by the Buddha?

It was taught [by him]. Because even the great Arhats were not able to teach and discern the characteristics of phenomena without first depending on the Buddha. Those [seven texts of Abhidharma] were collected by Bhadanta Kātyāyānīputra and the others in the *Jñānaprasthāna* etc. later on, from the āgamas (Lung) [which contain] what was first taught as individual fragments by the Buddha based on the thoughts and questions of his disciples.[25]

It is like, for example: Such teachings as, "Alas, all produced phemonena ('Dus Byas; saṁskṛta) are impermanent,"[26] which are found in

the *Udānavarga*, were taught individually by the Buddha in various sūtras based on the needs of disciples; although Dharmatrāta compiled them into sections, still they are the teachings of the Buddha. Therefore, the Abhidharma is exclusively the teaching of the Buddha, and was compiled by the Arhats. It is similar, for example, to the Sūtra and Vinaya. The reason is established, because it was compiled by Ārya Kāśyapa. So [the Vaibhāṣikas] say.

By saying "So they say," (Lo; kila) {i.3} [Vasubandhu] makes clear an opposing understanding.[27] The Sautrāntikas say: This is the system of the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharmikas, but we do not agree. [p.14; 9b5] Because many things contradictory to logic appear, such as propounding the substantial existence of asaṁskṛtas and so forth. Moreover, many other authors of Abhidharma [treatises] are known. These [treatises] were also composed by the Arhats and are not compilations of the Teacher's speech.

As for who composed which text:[28]

1) *Jñānaprasthāna* (*Ye She La 'Jug Pa*) is by Ārya Kātyāyanīputra.

2) *Prakaraṇapāda* (*Rab Tu Byed Pa*) is by Sthavira Vasumitra (dByig bShes).

3) *Vijñānakāya* (*rNam Shes Tsogs*) is by Sthavira Devaśarman (Lha sKyi).

4) *Dharmaskandha* (*Chos Kyi Phung Po*) is by Ārya Śāriputra.

5) *Prajñaptiśāstra* (*gDags Pa'i bsTan bCos*) is by Ārya Maudgalyāyana.

6) *Saṅgītiparyāya* (*'Gro Ba'i rNam Grangs*) is by Mahākauṣṭhila (gSus Po

Ches).

7) *Dhātukāya* (*Khams Kyi Tsogs*) is by Pūrṇa (Gang Po).

This condensed list appears in the text of Ācārya Yaśomitra (sLob dBon rGyal Po'i Sras).[29] Ācārya Pūrṇavardhana (sLob dBon Gang sPel) says the *Saṅgītiparyāya* was authored by Śāriputra.[30]

If one asks: Why are they called Sautrāntikas?

Because they take the sūtras as authoritative and do not accept the commentaries such as the seven texts of Abhidharma and so forth as authoritative, they are called Sautrāntika.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: In that case, [it contradicts] the statement which appears in sūtra, "Bhikṣus, the Three Baskets..." You will not be able to posit three baskets because, other than these [seven texts], no Abhidharma Basket appears.

To this statement the Sautrāntika says: "There is no fault. Those sūtras which establish the ultimate, and take as their subject the definitive characteristics of phenomena--those we posit as the Abhidharma Basket."

If one asks: Why are they called Vaibhāṣikas? Because they examine only the commentary *Vibhāṣā*, or because they learn the *Vibhāṣā*, they are called Vaibhāṣika.[31]

And among these, those who reside in the land of Kaśmīr are called Kaśmīran [Vaibhāṣika]. And those who reside to the west of Kaśmīr are called Westerners (Nub Phogs Pa; pāścāttya). [p.15; 10a5] And those who reside in places other than Kaśmīr, in central India etc., are called Bahirdeśaka (Nyi 'Og Pa).

Furthermore, as it says {i.3}, "[Without] discerning phenomena [there is no means of pacifying the afflictions."] This shows the four qualities--of purpose and so forth[32]--of the Abhidharma commentary.

The subject is the placing of the statement of purpose and relationship (dGos 'Brel Ngag)[33] before the actual commentary. It has a purpose, because based on that disciples will understand that the commentary has the four qualities of purpose and so forth, and so they will undertake [to study] the commentary.

Contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena are the subject of this commentary and that is shown by saying "phenomena..." Based on that, generating the wisdom that discerns phenomena within the continuum of the student is the purpose; and that is shown by saying "that discerns..." Based on that, obtaining Nirvāṇa with and without remainder is the secondary purpose (Nying dGos); and that is shown, implicitly, by the passage from "[there is no means of completely pacifying] the afflictions without...," up to

the passage, "Therefore, [this was taught by the Teacher, they say."] {i.3}

The secondary purpose depends on the purpose; and the purpose depends on the subject of the commentary; this is the relationship. Or the relationship is: phenomena are the subject, and this commentary is related as that which explains the subject.

On the need for showing the four qualities of purpose etc., Ācārya Dharmottara (Chos mChog) says, "The four qualities of purpose and so forth are shown in order to clear away these doubts: Whether this commentary has a purpose or not? Even if it has is it capable of achieving it? Even if it can, is it desireable? Even if desireable does it have a relationship [to the purpose?"]

Ācārya Vinītadeva (Dul Ba Lha) says: "Is it without subject? Is it without purpose? Is it without the marvellous secondary purpose? Are these without relationship to the method [of this treatise?] It is just to quell these doubts, in order to undertake the study of the commentary, that these four aspects are shown." [p.16; 10b6] Although he explains it this way, there is no contradiction [with the previous explanation.][34]

If someone says: If the words that show these four qualities of purpose etc. dispell these doubts, then even the mere statement that "sound is impermanent" should dispell the misconception of holding sound as permanent. If one accepts this, the reason and the example become

useless.[35] And if it doesn't dispell [that misconception,] then the mere statement that shows the purpose will not dispell the doubts [about the commentary,] because there is no difference between these two.

If someone says this [we reply:] The mere statement "sound is impermanent" does dispell the misconception that holds sound as permanent. But by showing reason and example, doubts and misunderstandings are cleared away and valid understanding is generated. So there is no contradiction, and thus the scholars explain it.

Then if one asks: Are these four qualities the same nature (Ngo Bo gCig) or different?

Purpose, purpose of the purpose and relationship are of the same nature as the subject, because all phenomena are its subject. Purpose and purpose of purpose are of different natures [from each other] because they are cause and effect.

Then if one asks: What are the individual natures and distinctions of the two Nirvāṣas which are the secondary purpose of Abhidharma?

In the system of the Śrāvakavadins, Nirvāṇa with remainder is an analytical cessation that eliminates the Truth of Cause--which includes karma and afflictions--[which is both] obtained and made manifest (mNgon Du Byas; saṁmukhī-kṛta); however the cessation that abandons [the Truth of] Suffering is obtained but not made manifest. Because they still have the

remainder of any of the three types of suffering. Because they still have a body of the Desire Realm. And the Ārya sGur Chung, having eaten ash porridge, died. And the Ārya Udayīn ('Char Ka) had his head cut off at a brothel and died.[36] And a Pratyekabuddha was killed by a poison arrow. Even the Buddha had his foot penetrated by a splinter of Acacia wood (Seng lDeng; khadiraka); and had pain in his back; [p.17; 11b1] and because of being hit by a chunk from Devadatta's mechanical catapult, he bled from his body. And so on, in the sūtras it happens that those who have a Desire Realm body have the suffering of sufferings.

For Arhats, since they can have a body of [any of] the three realms, if they are in the first three concentrations they do not have the first suffering, but they do have the remainder of the last two sufferings; from the fourth concentration upwards they have the remainder only of pervasive suffering.[37]

Therefore, at the time of making manifest the cessation that ceases all contaminated aggregates, it is called [Nirvāṇa] without remainder.

As it says in the *Udānavarga*:[38]

> The body disintegrates and feelings cool,
> discrimination[39] ceases, saṁskāras are pacified, consciousness vanishes.
> Like this is the end of suffering.

And so they accept this explanation.

According to the Mahāyāna: The liberation of the Śrāvaka and

Pratyekabuddha is not fully-accomplished liberation (mThar Phyin Pa'i Thar Pa). And as for the teaching that a splinter of Acacia wood penetrated the Teacher's foot and so forth: it was merely an appearance made for the benefit of disciples, but there is absolutely no suffering, because He is free from all the faults of existence and peace.

However, the teaching of the two form bodies (gZugs sKu; rūpakāya) [of the Buddha] as "with remainder," and the truth body (Chos sKu; dharmakāya) as "Nirvāṇa without remainder," is understood from the *Kāyatrayāvatāra Sūtra* (*sKu gSum La 'Jug Pa'i mDo*).[40]

Ācārya Yaśomitra says: "The purpose of teaching Abhidharma is in order to become expert in the aggregates and so forth. By this expertise two beneficial qualities will be obtained: by one's own attentiveness (Yid La Byed Pa; manasikāra) single-pointed concentration (Zhi gNas; śamatha) and so forth will develop; and in dialogues with others one becomes fearless in giving answers to all questions." {3}

B. The actual body of the composed commentary.

In this there are two topics:

1. Identifying the subject.
2. Establishing [the subject] extensively.

1. Identifying the subject. [p.18; 12a2]

As it says {i.3}: "[Without] discerning phenomena [there is no means of pacifying the afflictions.]" If one asks: What are those phenomena which should be investigated by wisdom?

Those phenomena are subsumed in two categories: contaminated and uncontaminated.

If someone says: It is agreed that the phenomena to be investigated by wisdom can be expressed as the five aggregates, eighteen dhātus, or twelve āyatanas; then why should they be stated as contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena?

There is a reason for this. The Ācārya wanted to explain this in a way that includes all phenomena. The five aggregates do not include all phenomena. By teaching the afflicted (Kun Nas Nyon Mongs; saṁkleśa) and purified phenomena (rNam Byang; vyavadānika), he wished [beings] to attain the ultimate good (Nges Legs; niḥśreyas) by virtue of taking up or abandoning these. And the eighteen dhātus and the twelve āyatanas can not themselves represent afflicted and purified phenomena.

If someone says: If contamination is posited by way of being concomitant with contamination; or by way of simoultaneously arising with contamination; or by way of being the base of contamination; then external things will not be contaminated phenomena. And if taken as that which is

nourished (rGyas Pa; anuśerate)[41] by means of being directed to a contaminated object (dMigs Pa; ālambana), then even the two Truths of Cessation and the Path would be contaminated.[42] If one says this:

The subject is saṁskṛtas other than the Truth of the Path. They are contaminated, because they will nourish contamination either by way of being a referent object or by their concomitants.

If one says: In that case there is the consequence that the eye faculty of an Arhat is not contaminated, because contamination is not nourished either by way of being a referent object or by concomitants, because there is no contamination in the continuum of an Arhat.

There is no fault. Although the afflictions of his own mental continuum are not nourished by means of concomitants; the afflictions of another's mental continuum can be nourished by [the Arhat's eye faculty] being a referent object. [p.19; 12b2]

If one says: Then contamination is the subject. There is the consequence that it is not contaminated, because it does not nourish contamination either by being a referent object or by concomitants.

There is no fault. Because it is concomitant with ones own afflicted omnipresent mental factors (Kun 'Gro; sarva-traga).[43] {4}

The Truth of the Path and the three asaṁskṛtas are the subject. They

are uncontaminated, because they are phenomena which do not nourish contamination either by being referent objects or by their concomitants.

If someone says: It is acceptable to say that the Truth of the Path and asaṁskṛtas are uncontaminated, but it is incorrect to say "three."

Arhat Guṇamati (Yon Tan Blo Gros) says: "There is no error. [Saying three] is to dispel the doubt that there may be [phenomena] that are neither contaminated nor uncontaminated, just as there are feelings that are neither pleasant nor suffering."

The Dārṣṭāntikas (dPe sTon Pa sDe Pa)[44] say: "[Saying three] is in order to dispel the belief that the eye faculty of an Arhat and external things are uncontaminated because they do not act as a support of external contamination; and the belief that they are contaminated because they do not act as the antidote of contamination.

Some say: As there are both the mundane and the supermundane paths, [saying three] is to show that the mundane [paths] are not the Truth of the Path. And, if asaṁskṛtas were known in the world as being uncontaminated, it would be understood; but they are not known in the world as being uncontaminated, [so it is necessary to specify three.] So they say.

And some say: Even though the meaning is understood, it is said in order to show it clearly.

The asaṁskṛtas are three-fold, as there are space and the two cessations.

If someone says: In that case, saying "space and the two cessations are asaṁskṛta" would be enough, so why say "three" as well?

There is no fault. [Some] Vaibhāṣikas propound a single asaṁskṛta.[45] [p.20; 13a4] And Vaiśeṣikas propound many asaṁskṛtas of subtle atoms (rDul Phra Rab; paramāṇu) etc. [Saying "three"] is to refute [these views.] {5a-c}

2. Establishing [the subject] extensively.

In this there are two topics:

a. Explaining asaṁskṛtas extensively.

b. Explaining saṁskṛtas extensively.

a. Explaining asaṁskṛtas extensively.

If one asks: What are the three asaṁskṛtas? Among the three asaṁskṛtas that exist, space is that permanent [phenomenon] that is non-obstructive (Mi sGrib Pa; anāvaraṇa).

If someone says: The two cessations are the subject. There is the consequence that they are asaṁskṛta space, because they are permanent [phenomena] which are non-obstructive. If one says this:

The latter--[that the two cessations are non-obstructive]--is not established. Because analytical cessations block ('Gog) contaminated phenomena which are their own objects of cessation; and non-analytical cessations block their own objects of cessation which are saṁskṛtas.

Then if one asks: In the location (Go Sa) of a wall etc., is there space or not? If not, space would be occassional (Res 'Ga' Ba), and so it would be impermanent. If there is, the location of a wall would be able to hold another wall. If one says this:

There is space in the location of a wall, because if there is not space which provides an open location, then even the wall itself will not be there. And also it says in sūtra:

A Brahman said to the Bhagavan,

"Oh Gautama, on what is earth supported?"

"Oh Brahman, it is supported on water."

"Oh Gautama, on what is water supported?"

"Oh Brahman, it is supported on air."

"Oh Gautama, on what is air supported?"

"Oh Brahman, air is supported on space."

"Oh Gautama, on what is space supported?"

"Oh Brahman, that is too silly (Ha Cang Thal Ches; atisarasi), because space has no support, no appearance and no object."

However there is no mistake of putting another wall in the location of

one wall, because in that location the [first] wall itself obstructs [any other wall.]

If one asks: Why is it called space? For the meaning "opening" (Go 'Byes Pa; avakāśa) we say space (Nam mKha'; ākāśa). [p.21; 13b4]

In the system of the Vaibhāṣikas, asaṁskṛta space is substantially established, because it has the capacity to function (Don Byed Nus Pa; artha-kriyā-śākti) as the support of air. {5d}

The analytical cessation is that cessation which is a separation from the contaminated phenomena which are its own objects to be abandoned.[46]

If one asks: Aren't analytical cessations actually produced by the path? Then why are they called asaṁskṛta [unproduced]?

They are called the fruit of separation as they are the abandonment of contaminated phenomena which are the objects to be abandoned by the path. However their entity is not newly created, because: in the case of the Vaibāṣikas, they propound [analytical cessation] as a permanent substance; and other schools propound it as lacking in the nature of a functioning thing.

If one asks: Isn't suchness also asaṁskṛta? Why is it definite that asaṁskṛtas are only three?

If suchness is accepted as selflessness, selflessness of phenomena is not accepted here [in this school;] the selflessness of persons is asaṁskṛta.

And some of the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths, impermanence etc.--those other than emptiness and selflessness--are saṁskṛtas. But there is no separate asaṁskṛta which is called suchness.

Then, if one asks: Are analytical cessations one substance or different?

Just as the objects to be abandoned are individual substances, so the cessations that abandon them are also individual substances. If it were not so, when one makes manifest the cessation that is the removal of the objects to be abandoned on the Truth of Suffering stage of the Path of Seeing, there would also be made manifest the cessation that is the removal of the remaining objects to be abandoned. If it were like that, there would be no reason to make effort on the path in order to remove the remaining objects to be abandoned.

In the *Dharmadinna Sūtra* (*Chos sByin Ma'i mDo*)[47] it says: "Cessations are not similar ('Dra Ba Min; asabhāga)." And if someone says it is contradictory with that statement: There is no contradiction. The intended meaning is that cessations do not have homogenous cause ('Dra Ba'i rGyu; sabhāga-hetu) {ii.52} and cessations do not act as homogenous cause of other phenomena. Its intention is not that there are no similarities among the cessations themselves. [p.22; 14a5]

Moreover, by calling them "cessations" it excludes non-cessations. By calling them "separation" it excludes impermanent cessations and non-analytical cessations.

If one asks: Why is it called analytical cessation? Because it is a cessation obtained by the wisdom that analyzes the Four Truths.

However if this is so, it is thereby accepted that the substances of the cessations gradually arise in the continuum; then there is the consequence that they are impermanent and saṁskṛta, because they are substances that are occassional in time and place, like sprouts. So the Vaibhāṣikas need to answer arguments like that.

The Vaibhāṣikas believe that, because it is taught in sūtra that the Truth of Cessation is one of the Four Truths, it exists substantially, like the Truth of the Path. {6a-b}

What permanently blocks its own objects of cessation from arising, and is other than analytical cessation, is non-analytical cessation. By saying, "What...blocks the arising..." it dispels [the conception] that impermanent cessations that merely block duration (gNas Pa; sthiti) are non-analytical cessations.

By saying, "...permanently blocks..." it dispels [the conception] that the two cessations, the absorption of non-discrimination ('Du Shes Med Pa'i

sNoms 'Jug; asaṁjñi-samāpatti) and the absorption of cessation ('Gog Pa'i sNyoms 'Jug; nirodha-samāpatti)--which occassionally block the arisal of mind and mental factors, but do not block their arisal permanently--[are non-analytical cessations.]

If one asks: Why are they called non-analytical cessations? They are called that because they are cessations that are obtained due to an insufficiency of conditions; and are not obtained by the power of analytical wisdom.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: The three asaṁskṛtas are substantially established. Because space supplies an open location. Because analytical cessations block their own objects of cessation. [p.23; 14b5] Because non-analytical cessations block the arisal of their own objects of cessation.

If it were not like that and the asaṁskṛtas did not [substantially] exist; since it says [in sūtra;] "Of whatever phenomena, whether saṁskṛta or asaṁskṛta, the supreme of them all is Nirvāṇa," it would be saying "the supreme of non-existents is a non-existent," and this would be a terrible phrase, without precedent. So [the Vaibhāṣikas] say.

The Sautrāntikas say: The asaṁskṛtas are not non-existent, but they are not substantially existent. Because space is merely the absence of obstructive tangible objects. Because analytical cessation is merely the separation from their own objects of cessation. Because non-analytical

cessation is any phenomenon which simply does not arise due to an insufficiency of conditions. {6c-d}

b. Explaining saṁskṛtas extensively.

In this there are two topics:

(1) The general meaning.

(2) The meaning of the text.

(1) The general meaning.

In this there are three topics:

(a) Laying out eight chapters.

(b) Laying out the relationship of these eight.

(c) Showing which subject is taught in which chapter.

(a) Laying out eight chapters.

Ācārya Pūrṇavardhana says that [Vasubandhu,] having composed as the concise statement {i.4}, "Phenomena are contaminated and uncontaminated," created eight chapters in order to explain this extensively.

In order to explain contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena in general, the first two chapters are taught.

Three chapters are in order to explain contaminated phenomena in detail:

The third chapter explains who is afflicted, where they are afflicted, and how they are afflicted. These three are taught respectively as: the animate world (Sems Can Gyi 'Jig rTen; sattva-loka) of the three realms and the five types of rebirth ('Gro Ba; gati)--[who is afflicted;] the [inanimate] vessel world (sNod Kyi 'Jig rTen; bhājana-loka)--[where they are afflicted;] the four birth-sources (sKye gNas; yoni) and the twelve limbs of Dependent Origination--[how they are afflicted.]

In order to show contaminated karma and the afflictions by which they are afflicted, the fourth and fifth chapters [are taught respectively.] [p.24; 15a6]

In order to explain uncontaminated phenomena in detail the last three chapters are taught:

The sixth chapter explains who is purified--the [types of] persons; the places where they are purified;[48] and how they are purified--the stages of realization.

As it says in sūtra: "Afflictions are to be destroyed by wisdom," the seventh chapter explains what it is that does the purifying.

As it says in sūtra: "Meditative equipoise (mNyam Par bZhag Pa; samāhita) comprehends reality just as it is," in order to explain the support of

wisdom and the wisdom that is based on that, the eighth chapter, "The Presentation of the Absorptions" is taught. So it is explained [by Pūrṇavardhana.]

An earlier Ācārya says it is in order to show the object, practice and fruit, that eight chapters are taught. And there are two aspects to the object: the first two chapters show the variety of phenomenal existence (Ji sNyed Pa); and chapters three, four and five show the final mode of existence (Ji lTa Ba)--the Four Truths.

Chapter six shows the realizations that accomplish [understanding] of how things truly exist.

In order to teach the fruit which is wisdom, and the qualities it includes, the last two chapters are taught.

(b) Laying out the relationship of the eight chapters

In order to explain the subject of Abhidharma, contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena, the first chapter is taught.

The second chapter is taught next, in order to explain extensively the faculties--which were merely mentioned [in the first chapter]--and the manner of arisal of saṁskṛtas.

After that the third chapter is taught, in order to explain extensively

the three realms which were merely mentioned in the previous chapters.

After that the fourth chapter is taught, in order to refute that Īśvara etc. is the cause of the three realms that were discussed, and to teach that they actually arise from karma.

The fifth chapter is taught next, in order to show that karma, moreover, is motivated by the polluting tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya). [p.25; 16a1]

After that chapter six is taught in order to show that what removes the polluting tendencies is the path.

Chapter seven is taught next, in order to explain in detail the knowledges (Shes Pa; jñāna) that were mentioned in the previous chapter.

After that chapter eight is taught, in order to extensively explain the common qualities of the Buddha, from the teaching of the previous chapter that the Buddha has both common and uncommon qualities.[49]

(c) Showing which subject is taught in which chapter.

This can be gathered from the actual meaning of the text.

(2) The meaning of the text.

From among the eight chapters, in the first chapter, Explaining the Dhātus, there are three topics:

(a) The group of the saṁskṛtas.

(b) The list of synonymns.

(c) The extensive explanation of the aggregates, dhātus and āyatanas.

(a) The group of the saṁskṛtas.

As it says {i.4}, "Saṁskṛtas, with the exception of the path [are contaminated]..." If one asks, what are these saṁskṛtas? {7a-b}

Since there is nothing that is created by a single causal condition,[50] these saṁskṛta dharmas are made when causes and conditions meet and assemble, and these saṁskṛtas [can be classified] in five categories, because they constitute the five aggregates of form and so forth.

If one says: It would be sufficient to say that "they are five, form and so forth;" or that "they are the five aggregates." Why say {i.4}, "They are the five aggregates, form and so forth?" There is no fault. In order to dispel the [conception that it refers to] the five aggregates of liberation (rNam Grol Gyi Phung Po lNga) he says "the five, form and so forth." In order to dispel the understanding [that it refers to] the five external sense objects (Don lNga), he says "the five aggregates."

Furthermore, the Vaibhāṣikas hold the five aggregates to be distinct substances.

But the Sautrāntikas say that the form aggregate as well as its non-associated formative forces (lDan Min 'Du Byed; viprayukta saṁskāras) is one substance.[51] While the aggregates of feeling, discrimination, the aggregate of the concomitants,[52] the consciousness aggregate, as well as the non-associated formative forces of these, are one substance. They hold that the four aggregates of "name" [i.e. consciousness aggregates] as well as their non-associated formative forces are a different substance from form. [p.26; 16b2]

The Cittāmātrins believe that consciousness and the five aggregates are the same substance.

Then if one asks: How are future un-arisen subjects saṁskṛta?

Because they are of the same type (Rigs mThun; jātiyatva ) and they have similar definitive characteristics to subjects that will arise, they are to be called saṁskṛtas. For example: Because it is of the same type as milk that has been "milked" from an udder, milk that has not been "milked", but remains in the body, is still called milk.[53]

"Also" (Kyang; punaḥ) {i.7} means that not only are there divisions among the asaṁskṛtas, but the saṁskṛtas have divisions also. {7a-b}

(b) The list of synonymns.

In this there are two topics:

1) The list of synonymns for saṁskṛtas in general.

2) The list of synonymns for contaminated phenomena in particular.

1) The list of synonymns for saṁskṛtas in general.

As it says {i.1}, "I will teach the commentary, *Abhidharmakośa*," since the Abhidarmikas are inclined to explain sūtras, in sūtra it says: "The paths of time (Dus; adhvan), the basis of discourse (gTam Gyi gZhi; kathā-vastu), having renunciation (Nges Par 'Byung bCas; saniḥsāra), and having a foundation (gZhi Dang bCas Pa; savastuka)." If one asks what are these?

These are a list of terms for saṁskṛtas. The reason for applying these to saṁskṛtas is as follows:

These saṁskṛtas are the subject. There is a reason for calling these the paths of time, because they have gone in the past; are going; and will go.

There is a reason to call them the basis of discourse, because discourse (gTam; kathā) is the sound of language (Lung Du sTon Pa; vyākaraṇa),[54] and the basis of that is words,[55] and words together with

their meanings are presented [in discourse.] Even though asaṁskṛtas are also the subject of words, since they are not causes [of discourse] and are rarely subjects, they are not taught as the basis of discourse.

This explanation complies with the *Prakaraṇapāda* (*Rab Tu Byed Pa*) which says, "The bases of discourse are included in the 18 dhātus."[56]

And they "have renunciation" because they are, without doubt to be renounced. [p.27; 17a2] Or, renunciation is Nirvāṇa--[the passing beyond sorrow,] and the sorrow to be renounced is the saṁskṛtas. And because passing beyond them is the end of saṁskṛtas, they "have renunciation."

If one objects: In that case there is the consequence that the Truth of the Path does not have renunciation, because it is without doubt not to be renounced.

The reason is not established. Because it is definitely to be cast aside at the time of attainment of Nirvāṇa without remainder. As the sūtra says: "Those who have [not] understood the dharma-aggregate as a raft do not understand even one dharma, and if they don't understand that, what need is there to say [they don't understand] other [dharmas?"][57]

As for "having a foundation", it is applied to entity, referent object, fetters (Kun sByor; saṁyojana), cause, and grasped object. But here, the saṁskṛtas are the subject.

They have a foundation because they have a cause. {7c-d}

2) The list of synonymns for contaminated phenomena in particular.

As sūtra mentions: "Aggregates, having conflict ('Thab bCas; saraṇa), suffering, origination (Kun 'Byung; samudaya), the world, the locus of views (lTa gNas; dṛṣṭi-sthāna), and cyclic existence." If one asks what are they? These are a list of names for contaminated phenomena.

If one asks what are the reasons?

Contaminated aggregates are the subject. There is a reason for calling them appropriating (Nye Bar Len Pa; upādāna),[58] because appropriation is the afflictions; and they are the aggregates that arise from that. For example, fire arisen from grass is called a grass fire.[59]

Or, because they are the aggregates that depend on the affliction of appropriating. For example, a man who depends on the king is called the king's man.

Or, because they are the aggregates from which the affliction of appropriating arises. For example, the tree from which medicine or flowers grow is called a medicine tree or flower tree.

That subject [contaminated aggregates,] is also called "having conflict". [p.28; 17b3] Since afflictions damage oneself and others they are conflict. And [conflict is affliction] because it is nourished either by being referent object or by concomitants. For example, when contamination is

nourished either by being a referent object or by concomitants [something] is said to "have contamination."

[The contaminated aggregates] are suffering, because they are connected with any of the three sufferings; and they are inconsistent with being an Āryan.

They are origination because they have the origination of suffering.

They are the world because they disintegrate instantaneously, and they also are destroyed by their antidotes. As it says in sūtra: "It disintegrates, and by completely disintegrating, it is the world ('Jig rTen; loka)."[60]

They are the locus of views because they are nourished by views taking them as objects.

They are cyclic existence because they cycle through one birth and death to another. {8}

(c) <u>The extensive explanation of the aggregates, dhātus and āyatanas</u>.

In this there are three topics:

1) The natures of the aggregates dhātus and āyatanas.

2) How they include other phenomena.

3) The detailed classification of dhātus and aspects.

1) <u>The natures of the aggregates dhātus and āyatanas</u>.

In this there are five topics:

a) The actual explanation.

b) The literal meaning and the purpose of each one of the three.

c) The reason for positing feeling and discrimination as separate aggregates.

d) The way of arranging the order of aggregates, dhātus and āyatanas.

e) Understanding the two āyatanas.

a) <u>The actual explanation [of natures of the aggregates, dhātus and āyatanas.]</u>

In this there are four topics:

i) Laying out the form aggregate.

ii) Laying out the three

middle aggregates.

iii) Laying out the aggregate of consciousness.

iv) Clarifying [which are] substantial phenomena.

i) Laying out the form aggregate.

In this there are two topics:

(A) The actual explanation.

(B) How many dhātus and āyatanas the [form aggregate] includes.

(A) The actual explanation [establishing the form aggregate.]

In this there are two topics:

(i) The condensed presentation.

(ii) The extensive explanation.

(i) The condensed presentation.

As it says {i.7b}: "...the five aggregates, form and so forth." If one asks, what is that aggregate of form?

The form aggregate has eleven [entities:] the five faculties, the five external objects (Don; viśaya) and non-revealing form (rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa'i gZugs; avijñapti-rūpa). [p.29; 18a4]

If one asks: What is the meaning of the aggregate of form? From sūtra: "Oh Bhikṣus, because it exists as form, and is suitable be form, therefore it is called the appropriating aggregate of form." By this is meant that what can be damaged by the physical or can be caused to change by the physical, that is [the aggregate of form.]

If one objects: That has an unacceptable consequence, because it does not pervade for the subtle atoms (rDul Phra Rab; paramāṇu), nor for past and future forms, nor non-revealing forms.

There is no fault. Because the subtle atoms do not remain single, and in an agglomeration of many they are suitable to be damaged. Past forms are finished being forms; and future forms are yet to become forms. Since the support of non-revealing forms is the elements ('Byung Ba), when they disappear, [non-revealing forms] also cease. {9a-b}

(ii) The extensive explanation.

In this there are three topics:

(I) The presentation of the five faculties by way of their definitive characteristics.

(II) The presentation of the five external objects by way of examples.

(III) The explanation of non-revealing form.

(I) The presentation of the five faculties by way of their definitive characteristics.

As it says {i.9}, "[Form is] the five faculties..." If one asks, what are these five faculties?

That clear matter that is the support of the consciousnesses that grasp forms etc. are the five faculties of the eye and so forth. Or, the supports of the consciousnesses of the eye etc., which are clear matter, are the faculties of the eye and so forth. As it says in the *Prakaraṇapāda*: "If one asks, 'What is the eye faculty?' It is the clear matter that is the support of the eye consciousness."[61] {9c-d}

(II)

<u>The presentation of the five external objects by way of examples</u>.

As it says {i.9} "[Form is]...the five objects..." If one asks, what are these?

If form which is the object of the eye is summarized, it can be subsumed in two types: the form of color; and the form of shape. [p.30; 15b4]

If one differentiates extensively there are twenty types: twelve forms of color and eight forms of shape. The first is established because there are four primary colors (rTza Ba'i Kha Dog)--blue, yellow, white and red. And there are eight secondary colors (Yan Lag Gi Kha Dog)--shade (Grib Ma; chāyā) and sunshine (Nyi Ma; ātapa), brightness (sNang Ba; āloka) and darkness (Mun Pa; andhakāram), cloud (sPrin; abhram) and smoke (Du Ba; dhūma), dust (rDul; rajas) and mist (Khuk rNa; mahikā).

Some believe that there are twenty-one, with the addition of the color of the sky, which appears blue, as one.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* explains forms as 25 [by adding to the above 21:] subtle atoms, gross objects, form with the possibility of appearing, and revealing form (rNam Par Rig Byed gZugs; vijñapti-rūpa).

Mostly blue mixed with yellow is green. Mostly blue mixed with red is black. Mostly yellow mixed with red is burnt orange (Dud Kha). Mostly

yellow mixed with white is light yellow. Blue mixed with white is light blue. So these are included within the [primary colors.]

The four [secondary colors,] cloud and so forth--[smoke, dust and mist,] are not different substances from the primary colors, because they are just particular cases [of these colors.] There is a reason for arranging them separately from these [primary colors:] in order to prevent the misconception that these are not form, because they appear like a wall from a distance, and from close up they do not appear at all.

There are eight forms of shape:[62] long and short, high and low, square and round, even and uneven.

There are eight types of sound. There is sound from appropriated elements (Zin Pa'i 'Byung Ba; upātta-mahābhūta), and sound from inanimate elements (Ma Zin Pa; anupātta).

From these two, the first is two-fold: sound indicative of sentient beings (Sems Can Du sTon Pa; sattvākhya); and what is not indicative.

Sounds that are indicative of sentient beings are two-fold: pleasant sounds such as the sound of teaching the dharma; and unpleasant sounds such as the sound of harsh words being spoken. [p.31; 19a5]

Sounds that are not indicative of sentient beings are two-fold: pleasant sounds such as the sound of musical instruments (Pheg rDob); and

unpleasant sounds like the sound of boxing (Khu Tsur rDeg Pa).

From the two types of sound from inanimate elements--sound indicative of sentient beings and sound that is not indicative--sound that is indicative of sentient beings is two-fold: pleasant sounds, like the sound of dharma teaching by an emanated person; and unpleasant sounds, like harsh words spoken by an emanated person.

That type of sound--[from inanimate elements]--which is not indicative of sentient beings is also two-fold: pleasant sounds, like the sound of a gong ('Khar rNga); and unpleasant sounds, like falling boulders (Brag Ral Ba).

There are six types of taste: sweet (mNgar Ba; madhura) and sour (sKyur Ba; amla); pungent (Tsa Ba; kaṭuka) and salty Lan Tsa Ba; lavaṇa); astringent (bsKa Ba; kaṣya) and bitter (Kha Ba; tikta).

Smell has four types: pleasant smell, unpleasant smell, moderate smell (mNyam Pa; sama), and strong smell (Mi mNyam Pa; viṇama).

Tangible objects has eleven types: the cause tangible objects--the four elements; and the result tangible objects--smoothness ('Jam; ślakṣṇatva) and roughness (rTzub; karkaśatva); heaviness and lightness; cold; and hunger and thirst.

Here, cold is a tangible object which comes from a preponderance of water and air elements and desires heat.

Hunger is a tangible object which comes from a preponderance of air in the stomach and desires food. Thirst is a tangible object which comes from a preponderance of fire and desires drink.

Here, "it desires" is said by way of designating the cause with the name of the result.[63]

If one says: When the inside of the body is felt (Reg Pa), there is the consequence that the body faculty is also a tangible object, because [the body faculty] is an object of utilisation of the body faculty.

The faculties are not tangible objects. But the appearance of feeling the inside of the body is the [body] faculty touching the cause tangible objects--[the four elements,] and the result tangible objects--[complex matter,] which are in the body aggregate; and it is that which is called [touching the faculty.][64]

These five objects all exist in the Desire Realm. In the Form Realm, because morsel food and suffering[65] have been abandoned, there is no smell and taste, nor hunger and thirst. [p.32; 19b6]

The tangible object of cold does exist there. Although there are no tangible objects that do harm, beneficial ones do exist--so the Vaibhāṣikas

believe (Lo; kila).[66]

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu's] own position is: Since they only enjoy meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi) [in the Form Realm,] what good can cold do? {10}

(III)

The explanation of non-revealing form.

As it says {i.11d}, "...non-revealing..." If one asks, what is non-revealing form?

It has five distinctive qualities: The distinction of occassion is that it even exists at the time of mental distraction and at the time of the two unconscious absorptions. Since even the eye etc. has this [quality,] the distinction of nature is that it can be either virtue or non-virtue. Since even revealing form has that [quality,] the distinction of time is that it is a succession in a continous flow. Since even the obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti) of virtues and non-virtues has this quality, it takes the four great elements as its cause.

Concerning this, the Kaśmīran [Vaibhāṣika] Saṁghabhadra (Kha Che 'Dun bZang) says:

> Here you are deficient and have departed from the treatise,
> you lose the assertion and thereis the consequence that what is not [non-revealing form] is [non-revealing form] itself.
> You have superflously used the term "even",

And what is to be distinguished is not distinguished.[67]

Thus he finds fault with [Vasubandhu's] definition. [His argument is as follows:]

The subject is the first moment of non-revealing form. There is the consequence that it is not non-revealing form, because it has the deficiency of not being a succession in a continuous flow.[68]

The subject [is non-revealing form:] There is the consequence that it is not substantially existent, because it is a continuum. If you accept this, it is contradictory with the treatise where it says that it is substantially existent.

Furthermore, take non-revealing form which arises from meditative stabilization as the subject: There is the consequence that you lose the assertion that it is non-revealing form, because it does not exist on the occassions of distracted or unconscious minds; because it exists [only] on occassions of non-distraction and of consciousness. [p.33; 20b2]

The subject is revealing form which is not non-revealing form: It has the consequence of being non-revealing form, because it exists on occassions of non-distraction and of consciousness.

"Even" is superfluous because when you say that it exists on occassions of mental distraction, it can be understood that it exists at the time of consciousness.[69]

And there is also the fault that the distinction which should be made--

that it is form which can not be shown [to the senses] and is not obstructive--is not made.

Saṁghabhadra, having said this, states his own system:

What is produced, is in the dissimilar, in the conscious and in the unconscious,
Form that is non-obstructive and determinate [in ethical status,] that is proclaimed as non-revealing [form.]

However faults remain in both systems: If it is held that [non-revealing form] is what happens following non-distracted conscious mind, there is the consequence that that is also revealing form. If it is held that what happens following unconscious [mental states is non-revealing form,] there is the consequence that the two vows arisen from mental stabilization would not be [non-revealing form.] So these faults still remain. {11}

As it says {i.11c}: "The four great elements are the cause." If one asks what are these?

The elements ('Byung Ba; bhūta) which are the cause are the earth element (Khams; dhātu), and the water, fire and wind elements; because from these arise the resultant forms. And because of the power of the karma of sentient beings, there has never been, since beginingless cyclic existence, the experience of their not arising.

They are called "great" (Chen Po; mahā) because each enters into the respective functions [of the aggregates of earth, water, fire and air] to a

predominant degree.

Ācārya Sthiramati (bLo brTan) says: "Since they are the basis of all resultant forms, they are a basis of great size; [p.34; 21a1 ] since forms and so forth--all the assemblages [of elements] have solidity etc., have great extension and great breadth of place; they are called great".

They are elements (dhātu) because they hold as forms what are the causes of their own definitive characteristics; and because they are the causes of resultant forms.

They have functions: Earth supports ('Dzin Pa; dhṛti) without letting fall down. Water makes cohesion (sDud Pa; saṁgraha). Fire ripens (sMin Pa; pakti). Wind increases ('Phel; vṛddhi) and expands (rGyas Par Byed; vyūhana). These are established as their function.

As for their natures: They are those tangible objects that are [respectively] solidity (Sra; khara), moisture (gSher; sneha), heat (Dro Nyid; uṣṇatā), and movement (gYo Ba; īraṇā).

The Vaibhāṣikas say that because function pervades nature but nature does not pervade function, in an aggregation of one element ('Byung Ba), there are all four [functions;] as in an aggregation of the earth element, there are the functions of cohesion, ripening and movement. Likewise, in water and so forth there is supporting and the rest, so it is established that there is also the earth element etc.

The Sautrāntikas hold that what appears are [the functions] that are manifested, and when they do not appear they exist in the form of potentialities (Sa Bon), therefore it does not pervade that they necessarily exist in a manifested form. A more extensive discussion comes below. {12}

And as it says in the scriptures, "the earth element and earth..." If one asks what is the difference between these?

In worldly convention the term earth is applied to a color and shape. Water and fire are also applied to color and shape in the world.

An aggregation of wind, which is a tangible object of the element of movement itself, is called, in the world, "wind," because it is commonly understood in the world that "the body is touched by wind."

Or, as with the previous [elements, "wind"] is applied to color and shape. {13}

(B) How many dhātus and ayatanas the [form aggregate] includes.

The five faculties and the five external objects alone are held to be the ten physical āyatanas and the ten physical dhātus; because there are not ten physical āyatanas and ten physical dhātus other than these. {14a-b} [p.35; 21b1]

ii) Laying out the three middle aggregates.

Feeling is what experiences an object through its own power.

But some believe it to be the experience that one takes an interest in (Don Du 'Nyer).[70]

When classified, there are five: pleasure, suffering, mental happiness, mental unhappiness, and neutral. If condensed there are three: pleasure, suffering and neutral.

If one says: If the mind and other mental factors have experience, they should be feeling; and if not, they would not even be awareness (Rig Pa).

[The mind and mental factors] are not of the nature of experiencing by their own power, but they experience by means of other power.[71] Therefore there is no fault, we reply.

Discrimination has the nature of grasping the characteristic marks (mTsan Ma; nimitta) of the object.

When classified there are two: Grasping the characteristic mark of an object (Don), like grasping blue etc. And grasping the characteristic mark of a term, like grasping what is called "male" or "female".

Or, there are the six collections of discrimination.[72]

Or, there are the three: The discrimination of the Desire Realm, which

is less extensive. The discrimination of the Form Realm which is extensive. And the discrimination of the Formless Realm whch is limitless.

Then if one asks: Is there or is there not discrimination in the wisdom of meditative equipoise of the Āryan? If there is, then since Āryans would possess the grasping of characteristics, they would not be liberated from the grasping of characteristics. If not, then discrimination would not be a [mental factor] that accompanies all minds. If one says this:

Although in the wisdom of meditative equipoise of the Āryan there are the distinctions of having clarity or unclarity, bliss (Sim) and pain etc.; the teaching that the [Āryan] is "liberated from characteristic marks" is that he is liberated from the grasping at the two selves.[73] Therefore there is no fault. {14c-d}

Formative forces ('Du Byed; saṁskāra) is the aggregate of what is other than the four aggregates from the form aggregate to the consciousness aggregate.

When classified it is twofold: the concomitants (mTsungs lDan; saṁprayukta), which are the mental factors other than feeling and discrimination; [p.36; 22a2] and the non-associated formative forces (lDan Min 'Du Byed; viprayukta-saṁskāra), prāpti and so forth.

Here, are the minds and mental factors identical or distinct?

sKal lDan Khyad Par Can holds that they are the same. From the *Bhavasaṁkrānti Sūtra* (*Srid Pa 'Pho Ba'i mDo*):[74]

> Mind itself appears as two.
> Thus it is believed to appear as attachment etc.,
> or to appear as faith etc.
> Afflicted and virtuous phenomena do not exist.

Bhadanta Śrī Rāja says: "Because feeling and consciousness are taught as other aggregates, they are different from mind, but these other [mental factors] are imputed (bTags Pa) to occassions of mind."

Bhadanta Kumarāja says: "The four [mental factors,] feeling, discrimination, contact, and intention, are different from mind, and the others are imputed to occassions of mind."

Ācārya Asañga says in the *Compendium* (*bsDu Ba*):[75]

> Some Śramaṇas (dGe sByong) and Brahmans hold that among [the aggregates included in] name, only mind is substantial, and do not accept the phenomena of mental factors [as substantial.] But such individiuals are incorrect. If one asks why? Because [the teaching of the aggregates as] five would be incorrect. Because [saying mental factors] are occasional[76] would be faulty. Because [the mental factors] would not have different causes. And it would be contradictory to scripture.

So [Asañga] states the faults. His meaning is:

If [the aggregates of] feeling and so forth are not established as other than mind, then the teaching of the aggregates as five would be incorrect.

If one believes that the aggregates of feeling and so forth are imputed on occassions of mind, [consider the following consequences:] If mind and

feeling etc. have different definitive characteristics and activities, then the consequence is that they are different things. If they are not different, the divisions of the occassion--[mind,] and the occassional event--[mental factor,] would be unacceptable. And these mental factors, since they would have no differences in object, faculty, attention and so forth as their efficient cause (Byed rGyu; kāraṇa-hetu), it would be impossible that there would be differences of result. [p.37; 22b3]

And even in sūtra [we find that holding mind and mental factors as the same] is contradictory with these scriptures: "Feeling, discrimination, intention, contact, attention and so forth, which arise simoultaneously with mind..." And: "Mind, afflicted with attachment, will not be liberated. Awareness, afflicted with ignorance will not see." And: "Mind is afflicted with attachment. It is purified by faith." This is the meaning [of Asañgas criticism.]

Moreover, there are these faults: If it is held that mind and mental factors are the same substance, then there is the consequence that concomitant cause (mTsungs lDan Gyi rGyu; saṁprayuktaka-hetu) {ii.53} is impossible; because by saying that mind and mental factors are the same substance, it holds that they are identical.[77]

Moreover, if a mind is one with the virtues of faith etc., and with the non-virtues of anger etc., then at that time such a mind would become, by

its very nature, virtuous or non-virtuous; because the very essence of these [minds] would be naturally virtuous etc. If you believe that, then virtue and non-virtue by way of the concomitants would be impossible.

Moreover, there would not even be the mental factors of feeling and so forth, because they would be identical with [mind.]

These three [aggregates], feeling, discrimination, and formative forces, together with non-revealing form and the three asaṁskṛtas--these [seven] are the āyatana of phenomena from among the the 12 āyatanas; and the dhātu of phenomena from among the 18 dhātus. {15}

iii) Laying out the aggregate of consciousness.

By consciousness (rNam Par Shes Pa; vijñāna) there is awareness (Rig Pa; vijñapti) of an object. Accordingly, [for the six consciousnesses] from awareness of form by eye-consciousness, to awareness of phenomena by mind; so [the root text] says {i.16} "individually" (So Sor; prati).[78]

Consciousness is also the āyatana of mind (Yid; manas); and it is also considered to be the seven dhatus of mind, because it is considered to be the six [sense] consciousnesses and the mind dhātu. [p.38; 23a3]

There is no mind dhātu that is a separate substance from the

consciousnesses. Of the six consciousnesses, "that which has just passed away, that is [called] the mind [dhātu.]"[79] {16-17a-b}

iv) Clarifying which are substantial phenomena.

If one says: There is the consequence that the dhātus are not definitely 18 in number; because, since the mind dhātu and the [six] dhātus of consciousness can each be included in the other, there should be either 12 or 17 dhātus.

There is no fault. As each of the first five consciousnesses has a different faculty as a support, and since mental consciousness does not have such [a support,] in order to establish a support for the sixth, mental consciousness, 18 dhatus are prescribed. {17c-d}

The five aggregates include all saṁskṛta phenomena; and the 12 āyatanas and the 18 dhātus include all phenomena, so granted they can be subsumed by these many [categories.] If one asks: Is there a smaller number [of categories] which includes all phenomena?

There is. The form aggregate includes the ten physical āyatanas and the ten physical dhātus. The mind āyatana includes the aggregate of consciousness and the seven mental dhatus. The dhātu of phenomena

includes the aggregates of feeling, discrimination, and concomitant formative forces, and the āyatana of phenomena. And there are not any phenomena other than these.

The dhātu of phenomena includes the three middle aggregates [of feeling, discrimination and formative forces] by virtue of their being of its own nature. Because they are not merely included, but the objects to be included are of the [same] nature as the includer; and [the includer] is free of (Mi lDan Pa; viyukta) things that are of a different nature from it. {18}

If someone says: There is the consequence that the dhātus are not definitely 18 in number, because the eye and so forth have two each.

There is no fault. [p.39; 23b3] Because the eyes and so forth, of which we have two, are the same type of clear support of consciousness; they are the same in taking as their sphere of activity a single form; and they are the same in acting as the cause of their own resultant [eye]-consciousness.

There is a reason for having two each of the eyes and so forth; it is in order to beautify the body (rTen; āśraya).[80] {19}

b) <u>The literal meaning and</u>

purpose of each one of the three.

If one asks, why are they called aggregates?

They are called aggregates (Phung Po; skandha) in the sense of "a heap of many." As it says in sūtra:[81]

> Whatever form there is--past, future or present, inner or outer, coarse or subtle, inferior or excellent; whatever is far away or whatever is nearby; gathering all these together as one, it is counted as what is called the aggregate of form.

And in this way it is explained up to the aggregate of consciousness.

As the Vaibhāṣikas explain the meaning of this: "past..." etc. means that it is forms that are included in all [three] times. "Inner or outer" means [it is forms] included in the continuum of oneself or of others; or [it means] the forms of the inner and outer āyatanas. "Subtle or coarse" means either non-obstructive or obstructive; or subtle and coarse are posited as relative to each other. "Inferior or excellent" means afflicted and not [afflicted.] "Nearby or far away" means arising in the present, or in the past and future.

It should be understood similarly up to the consciousness aggregate.

The Bhadanta says:[82] "The forms of the three times are taught in their own names. Subtle and coarse are [respectively] what is grasped by a mind or by a sense consciousness. Inferior and excellent means unattractive and attractive. Near and far are objects which are apparent or not apparent." [p.40; 24a4]

Because they are the doors of arisal and propagation for mind and mental factors they are called āyatanas.[83] It is by way of the eye faculty and so forth being the support; and by the forms etc. being the object condition (dMigs rKyen), that mind and mental factors arise.

It is called dhātu because it has the meaning of "type" (Rigs; gotra). For example: It is like a mountain that has much gold is called a dhātu of gold.[84]

It is also applied with the two meanings, of a cause--as in the type (Rigs; gotra) of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha; and with the meaning of nature--as in the type of a king or brahman etc. And both of these [meanings, cause and nature] are appropriate [to dhātus,] because: asaṁskṛtas are a type of [cause] which arises as mental consciousness; and saṁskṛtas are their own homogenous cause (sKal mNyam Gyi rGyu; sabhāga-hetu) {ii.52}, and the [dhātus] have 18 different natures.

Or, the meaning of lineage (Rigs; gotra) is source ('Byung Khungs).[85] Because they are the homogenous cause [i.e. source or mine] of their own subsequent similar-type result.[86]

Or, since this does not pervade the asaṁskṛtas, they are the sources of mind and mental factors. {20a-b}

And if one asks: Why did the Bhagavān teach five aggregates, 12 āyatanas and 18 dhātus, when these are not different substances, and each set individually includes all saṁskṛtas and phenomena?

He taught the three aspects for a reason. The reason that he had for teaching three, the aggregates and so forth, was in order to dispel the [three types of] delusion (rMongs Pa; moha): grasping at mental factors, or at form, or at form and mental factors together, as a unitary self.

It was in order to help the [three types of] disciples: those with sharp faculties (dBang Po; indriya), who understand right from the first statement; those with middling [faculties,] who understand with a little elaboration; and those with dull [faculties,] who understand after extensive elaboration.

And it was in order to help the [three types of] disciples who prefer ('Dod Pa; rucira) either condensed, or intermediate, or extensive expression. {20c-d} [p.41; 24b4]

c) <u>The reason for positing feeling and discrimination as separate aggregates</u>.

And if one asks, why is it definite that the aggregates are five in number?

It is definite. Because first of all, it is definite that things are two-fold: form and non-form. Non-forms are definitely two-fold: consciousness and not

consciousness. What are non-form and not consciousness are definitely the three aggregates--feeling, [discrimination and formative forces.]

And if one asks: Having included the other mental factors in the aggregate of formative forces, what is the reason for explaining feeling and discrimination as aggregates separate from those mental factors?

There is a reason. Because these two, contaminated feeling and discrimination are the roots of disputation (rTzod Pa'i rTza Ba; vivāda-mūla), and the main cause of cyclic existence. And because of the reason for the order of the five aggregates which is shown below.

Also from sūtra:

> With attachment to the desired as the cause, kings with kings, farmers with farmers, householders with householders, dispute with each other. Because of attachment to a view, monks (Rab Tu Byung Ba; pravrajita) dispute with each other.

And from the *Sūtra of Praises for not Having Disputes (rTzod Pa Mi mNga' Bar bsTod Pa'i mDo)*:

> Desire does not appear; there is no relationship [for disputes.] You have destroyed the net of views. Because of that no disputes arise. Without their roots, from what can they arise?

In this way [feeling and discrimination are shown as separate aggregates] by means of logical pervasion and counter-pervasion (rJes Su 'Gro lDog). The householder on one hand and the monk on the other, each clinging strongly, respectively, to desire and views; with desire for experiencing the taste of feelings and with mistaken discrimination, [the

monk] grasps at the good and bad marks of their own and others' tenets; [the householder grasps at] water, fields, livestock,[87] women, houses and wealth; and [the monk seeks to] establish or refute his own or others' tenets. So, [feeling and discrimination] are said to be the roots of disputes between kings and kings etc., between monks and monks. [p.42; 25a5]

Those who have attachment and so forth for the feeling of pleasure etc. gather karma. And this is also caused by mistaken discriminations. Therefore these are the main causes of cyclic existence.

The [third] reason [why feeling and discrimination are taught as separate aggregates] is shown below where the five aggregates are taught in their order as coarse and so forth. There, feeling and discrimination as aggregates separate from the other mental factors will also be set forth. {21}

If one asks: What is the reason for presenting asaṁskṛtas as āyatanas and as dhātus but not as aggregates?

There is a reason for not explaining asaṁskṛtas as aggregates. Because asaṁskṛtas are not any of the five aggregates, the form aggregate etc.; and they are not suitable to be a sixth aggregate. This latter is established because they can not have the meaning of aggregate which is a heap of many. Also, the five aggregates are taught in order to understand them as the basis of affliction and purification; but asaṁskṛtas can not be the

basis of affliction and purification.

Therefore, the āyatanas are definitely 12, because there are definitely the ten physical things, and the non-physicals are definitely two, mind and phenomena.

The dhātus are definitely 18: the ten physicals; the non-physicals are definitely two--phenomena and mind; and mind definitely has seven aspects.

Furthermore it says {i.14}, "The faculties and the external objects alone [are held to be the ten (physical) āyatanas and the ten (physical) dhātus."] But here [at this point in the text] the definite number of the āyatanas and dhātus are not taught.

Therefore, it is in order to understand that they are the five illusory bases of self-grasping that five aggregates are taught. It is in order to understand that they are the doors of arisal of the six consciousnesses along with their concomitants that the 12 āyatanas are taught. It is in order to understand cause along with its results that the 18 dhātus are taught. In this way it should be understood. {22a-b} [p.43; 25b5]

d) The way of arranging the order of aggregates, dhātus and āyatanas.

If one asks, what is the reason for teaching the five aggregates in this order?

The order of the five aggregates is presented by way of their subtlety and coarseness. Since most of the forms are obstructive they are [the most] coarse. Among the non-physicals, as we say "my hand feels, my foot feels," since feeling is thus coarse, [the next is] feeling. Then since it grasps definitive marks, discrimination is [the next most] coarse. Then formative forces [which wish,] "May I be happy, may I not suffer," is [the next most] coarse. Consciousness, being merely aware of the object's entity, is subtlest.

Or they are taught according to the stages of the arisal of the afflictions. From beginingless time, beings like form; so, at first they look at form. From the beauty or unattractiveness of forms, happy and suffering feelings arise. From that, mistaken discrimination arises. From that the formative forces like attachment and hatred arise. From that the consciousness becomes afflicted.[88]

Or, it is taught with a sense according with the way we enjoy food: [there is the] food's container, the food, the seasoning, the cook, and the consumer. Form is like the container; feeling is like the food; discriminations are like the seasoning; formative forces are like the cook; and consciousness is like the consumer.

Or, it is taught according to the order of the realms. Beings of the Desire Realm are distinguished by their desire for sense objects ('Dod Pa'i

Yon Tan; kāma-guṇa) of form.[89] Those of the concentrations are distinguished by the quality of feeling. Those of the first three levels of the Formless Realm are distinguished by discrimination. And those of the Peak of Existence are distinguished by the qualities of formative forces. Consciousness abides in all [the realms.] {22c-d}

From among the six faculties there is a reason for teaching the five faculties--the eye and so forth--first: because they are subjects whose objects are in the present. [p.44; 26a6] There is a reason for teaching the mental [faculty] later; because it is a subject [that grasps all] three times, and it is difficult to understand because it views asaṁskṛtas.

From among the [five faculties] there is a reason for teaching the four--the eye and so forth--first: because they take as objects complex matter ('Byung Ba Las Gyur Pa; bhautika). There is a reason for teaching the body faculty later: because it takes as objects both elements and complex matter.

From among the four others, there is a reason for teaching the two--eyes and ears--first: because these two engage distant objects. The two--nose and tongue--engage what is near. Between the two, eyes and ears,[90] there is a reason for teaching eyes first: because it engages objects that are very far away. For example, one may see the form of a far away river, but still not be able to hear its sound.

Between the two, nose and tongue, there is a reason for teaching nose first: because it engages its object more quickly. For example, the nose has sensed the smell when the tongue has not yet experienced the taste.

Or, it is taught in accordance with the order of the positions of the faculty bases. Beginning with the eyes being in the first [top] position, [down to] the body which is located mostly down below.[91]

When we explain in this way the arrangment of the six inner āyatanas, the order of the outer āyatanas is also understood. Because [the objects] are taught according to the order of the subjects. This also establishes the order of the dhātus, because the six result dhātus of consciousness are taught according to the order of their causes. Thus, when the order of the six faculties is established, the order of the six objects and the six consciousnesses is also established. It is like, for example, when the order of six kings is established, the order of their six queens and six princes is also established. {23}

e) Understanding the two āyatanas. [p.45; 26b6 ]

If one says: Why is the object of the eye alone called the form āyatana and dhātu; and the object of the mind alone called the āyatana and dhātu of phenomena? This has an incorrect consequence, because all the ten

[faculties and sense objects]--the eye and so forth--are form; and all āyatanas and dhātus are also phenomena. If someone says this:

Although all ten are form, they are individually āyatanas, and they are not all together (sPyir; samasta) [one āyatana.] It is in order to understand this that the nine--eye and so forth--are taught each in its own name. And because there is no other name for the object of eyes, it is called form. The general term [form] is used in order to understand the particular; only the object of the eye is called the form āyatana and dhātu. Just as by the expression "many horsemen" the particular of an army etc. is indicated.

Or, because the object of the eyes can be pointed out (bStan Yod; sanidarśanatva),[92] and is obstructive, it is the dominant (gTzo Bo; prādhānya) form, so the term is applied to it. Just as the expression "supreme man" is understood as the king.

"And in mundane usage that is known as form, and not anything else." So [Vasubandhu's] commentary explains.[93]

Or, although all the ten physical āyatanas are form, there is a reason to call these others the eye and so forth; and to call the objects of the eye the form āyatana. Teaching them in this way--by means of arranging the ten physical āyatanas as object and subject, is in order to understand the individual āyatanas and their own particular objects.

There is a reason for applying the general term form only to the object

of the eye. By means of the contact of being touched by the hand and so forth it qualifies as form (gZugs Su Rung Ba; rūpyate). It is suitable to be shown to the eye consciousness. And also in the world, this alone is known as form.

Others say:[94] "Because of its grossness (Rags Pa; audārika) [by way of having] 20 aspects; because they are the objects of activity of the three [types of eye]--the fleshy eye, the divine eye and the wisdom eye; only the object of the eye is taught as the form āyatana and dhātu." So they say. [p.46; 27b1]

Also: although it is true that all the āyatanas and dhātus are phenomena, there is a reason to call the object of mind alone the āyatana and dhātu of phenomena. The others are called by their own names. But some [phenomena] have no other names, and it is in order to understand them as specifically objects of mind that the general term "phenomena" is applied to the objects of mind. It is like when "Nameless" itself becomes a name.

Or, it is because there are many phenomena to be included--feeling and so forth, and because the supreme phenomenon, the analytical cessation of Nirvāṇa, is also included therein, that only the objects of mind are called the āyatana and dhātu of phenomena.

Or, [we can understand] from the words (Ngag) of the Ācārya: Although all 12 āyatanas are phenomena, there is a reason for calling the five--the eye etc.--the āyatana of the eye and so forth, and for calling seven other phenomena the āyatana of phenomena.[95] Because teaching them in this way, by means of arranging the 12 āyatanas as objects and subjects, is in order to understand the individual āyatanas and their own particular objects. There is a reason to apply the general term phenomena to those seven phenomena. Because they subsume many phenomena, and they also include the supreme phenomenon, Nirvāṇa.[96] {24}

2) How they include other phenomena.

In this there are two topics:

a) How the dharma aggregate is included [in these categories.]

b) Applying this to other [phenomena] as well.

a) How the dharma aggregate is included.

Then if one says: In other sūtras other things which have the name "aggregates" and so forth occur. If they are not included in what is

mentioned here, they would be phenomena other than these, and so there would not be a definite number of those [phenomena.] And if they are included, how? [p.47; 28a2]

The answer to this, the way in which the dharma aggregate is included is this: "The 80,000 dharmas that were taught by the Sage" {i.25} are, according to the Sautrāntikas, speech (Tsig; vāc) which is the object of the ears, i.e. they are in the nature of speech. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that they are in the nature of terms (Ming; nāman), which are the objects of mind. So, they are included, respectively, in either the form aggregate or the aggregate of formative forces.[97]

The Abhidharmikas say, from the *Jñānaprasthāna* (*Ye Shes La 'Jug Pa*):

> If one asks, what are the teachings of the Buddha? They are the Tathāgata's speech (bKa'; vāc); discourse (gSung; vacanam.); utterance (rJod Pa; vyāhāra); melodious voice (dByangs; gīrṇi); definite discourse (Nges Pa'i gSung; ukti); the path of speech (gSung Gi Lam; vāk-patha); melodious speech (gSung dByangs; vāg-ghoṣa); activity of speech (gSung Gi 'Phrin Las; vāk-karma); speech as revealing action (gSung Gi rNam Par Ri Byed; vāg-vijñapti).[98]

And:

> If one asks, what is the dharma called the teaching of the Buddha? It is the collection of words (Ming; nāman), collection of phrases (Tsig; pada), collection of phonemes (Yi Ge; vyañjana), which are arranged in order, fixed in order, and put together in order.[99]

As it says this, that these [dharmas] are in the nature of both [speech and terms,] therefore they are included in both [the aggregates of form and

of formative forces.] So [the Abhidharmikas] believe.

Other sects believe there are 84,000 dharma aggregates. As it says in the *Ānanda Sūtra* (*Kun dGa Ba'i mDo*):

> Ānanda said: "I have directly taken a little more than 80,000 (brGyad Khri lHag gCig) dharma aggregates from the Bhagavan. Two [thousand I have received] from bhikṣus."

And also from the *Vyākhyāyukti* (*rNam Par bShad Pa'i Rigs Pa*):[100]

> Even according to the Śrāvakayāna [the dharma aggregate] is not subsumed in 80,000, because, as it says in the *Ānanda Sūtra*: "I have gotten more than 80,000 from the Bhagavan, and two [thousand] from bhikṣus." [p.48; 28b2] So it is understood that these were heard by Ananda during his more than 20 years of service to the Teacher; but he did not get the teachings given before his service. It is unreasonable that before that time very few dharmas were taught; and to maintain that the only ones taught previous [to his service] were the [dharmas] he got from the bhikṣus would not be sensible.

And from the commentary to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*Kun Las bTus Kyi 'Grel Ba*):[101] "In the context of the Śrāvakayāna, the 84,000 dharma aggregates held by Sthavira Ānanda are this very Tripiṭaka."

And also in the systems of other schools it says, "84,000 dharma aggregates."

Therefore, it is understood that the belief in 80,000 is only in the system of the Kaśmīra-Vaibhāṣikas. {25}

Then, if one asks, what is the size of each dharma aggregate?

Some say, "It is equal in size to the commentary compiled by Śāriputra

called *Dharmaskandha,*[102] in which there are 6,000 verses." Accordingly the 80,000 dharma aggregates would have 480,000,000 verses.

From the commentary to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*:[103] "If one asks: What is the size of one dharma aggregate? The meaning of 'ten one-hundreds' is that a dharma aggregate has 1000." Thus it explains that each dharma aggregate has 1000 verses. According to this method of calculation, the 84,000 dharma aggregates will have 84,000,000 verses.

Concerning the size of a verse, Ācārya Dharmamitra (Chos Kyi bShes gNyen) says: "Each verse has just 32 syllables (Yig 'Bru)." Thus he says in Indian letters (Yi Ge) [a verse] is eight times four or 32. So in Tibetan letters [a verse] would be 28 [syllables, with each syllable being a unit] between stops (Tseg Bar). [p.49; 29b3]

Others say: Since the [length of] expression (rJod Byed) is not definite, it is the objects of expression--the aggregates, dhātus, āyatanas, dependent origination, and so forth; each complete exposition (gTam; kathā) showing an individual category of topics, and each of these is one dharma aggregate; but as for the number of verses, it is not definite.

Then if one asks, why are these taught? The dharma aggregates are accordingly taught as the antidotes to the 80,000 different afflicted activities--attachment and so forth--of sentient beings.

Ācārya Yaśomitra explains: "The term 'tu' (Ni) {i.26d} is in order to

eliminate the previously explained position [of measuring dharma aggregates by verses;] or in order to firmly establish (Nges gZung; avadhāraṇa) [this position.][104]

I have seen that some say the latter system is Ācārya [Vasubandhu's] own system.

Some earlier Tibetan scholars say: Since there are 21,000 activities motivated by each of the three, attachment and so forth; and [21,000] motivated by equal proportions [of the three]; therefore there are 84,000 dharma aggregates as antidotes for these.

From the *Rātnolkā-nāma-dhāraṇī* (*dKon mChog Ta La'i gZungs*):[105]

> By the doors of different dharmas,
> the 84,000 which are taught
> by the Victors enacting the benefit of wandering beings,
> worldly sentient beings are tamed according to their minds.

These [positions] are clearly according to the common vehicle.

According to the uncommon great vehicle Ācārya Dharmamitra says:

> According to the unsurpassed vehicle, the load of ink that can be carried by Steadfast (Rab brTan), Lord Indra's elephant, can write one dharma aggregate. If it is figured that way, this statement from the sūtras also becomes reasonable: "Devadatta (lHas Byin) can recite the number of volumes that can be carried by 5000 elephants." [p.50; 29b4]

And it also says in the *Sūtra of Repaying Kindness* (*Drin Lan bSab Pa'i mDo*): "Devadatta can recite the number of sūtras in the loads of 60,000 Gandha-hastin (sPos Kyi Glang Po) elephants."[106]

If one asks: If that many dharma aggregates were taught, since they are not apparent now, here in this world, where are they?

Ācārya Dharmamitra says:

> Some are in the realms of other worlds, and most others are in the region of the nāgas. As it is explained in the *Śiṣyalekha* (*sLob sPring*):[107] "The teachings, excellent as a supreme jewel and faultless, which are the means of purification, were respectfully received like a crown ornament by the great nāgas with hooded heads, and dispelled the darkness that abides in the depths of the earth."

Ācārya Vasubandhu says in his *Vyākhyāyukti*:[108] "Because the bases of the well-collected [teachings] has deteriorated, I understand that they are not all [extant."]

And it also appears in the *Āgama-praśna-vṛtti* (*Lung Zhu Ba'i 'Grel Pa*):[109]

> After the passing of the Teacher, a Brahman king called Puśyamitra (rGyal Byed bShes) destroyed stūpas, killed bhikṇus and also burned scriptures and temples (gTzug Lag Khang).

And:

> Because the beggar Sūryasiddhi (Nyi Ma'i dNgos Grub) and others destroyed the well-collected [scriptures], most have disappeared. And even those that survive are not whole, so all are not extant.[110]

And also from the ṭīkā of Ācārya Yaśomitra: "Those dharma aggregates have disappeared, and this alone remains." And, "The sūtra that taught all the six causes has disappeared. And in this *Ekottara-āgama* (*gCig Las 'Phros Pa'i Lung*) which should teach up to 100 dharmas, now only the teachings up to ten appear."[111] {26} [p.51; 30a4]

b) Applying this to other [phenomena] as well.

Just as the dharma aggregates are included in the aggregates, "likewise others...should also be included {i.27}. In applying this, if one asks, how are they to be included, which goes where?

As it says {i.27}: "Aggregates, āyatanas and dhātus..." and "as is appropriate...examining their definitive characteristics...," these [quotations] show respectively [what and how they should be arranged.]

Here, of the three--[aggregates, āyatanas and dhātus]--the way in which things that are called "aggregates" are to be included in the [five] aggregates is as follows:

In sūtra occurs: "The aggregates of morality, meditative stabilization, wisdom, liberation, and seeing the wisdom of liberation."[112]

According to the Vaibhāṣikas these are included in the form and formative forces aggregates: Morality is form--the seven restraints (sPong Ba; virati) of body and speech. The others, even the two last aggregates, are mental factors--other than feeling and discrimination--because they are particular instances of conviction (Mos Pa; adhimokṇa ) and wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā).[113] The last four are included in four or five [aggregates] if taken with their retinues, because the virtues of meditative equipoise on the levels of the six concentrations also have non-revealing forms.

The Sautrāntikas and so forth believe that all are included in the aggregate of formative forces, because the aggregate of morality is also considered to be a particular instance of [the mental factor of] intention (Sems Pa; cetanā).

Similarly the aggregates known as confessing sin (sDig Pa bShags Pa), rejoicing, and supplicating are also included in the aggregate of formative forces; because they are [respectively] of the natures of regret ('Gyod Pa; kaukṛtya), faith (Dad Pa; śraddhā), and prediliction ('Dun Pa; chanda). If these are considered with their retinues, they are also included in four aggregates.

Furthermore, the aggregates known as "the certainty of good [karmic consequences,"] "the certainty of bad [karmic consequences,"] and "uncertainty [of karmic consequences,"] are included in five aggregates. As it is said, "Āryans and those who commit the automatic transgressions (mTsams Med; ānantarya) have the certainty of good and bad [consequences."] So [these three categories] are taught [respectively] in terms of Āryans, those who commit the automatic transgressions, and individuals who are other than these two. [p.52; 30b5]

How things that are called āyatanas are included in the [twelve] āyatanas:

In the case of the first eight of the ten that are explained as

"encompassing āyatanas" (Zad Par Gyi sKye mChed; kṛtsna-āyatana):[114]
As it says {viii.36}, "The encompassing are ten; of which eight are non-attachment," since they are of the nature of non-attachment, they are included in the āyatana of phenomena. If taken with their retinues, they are of the nature of the five aggregates, so they are included in [the āyatanas] of mind and phenomena.

As it says {viii.36}, "Two are pure and formless." These two, space and consciousness [encompassing āyatanas,] are included in the āyatanas of mind and phenomena, because they are of the nature of the first two levels of the Formless Realm.

Likewise, the eight āyatanas of mastery (Zil Gyis gNon; abhibhv-āyatana) {viii.36} also are included in the āyatana of phenomena because they are of the nature of non-attachment. If taken with their retinues, they are included in the āyatanas of mind and phenomena.

And it also says in sūtra:

> Here, oh Bhikṣu, when a teacher teaches the dharma, or anyone taking the position of a guru, be it a wise man (mKhas Pa; vijña) or a celibate practitioner (Tsangs Pa mTsungs Par sPyod Pa; brahmacārī); in whatever manner this teacher--or anyone taking the position of a guru, be it a wise man or a celibate practitioner--teaches the dharma; in just that manner, the meaning of each of those dharmas will be understood. From that understanding of the meaning and understanding of the dharmas, great joy (Rab Tu dGa' Ba; prāmodyam, pramudita) arises. From great joy, happiness (dGa' Ba; prīti) arises. From the generation of mental happiness the body becomes supple. When the body is supple, pleasure (bDe Ba; sukha) is experienced. Being in pleasure, the mind becomes placed in equipoise. When the

> mind is placed in equipoise, it knows reality as it is and sees reality as it is. [p.53; 31a6 ] [Knowing reality as it is and seeing reality as it is] one becomes disgusted (Yid 'Bung; nirvidyate) [with the world.] When there is disgust [for the world] one becomes separated from attachment ('Dod Chags Dang Bral Ba; virajyate). [When there is separation from attachment one is liberated. This is the first āyatana of liberation.][115]

In brief, in this way, whatever type of other aggregate, āyatana, and dhatus there are, by properly examining each one's distinctive characteristics, they should be included in their appropriate place just as it was explained for the dharma aggregates. {27}

The Vaibhāṣikas say: The cavities such as the mouth and so forth are the dhātu of space; and [such cavities are nothing other than] the light of day-time or the darkness of night. Its nature is obstructive, and because it exists around other things that are obstructive, it is "around the obstructive" (Thogs bCas Nye 'Khor; agha-sāmantaka).[116]

"So they say..." (Lo; kila) {i.28}, is a word of disagreement used by the Sautrāntikas to the Vaibhāṣikas. [The Sautrantikas say:] The asaṁskṛta of space is the dhātu of space. Its nature is non-obstructive and because it is around other things that are obstructive,[117] it is the "non-obstructive around [the obstructive."] Therefore, in this way, it is included in the āyatana and the dhātu of phenomena.

The dhātu of consciousness is included in the seven dhātus of mind.

In this way, from among the 62 dhātus taught in the *Sūtra of Many Dhātus* (*Khams Mang Po'i mDo*; *Dhātubahuka-sūtra*),[118] the 18 dhātus--the eye etc.--which were explained previously, are the ones that include [the others.][119]

The four [elements,] earth and so forth, explained next among the six elements (Khams; dhātu),[120] are included in the dhātu of tangible objects, as was previously explained. Here, doubts concerning the elements of space and consciousness are being cleared up.

Contaminated consciousness is the dhātu of consciousness. Because the dhātu of consciousness is the support of birth in existence, and uncontaminated consciousness severs existence. Therefore, not all concsciousnesses are the dhātu of consciousness. [p.54; 31b6]

After that, the six dhātus that are explained as desire, harmful thoughts (gNod Sems; vyāpāda), harmfulness (rNam Par 'Tse Ba; vihimsā), renunciation, non-harmful thoughts and non-harmfulness, are included in the dhātu of phenomena. Because, the first three are mental factors to be abandoned and are of the nature of Desire Realm attachment, anger, and injuring sentient beings; and the latter three are mental factors as antidotes and are of the nature of non-attachment, non-anger, and mercy.

After that, the six dhātus known as pleasure, suffering, mental

happiness, mental suffering, equanimity, and ignorance are mentioned. As the first five are feelings and the sixth is a formative force they are included in the dhātu of phenomena.

After that, the four dhātus, feeling, discrimination, formative forces and consciousness are mentioned. The first three are included in the dhātu of phenomena and the fourth is included in the seven mental dhātus.

After that, the three Realms (Khams; dhātu)--Desire, Form, and Formless are taught. They are included respectively: in 18 dhātus; in 14 dhātus excluding smell, taste, nose and tongue consciousnesses; in the last three dhātus.[121]

After that, the three dhātus of form, formlessness and cessation are taught. They are included [respectively] in 14 dhātus; in the last three dhātus; and in the dhātu of phenomena. Here, the dhātu of cessation means analytical cessations and non-analytical cessations.

Then, the three dhātus of the past, future and present are taught, and they are included in all 18 dhātus.

After that, the three dhātus of the bad, middling, and marvelous are taught. They are the same three as the dhātus [i.e. realms] of the Desire Realm (Khams; dhātu) etc., [Form and Formless Realms.] [p.55; 32b1]

After that, the three dhātus of virtue, non-virtue and neutral are taught. The first two are included in the dhātus of form, sound, phemomena,

and the seven mental dhātus. The last is included in 18 dhātus.

After that, the three dhātus of Learners, No-more-learners, and neither-one-nor-the-other are taught. The first two are included in the last three dhātus, and the third is included in 18 dhātus.

After that, the two dhātus, contaminated and un-contaminated, are taught. The first is included in 18 dhātus, and the latter in the last three dhātus.

After that, the two dhātus of saṁskṛta and asaṁskṛta are taught. The first is included in 18 dhātus, and the latter in the dhātu of phenomena.

Thus, these are the 62 dhātus. If one becomes expert in these, he is called a scholar who is expert in the dhātus.[122]

As for the world systems ('Jig rTen Gyi Khams; loka-dhātu) that are taught as a small chiliocosm, a middling dichiliochosm and a trichiliochosm--they are included in 18 dhātus, without differences [between the three.] Those that are included in the Desire Realm, are [included in] all 18 dhātus. The First Concentration is included in 14.[123] {28}

Thus the divisions of dhātus
are given here, extensively and concisely.
In this way discerning people
will analyze well and spread the teachings.

This is a [summary] verse [inserted by dGe 'Dun Grub] at an intermediate stage [of the chapter.]

3) <u>The detailed classification of dhātus and aspects</u>.

Although if extended there are 22 detailed classifications, for the sake of easy expression, there are eight:

a) The five, the one that can be pointed out etc.

b) The divisions of having investigation and having analysis etc.

c) The five, having a referent object etc.

d) The detailed classification of the three originations.

e) The five, having substance etc.

f) The detailed classification of the objects to be abandoned on the Path of Seeing etc. [p.56; 33a1]

g) The detailed classification of view and non-view.

h) The three, what can be known by two etc.

These are the eight.

a) The five, the one that can be pointed out, etc.[124]

If someone asks: Among the 18 dhātus, how many can be pointed out (bsTan Du Yod Pa; sanidarśana) and how many can not? Here, among the 18 dhātus, only the dhātu of form can be pointed out. Because it can be pointed out to the eyes that, "this is here and that is there."

The ten physical dhātus are obstructive. Because from among the three [types of obstruction,] the obstruction of blocking (sGrib Pa La Thogs Pa; āvaraṇa-pratighāta); the obstruction of object (Yul La Thogs Pa; viṣaya-pratighāta); and the obstruction of referent object (dMigs Pa La Thogs Pa; ālambana-pratighāta); they are the obstruction of blocking. Because they block other physical things from arising in their own location.

The obstruction of object is like when the eye has one thing for its object, such as blue; by [the blue] obstructing [the eye] it blocks any other phenomenon from becoming an object.

The obstruction of referent object is like when the mind and mental factors have one referent object, such as blue; by [the blue] obstructing [the mind and mental factors] it blocks any other phenomenon from becoming a referent object.[125]

Here [for the ten physical dhātus,] obstruction is a resistance (rDugs Pa; pratighāta) because physical things prevent one another from taking each other's location.

But [there is also] an obstruction which is a blocking that prevents the arising of anything else as [a faculty's] own object. As it says in the the *Prajñapti* (*bDags Pa*): For the eye, there are four possibilities of being obstructed or not obstructed by water or dryness; and there are the four possibilities of being obstructed or not obstructed by night or day. So the eye and so forth engages its own object but it does not engage any other object--this is the obstruction of object.

And the concomitants grasp their own object, but they do not grasp any other--this is the obstruction of referent object.

Here, from among these three [types of obstruction, the ten physicals] are [obstruction] in terms of the first, because the atoms (rDul Phran; aṇu) of the eye etc. will block another from coming into their own location. [p.57; 33b2]

The remaining eight dhātus, because they are not like this, are established as non-obstructive.

Here, the difference between object (Yul; viṣaya) and referent object (dMigs; ālambana) is: Whatever is an object of the five faculties is an object; and whatever is grasped by mind and mental factors is both referent object

and object.

And among the 18 dhātus there are eight that are exclusively [morally] neutral (Lung Du Ma bsTan Pa; avyākṛta), because they are indeterminate as to their natures being either virtue or non-virtue. If one asks which are they?

From among those ten physical dhātus which were explained as being obstructive, form and sound can also be virtue or non-virtue. So not including these, it is the five faculties, smell, taste and tangible objects [which are exclusively neutral.] {29}

The other ten dhātus have all three aspects, being either virtue, non-virtue or neutral. From among those [ten,] form and sound--which are included in revealing form of body and speech--can be all three, virtue, non-virtue and neutral, based upon the motivation. [Those dhātus which] are included in the continuum but are not included as revealing form, and all those which are not included in the continuum, are naturally neutral.

From among the eight non-obstructive dhātus, the seven mental dhātus can be any of the three, virtue, non-virtue or neutral, because they can be concomitant with accompanying non-attachment, attachment and so forth.

As for the dhātu of phenomena, some by nature, some by concomitants, some by motivation, and some ultimately, are virtuous; and

likewise it should be understood [they can be non-virtuous or neutral.] {30a}

Then if one asks: Among the 18 dhātus, how many are included in the Desire Realm; how many are included in the Form Realm; how many are included in the Formless Realm; how many are not included in the realms?

All 18 dhātus belong to the Desire Realm, because they are capable of nourishing (rGyas Su Rung Ba) the afflictions of the Desire Realm. [p.58; 34a3]

In the Form Realm there are 14. And if one asks what are they? They are all the dhātus with the exception of smell, taste, nose-consciousness and tongue-consciousness. The two--smell and taste--are not in the Form Realm because they are morsel food, and those who are free of attachment to these take birth there.

If one says: In that case there would also be no tangible objects.

[That is not correct.] As there are two [types of tangible objects]--morsel food and non-food; although the tangible objects that are morsel food do not exist there, there do exist the elements which are the support of the forms of the faculties and so forth, as well as tangible objects such as clothing etc. Within taste and smell there is nothing that is not morsel food. Even if there were, there is no need for it in the Form Realm. Therefore there is also neither nose nor tongue consciousness, because their objects are not

there. {30}

The dhātus of mind, phenomena and mental consciousness are included in the Formless Realm, because they are capable of nourishing the afflictions of the Formless Realm; and because those who are separated from attachment to form take birth there; and, by merely abandoning form, none of the ten physical dhātus exist there. And since these do not exist, the five consciousnesses, which are their effects, also do not exist.

Although the three dhātus--from among the 18--that are included in Formless Realm can certainly be contaminated; in general, those three--mind, phenomena and mental consciousness, have contaminated [phenomena] included in the first two Truths; and they also have uncontaminated [phenomena] which are included in the Truth of the Path and asaṁskṛtas.

As for the 15 remaining--the ten physical dhātus and their resultant five dhātus of consciousness: they are exclusively contaminated, because they are objects to be abandoned on the Path of Meditation; and they nourish contamination. [p.59; 34b3]

The Dārṣṭāntikas (dPe sTon Pa) say: The statement that the form aggregates of Arhats and the inanimate world are both contaminated and uncontaminated because they are not the antidote of contamination nor are they the support of contamination--this statement is not reasonable. Because

they [contaminated and uncontaminated] are mutually exclusive, and there is no possibility of a third aggregate. {31}

b) <u>The divisions of having investigation and having analysis etc</u>.

Then, among the 18 dhātus, those that definitely are accompanied by investigation (rTog Pa; vitarka) and analysis (dPyod Pa; vicāra) are the five dhātus of consciousness, the eye and so forth. Because they are directed externally, and are concomitant with gross and subtle [modes of perceiving external objects.] Therefore, since this negates the possibility of non-possession (Mi lDan rNam gCod),[126] it should be explained like this: The five dhātus of consciousness are exclusively with investigation and analysis. It should be expressed this way because the writers of the ṭīkas say, "The term 'Ni' (hi) {i.32} means they are exclusively (Kho Na) with investigation and analysis; thus it indicates restriction (Nges Par gZung Ba; avadhāraṇa) in the example."[127]

The last three dhātus of mind, phenomena and mental consciousness have three aspects: having investigation and analysis; having only analysis but not having investigation; and having neither investigation nor analysis.

In the Desire Realm and on the actual absorption of an ordinary first concentration (bSam gTan Dang Po'i dNgos gZhi Tzam Po Ba)[128] the

dhātus of the mind, mental consciousness, and the concomitants--other than investigation and analysis--which are within the dhātu of phenomena, necessarily have investigation and analysis as their accompaniment; so they are with investigation and with analysis.

The investigation of the Desire Realm and of the actual absorption of an ordinary first concentration; and the mind [dhātu] etc. of the actual absorption of a special first concentration (bSam gTan Dang Po'i dNgos gZhi Khyad Par Can; dhyānāntara)[129] do not have investigation, but have only analysis. Because, respectively: there is no second investigation of the [Desire Realm] or ordinary first concentration, but it definitely is accompanied by analysis;[130] and the special first concentration has abandoned investigation but definitely has analysis. [p.60;35b4]

The analysis of the special first concentration and the minds etc. from the second concentration on up; and all the non-concomitants in the dhātu of phenomena have neither investigation nor analysis. Because, respectively: analysis has no second analysis; the second concentration on up are the stages (Sa Pa; bhūmi) which have abandoned investigation and analysis; and non-concomitants have neither investigation nor analysis; [so these three categories] are without investigation or analysis.

If one says: Then there would also be the case [not included in the above three posibilities] of being without analysis but with investigation

alone; because analysis has no second analysis, and analysis belonging to the first concentration on down is necessarily concomitant with investigation.[131]

That is true, however, it says {i.32}, "the last three [dhātus] are of three types," which complies with what is taught in sūtra: the three--having investigation, having analysis, etc.; and the three meditative stabilizations...

The remaining ten physical [dhātus], the eye and so forth, since they are not concomitants [of mind,] are exclusively without both investigation and analysis. {32}

If someone says: If the five dhātus of consciousness have investigation, it is contradictory to the sūtra that explains them as being without conceptuality (rNam Par rTog Pa; vikalpa): "Oh Bhikṣus, the eye consciousness cognizes blue, but not by thinking, 'This is blue.'"[132] If one says this:

There is no contradiction, because, in general, there are three conceptualities: natural conceptuality (Ngo Bo Nyid; svabhāva); examining conceptuality (Nges Par rTog Pa; abhinirūpaṇa); and conceptuality of memory (rJes Su Dran Pa'i; anusmaraṇa).[133] From among these the consciousnesses of the five doors are explained as non-conceptuality because of [being without] examining conceptuality and conceptuality of

memory; but not because they are without natural conceptuality.[134]

Then if one asks, what are these conceptualities? The first [natural conceptuality] will be explained among the mental factors {ii.33}. [p.61; 35b5] Examining conceptuality and the conceptuality of memory should be understood respectively as: a wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā) concomitant with mental consciousness which is wavering (gYeng Ba; vyagra)[135] towards its object. [And conceptuality of memory is:] A memory concomitant with a mental consciousness which remembers its object without depending on a name; and this includes all [such memory] whether in meditative equipoise or not in equipoise (mNyam Par bZhag Pa; samāhitā). Here, wavering mental wisdom is [a wisdom] concomitant with that [mental consciousness] that is arisen from hearing or thinking or is inborn.[136] {33}

c) The five, having a referent object etc.[137]

If one asks: Among the 18 dhātus, which are those that necessarily have a referent object, and which are the others?

The seven mental dhātus have referent objects, because having attended to an object they grasp it. One part of the dhātu of phenomena, the mental factors, also have referent objects. The remaining ten and a half dhātus are established as without referent objects because they are not

concomitants.

If one asks how many among these [18 dhātus] are appropriated (Zin Pa; upātta) [by consciousness,] how many are not appropriated, and how many are both?

Nine are exclusively not appropriated by mind. If one asks, what are those nine? The seven mental dhātus and part of the dhātu of phenomena, which are explained as having referent objects--these eight non-obstructive dhātus--plus sound [are exclusively not appropriated by mind.]

The other nine dhātus, the five--the eye and so forth, and the four--form, smell, taste and tangible objects--these nine have both aspects of being either appropriated or not appropriated. Because the five faculties of the present and the four--form and so forth of the present, when they are within the aggregation of the faculties are appropriated.

But the eye and so forth of the past and future; and the four--form and so forth [which is not within the aggregation of a faculty,] although it is included in the continuum and is of the present; and hair, moustache, nails--except for their roots, feces, urine, saliva, mucus and blood etc.; and that which is not included in the continuum, are not appropriated.[138] [p.62; 36a6]

Here, the meaning of "appropriated" is: That which is grasped by the

mind and mental factors in its function of support,[139] because it generates a feeling of pleasure or pain by means of benefiting or harming the physical faculties; i.e. what is called by the world "with mind" (Sems Dang bCas Pa; sacetanā).

And Ācārya Pūrṇavardhana explains it this way:

Appropriated are those [things] which are included in the body, which are grasped in their function of support of the mind and mental factors, because they are mutually coordinated [with those minds and mental factors.][140]

Here, the explanation that, "the five faculties--the eye and so forth--of the past and future are not appropriated;" this is the conception of the Vaibhāṣikas. Since the past is passed away, and the future is unborn, they are not entities. And it is unreasonable that non-entities should be faculties.

Therefore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as well as the *Pañcaskandha*[141] teach the five--the eye and so forth--as exclusively appropriated.

And also the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*Bye bShad*) explains:

If one asks, aren't these taught as two-fold [appropriated and non-appropriated] in other [texts?]

Although they are taught that way, still the past and future are not said to be non-appropriated, because they do not exist. Non-existants can not be called either appropriated or non-appropriated. As for [the faculties of] the present, it is that which is abiding in existence, and is appropriated by the mind and mental factors; that is "the eye and so forth."

Therefore, the faculties of the eye and so forth are exclusively

appropriated. And so there are nine that are not appropriated, and five that are appropriated. And as for those that are both, there are four.[142] And this appears to be the reasonable explanation. {34}

And if one asks: Among the 18 dhātus, how many are elements and how many are complex matter, how many are both and neither?

Among these, the tangible objects have both aspects, being both elements and complex matter. [p.63; 36b6] Because the four--earth and so forth--are elements; and the seven--smoothness and so forth--are complex matter.[143]

The remaining nine physical dhātus, the eye and so forth, are solely complex matter.

One part of the dhātu of phenomena, non-revealing form, is also complex matter; because it is explained as resultant form with the statement {i.11}, "...what is caused by the great elements, that is called non-revealing [form.]"

The remaining seven mental dhātus and the dhātu of phenomena--excluding non-revealing form--are neither elements nor complex matter. So it is established.

Here, Bhadanta Buddhadeva's explanation that the ten physical āyatanas are only elements is not reasonable.[144] Because in sūtra it says:

> The elements are just four, and they are taught as having the characteristics of hardness and so forth; and hardness and so forth are tangible objects. And the eye etc. does not grasp hardness etc.; and the body faculty also does not grasp color etc.

And from sūtra:

> Oh Bhikṣus, the eye, is an inner āyatana, it is caused by the four great elements, it is clear form, physical, can not be pointed out, and it is obstructive.

Thus and so forth it is taught.

[If Buddhadeva raises as an objection] the statement from sūtra: "That hardness and solidity that is in the fleshy ball of the eye...":[145] The intention is that [the eyeball] is the support of the faculty joined with the faculty.

And [if one raises as an objection the statement from the *Garbhāvakrānti-sūtra* (*mNgal Du 'Jug Pa*)]: "Bhikṣus, the person is the six dhātus."[146] This was taught in order to show the fundamental substances of sentient beings (Sems Can Gyi rDzas Kyi gZhi; maula-sattva-dravya), but it does not mean [the person is] only those [six dhātus.] Because then there would be the consequence that mental factors did not exist; because consciousness itself--[which is one of the six dhātus]--is not also the mental factors. As it says in sūtra: "The dharmas of discrimination and intention are mental factors which are based upon mind."[147] [p.64; 37b1] And, "...mind together with attachment..." and so forth.

Then, from among the 18 dhātus, the ten physical dhātus--the eye and so forth--are exclusively a collection of subtle atoms. The remaining eight are not collections. {35}

Then if one asks: From among these [18], which cut, like an axe; and which are to be cut, like a tree?

Those that cut, like an axe; and those that are cut, like trees etc., are the four external dhātus of form, smell, taste and tangible objects. But the faculties, because they are clear like light, do not cut and are not cuttable: Because, if [cutting] is applied to the making into parts a compound continuum which arises in an undivided form, the faculties can not be made into two unified continuums. Because there is no body faculty and so forth in a limb that has been cut off.

If one says: In that case, if the tip of an ear etc. is cut off, how will it grasp tangible objects? The severed tip of an ear etc. does not grasp tangible objects. But the grasping that occurs if it is reattached is because it is [then] in relationship to the body which has faculties, so the faculty arisen from development[148] is born again. The movement of a tail cut off from a lizard etc. is due to wind, and not because of faculty or intention; because that would have the consequence of there being two continuums.

Sound has no continuum; and the eight non-obstructive dhātus have

no body so they do not abide in compound [continuums,] and therefore they neither cut nor are they cut.

Just as the four external dhātus are both cut and cuttable; similarly the same four are burned by fire, and the agents of weighing by scale. [p.65; 38a1]

As for excluding the agent of burning and the object of weighing, some say: The agent of burning is only fire; and the object of weighing is only heaviness; therefore both [the agent of burning and the object of weighing] are solely tangible objects.[149] Others say they are not solely tangible objects but they are these same four external dhātus. Thus there are conflicting opinions. {36}

d) The detailed classification of the three originations.

Then if one asks: Among the 18 dhātus, how many are arisen from fruition (rNam sMin Las Byung Ba; vipāka-ja), and how many are not arisen in this way?

The five inner dhātus--the eye and so forth--are arisen from fruition and arisen from development (rGyas Pa Las Byung Ba; aupacayika). Because they are generated by various entities of non-virtue and contaminated virtue, and developed by the causes of development. Therefore, among the inner

faculties there are those that are arisen from fruition, because those in the higher states are the fruition of virtues, and those in bad migrations are the fruition of non-virtues. There are those that are arisen from development, because they arise from any of the four causes of development, which are food, health practices (Legs Par Bya Ba; saṁskāra),[150] sleep and meditative stabilization.

Some say there are five causes of development, including celibacy (Tsangs sPyod; brahmacarya). But the Ācārya [Vasubandhu] says that celibacy merely does no harm to the faculties, but does not develop them.

If one asks, why is it called arisen from fruition? Because it is arisen from the causes of fruition, it is called "arisen from fruition," leaving out the middle word. It is like, for example: A cart having a bullock is called a bullock cart.

The four causes of development are: food; the health practices of applying ointments (bSku mNye; abhyaṅga) and bathing (Dril Phyi; snāna)[151] etc.; sleep; and meditative stabilization. Because they arise from these four they are called "arisen from development." [p.66; 38b1]

If one says: Are the five inner [dhātus] naturally flowing [results] (rGyu mThun Pa Las Byung Ba; naiḥṣyandika) or not? If they are, it is incorrect that there are only two types of arisal. If they are not, it is contradictory with the statement [where the root text] says {i.38}, "The last three are momentary,"

and the Commentary explains that except for the first moment of [the level of] patience of understanding the dharma of suffering (sDug bsNgal Chos Shes Pa'i bZod Pa; duḥkha-dharmajñāna-kṣanti)[152] there is no other saṁskṛta which is not a naturally flowing result.[153] If one says this:

Because those two [types of arisal] are the naturally flowing [result] of subsequently arising from their own previous similar type, the latter fault does not pertain. And as there is no third [type of] naturally flowing [result] which is other than these two, we are free from the first fault [that there are more than two types of arisal.][154]

The dhātu of sound is not born from fruition, because fruitions which are not concomitants do not resume after being cut off;[155] and [fruitions] do not come into being purely voluntarily [as the sound of a voice does].

If one says, in that case it is contradictory with these explanations, [first] from the *Prajñapti-śāstra*:

> Listen to the causes by which is obtained
> the melodious tone that marks the Tathāgata's voice:
> By abandoning harsh words and idle chatter
> the mark of a Tathāgata will be obtained."

Thus it explains that the voice of the Teacher arises from fruition.[156] And from the *Āgama-kṣudraka-vyākhyāna* (*Lung Phran Tsegs*):[157]

> The pleasant voice of Venerable Yaśabhadraka (sNyan Pa bZang lDan) arose from the fruition of offering a bell to the stūpa of the previous Buddha Kakutsunda ('Khor Ba 'Jig); and, when he was born as a

cuckoo, calling out with a sweet voice and circumambulating, with a pure mind, Buddha Kāśyapa ('Od Srungs).

Here, the Bahirdeśaka's (Nyi 'Og Pa) maintain: From these actions elements of the nature of fruitions are produced; and from those arise the voice, pleasant like the tone of voice of Brahma; so it is a three-stage sequence.[158]

The Kaśmīrans say: From action arise the elements born of fruition; from these, those arisen from development; from these, those that are naturally flowing [result;] and from these arise the tone of voice. So they say it is a five-stage sequence. [p.67; 39a3]

But in either case, since [the voice] arises by means of a sequence, it is explained that way, and not [that it arises] directly [as fruition of karma.] Because [if the voice was fruition of karma] there would be the consequence that it could not be produced purely at will; and having been terminated it could not be resumed.

Therefore, one should say that sound has arisal from development and is naturally flowing [result.]

The eight non-obstructive dhātus--the seven mental dhātus and the dhātu of phenomena--are naturally flowing [result,] and are born of fruition, because they are [respectively:] generated by homogenous cause (sKal mNyam Gyi rGyu; sabhāga-hetu) and omnipresent cause (Kun 'Gro'i rGyu;

sarvatraga-hetu); and generated by fruitional cause. They are not arisen from development because these eight do not abide as collections [of atoms so] there is no physical development.

The remaining other four dhātus of form, smell, taste and tangible objects have all three aspects--arising from fruition etc. Because when they are in a collection that is arisen from development they are arisen from development; when they are in a collection that is born from fruition they are born from fruition; when they are not included in a continuum they are naturally flowing [result.] {37-38a}

e) The five, having substance etc.[159]

Now for the explanation of the five that are substantially existent and so forth:

Then, among the 18 dhātus, the only one that has as its nature permanent and stable substance is solely the part of the dhātu of phenomena that is asaṁskṛta. Here substantial existence (rDzas Su Yod Pa) means, from among these four [possibilities]--permanent and stable abiding, ability to perform a function, established by way of itself (Rang rGyud Du Grub Pa), and other than these--here, the meaning is according to the first.

The other remaining dhātus, being saṁskṛtas, are established as not

existing as permanent and stable substance. [p.68; 39b3]

Then, among the dhātus, concerning the three uncontaminated dhātus, the last three--the mind, phenomena and mental consciousness--which are in the collection at the first moment of [the level of] patience of understanding the dharma of suffering; since, from the Supreme Worldly Dharma on down they are contaminated, and since no uncontaminated thing precedes them, so they do not arise from homogenous cause; therefore, they are momentary (sKad Cig Ma; kṣaṇika)in not being naturally flowing [results.][160] However, since this is the concluding moment, and since it is the moment of completion of patience of the dharma of suffering, therefore from its second moment onwards it is naturally flowing [result.]

This demonstrates the exception in the generalization of the statement {i.37}, "Naturally flowing [result,] born from fruition; are the eight non-obstructive [dhātus."] Because the three--the mind etc. of the first moment of non-contamination, and the asaṁkṛtas of the dhātu of phenomena, have none of the three types of arisal.

If one asks: Does one who is not endowed with the eye dhātu and who newly obtains it, does he also newly obtain the dhātu of eye-conciousness?

Here there are four possibilities (Mu bZhi; catuṣ-koṭi). Thus the statement {i.38} that: "The dhātus of eye and [the eye] consciousness [can be obtained] individually..." shows the first two possibilities.

From these two the first possibility is: Born in the Desire Realm, one gradually obtains an eye faculty; or, having passed away in the Formless Realm, one takes birth in the second concentration on up. The first [example is a case of obtaining the eye faculty separately,] because one has already previously obtained the virtuous and afflicted eye consciousness; and the second [case is an example of obtaining the eye faculty separately] because on its own level, from the second concentration upward, there is no eye consciousness,[161] and the eye faculty is newly obtained [because one arrives from the Formless Realm.]

The second possibility is: A being in the second concentration and above, having manifested (mNgon Du Byas; saṁmukhī-kṛ) an eye consciousness of the first concentration, looks at forms; or, having passed away in the second concentration etc., at the time of conception in the intermediate existence of the Desire Realm or the first concentration. [p.69; 40a4] The first [is a case of obtaining the eye consciousness separately,] because beings of the Form Realm possess all of the faculties, so they already have eyes; and the latter [is an example] because, when one is conceived in the intermediate existence, although the virtuous and afflicted

eye consciousness is obtained, the eye [faculty] is not obtained. As it says in [Yaśomitra's] ṭīkā: "There is no possession of an eye dhātu that was not previously possessed, because the faculty is possessed as if it were already obtained, since there is no interruption."[162]

The third possibility is that the dhātus of eye and eye consciousness are obtained simoultaneously. For example, having passed away in the Formless Realm, taking birth in the Desire Realm or the first concentration. In those cases, when one who did not have these two [dhātus] previously is reborn in the intermediate state, intermediate state beings have all the faculties. And the obtainment of past and future virtuous and afflicted eye consciousness also occurs at that time.

The fourth possibility, [which is that neither dhātu is obtained,] is shown by saying "also" (Yang; ca) {i.38}. It is [the possibilities that] are not included in the above cases. Moreover, the Commentary explains that the term "also" refers to the four possibilities that are shown; and [that this analysis also] holds for the obtainment of the eye and visible form; and for obtainment of the eye consciousness and visible form. {38}

Then, from among these [18], those that are internal are the 12, the eye and so forth. If one asks, what are they? Those that are other than the six dhātus that are objects--form etc.

And so it is established that the six--form etc.--are external.

Here, within the dhātu of phenomena, the concomitants are internal; and most of the non-concomitant saṁskṛtas, and the asaṁskṛtas, are external; so it is reasonable to express the dhātu of phenomena as both [internal and external.] However, it appears that they are explained as [six external dhātus] in order to conform to the common usage, "the six external āyatanas." [p.70; 40b4]

Here, the meaning of external and internal is taken as stating what is not included and what is included in the continuum of a sentient being. It is not, as outsiders [non-Buddhists] impute, that internal and external are the existence or non-existence of self.

In the *Udānavarga* (*Lung Sil Bu*)[163] it says,

> The self is the protector of self,
> who else could be the protector?
> The wise person attains higher rebirths
> by means of a well-subdued self.

In what is said here, the term "self" is used for the mind, because just after that it says:

> Difficult to hold, and engaging swiftly,
> wherever it likes, there it goes.
> Subduing the mind is good.
> Subduing the mind leads to happiness.[164]

Then, from among these 18 dhātus, what is known as the dhātu of phenomena is coordinated (brTen Pa Dang bCas Pa; sabhāga),[165] because

it is a dhātu that performs its own function. Because for either an Āryan or an ordinary individual it performs the action of creating their mental consciousnesses.

In this [Vaibhāṣika] system, they do not believe in self-consciousness (Rang Rig). So [for an Āryan,] in one moment of having as the object of mind the thought that, "all phenomena are selfless," [that mind] has [as its object] all [phenomena] except one's own awareness and the collection [of concomitant mental factors] that arises simoultaneous with that. So the Vaibhāṣikas believe.

If self-consciousness is accepted these [exceptions] would also be included [as objects of that mind.]

But even in this [Vaibhāṣika] system, [one's own awareness and its concomitants] are the referent object of the second moment of mind, so all phenomena are included. Therefore the dhātu of phenomena is always coordinated.

The remaining 17 are also "analogous-to-that" (De Dang mTsungs Pa; tat-sabhāga),[166] because they are those dhātus which do not perform their own functions.

The term "also" {i.39} indicates that they can also be coordinated. The meaning of coordinated and analogous-to-that is: A dhātu that does not perform its own function is analogous-to-that; those that do [perform their

own function] are coordinated. [p.71; 41a5] An eye that has looked, is looking and will look at a form, is coordinated. And in this manner [the other faculties] should be understood up to the the body.

The Kaśmīrans say that analogous-to-that is the four: an eye which, without seeing forms, has ceased, is ceasing, will cease, or is not destined to arise (Mi sKye Ba'i Chos Can; anutpatti-dharmin).

The Westerners say that a subject not destined to arise is two-fold: with and without consciousness, so there would be five [types of analogous-to-that.]

Likewise [this analysis] should also be applied to the five dhātus--form and so forth.[167]

As for the seven mental dhātus, all those that are arisen are coordinated, and the non-arisen are analogous-to-that. Because arisen consciousnesses definitely perform their function toward their objects.

And for the six [faculty] dhātus--from the eye to mental [faculty,] it is impossible for two individuals etc. to look etc. through one set of eyes etc. So, what is coordinated or analogous-to-that for one, is also coordinated or analogous-to-that for all.[168]

But for the five [object] dhātus--from form to tangible objects, such as the moon, a drama, a sporting event, the sound of a drum etc.--it is possible for there to be one observer etc., and it is also possible for there to be many

other observers etc. So since these [objects] are in common; in relation to one who is observing etc. that [object] it is coordinated; and in relation to one who is not observing etc. it, it is analogous-to-that.

If someone says: It is agreed that the two, form and sound are like that because they can be grasped without contact. But for smell etc., since they are grasped by contact, those that are grasped by the faculties of Devadatta are not grasped by the faculties of Yajñadatta, so they are not common. Therefore they would be similar to [the faculties of the] eye etc. If someone says this:

They are not similar. [p.72; 41b5] Because if these [smells etc.] contact the nose faculty etc. of Devadatta, his nose consciousness etc. will arise; and if they contact the nose faculty etc. of Yajñadatta, his nose consciousness etc. will arise. So it is not definite that the nose consciousness etc. of only one individual will arise. There is also the possibility that the nose consciousnesses etc. of subtle organisms etc. that reside in the nose will arise. So, it is not definite that the nose consciousness etc. of only the individual whose nose faculty etc. is contacted will arise.

Therefore the [faculties of the] eye etc. are not common, so they are designated [as coordinated or analagous-to-that] in terms of a single continuum. But the five [objects of] form etc. are common, so they are designated in terms of many continuums. In this way it should be

understood.

Here, the explanation that the seven mental dhātus are both coordinated and analogous-to-that is according to the Vaibhāṣikas, who believe in the so-called future "subject not destined to arise." But the upper schools do not believe in this.

Therefore the *Abhidharmasammucaya* and the *Pañcaskandha* etc. explicitly explain just the five internal physical dhātus--the eye and so forth--as coordinated and analogous-to-that; but they do not explicitly explain these two in relation to the other dhātus. But implicitly eight--the seven mental dhātus and the dhātu of phenomena--are exclusively coordinated; and the five external dhātus--form etc., are both coordinated and analogous-to-that. Because it says in the *Mahāvibhaṣā* (*Bye Brag Tu bShad Pa*):[169]

> For these [faculties,] the eye etc., [because] they are not common, those that are coordinated or analogous-to-that for one [individual] are [the same] also for all sentient beings. So it is definite that these are coordinated or analogous-to-that. [p.73; 42a6] Form etc. exists as coordinated and analogous-to-that within separate individual continuuums. Because consciousness has no other activities, the other [dhātus] are not designated as coordinated or analogous-to-that. {39}

f) The detailed classification of the objects to be abandoned on the Path of Seeing etc.

Then if one asks: Among the 18 dhātus, how many are to be abandoned by Meditation, how many are to be abandoned by Seeing, and how many are not to be abandoned?

The ten physical dhātus--the eye and so forth--are to be abandoned exclusively by Meditation. Because they are contaminated they are to be abandoned; and they are not to be abandoned by Seeing, because they do not misconceive the Truths, and because they are not related to that [misconceving of the Truths.]

For that [same] reason, the five consciousnesses of the eye and so forth are also to be abandoned by Meditation.

The last three dhātus--the mind, phenomena, and mental consciousness--have three aspects, being objects to be abandoned by Seeing, objects to be abandoned by Meditation, and objects that are not to be abandoned. The 88 polluting tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya)--view, doubt and so forth--which will be explained below {v.4}, along with their concomitants, their characteristics (mTsan Nyid; lakṣaṇa), their secondary characteristics (rJes Su mThun Pa'i mTsan Nyid; anulakṣaṇa), and their obtainment;[170] these are to be abandoned by Seeing. The remaining contaminated objects are to be abandoned by Meditation.[171] And the uncontaminated are not to be abandoned.

Here, the Vātsīputrīyas (gNas Ma Bu Pa'i sDe Pa) say: The subjects are [the state of being an] ordinary individual and the karmas of body and speech [that lead to] bad migrations. They are objects to be abandoned by Seeing, because they cease at the time that the Path of Seeing is generated. The

sūtra says: "For the Stream Enterers, rebirths in bad migrations have ceased." So they believe.

The refutation of this is: The quality of being an ordinary individual is not to be abandoned by Seeing, because it is not afflicted. [p.74; 42b6] If one asks, how can this be established?

As it says {iv.42}, "The afflicted non-physical will be lost by the arisal of the antidote." It explains that by separating from attachment the afflicted is cast off, even though the level (Sa; bhūmi) is not changed. So, if being an ordinary individual is an afflicted state, ordinary individuals of the Desire Realm who separate from attachment by means of the mundane path would consequently not be ordinary individuals.

This would contradict the explanation that says {ii.40}, "An ordinary individual is held to be [one who has not obtained the path;] it is lost by obtainment [of the path] and by changing levels." Thus [the state of being an ordinary individual] is cast off by the changing of level at birth, but it is not cast off by merely separating from attachment. Therefore [being an ordinary being] is not an afflicted state.

And since those who have cut the roots of virtue would not be ordinary individuals, [which they are,] it is also not virtuous.

Therefore the quality of being an ordinary individual is non-obscuring neutral (Ma bsGribs Lung Ma bsTan; akliṣṭa-avyākṛta).[172]

The subject is also the karmas of body and speech which will cause birth in bad migrations. They are not to be abandoned by Seeing, because they are physicals, they do not misconceive the Truths and they are also not the retinue or obtainment [of minds that do.] Here the karmas of body and speech of those in bad migrations is the non-virtuous karma that causes birth there.

The subject is the afflicted consciousnesses which arise from the support of the five faculties, but which are not the sixth, mental consciousness. They are not to be abandoned by Seeing, because they are not mistaken with regards to the Truths, nor anything in the retinue [of what is]. {40}

g) The detailed classification of view and non-view.

Then if one asks: Among the 18 dhātus how many are view and how many are non-view?

The eye and one part of the dhātu of phenomena are view, because, respectively, they view form, and make a determination of (Nges rTog; santīraka) the object.

If one asks, what is that one part of the dhātu of phenomena? There are eight types: The five--the view of the transitory collection ('Jig Tsogs La

lTa Ba; satkāya-dṛṣṭi) and so forth;[173] the mundane right view; the view of learners; and the view of no-more-learners. [p.75; 43b1]

Of these, the first five are afflicted; the sixth is contaminated virtue; the last two are uncontaminated, [and respectively,] having the seeds to be abandoned by Meditation, and not having [those seeds.] When they view the phenomena to be known they are, respectively, analogous to viewing forms on a cloudy or cloudless night and day--being unclear, clear, and extremely clear.

The mundane right view is exclusively contaminated virtuous wisdom concomitant with mental consciousness. But the wisdom which is a mind that arises concomitant with the five consciousnesses of the eye and so forth, is not mundane right view; because a view is a determination, and they are without determination.[174]

If one says: In that case there is the consequence that the eye is also not view, because it is without determination.

The eye is called view because it sees form, not because of determination. {41}

If one asks, do all eyes see? Eyes that are coordinated with consciousness see, but not those which are analogous-to-that.

If one says: In that case, only the consciousness which is based on the eye will see.

It is not only the consciousness based on the eye that sees, because if it is the consciousness that sees, it would be without obstruction, so it could see also forms which are obstructed by walls etc. But forms which are obstructed by walls etc. are not seen.

By saying "So they say..." (Lo; kila), the Sautrāntikas refute this: Although it is the consciousness that sees, it does not engage all obstructed things. [p.76; 44a1] For those things which are blocked by obstructions, if the causes are not complete the consciousness does not arise, and if the causes are complete, the consciousness will arise, even if it is blocked by glass (mChing Bu; kāca), or water (Chu; ambu), or crystal (Shel; sphaṭika), or clouds (lHang Tser; abhrapaṭala) etc.[175] {42}

Both eyes also see form, because looking with two eyes sees more clealy than looking with one. "Also" (Kyang; api) {i.43} means that seeing can also be done with one [eye.]

Then if one asks, does the eye etc. grasp the object by contacting it or does it grasp without contact?

The three, the eyes, mind and ears grasp their object without contacting it. Because [the eyes and ears] grasp form and sound which are far away, and do not grasp objects that are in immediate contact ('Dab Chags; nirantara) with themselves; and the mind is not physical [so there is no contact at all.]

The three, the nose, tongue and body, on the other hand, grasp after making contact with the object, because they depend on grasping objects that are in immediate contact with themselves.

If one says: In that case, the eye could see forms which are far away and forms which are obstructed.

There is no fault, because although a magnet will draw metal, it will draw an object in a suitable location, and will not draw an object in an unsuitable location. {43}

The three, the nose etc., grasp an object of equal dimensions [to the faculty], it is held. Because they have to grasp objects by making contact with them. The two, the eye and ear, grasp [objects] of either equal or unequal dimensions, and the mind is indeterminate because it is not physical.

The [mental faculty which is the] support of the last, mental consciousness, is a [previous] mind which is past at the time [of that mental consciousness.] The supports of the five engaging consciousnesses arise simoultaneously with their faculty consciousnesses; and the mind [faculty is also the support of a faculty consciousness when it is in the past].[176]

If one says: In that case, is whatever is the support of eye consciousness its similar and immediately preceding condition (mTsungs Pa De Ma Thag Pa'i rKyen; samanantara-pratyaya)?[177]

Here there are four possibilities:

1) The eye faculty is the support of the eye consciousness but not its similar and immediately preceding condition. [p.77; 44b2]

2) The mental factor that originates before the eye consciousness, for example, is a similar and immediately preceding condition of the eye consciousness, but is not its support.

3) At the eye consciousness' own time [of arisal] the mind that is [just] past is both [its support and similar and immediately preceding condition].

4) And form, for example is neither.

There is nothing that is the support of mental consciousness but is not its immediate condition. The mental factors which originate immediately before a mental consciousness are its immediate condition but not its support. {44}

Then if one asks, since the five engaging consciousnesses arise from both object and faculty, why is the faculty posited as the support but the object is not posited as the support?

The bases of the engaging consciousnesses are the eye and so forth, because the engaging consciousnesses are either clear or unclear, based on the clarity or unclarity of the eye and so forth. Changes in the eye consciousness and so forth are due to changes in the eye and so forth. Due

to benefit or harm [to the facuties] happy or suffering [consciousnesses] will accordingly arise.

And as the *Pramāṇavarttika* (*rNam 'Grel*) says:[178]

> If seeing a great distance is the basis of valid knowledge,
> come here and place your reliance on the vulture.

Since the eye of the vulture is naturally clear, even if a form is not clear, and there are many intervening yojanas, the eye consciousness is generated. And the ear and so forth are the same as that: According to the clarity or unclarity of the faculty, a clear or unclear consciousness is generated. But by a change in the form and so forth, it is not definite that there will be a change in these consciousnesses. Therefore, the support of eye consciousness and so forth is the eye and so forth.

There is a reason for designating these engaging consciousnesses with [the names of] the eye [faculties] and so forth, calling them the "consciousnesses of the eye" and so forth. Because, the eye and so forth are the supports of the engaging consciousnesses, and their uncommon causes; and the objects are neither of these. It is like, for example, the sound of a drum, or a sprout of barley.[179] [p.78; 45a3]

Because form and so forth can be the referent object of both the consciousnesses of the five doors as well as mental consciousness, it is a common cause; therefore [the engaging consciousnesses] are not designated [by the names of] these [objects.] It also says in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*

(*Tsad Ma Kun Las bTus Pa*):[180]

> Because it is the uncommon cause,
> its designation is given by the faculty. {45}

Then if one asks: If an eye etc. situated in a body, takes for its subject form etc. and generates eye consciousness etc.; are that body, eye etc., form etc., and consciousness of the same level (Sa; bhūmi) or different?

In order to show that they are different as well as the same, it says {i.46}:, "The body [does not have an eye of a lower level...]" and so forth. The body here is held to be the medium (Khog Pa) of the support. With respect to that the five--the eye and so forth, and the three--form, sound and tangible objects, are of the Desire Realm and the four concentrations. And the three consciousnesses of the eye, ear and body are only of the levels of the Desire Realm and the first concentration. Smell and taste, and the consciousnesses of nose and tongue are only of the level of the Desire Realm.

With respect to that, an eye of a lower level is not supported on a body of a higher level, because there is a superior eye on its own level, so there is no need for a lower eye. Therefore [the body] is the support of an eye of its own level or a higher level.

A form of a higher level can not be the object of a lower eye, because a higher form is so subtle [a lower eye] will not see it. Therefore, the objects of an eye of a higher level are the forms of its own level and of a lower level.

Also an eye consciousness of a higher level is not based on the eye of a lower level, because the superior consciousness of the higher can not be based on the inferior eye of the lower. However, a consciousness of a lower level or of its own level are based on it.

Although it is said that "a lower consciousness is based on" [an eye of its own or a higher level,] a consciousness of the Desire Realm is not based on an eye of the first concentration, because there is a superior consciousness on its own level [of the first concentration,] so there is no need. [p.79; 45b4] Therefore, [that statement] is according to the fact that from the second concentration upward, on their own levels, there are no consciousnesses of the five doors. For that reason from the second concentration upward, when they observe form, they have to manifest the eye consciousness of the first concentration.

Then if one asks: On which levels do consciousnesses [of which levels] see form? [The faculty] having based on which bodies, for what levels of consciousness does it act as support and see forms?

The eye consciousness sees the forms of all levels, because the eye consciousness sees all the forms of its own level, lower levels and higher levels. However this [statement] is made in general terms; what is specifically meant here is: The eye consciousness of the Desire Realm sees only the form of its own level, but can not see the forms of higher levels,

because it does not engage remote objects. Therefore, here the explanation is made in the sense that the eye consciousness of the first concentration sees forms of its own level, lower level, and higher levels.

Consciousness not only sees form of all levels, but the body [i.e. faculty] also both sees form of all levels and acts as support for consciousness of all levels [which sees form of all levels.]

As for form: [When the faculty is] based on a Desire Realm body it sees form of its own level and of higher levels. Based on a body from the first concentration up to the third concentration it sees form of its own level, lower levels and higher levels. When [based on] a body of the fourth concentration it sees all form of its own level and lower levels.

As for consciousness: Being supported on a body of the Desire Realm, consciousness of its own level and a consciousness of the first concentration are generated. [Being supported] on a body of the first concentration only a consciousness of its own level is generated. [p.80; 46a4] [Being supported] on a body of the second concentration upward, only the lower consciousness of the first concentration is generated.

Therefore [when the root text] says {i.46}, "...but both [the form and consciousness] can be on all levels in relation to the body," it is [merely] stated in general terms. {46}

Just as the eye has been extensively explained, so it is the same for the ear. [Here is a summary verse:][181]

> A body does not have a lower ear.
> An ear does not have a higher sound.
> But the sound for a consciousness,
> and both [the sound and consciousness] of a body, can be on all levels.

So it should be comprehensively applied.

As for the three dhātus of nose, tongue and body: the object, consciousness, and supporting body are all just of their own level. Because they grasp by making contact with the faculty, so they will not engage an object that is cut off from them, or is far away.

Having laid this out generally, the exceptions are: The body, body faculty, and tangible objects are on their own levels; but a body consciousness which is born from the second to the fourth concentration, if it grasps tangible objects, is on the level of the lower first concentration. And [a consciousness] that is born in the Desire Realm or the first concentration, when it grasps tangible objects, is solely of its own level.

Mind, phenomena, mental consciousness, and their supporting body are of indeterminate level. Because sometimes they are all on the same level, and sometimes they are of disimilar level. {48}

h) <u>The three, what can be</u>

known by two etc.

Then, from among the 18 dhātus, those which can be known by two consciousnesses are the five external āyatanas from form to tangible objects; because form is known by both eye consciousness and mental consciousness and so forth. The remaining 13 dhātus, since they are not the objects of the consciousnesses of the five doors, they are established as known by mental consciousness alone. [p.81; 46b5]

And from among the 18 dhātus, one part of the dhātu of phenomena, asaṁskṛta phenomena, is called permanent, because it is not momentary. The rest, since they are saṁskṛtas, are impermanent. {48b}

Then if one asks: From among these dhātus, how many are faculties and how many are not? Since the sūtra teaches 22 faculties:[182] 14 which are part of the dhātu of phenomena--life (Srog; jīvita), the five feelings, the five--faith and so forth, and the three uncontaminated faculties; and the 12 that are explained as internal dhātus, the eye and so forth; these [dhātus] are faculties. Because: the five--the eye and so forth are individual faculties; the male and female faculties are included in the body faculty; and the seven mental dhātus and the three uncontaminated faculties are a part of the mental faculty.

In this way the remaining [dhātus,] one portion of the dhātu of phenomena, and the five--form and so forth, are established as not being

faculties.

This is the explanation of the first chapter entitled "Presentation of the Dhātus From the Verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*."

## NOTES--CHAPTER 1

1. The five basic subjects are:
    1. The basic subject of what appears--form.
    2. The basic subject of what is principle--mind.
    3. The basic subject of what is in the retinue--the mental factors.
    4. The basic subject of the non-associated formative forces.
    5. The basic subject of asaṁskṛtas.

2. *ADKK* p.140

3. Unless otherwise noted, "the commentary" refers to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*.

4. *ADKB* p.3; *bShad Pa* p.1.

5. *SAKV* p.5; *'Grel bShad* p.3b3:

> It is like, for example, saying: "Among those brahmans, the white one wearing the white clothes is Devaśarma (Lha sKyid)." And in the same way here {i.1}, by saying:
>
> > The one who has completely overcome all obscuration, who leads beings out of the mire of saṁsāra, having prostrated to Him, who teaches according to [the true] meaning...
>
> "The one who..." can only apply to the Buddha Bhagavan, because there can not be anyone other than the Buddha who possesses such extraordinary qualities.

6. *ADKB* p.5; *bShad Pa* p.1

7. Sarnath Edition p.5 corrected to Mi Shes Pa; in accordance with 'Bras sPung Edition 4b5.
    Below, Sarnath Edition is corrected to 'Jig rTen Na.

8. See *SAKV* p.7; *'Grel bShad* 6a1 for this and following sūtra examples.

9. *'Grel bShad* reads rTson Dang for rTson Nam. "rTson" is translation of "dhātu"--which seems here to have the meaning of a "mass of stone." See *BHS* p.283 definition #6.
    The Tibetan could also be read: "like gold hidden amidst colored

powder or stone."

10.*ADKB* p.8; *bShad Pa* p.2.

11. To.326 in mDo sDe; To.4099 and To.4100 for commentary quoted below. See also Sparham (1983), p.43 verses 9-10.

12. *ADKB* p.6; *bShad Pa* p.1.

13. Pūrṇavardhana p.8a7.

14. See *SAKV* p.6; *'Grel bShad* p.5a5.

15. The six are: anāgamya, dhyānāntara {viii.22}, and the four dhyānas. See {vi.20} for details.

16. *ADKB* p.915. The root text lists the two, as is quoted, but the commentary clearly includes the four concentrations.

Pruden p.936 {20c-d} has misunderstood and mistranslated Poussin (p.170), reading "intermediaire" to mean "intermediate state", when it merely refers to the Sanskrit "antara" as short for "antara-dhyāna", which is another way of saying the level of dhyānāntara.

17. i.e. The four actual absorptions of the Form Realm, the preparatory level (Nyer bsDogs; samāntaka) of the first concentration (Mi lCogs Med; anāgamya), the special first concentration (bSam gTan Dang Po'i Khyad Par Can; dhyānāntara), and the first three formless absorptions. The actual absorption of the fourth formless absorption can not be used to attain the Path.

18. i.e. It has the aggregate of form, as well as the other four mental aggregates--shown below, because of the form of the uncontaminated vow.

19. *ADKB* p.146; *bShad Pa* p.75:

> In the third concentration, because one is separated from attachment to joy (dGa Ba; prīti), there is only the faculty of pleasure and there is no mental happiness; because joy is mental happiness.

See {ii.7} and {viii.9} for further comment.

Above the third concentration there is neither pleasure nor mental happiness, only neutral feeling.

20. *ADKB* p.12; *bShad Pa* p.3: tat sambhārabhāvāt// "Because [the commentaries] are the requisite materials for [the attainment] of that [stainless wisdom."]

21. This passage applies a traditional Buddhist hermeneutic to the question of why this and other Abhidharma texts, as well as contaminated wisdom that arises from them, should be designated with the name Abhidharma, when they are not in fact ultimate Abhidharma which has been defined as stainless wisdom.

To justify designating the conventional with the name of the ultimate it must past three tests: there must be a reason, a purpose, and a refutation proving that it is not an example of ultimate Abhidharma.

22. *ADKB* {ii.33}:

> vitarkya vicārya vācaṁ bhāṣate, nāvitarkya nāvicārya//
>
> Having investigated, having analyzed, one speaks, not without investigation nor without analysis.

There is both investigation and analysis in the Desire Realm and the first concentraiton, only analysis in the special first concentration, and neither above that level. See {i.32}.

23. See {ii.47}.

24. See {iv.20}.

25. This is the view of the Vaibhāṣikas--*ADKB* p.15; *bShad Pa* p.4.

26. I,3. See Sparham (1983), p.3 verse 3.

27. *SAKV* p.15; *'Grel bShad* p.10b7 makes clear the use of "Kila" as a a backhanded affirmation that Vasubandhu will use throughout to indicate Vaibhāṣika positions that the Sautrāntikas and, implicitly, he himself does not agree with:

> The term "kila" points out alternative opinions, with the sense that, "this is the belief (gZhung Lugs; mata) of the Abhidharmikas but it is not that of we Sautrāntikas."

28. See Takakusu (1905); Poussin, Introduction; Anacker (1975) p.60; Watanabe (1983) p.47; Banerjee (1957) p.51.

29. *SAKV* p.15; *'Grel bShad* p.10b7.

30. Here we have a clear indication of which Indian commentaries, besides the Vasubandhu's autocommentary, dGe 'Dun Grub was using.

31. In this paragraph we have an occasion of evidence that this text was composed as Zin Bris or transcribed from oral teachings. Where *SAKV* p.15; *'Grel bShad* 11a7 reads:

> Bye Brag Tu sMra Ba Zhes Bya Ba Ni Bye Brag Tu bShad Pas rTze Zhing sPyod Pas Na Bye Brag Tu sMra Ba'o //

The sPyod Pa (caranti)--"they engage in the *Vibhāṣā*" has been replaced by the homonym dPyod--"they examine" in *GDD* p.14, "Bye Brag Tu bShad Pa Tzam Zhig dPyod Pa..."

That this took place during dGe 'Dun Grub's composition of the text is suggested by the fact that mChims p.11a7 retains Yaśomitra's sPyod (caranti).

32. 1. Purpose. 2. Ultimate purpose. 3. Relationship. 4. Subject.

33. This is shorthand for the statement of the four purposes mentioned above.

34. Geshe Sopa explains that this is a traditional hermeneutic for determining the validity of a text by means of four tests: does it have, 1) a primary purpose; 2) a secondary purpose--for example if the primary purpose is to generate wisdom that discerns dharmas, the secondary purpose, the purpose of the purpose, is to attain liberation by means of the discernment of dharmas; 3) a subject that is connected to the purpose; and 4) a relationship between the subject, the purpose and the secondary purpose.

35. i.e. There is no need for the reason and the example because the mere statement of the words will create the desired proof.

36. For this story see 'Dul Ba'i gLeng 'Bum Chen Po in *The Collected Works of Bu sTon*, part 23, volume Ha, p.230a (English page no. 459).

37. This refers to the three types of suffering: suffering of suffering; suffering of change; pervasive suffering.

38. 26.17; see Sparham (1983) p.101.

39. The first 'Du Byed on this line in Sarnath Edition is corrected to 'Du Shes to accord with 'Bras sPung Edition and common sense.

40. There is a *Kāyatrayāvatāramukha-nāma-śāstra*--To.3890. I do not find the sūtra.

41. *SAKV* p.17; *'Grel bShad* p.12a6:

> "They are nourished" (rGyas Par 'Gyur; anuśerate) means they attain growth (rGyas Pa; puṣṭim); or they attain a support (gNas Thong; pratiṣṭhā). Desire and so forth are perpetuated (rGyun Chags Par 'Gyur; saṁtāyante) insofar as they attain growth and support.
>
> Others say: It is like, when one says, "This food nourishes me," (rGyas Par 'Gyur; anuśete); it means the food is salutary and congenial. In the same way, to say that desire etc. are nourished in those dharmas, means that [the dharmas] are congenial [to those afflictions.] Those which are produced by karma that is moistened (bRlan Pa; abhiṣyandita) by desire etc., are the contaminated dharmas; as it says {iv.1}, "The world and its variety are produced by karma..."

42. i.e. Viewing any of the Four Noble Truths can increase contamination.

43. i.e. It is nourished by the contaminated mental factors as concomitants.

44. See my Introduction, Bareau (1955) p.160, and Dutt (1970) p.53. The Tibetan tradition considers them a category of Sautrāntikas who teach all phenomena by way of examples.

45. Vātsīputrīyas (gNas Ma'i Bu sDe Pa) say that Nirvāṇa is the only asaṁskṛta.

46. As Poussin points out (Pruden fn#24), the Sarvāstivādins hold cessation/separation ('Gog Pa/Bral Ba; nirodha/visaṁyoga) to be a substantially existent dharma in itself: "Disjunction is not produced by causes, and so is eternal. Through pratisaṁkhya (comprehension of the Truths) one obtains the acquisition (prāpti, ii.36b) of disjunction."

47. *Madhyama Nikāya* I.44; Taisho 27, p.162b11. Quoted at *SAKV* p.21. See also Pruden fn#26.

48. *mChims* p.17a6 specifies that this is the three realms:

> Gang Du rNam Par Byang Ba'i Khams gSum /

49. Some of the qualities of the Buddha, such as the attainment of the concentrations and formless absorptions are common to other Āryansand even non-Buddhists, who attain them on the contaminated mundane path.

50. See {ii.64}.

51. This refers in particular to the four characteristics--arising, aging, duration and impermanence--which are considered by the Sautrāntikas to be merely attributes of, but one substance with, form.

52. i.e. The mental factors within the aggregate of formative forces.

53. This example is from the Sanskrit, where milk is called by the past participle "dugdha", literally--"that which has been drawn", a name that can be applied to both drawn or undrawn milk.

54. *ADKB* p.26: kathā = vākyam// "Discourse = speech."
To which Yaśomitra comments:

> kathā = vākyam, varṇātmikaḥ śabda ityarthaḥ//
> Discourse is speech, which means words of articulate sounds.

55. See {ii.47}.

56. Poussin (Pruden fn#31) cites Taisho 26, p.728a24:

> The three paths, the three kathā-vastus are embraced within eighteen dhātus, twelve āyatanas, and five skandhas; they are known by the nine knowledges, with the exception of the nirodha-jñāna; they are discerned by six consciousnesses; and they are affected by all the anuśayas.

Geshe Sopa comments that the sense of this quotation is: The bases of discourse are included in the 18 dhātus, rather than the other way around.

57. This is a paraphrase of the aphorism given by *SAKV* p.27; *'Grel bShad* p.21b5, from *Majjhima*, i.135 and *Vajracchedikā*, para.6:

> "Those who understand the method of the dharma [know that] dharmas are to be given up; how much more so non-dharmas." As it says this, just as the Truth of the Path is properly to be renounced, just so do all saṁskṛtas have renunciation.

'Bras sPung Edition p.17a4 and Sarnath Edition p.27, l.6 should be ammended to:
Chos Kyi Phung Po gZings lTa Bur Ma Shes Pa rNams...

58. On appropriating aggregates see *Visuddhi Magga* Chap. xiv, translated in Warren (1972) p.155.

59. A case of the name of the cause given to the result.

60. *Saṁyutta* iv.52: lujyate pralujyate tasmāl-lokaḥ.

61. In these passages I have translated gZugs (rūpa) as form except in the phrase, gZugs Dang Ba--which I have rendered "clear matter" to make the sentences more comprehensible in English. But the intention here is that matter and form are synonymous.

62. The Sautrāntikas deny that shape is anything other than color.

63. i.e. The tangible object, e.g. hunger, is actually the cause that produces a result called hunger. But here the name of the effect--hunger, is given to the cause.

64. i.e. Since we have sensations within the body, the distinction being made here is that such inner sensations are not a touching of the body faculty itself--faculties can not be touched, but rather a touching of the tangible objects which exist within the body.

65. This does not apply to pervasive suffering, which does exist in all three realms.

66. So there would be no cold in the sense of being uncomfortably cold, but there could be, for example, a pleasant cool breeze.

67. This is Saṁghabhadra's objection from his *Nyāyānusāra*, reproduced at *SAKV* p.40; *'Grel bShad* p.31b5.

68. Because it is the first moment.

69. This criticism refers to a line from *ADKB* p.38; *bShad Pa* p.13, which is not cited by GDD:

> The term 'even' indicates that [non-revealing form] also exists in those who are not distracted and are conscious.

70. The first of these positions holds feeling to be the subject that experiences; the second holds feeling to be the object experienced.

71. When a concomitant group of minds and mental factors arise, it is by means of the mental factor (or the aggregate) of feeling that the others experience the object. Similarly, it is by means of the mental factor (or aggregate) of discrimination that the mind and other mental factors discern and identify the object.

72. i.e. The six consciousnesses.

73. The sense here is that the meaning of the sūtra teaching that the Āryan is "liberated from grasping at characteristic marks" is that he or she no longer holds to the two types of self-grasping--the gross and subtle selves of person. But the Āryan is still able to distinguish differences between objects and to experience different qualities of pain, pleasure and so forth.

74. To.226.

75. Geshe Sopa suggests this refers to To.4038: *Yogacaryābhūmi-viniścaya-saṁgraha*; *rNal 'Byor sPyod Pa'i Sa rNam Par gTan La dBab Pa bsDu Ba*.

76. i.e. Arise in dependence on mind.

77. i.e. And therefore can not be concomitant with each other.

78. i.e. Each consciousness is individually aware of its appropriate object.

79. Each of the five faculty consciousnesses has as a cause and support a physical faculty--eye, ear, nose, etc. What then acts as the support and cause of a mental consciousness? The last moment of a faculty consciousness or a mental consciousness, just prior to the arising of a mental consciousness, is the support and cause of that mental consciousness, and that last moment is designated as the mental faculty (mana-indriya) or mind dhātu (mano-dhātu). To state it another way: A faculty consciousness (or mental consciousness) in its function as the immediately preceeding cause of a mental consciousness is designated as the mental faculty and the mind dhātu.

This is clarified in the next section.

Poussin explains it at (Pruden fn# 84):

The consciousnesses (vijñāna) succeed one another...the

consciousness that dissappears is the immediately antecedent cause (ii.62a), the support (āśraya) of the consciousness which immediately follows. Under this aspect it receives the name of manas, mana-āyatana, *manodhātu*, and *mana-indriya* {ii.1}. It is to the consciousness that follows what the organ of sight is to the visual consciousness.

See also Pruden fn#85. [Which is misnumbered, it should be #84.]

80. *ADKB* p.55; *bShad Pa* p.21:

Although they constitute only one dhātu, two eyes and so forth arise for the sake of the beauty of the body. Otherwise, if there were only a single eye or ear, or a single nostril, it would be extremely ugly.

See also {i.43; ii.1}

81. *Saṁyuktāgama* Taisho 2, p.14c4.

82. Poussin points out (Pruden fn# 93): "Hsuan-tsang translates: 'The Bhadanta Dharmatrāta.'"
*SAKV* p.58: "Bhadanta refers to a Sthavira; or some Sautrāntika Sthavira of that name."
See the above-cited footnote for the complete discussion of this controversy.

83. This is a slightly confused version of Vasubandhu's Sanskrit etymology (*ADKB* p.59; *bShad Pa* p.22):

citta-caitta-āya-dvāra-artha āyatanārthaḥ / nirvacanaṁ tu-- citta-caittānām-āyaṁ tanvanti iti āyatanāni / vistṛṇvanti iti arthaḥ//
The meaning of āyatana is the door of entry of the mind and mental factors. Etymologically āyatanas are what further (mChed; tanvanti) the arrival (sKye Ba; āya) of the mind and mental factors. That is to say they propagate (rGyas Par Byed; vistṛṇvanti) [mind and mental factors.]

And *SAKV* p.59; *'Grel bShad* p.57a6:

Āyatana means they further (mChed Par Byed; tanvanti) the production ('Byung Ba; utpatti) of the mind and mental factors. Because the production of consciousnesses depends on those, they are all

established as āyatanas.

Poussin (Pruden fn#94) says there are 20 opinions on the meaning of this term in the *Vibhāṣā* Taisho 27, p.379a12.

84. i.e. A gold-type mountain.

85. *ADKB* p.59 uses ākara--mine, translated as 'Byung gNas in *bShad Pa*.

86. *ADKB* p.59; *bShad Pa* p.23:

> If lineage (Rigs; gotra) means a mine here; what are the eye and other [dhātus] the source of?
> Of their own species (Rang Gyi Rigs; svasyā jateh.). Because they are their homogenous cause.

87. 'Brog is actually all the possessions of a nomad, including materials such as tents, utensils, etc.

88. GDD seems to have turned around the causes and effects of this sequence, *ADKB* p.66; *bShad Pa* p.26:

> From beginningless cyclic existence men and women delight in each other's form. And this is because of the desire for the experience of [pleasurable] feelings. That desire is because there is mistaken discrimination. That mistake is due to afflictions. And mind becomes afflicted by these [afflictions.] So, the order is in accordance with the stages of affliction.

89. See Pruden p.83 for citations of kāma-guṇa.
*BHS* p.175: the objects of the five senses; qualities of desire.

90. Sarnath edition corrected from sNa to rNa to conform with 'Bras sPung Edition p.26b2.

91. i.e. They are taught in accordance with their relative positions--high or low--on the body.

92. *ADKB* p.60; *bShad Pa* p. 29:

> sanidarśanatvāt ca--idam iha, amutra iti //
> Because it can be pointed out, "That is here or there."

93. *ADKB* p.60; *bShad Pa* p.29

94. Dharmatrāta's opinion. See his *Saṁyukta Abhidharmahṛdaya*, Taisho 28, p.873a28-b2. (Pruden fn#113.)

95. *GDD* p.38 from *ADKB* {i.15}:

> These three [skandhas], feeling, discrimination, and formative forces, together with non-revealing form and the three asaṁskṛtas--these [seven] are the āyatana of phenomena from among the the 12 āyatanas; and the dhātu of phenomena from among the 18 dhātus.

96. This is summarized from *ADKB* commentary to {i.24}, *ADKB* p.69; *bShad Pa* p.28.

97. See Pruden fn#114 for discussion and other sources.

98. Quoted at *SAKV* p.71; *'Grel bShad* p.55a7.

99. *SAKV* p.71; *'Grel bShad* p.55b3.

100. To.4061. By Vasubandhu.

101. To.4054.

102. See Pruden fn#115 for citations.

103. To.4054.

104. *SAKV* p.72; *'Grel bShad* p.56a3.

105. *Ārya-ratnolkā-nāma-dhāraṇī mahāyāna sūtra*, To.145. Also known as, *dKon mChog sGron Me*.

106. This term is contextualized at {vii.31} in a discussion of the power (sTob; bala) of a Buddha's body. One opinion is that his power is equal to that of Nārāyaṇa (Sred Med Kyi Bu). Nārāyaṇa's power is then explained as the seventh term in a series which begins with the elephant and each term equals ten times the preceding term. The list is: prākṛta-hastin (gLang Po Che Phal Ba), gandha-hastin (sPos Kyi Glang Po), mahānagna (Tsan Po Che Chen Po), praskandin (Rab gNon), varāṅga (Yan Lag mChog), cāṇūra (sTobs mChog), nārāyaṇa (Sred Med Kyi Bu).

See *mChims* p.383a; and Pruden fn# 175-180 for various citations.

107. To.4183, *Slob Ma La sPrings Pa'i sPring Yig*; *Śiṣyalekha*, by Candragomin.

108. To.4069

109. To.4116, *Vinaya-āgama-uttara-viśeṣa-āgama-praśna-vṛtti*; *'Dul Ba Lung Bla Ma'i Bye Brag Lung Shu Ba'i 'Grel Pa*

110. According to George Churinoff (1992) Puśyamitra founded the Śuṅga dynasty in 187 B.C. And Sūryasiddhi burned Nālandā.

111. To.1141 = *gCig Las 'Phros Pa'i bStod Pa*; *Ekottaristava*.

112. For morality see {iv.13}. For meditative stabilization see {vi.68}. For wisdom see {ii.25}. For liberation see {vi.76}.
For sūtra citations see Pruden p.87.

113. *SAKV* p.73; *'Grel bShad* p. 56b1:

> The morality aggregate is included in the form aggregate because of its being the [non-revealing] form of the restraints of body and speech. The rest are [included] in the aggregate of formative forces because: meditative stabilization and so forth are mental factors; here liberation is thought to be [the mental factor] of conviction (adhimokṣa); and seeing the wisdom of liberation is a particular instance of wisdom (prajñā).

114. See {viii.36}; and Verdu p.163.

115. Quoted by *SAKV* p.73; *'Grel bShad* p. 57a-b. Poussin cites *Dīgha* iii.241 and *Aṅguttara* iii.21 (Pruden fn#118).

116. *ADKB* p.77; *bShad Pa* p.32:

> Cavities are not perceived to be anything other than light or darkness. Therefore, it is held (kila) the āyatana of space is of the nature of light and darkness, which are understood to be of the nature of night and day. And that is called "around obstructive form" (Thogs Pa'i Nye 'Khor; agha-sāmantaka). "Obstructive" is held to mean (kila) agglomerated (bSags Par gNas Pa; cita-sthaṁ) form, because it is very susceptible to being smashed (gNod Pa; ghāta); and this is what is around that.
>
> Others [the Sautrāntikas] say: Because this is not obstructive to

other forms it is non-obstructive, and because it is around other forms, it is "the non-obstructive that is around [other forms."]

117. I supply this reading by correcting 'Bras sPung Edition p.31b3; Sarnath p.53 l.10 to:

> 'Dus Ma Byas Kyi Nam mKha' Ni Nam mKha'i Khams Yin Zhing Ngo Bo Thogs Med Dang Thogs bCas gZhan Gyi Nye 'Khor Ni...

This complies with the *bShad Pa* p.32:

> De Ni Thogs Med Kyang Yin La gZugs gZhan Gyi Nye 'Khor Yang Yin Pas...

118. To.297. See Pruden fn#119 for other citations.

119. In the following section the remaining 44 dhātus that are mentioned in this sūtra are distributed among the 18.

120. Space, consciousness, earth, water, fire and air. The first two are the main topics of this section. The last four were discussed earlier.

121. i.e. mano-dhātu, dharma-dhātu, mano-vijñāna-dhātu.

122. There are 44 here, including the six elements of space, consciousness, earth etc. Adding the 18 dhātus that are the includers, it comes to 62.

123. We see at {iii.73-74} that a world system ('Jig rTen Gyi Khams; loka-dhātu) consists of the Desire Realm and the first concentration of the Form Realm. A small chiliochosm is 1000 world systems; a dichiliochosm is one million world systems; and a trichiliochosm is one billion world systems.
See also BC for further discussion of these terms.

124. The five topics covered in this section are:
1. Which dhātus can be pointed out.
2. Which are obstructive.
3. Which are virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral.
4. Which are included in which realms.
5. Which are contaminated and non-contaminated.

125. *ADKB* p.80; *bShad Pa* p.34 goes on to say:

> And what is the difference between an object and a referent object? That place upon which something performs its action, that is

its object. That which is grasped by the mind or mental factors is a referent object.

And why is the engaging of something's own object or referent object said to be obstructed (Thogs Pa; pratihanyate)? Because due to that [engaging of one object] it does not engage any other. Or, here obstruction means making contact with (gTong Pa; nipāta), which is the engagement with its own object.

126. This is one of two types of negation:
1. Mi lDan rNam gCod -- rules out the possibility of non-possession.
2. gZhan lDan rNam gCod -- rules out the possibility of anyone other than the subject possessing the object.

127. Quoted by GDD from *mChims* p.43b5, apparently a close paraphrase of *SAKV* p.88; *'Grel bShad* p.67b2.

128. This is the ordinary level of the first concentration, as opposed to the special first concentration (dhyānāntara), which does not include analysis. See *MS* p.120.

129. This is a special level of the first concentration, just above it but before the second concentration, distinguished by the fact that it lacks investigation.

130. We see just below that vitarka is always accompanied by vicāra but is always free from another vitarka. There are never two simoultaneous vitarkas. (*ADKB* p.89; *bShad Pa* p.39)

131. This fourth possibility is *ADKB* p.89; *bShad Pa* p.39:

> Analysis that is without analysis but only with investigation.

132. Here the limit to Tibetan vocabulary can create real confusion: both investigation (vitarka) and conceptuality (vikalpa) are translated as rTog Pa-- although vikalpa is usually refered to as rNam Par rTog Pa.

133. This phrase is introduced by "kila" (Grag)--*ADKB* p.89; *bShad Pa* p.40. This is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas. Vasubandhu's opinion is found at {ii.33}.

134. *ADKB* p.89; *bShad Pa* p.40:

> Just like when a one-legged horse is called "without legs."

135. *ADKB* p.90; *bShad Pa* p.40:

> Wavering means not in meditative equipoise.

136. These are opposed to a wisdom that is bhāvanā-mayi--arisen from meditation, which would not be wavering.
See Pruden fn# 141 for explanation from *SAKV* p.90. See also {ii.24}.

137. The five topics of this section are:
1. Which dhātus have referent objects.
2. Which are appropriated.
3. Which are elements and which are complex matter.
4. Which are collections.
5. Which can be cut etc.

138. In this list the *bShad Pa* p.4 includes teeth (So) after nails; and uses Phyi Sa for excrement where GDD has bShang.
The *bShad Pa* also has Ba sPu--body hair, where GDD has Kha sPu--mustache. The Sanskrit p.91 is "romana" which Monier Williams gives as: "the hair on the body of men and animals...less properly applicable to the long hair on the head and beard of men..."

139. *ADKB*; *bShad Pa* p.41: p.91:
rTen Gyi dNgos Por gZung Ba; adhiṣhṭhāna-bhāvena-upagṛhīta//

140. Poussin (Pruden p.99) goes on to say:

> Organic matter, that is to say matter which constitutes the five organs of consciousness, as well as matter not separable from organic matter, is "appropriated," is "made one's own," by the mind: this results from the fact that, in the case of well-being or illness, there is a reciprocal reaction between the mind and this matter. Matter that the Abhidharma calls "appropriated," is called in common language, sacetanā or sensitive matter.

See also Pruden fn#143.

141. To.4059, by Vasubandhu.

142. i.e. The four objects: form, smell, taste, tangible objects.

143. See {i.10c}, the discussion of the cause and result tangible objects.

144. On Buddhadeva and his view that all form is strictly the elements and there is no such thing as complex matter, see *CCB* p.36; and Pruden fn# 146.

145. *Samyuktāgama* 11.1

146. The six elements mentioned above: earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness.

The argument is that the person is made up merely of the six basic elements, and not complex matter.

147. The Tibetan here, quoted from *bShad Pa* p.43, leaves out the compound from Sanskrit--citta-anvyāt, *ADKB* p. 94. The full phrase reads:

saṁjñā ca vedanā ca caitasika eṣa dharmaś-citta-anvyāt-citta-niśritaḥ//

148. rGyas Byung Gi dBang Po is a faculty that can be improved with care, practice, food, etc. It is in contrast to rNam Min Gyi dBang Po, which is inborn in a fixed state due to karma.

See {ii.37}.

149. Fire, as an element, is one of the four cause tangible objects; heaviness is one of 11 result tangible objects. See {i.10}. So this position is that the agent of burning and object of weighing are only tangible objects and not the other three external dhātus.

150. *SAKV* p.98; *'Grel bShad* p.74a7:

saṁskāra = abhyaṅga-snāna-ānuvāsanādi-svabhāva//
Legs Par Bya Ba Ni Lus bsKu Ba Dang sMan Par bTang Ba La Sogs Pa'i Ngo Bo Nyid Do//

See just below for discussion.

151. *Tsig mDzod Chen Mo* p.1332:

Dril Phyis = Lus Kyi Dreg Pa Phyis Pa//
To wipe off the dirt of the body.

152. This is the first moment of the Path of Seeing. It is the first uncontaminated moment in a personal continuum, so it is not a naturally flowing result. See {vi.25}.

153. Paraphrased from *ADKB* p.100; *bShad Pa* p.46.

154. See {ii.49} for the six types of causes.
Poussin (Pruden fn#156) provides the following commentary:

> Let us consider one moment or state of existence of this subtle matter which is the organ of sight. One part of this matter is retribution of a former action; another part proceeds from food; all this matter is the outflowing result of a previous moment or state in the existence of the eye. But this previous moment or state is not, in an of itself, capable of generating the present moment; in fact, at death the organ of sight ceases producing itself through outflowing. Thus by definition the organ of sight is not an outflowing. But consider, on the contrary, the flesh that constitutes the body: it persists after death; it is thus an outflowing, the result, in each of the moments of its existence, of the previous moment.

155. i.e. Sounds, such as a voice, can resume after they cease. This is not true of fruitions--other than mental states, because they can only arise once, which thereby exhausts the cause of their arisal.

156. See *CCB* p.34-35.

157. To.4115

158. i.e. Action produces elements produces sound. So sound is never directly caused by fruition.

159. The topics covered in this section are:
1. Which dhātus are substantially existent.
2. Which are momentary.
3. Which are newly obtained.
4. Which are internal and external.
5. Which are coordinated and analogous-to-that.

160. i.e. This is the only moment of any compound phenomenon that is not a naturally flowing result. Therefore it is called "momentary."

161. At {viii.13} we learn that beings from the second concentration on up utilize faculty consciousnesses of the first concentration.

162. Quoted in *mChims* p.48a8.

163. First citation is 23.14, Sparham p.86.
Second citation is 31.1, Sparham p.134.

164.*ADKB* p.104; *bShad Pa* p.48:

> If there is no self, how can there be internal and external? Since the mind (Sems; citta) is the basis of holding a self (Ngar 'Dzin Pa; ahaṁkāra), the term self is applied to it figuratively. As it says: "The wise man attains heaven by means of a well-subdued self."

See also Pruden fn# 161 for definition of inner and external dhātus from the *Vibhāṣa*.

165.The definition from *ADKB* p.106; *bShad Pa* p.49:

> That object ascertained by a consciousness, whether, with regard to it, that consciousness is [already] arisen or is going to arise, that object is called "coordinated" (brTen Pa Dang bCas Pa; sabhāga).

See *Index* p.99: brTen in Derge; bsTen in Peking.

166. i.e. They are analogous, but not always coordinated.

167. i.e. Just as the five faculties are coordinated when they have objects, and analogous-to-that when they don't, or when they are unarisen; likewise the objects are coordinated when they are grasped by a subject and analogous-to-that when they aren't, or when unarisen.

168. i.e. A particular person's particular faculty is designated as coordinated or analogous-to-that depending on how it functions, and that designation stands both from the point of view of the person to whom the faculty belongs, and from anyone else's point of view.

But for the five objects (in the next paragraph), they are designated depending on whether they are grasped or not by a given individual. So for one person who sees an object it will be coordinated; for another who does not see it, it will be analogous-to-that.

169. Taisho 27, p.368.

170. For concomitants see {ii.24}. For characteristics and secondary characteristics see {ii.46}. For obtainment see {ii.36}.

171. *SAKV* p.110; *'Grel bShad* p.82a3:

> And what are these? Ten subtle propensities {v.5}, their co-arisals (lHan Cig 'Byung Ba; sahabhuva) and their obtainments; the

contaminated virtuous along with their retinue; non-obscuring neutral formative forces {ii.66}; and non-revealing form and its contaminated retinue {iv.13}.

172. Here GDD calls this Ma bsGrib Lung Ma bsTan. The *bShad Pa* p.52 has Nyon Mongs Pa Can Ma Yin Pa'i Lung Du Ma bsTan Pa.

173. *GDD* p.296:

> Within [the polluting tendency of] view there are five [divisions:] view of the transitory collection ('Jig Tsogs La lTa Ba; satkāya-dṛṣṭi); wrong view (Log Par lTa Ba; mithyā-dṛṣṭi); the view of holding to the extremes (mThar 'Dzin Pa'i lTa Ba; antagrāha-dṛṣṭi); esteeming [unworthy] views (lTa Ba mChog 'Dzin; dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa); esteeming [mistaken] morality and asceticism (Tsul Khrims Dang brTul Zhugs mChog Tu 'Dzin Pa'i lTa Ba; śīla-vrata-parāmarśa).

See {v.1b-3}.

174. On Nges Par rTog Pa; santīrika or tīraṇa--*SAKV* p.113; *'Grel bShad* p.84b4:

> santīraṇaṁ punar viṣaya-upanidhyāna-pūrvakaṁ niścāyakarshaṇam // Determination is to draw a conclusion having first examined the object.

175. In the *ADKB* p.116; *bShad Pa* p.54 this argument over whether the eye or the consciousness sees, includes a discussion about whether the eye actually has to make contact with its object; (see below {i.43c-d}). The argument is most clearly laid out by Poussin (Pruden p.116 with other sources cited at fn#173):

> [Vasubandhu to Vaibhāṣikas:]
> Do you maintain that an organ of sight sees its object by entering into a close relationship with its object, in the manner in which the organ of touch feels a tangible object {i.43c-d}? In this hypothesis I would understand that the organ of sight, being capable of being arrested, does not see obscured visible matter. But you maintain that the organ of sight sees at a distance: you do not then have the right to say that, being capable of being arrested, it does not see obscured visible matter. Moreover, one sees obscured visible matter through a glass, a cloud, a crystal and water: how would you explain this fact? I would say then that the visual consciousness sees, it arises with respect to

obscured visible matter when the screen does not from an obstacle to light; it does not arise in the contrary case.

176. This is an extremely compressed summary of *ADKB* p.125; *bShad Pa* p.61:

> "THE SUPPORT OF THE LAST IS PAST." The support of the mental consciousness dhātu is the [mental faculty] which has just ceased. "[THE SUPPORT OF] THE FIVE IS ALSO WHAT ARISES SIMOULTANEOUS WITH THEM." The term "also" means that [their supports] are also of the past. Here, the support that arises simoultaneous with the eye consciousness is the eye [faculty; and likewise] up to the body [faculty being the support] of the body consciousness. And their support in the past is the mind [faculty.] Thus those five collections of consciousness each has two faculties for support.

177. *GDD* {i.62}: "Similar and immediately preceding condition is the mind and mental factors."

See also Verdu, p.76-7.

178. To.4210, 4216.

179. i.e. Each faculty is "uncommon" or specific to the particular engaging consciousness of a particular individual, whereas an object can be general in being grasped by both an eye consciousness, a body consciousness or a mental consciousness, and general in being grasped by more than one individual.

So the metaphor: It is the sound of the drum and not the sound of the stick; and it is a sprout of barley and not a sprout of the field. *SAKV* p.127; *'Grel bShad* p.92b7)

180. To.4203.

181. A verse from *ADKB* p.130; *bShad Pa* p.65.

182. The 22 indriyas are listed at *ADKB* p.132; *bShad Pa* p.66:

1. Eye (Mig; cakṣu)
2. Ear (rNa Ba; śrotra)
3. Nose (sNa; ghrāṇa)
4. Tongue (lCe; jihva)
5. Body (Lus; kāya)

6. Mind (Yid; manas)
7. Female (Mo'i dBang Po; strīndriya)
8. Male (Po'i dBang Po; puruṣendriya)
9. Life (Srog; jīvita)

The five feeling faculties

10. Pleasure (bDe Ba; sukha)
11. Suffering (sDug bsNgal; duḥkha )
12. Mental happiness (Yid bDe Ba; saumanasya)
13. Mental unhappiness (Yid Mi bDe Ba; daurmanasya)
14. Neutral feeling (bTang sNyoms; upekṣā)

The five pure faculties of faith etc.

15. Faith (Dad Pa; śraddhā)
16. Diligence (brTzon 'Grus; vīrya)
17. Memory (Dran Pa; smṛti)
18. Meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi)
19. Wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā)

The last three

20. Knowing all that is not known (Kun Shes Par Byed Pa; anājñātam-ājñāsāymi)
21. Knowing all (Kun Shes Pa; ājñā)
22. Endowment with knowing all (Kun Shes Pa Dang lDan Pa; ājñātāvi)

# CHAPTER TWO

# THE PRESENTATION OF THE FACULTIES

## Outline to Chapter Two

I. Establishing the faculties.
    A. The nature of the faculties.
        1. The activity of the faculties.
        2. Fixing the number of faculties.

    B. The nature of [each faculty] in its particular context.
        1. Explaining the five faculties of feeling.
        2. Explaining the last three faculties.

    C. Classifying the aspects.
        1. Classifying based on associations.
        2. Classifying based on cause and result.
        3. Classifying based on nature.
        4. Classifying based on objects of abandonment.

    D. How faculties are gained and lost.
        1. How they are gained.
        2. How they are lost.

    E. How many faculties obtain the fruit of virtuous practice.
    F. The ways of possessing faculties.
        1. Definitely possessing.
        2. Possibly possessing.

II. The manner of arising of saṁskr̥ta phenomena.
    A. The actual explanation.
        1. The manner of arising of the physicals.
        2. The manner of arising of the non-physicals.
            a. The presentation.
            b. The explanation.
                (1) The manner of arisal of concomitants.
                    (a) Determining those that are definite in category.
                        1) The presentation.
                        2) The explanation.

a) The great grounds of mind.
b) The virtuous great grounds.
c) The great grounds of great afflictions.
d) The non-virtuous great grounds.
e) The great grounds of minor afflictions.

(b) Concomitants that are indefinite.
(c) Differences in what seem similar.
(d) Uniformity in what seem different.

(2) The manner of arisal of non-concomitants.
(a) The presentation.
(b) The explanation.
1) Obtainment and non-obtainment.
a) The actual explanation.
b) Explaining their qualities.
i) The qualities of obtainment.
ii) The qualities of non-obtainment.

2) Homogeneity.
3) Non-discrimination.
4) The two absorptions.
a) The explanation of the absorption of non-discrimination.
b) The explanation of the absorption of cessation.
c) The explanation of the common support of these two.

5) Life.
6) The characteristics.
7) The expressors.

(c) Summarizing the meaning.

B. The ancillary explanation of causes and conditions together with results.

1. The explanation of the causes together with results.
    a. The explanation of causes.
        (1) The presentation.
        (2) The explanation.
            (a) Efficient cause.
            (b) Connate cause.
                1) The definition.
                2) Examples.
                    a) The general presentation.
                    b) Explaining in detail the attendants of mind.
            (c) Homogeneous cause.
            (d) Concomitant cause.
            (e) Omnipresent cause.
            (f) Fruitional cause.
        (3) Summarizing the meaning.
    b. The explanation of results.
        (1) The presentation.
        (2) The explanation.
            (a) Which result is from which cause.
            (b) Explaining the characteristics of each.
    c. The explanation of qualities that are common to both of these.
        (1) The time in which the result is grasped or delivered.
        (2) Which things are produced by how many causes.
2. The explanation of conditions.
    a. The presentation.
    b. The explanation.
        (1) The definition of each condition.
        (2) Which condition will produce its results in which of the three times.
        (3) Which things are produced by how many conditions.
        (4) The extensive explanation of [similar and] immediately preceding condition.

(a) Divisions of the mind as 12.

1) The actual explanation.

2) Applying [the rules] to the conditions and what possess the conditions.

(b) Divisions as 20.

(c) Examining which are newly acquired from which of the 12.

In the Second Chapter, the Presentation of the Faculties, there are two topics:

I. Establishing the faculties.

II. The manner of arising of saṁskṛta phenomena.

I. Establishing the faculties.

There are six topics:

A. The nature of the faculties.

B. The nature of [each faculty] in its particular context (sKabs Su Bab Pa'i Ngo Bo).

C. Classifying the aspects.

D. How faculties are gained and lost.

E. How many faculties obtain the fruit of virtuous practice.

F. The ways of possessing faculties.

A. The nature of the faculties:

There are two topics:

1. The activity of the faculties.

2. Fixing the number of faculties.

1. The activity of the faculties.

As it says {i.48}, "The 12 that are explained as inner are faculties." If one asks, why are they called faculties?

Because they exercise special authority (dBang Byed; indanti) they are called faculties (dBang Po; indriya).

Then, if one asks: Over what do each of the 22 faculties excercise authority?

The five faculties--the eye and so forth--have authority over four concerns: They have authority over beauty of the body; protection of the body; generating their own consciousnesses along with their concomitants; and over the uncommon causes [of only seeing forms for the eye and only hearing sounds for the ear and so forth.]

They have authority over the beauty of the body because without them the body would become unattractive.

They have authority over protection of the body, because it is protected by seeing undesired forms and hearing undesired sounds. And the three, nose, tongue and body protect the body by utilizing morsel food.

They have authority over the uncommon causes, because they have authority [over the grasping of objects] from the seeing of form by the eye up to touching of tangible objects by the body.[1]

The four--male, female, life and the mental faculty have authority over two concerns each.

The two, male and female faculties, have authority over two concerns each: They have authority over the classification of (Bye Brag; bheda) and differences (Khyad Par; vikalpa) between sentient beings. Because it is by way of having male or female faculties that the classification of sentient beings is distinguished. [p.83; 47b4] And it is by way of having male or female faculties that the differences in sentient beings are distinguished, such as the size of breasts and amount of facial hair, tight or loose skin, high or low tone of voice, and so forth.[2]

The faculty of life has authority over two concerns: It has authority over subsistence as same type (Ris mThun gNas Pa; nikāya-sabhāga-sādhāraṇa) and conjunction of same type (Ris mThun mTsams sByor Ba; nikāya-sabhāga-saṁbandha).[3]

If one asks: In that case, if the mental faculty has authority over conjunction of same type, then what is the difference?

There is a difference, because it is said that life conjoins only in the intermediate state, but mind conjoins also at the [moment of conception] of the birth existence (sKye Srid).

The faculty of mind also has authority over two concerns, because it has authority over conjunction of same type, and over [the consciousness being in] conformity with the nature of the authority (dBang Po'i Ngo Bo Dang mThun Pa; vaśi-bhāva-anuvarttana). Because based on the virtue or

non-virtue of the motivating mind which acts as authority, the karma of body and speech which is motivated by that will become virtuous or non-virtuous.[4]

The phrase, "So they say..." (Lo; kila) {ii.1} is a phrase of disagreement.[5]

The five faculties of feeling have authority over affliction, because from the feelings of pleasure and mental happiness attachment develops; from suffering and mental unhappiness anger develops; from neutral feeling ignorance develops. And so by these the afflictions develop.

The last eight faculties have authority over purification, because the contaminated [last eight faculties] will subdue the manifest afflictions; and the uncontaminated will cut out the seeds of afflictions. {1}

The Sautrāntikas say: It is not because the five faculties--the eye and so forth--have authority over the beauty of the body, protection of the body or the uncommon causes that they are posited as faculties; but because they excercise authority over the production of the consciousnesses and their concomitants, which observe their respective objects; and the mental faculty excercises authority over the production of a mental consciousness and its concomitants which observes all objects of knowledge; for this reason these six are posited as faculties.[6] [p.84; 48a4]

Also the male and female faculties do not have authority over the categories and differences of sentient beings; as in the case, for example, of an individual of the Form Realm [where there are sexual differences among the gods who do not possess sexual organs.][7] It is because they excercise authority over the nature of masculinity and femininity that these two are posited as faculties.

If one asks: What are the natures of these two? The male and female faculties are posited from one part of the body faculty, and they are not any other substance; because they are physical faculties which grasp tangibles of their own vicinity.

As for the Sautrantika's own system: It is because these [two] act as the support of a body consciousness which grasps tangible objects [that they are posited as faculties.]{2}

The faculty of life does not have authority over conjunction of same type [as the Vaibhāṣikas hold], because the mental faculty itself has authority over conjunction of subsequent similar type (Ris Dra Phyi Ma mTsams sByor Ba). Therefore life, the five feelings, and the five faculties--faith etc.,[8] are considered to be faculties because they excercise authority over, respectively, subsistence as same type, afflictions, and purification.[9] {3}

Adapting [the root text] {ii.4} to: "Because they excercise authority over the attainment of higher and higher [paths] not yet [attained] and so

forth..."[10] The faculties of knowing all that is not known (Mi Shes Pa Kun Shes Par Byed Pa; anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya); knowing all (Kun Shes Pa; ājñātendriya); and the endowment of knowing all (Kun Shes lDan Pa; ājñātāvīndriya) are posited as faculties because they excercise authority over, respectively, the attainment of the faculty of knowing all which is above itself; the faculty of endownemt of knowing all which is above that; the attainment of Nirvāṇa without remainder.[11]

By saying "and so forth" (Sogs; ādi) {ii.4} it shows that because they excercise authority over, respectively, objects to be abandoned by Seeing; objects to be abandoned by Meditation; and abiding in bliss in this life (mThong Chos La; dṛṣṭa-dharma); therefore these three are posited as faculties. {4}

2. Fixing the number of faculties.

If one asks: Don't these have authority [over their respective objects:] The voice over talking; the hand over taking; the feet over taking steps; the penis over pleasure; and the anus over excreting waste? Then why is it certain that the number of faculties is 22? [p.85; 48b5]

It is certain. Because as many as are supports of mind, categories of sentient beings, subsistence as same type, afflictions, collections of causes of purification, and the nature of purification--that amount is also definitely

the number of faculties. The five faculties--the eye etc.--are the support of mind; the two--male and female faculties are the categories of sentient beings; life [has authority over] subsistence as same type; the five feelings [have authority over] afflictions; the five--faith etc.--are the collections of causes of purification; and the last three faculties are the nature of purification.

Alternatively, the Sautrāntikas say, 14 faculties are posited based on supports for entering into cyclic existence; taking birth in cyclic existence; abiding in cyclic existence; and experiencing cyclic existence. The five faculties--the eye etc.--are the supports for entering into cyclic existence;[12] by the contact of the two, male and female faculties, there is birth in cyclic existence; by the faculty of life one abides in cyclic existence; and by the faculties of the five feelings one individually experiences the beneficial and harmful [experiences of cyclic existence.]

Similarly, the other eight faculties are posited based on a basis of engaging in purification, which is the reverse of entering into cyclic existence; taking birth in; abiding in; and experience of purification. The five faculties of faith etc. are the basis of engaging in purification; by the faculty of knowing all that is not known one takes birth initially in purification; by the faculty of knowing all one abides continuously [in purification;] and by the faculty of the endowment of knowing all one experiences the pleasure and

bliss of the abandonment of afflictions. {5-6} [p.86; 49a5 ]

B. The nature of [each faculty] in its particular context.

There are two topics:

1. Explaining the five faculties of feeling.
2. Explaining the last three faculties.

1. Explaining the five faculties of feeling.

Then, if one asks, what are the natures of the 22 faculties? The six faculties of the eye etc. and the two faculties of male and female were already explained. Life and faith etc. will be explained later. At this time the five faculties of feeling and the last three faculties will be explained.

If one asks, what are the five faculties of feeling?

Bodily feeling is a feeling which is based on the physical faculties. That bodily feeling which is disagreeable (Sim Pa Ma Yin Pa; asāta) and experiences pain is the faculty of suffering.

That which experiences agreeable [sensation] is the faculty of pleasure. In the third concentration, the mental feeling which has agreeable experience is the faculty of pleasure.[13] Otherwise, from the second concentration down, mental feelings that have an agreeable experience are the faculty of mental happiness.

The mental feeling which has disagreeable experience is the faculty of mental unhappiness.

The faculty of neutral feeling is that which experiences what is in between agreeable and painful. If one asks: Is this bodily feeling or mental feeling? It has both feelings.

If one says: In that case, what is the reason for putting these two together as one, instead of [stating them] separately as is the case with [the faculties of] pleasure and suffering?

There is a reason. The mental feelings of happiness and suffering mostly arise from concepts (rNam rTog; vikalpana).[14] Bodily feelings of pleasure and suffering arise without depending on concepts, but arise by the power of their objects; and so arise even for Arhats. Therefore [bodily and mental feelings] are taught separately. [On the other hand,] the two neutral feelings arise naturally, without concepts.[15]

[A second reason is:] The two [types of bodily or mental] happiness and suffering separately experience benefit and harm; and bodily feeling is stable, whereas mental feeling is unstable; therefore [bodily and mental feelings] are taught separately. But for [neutral feeling] there are no such distinctions [so bodily and mental neutral feeling are taught as one.] {7-8} [p.87; 49b6]

2. Explaining the last three faculties.

The nine [faculties]--the five faculties of faith etc., the mental faculty, the faculty of pleasure, the faculty of mental happiness, and the faculty of neutral feeling--when they are on the Path of Seeing, uncontaminated Path of Meditation, and the Path of No More Learning, are, respectively: the three faculties of knowing all that is not known, knowing all, and endowment of knowing all.[16] {9a-b}

C. Classifying the aspects.

There are four topics:

1. Classifying based on associations.
2. Classifying based on cause and result.
3. Classifying based on nature.
4. Classifying based on objects of abandonment.

1. Classifying based on associations.

If one asks: Among these 22 faculties how many are contaminated and how many are uncontaminated?

The last three faculties are without taint, because they are the Truth of the Path.

The seven physical faculties, the faculties of life, suffering, and mental

unhappiness are the subject. They are contaminated, because they are saṁskṛtas which are not the Truth of the Path. The remaining nine have both types--contaminated and uncontaminated, because when they are included in the Truth of the Path they are uncontaminated, and all other saṁskṛtas are contaminated.[17] {9b-d}

2. Classifying based on cause and result.

The faculty of life is fruition (rNam sMin; vipāka), because it is the fruition of non-virtuous karma in a bad migration; and it is the fruition of virtuous karma in a happy migration.

If one says: In that case, of what is the fruition of the faculty of life of the Arhats who are said to be giving up (gTong) or sustaining ('Jog; sthāpayati) the saṁskāra of longevity (Tse'i 'Du Byed; āyuḥ-saṁskāra)?

Some say: As it is explained in the treatise:[18]

> A bhikṣu Arhat possessed of supernatural powers who has attained control over the mind, having offered some necessities of life, a begging bowl, dharma robes and so forth, either to the saṅgha or to an individual, deliberately engages in the absorption of the fourth concentration of the supreme limit (Rab mTha'i bSam gTan bZhi Pa; prānta-koṭika). Having arisen from that, by mentally thinking and also verbally expressing that, "Whatever my fruition of experience (Longs sPyod Kyi rNam sMin; bhoga-vipāka) may be, may it be transformed into fruition of longevity (Tse'i rNam sMin; āyur-vipāka)." That fruition of experience is transformed into the fruition of longevity.

Therefore it is the fruition of karma of the present life (mThong Chos; dṛṣṭa-dharma). So they say. [p.88; 50b1]

Some say: Since all Arhats have not performed the giving up and sustaining of the saṁskāra of longevity [it happens this way:] Having died an untimely death in a life that was to have attained 100 years due to karma thrown previously while living as an ordinary individual; seeing that remaining longevity left over from that life, by the power of the previous effort [the Arhat] brings [that remaining longevity] here into this life. Therefore it is the fruition of karma of a previous [life.] So they say.

Bhadanta Ghoṣaka says:

> In the case of prolonging longevity: By the power of meditative equipoise in the absorption of the fourth concentration of the supreme limit, elements of a body that are conducive to preservation of longevity, which are included in the level of the fourth concentration, are generated in this body. So it occurs by the power of the meditative stabilization that prolongs longevity; and it is not the fruition of karma. However, considering the majority of cases, they can be explained as the fruition of life [faculty.]

If one asks: Then on what type of bases is giving up and sustaining [of longevity] done?

It can be done on the bases of males and females of the three continents but not on others. Because for the others no need for them to do this is established.

Who does it? It is done by one who "is liberated not depending on occassion" (Dus Dang Mi sByor Bar rNam Par Grol Ba; asamaya-vimukta),[19] who meditates on the fourth concentration. Because [this Arhat] is without afflictions and by his sharp faculties has mastery over meditative

stabilization.

If one asks: What is the method of giving up and sustaining [longevity?] The method of sustaining was explained previously. The method of giving up is: A bhikṣu Arhat possessed of supernatural powers who has attained control over the mind, having offered some necessities of life, a begging bowl, dharma robes and so forth, either to the saṅgha or to an individual, deliberately engages in the absorption of the fourth concentration of the supreme limit. Having arisen from that, by mentally thinking and also verbally expressing that, "Whatever my fruition of experience may be, may it be transformed into fruition of longevity," [longevity is thereby] given up. [p.89; 51a2]

As for the purpose of giving up and sustaining: Seeing that oneself is not going to remain in this life for long, and that if you remain, you see benefit for the Teachings and for sentient beings, one sustains [life.] If one sees that even though you might remain a long time in this life, there will be no benefit for the Teachings or for sentient beings, it is given up.

Then if one asks: As it says [in sūtra:] "[The Blessed One,] having extended the saṁskāras of life (Srog; jīvita), he gave up the saṁskāras of longevity (Tse; āyus)."[20] So what is the distinction between life and longevity?

The Vaibhāṣikas say: There is no distinction because it is taught in the

treatise,[21] "If one asks, What is life? It is the longevity of the three realms."

The Sautrāntikas say: Life is formed ('Dus Byas Pa) by karma of the present life time (Tse); longevity is formed by karma of previous life times (Tse).[22]

If one asks: In that case, what was the reason for [the sūtra quoted above] using the plural in saying, "saṁskāras of life"?

The Vaibhāṣikas say: It is impossible to give up or sustain life as one single moment; therefore [the plural is used] in order to make clear that it is given up or sustained as a continuum of [moments of] life.

The Sautrāntikas say: It is in order to understand that life has many compounded aggregates ('Du Byed Kyi Phung Po). For example, in the two lower realms it has five aggregates, and in the upper realm it has four aggregates. Therefore [the plural is used] to make known that life is not necessarily only a single substance, but has a number of saṁskāras. If that were not the case, it would be correct [to use the plural] to say lives, but it would be incorrect to say saṁskāras.[23]

If one asks: In particular, what was the purpose of the Teacher's giving up and sustaining longevity?

The Sautrāntikas say: It was in order to show he had mastery over death that he gave up the saṁskāras of longevity. [p.90; 51b2] And it was in

order to show that he had mastery over longevity that he extended (Byin Gyis Rlab; adhiṣṭhita) the saṁskāras of longevity for three months. But not more than [three months,] because beyond that there was no one to be subdued by [the Buddha] himself. And it was in order to fully accomplish his pledge that, "If I wish, by meditating on the [four] feet of supernatural powers (rKang Pa; ṛddhi-pāda), I can remain for an eon (bsKal Pa; kalpa) or more than an eon." So they say.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: It was in order to demonstrate that He had vanquished the four Māras.[24] On top of the vajra-throne, in the first watch [of the night] he conquered Devaputra-Māra; in the third watch he conquered Kleśa-Māra. At Vaiśālī, by extending the saṁskāras of longevity for three months, he conquered Maraṇa-Māra. At Kuśīnagar (Gyad Yul), by attaining perfect Nirvāṇa in the sphere without remainder of aggregates, he conquered Skandha-Māra. {10a}

Then if one asks, are the others fruition or not? In 12 faculties there are both fruition and non-fruition.

If one asks, which 12? They are those excluding the last eight faculties and mental unhappiness. The seven physical faculties have both, because they can be both fruition and arisen from development.[25] The four feelings and the mental faculty have both, because the virtuous and non-

virtuous are not fruition and the others are fruition.[26]

The last eight faculties are not included because they are definitely virtuous. Mental unhappiness is not included, because it is definitely either virtuous or non-virtuous.[27] {10a-c}

That mental unhappiness alone [always] has fruition, because it is definitely either contaminated virtuous or non-virtuous.[28] [p.91; 52a3]

The ten faculties of mind, the other four feelings, and the [five faculties of] faith etc., have both; because the faculties of faith etc. that are contaminated virtue, have fruition; and those that are uncontaminated do not have fruition. Mind and the other four feelings that are contaminated virtue or non-virtue have fruition; and otherwise, those that are uncontaminated or neutral do not have fruition.

The seven physical faculties and the faculty of life do not have fruition, because they are neutral. {10c-11a}

3. Classifying based on nature.

The last eight faculties are virtuous, because they are determinate (Lung Du bsTan Pa; vyākṛta) and they yield pleasant results.

Mental unhappiness has both aspects of being virtuous and non-virtuous; because mental unhappiness over virtues performed is non-virtuous, and mental unhappiness over non-virtues performed is virtuous. According to

the Bahirdeśaka and Sautrāntikas: Mental unhappiness over neutral actions becomes neutral, so it can also be neutral.

Mind and the other four feelings have all three, virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral.

As for the other eight, the seven physical [faculties] and life, they are neutral only; because they are neither virtuous nor non-virtuous phenomena. {11b-d}

If one asks: Among these 22 faculties, how many are included in the Desire Realm, how many are included in the Form Realm, how many are included in the Formless Realm, and how many are not included in the realms?

The three stainless [faculties] and what is within their collection[29] are not included in the realms, because they are uncontaminated.

The other faculties are included in the Desire Realm because they are capable of nourishing the afflictions of the Desire Realm. [p.92; 52b3]

[Fifteen faculties,] excluding the three stainless faculties, the male and female faculties, suffering and mental unhappiness, are included in the Form Realm; because they are capable of nourishing the afflictions of the Form Realm.

There, [in the Form Realm, the male and female faculties are not

included because] they have separated from attachment to sexual intercourse, and the male and female faculties make the body unattractive.[30]

There isn't suffering in the Form Realm, because there is neither suffering produced by cause, nor is there suffering produced by conditions. The first is established because there are no non-virtues. The second is established because the body is clear like light.

There is no mental unhappiness there, because there is neither mental unhappines produced by cause, nor mental unhappiness produced by conditions. Because, respectively, they have abandoned anger; and because they have separated from the nine factors of ill-will (mNar Sems; āghāta): he has harmed me; is harming me; will harm me. He has harmed my friends; is harming them; will harm them. He has helped my enemies, is helping them, will help them.

All these [15] faculties are in the first concentration, but in the second concentration there is no faculty of pleasure. In the fourth concentration and in the actual absorption of a special [first concentration] there is neither pleasure nor mental happiness.[31]

In the Formless Realm, excluding the seven physical faculties, pleasure, and mental happiness--which is indicated by the term "also" ('Ang; ca)--on top of those [faculties that were excluded from the Form Realm;] the

remaining eight are included in the Formless Realm. Because they are capable of nourishing the afflictions of the Formless Realm. {12}

4. Classifying based on objects of abandonment.

The mental faculty and three faculties of feelings--pleasure, mental happiness and neutral feeling, have three types: to be abandoned by Seeing, to be abandoned by Meditation, and not to be abandoned. [p.93; 53a4] Because when they are concomitant with objects to be abandoned by Seeing they are objects to be abandoned by Seeing; the contaminated which are other than that are objects to be abandoned by Meditation; and when they are uncontaminated they are not objects to be abandoned.[32]

Mental unhappiness is to be abandoned by both the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation, because when it is concomitant with objects to be abandoned by Seeing it is to be abandoned by Seeing; and when concomitant with objects to be abandoned by Meditation it is to be abandoned by Meditation.

Nine faculties--the seven physicals, life and suffering--are to be abandoned by Meditation; because they are objects to be abandoned which are not to be abandoned by Seeing.

The uncontaminated five faculties of faith etc. are not to be abandoned, because they are not contaminated. By saying "also" (Yang; api)

{13d}, it shows that when they are contaminated they are to be abandoned by Meditation.

The last three faculties are not to be abandoned because they are uncontamainated. {13}

D. How faculties are gained and lost.

There are two topics:

1. How they are gained.

2. How they are lost.

1. How they are gained.

If one asks: At the moment of conception in the rebirth existence, how many faculties are newly gained which have the nature of being fruition?

In the Desire Realm, at first, at the moment of conception of the rebirth existence two faculties are newly gained which are of the nature of fruition: the two faculties of body and life are newly gained. Because at that time there is no eye faculty and so forth; and although there are the faculties of mind and neutral feeling, they are not fruitions, because these two are afflicted at the moment of conception.[33]

If one asks: Is this definite for all [types of beings?] Beings of supernatural birth gain not only these two. If one asks, then which do they

gain? If they are like people at the beginning of a kalpa,[34] without either of the two sex organs (mTsan Med Pa; avyañjana), the supernaturally born newly gain six faculties that are of the nature of fruition. Because they simoultaneously gain the five faculties of the eye etc., and the faculty of life. If they have either sex organ, then [they gain] seven. If they have both, they gain eight by adding these two. [p.94; 53b4]

If one asks: If their birth-source (sKye gNas; yoni) is good, how can they have two sex organs? Although among the happy migrations this does not occur, it does [for those born] in bad migrations.

In the Form Realm, at the moment of conception six faculties are gained, the five faculties of the eye etc., and life are gained.

Above that,[35] in the Formless Realm, one faculty is newly gained which is of the nature of fruition, because only the faculty of life is gained. {14}

2. How they are lost.

If one asks: If this is the way they are gained, then at the time of death, how many faculties newly cease?

At the time of death in the Formless Realms, three faculties simoultaneously cease; because life, mind[36] and neutral feeling will cease simoultaneously.

In the Form Realm eight cease, because in addition to the previously mentioned six [that were gained], mind and neutral feeling are added.

In the Desire Realm [if the being has] both sex organs, then in addition to the eight [that can be gained], these two are added, making ten that cease; or, if endowed with either one of the [sex organs], adding that one to the eight, nine cease; or, if endowed with neither [sex organ], then just those eight will cease.[37]

These are in the case of death all at once (Cig Car 'Chi Ba; sakṛt-maraṇa). In gradual death, for the other three birth-sources[38] four faculties newly cease: body, life, mind and neutral feeling. Since the faculties of the eye etc. have already ceased, they do not cease at the moment of the final death state.

But it should be understood that this is based on a mind of death produced by a neutral or afflicted [mind.] In all cases of a mind of death produced by a virtuous [mind,] by adding the five faculties of faith etc. to [those that cease in each realm,] in the Formless Realm eight faculties would cease, and so forth.

If one asks: What is the reason that at the time of discussing the gaining of the faculties, the faculties that are in the nature of fruition are explained; whereas when discussing the giving up of faculties, the giving up of those that both are and are not of the nature of fruition is explained?

Those two are meant to illustrate each other. {15-16b} [p.95; 54a5]

E. How many faculties obtain the fruit of virtuous practice.

In connection with the faculties, the occassion falls to explain all the distinguishing qualities of the faculties.

If one asks: As the fruits of the renunciate's life (dGe sByong Tsul Gyi 'Bras Bu; śrāmaṇya-phala)[39] are also explained as obtained by the faculties, by how many faculties are they obtained?

"The two end fruits" {16c} are the fruits of Stream Enterer and Arhat, because they are the first and the last fruits. These two are obtained by nine faculties.

If one asks, how are they obtained? The fruit of Stream Enterer is obtained by nine faculties: the fifteenth moment of mind [on the Path of Seeing,] the faculty of knowing all that is not known; the sixteenth moment, the faculty of knowing all; and [the fruit is also obtained] by the mental faculty and the five faculties of faith etc. which are in the collection of these two; and since [the about-to-become-Stream Enterer] is not yet separated from the attachment of the Desire Realm, it is obtained by the faculty of neutral feeling which is included in the preparation of the first concentration.[40]

The reason is established, because the first [knowing all that is not

known] brings about the attainment of separation which is the abandonment of the objects to be abandoned by Seeing; and the second [knowing all] makes firm that attainment of separation which is the abandonment of the objects to be abandoned by Seeing. For example they are like, respectively, driving out a thief, and closing the door.[41]

If one says: There is the consequence that the second [knowing all] does not obtain the fruit of Stream Enterer, because at that time [of the sixteenth moment] it is already obtained.

There is no fault. Because it makes firm the attainment of separation, it is merely said that it "obtains" [the fruit.]

The fruit of Arhat is also obtained by nine faculties, because it is obtained by the Path of Meditation included in the vajra-like meditative stabilization, the faculty of knowing all; by the faculty of the endowment of knowing all which is included in the Path of No More Learning, the knowledge of exhaustion (Zad Pa Shes Pa; kṣaya-jñāna) {vii.7}; by the mental faculty and the five faculties of faith etc. which are in the collection of these two; and by any one of the feelings of pleasure, mental happines or neutral feeling. [p.96; 54b5] So, if it is based on an actual absorption of the first two concentrations it is obtained by mental happiness. If based on an actual absorption of the third concentration it is obtained by pleasure. If it is based on another uncontaminated level it is obtained by the faculty if neutral

feeling.[42]

The reason is established, because the first [knowing all] brings about to the attainment of separation which is the abandonment of the objects to be abandoned by Meditation without exception; and the second [endowment of knowing all] holds the attainment of separation which is the abandonment of the objects to be abandoned by Meditation without exception. The example is the same as the previous one.

The two middle fruits are the fruits of Once-Returner and Non-Returner. These two are obtained by seven, eight or nine faculties.

The first is obtained by seven faculties, because: For the Gradualist Returner (mThar Gyis Pa'i Phyir 'Ong; ānupūrvika),[43] with either sharp or dull faculties, if he has previously practiced mostly single-pointed concentration (Zhi gNas; śamatha), it is obtained by the worldly path with the aspects of subtle and coarse. So it is obtained by the five faculties of faith etc.; the mental faculty; and the faculty of neutral feeling which is included on the preparation of the first concentration.

Then there is one who obtains by eight faculties: For the Gradualist Returner, with either sharp or dull faculties, if he has previously practiced mostly insight (lHag mThong; vipaśyanā), since he has preferred the supermundane path with the aspects of the Truths, it is obtained by the faculty of knowing all as well as the previous seven faculties.[44]

Then there is one who obtains by nine faculties: The fruit of the Returner Previously Freed of Attachment (Chags Bral sNgon Song; bhūyo-vītarāga) is obtained by nine faculties. The nine faculties are the same nine which obtained the fruit of Stream Enterer. The difference is whether or not he has abandoned [up to and including] the sixth affliction of the Desire Realm prior to the Path of Seeing.[45] [p.97; 55a5]

The fruit of Non-Returner is obtained by seven faculties. Because, when a Gradualist Non-Returner with dull faculties obtains the fruit of Non-Returner by means of the mundane path, it is obtained by the five faculties of faith etc., the mental faculty, and neutral feeling.

Then there is one who obtains by eight faculties: When the Gradualist Non-Returner with dull faculties obtains the fruit of Non-Returner by means of the supermundane path, it is obtained by the previous seven as well as by the faculty of knowing all.

Then there is one who obtains by nine faculties: The fruit of Non-Returner Previously Freed of Attachment is obtained by the nine faculties that obtained the fruit of Stream Enterer. But the difference is that, if it is based on the actual absorptions of the first two concentrations it is obtained by mental happiness; if it is based on the actual absorption of the third concentration, it is obtained by pleasure; if it is based on the actual absorption of the fourth concentration it is obtained by the faculty of neutral

feeling.

Then, for a Gradualist Non-Returner with sharp faculties, if he has previously practiced mainly single-pointed concentration, since he prefers the mundane path with the aspect of subtle and coarse, [the fruit] is obtained by eight faculties, the mental faculty, the five faculties of faith etc., neutral feeling, and mental happiness.

Then, if it is [a Gradualist Non-Returner] with sharp faculties who has previously practiced mainly insight, since he prefers the supermundane path with the aspect of the Truths, [the fruit] is obtained by nine: the previous eight faculties on top of which is added the faculty of knowing all. {16c-d}

If one says: If the fruit of Arhatship is obtained by nine faculties, that is in contradiction with the explanation in the *Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra*: "If one asks: By how many faculties is the fruit of Arhatship obtained? It is said that it is obtained by 11 faculties."

There is no contradiction. Because the explanation that it is obtained by nine is according to obtainment one time.[46] [p.98; 55b6] The explanation that the fruit of Arhatship is obtained by eleven faculties is said with the thought of some Arhats of dull faculties who again and again degenerate, and when they regain [the fruit] there is the possibility that it is obtained by 11 faculties.

At that time there is the possibility of it being obtained by 11 faculties:

At first it is obtained by nine faculties with neutral feeling of the fourth concentration. Having degenerated from the fourth concentration and above, if it is [re-obtained] based on the actual absorption of the third concentration, it is obtained by pleasure. Having degenerated from the third concentration and above, if it is [re-obtained] based on the actual absorption of the second concentration, it is obtained by mental happiness.

Even if one loses Arhatship many times, it can not be obtained by more faculties than this. Because other than these 11 there are no faculties that effect the attainment of Arhatship.

If one says: In that case there is the consequence that the fruit of Non-Returner can also be obtained by 11 faculties, because it is possible to degenerate from that.

There is no fault. Because it is not possible for [the Non-Returner] Previously Freed of Attachment to degenerate; and the fruit of Gradualist Non-Returner can not be obtained by the feeling of pleasure.[47]

If one says: Then there is the consequence that the fruit of Non-Returner can be obtained by ten faculties. Because by basing on the preparatory level of the first concentration, at the time of [attaining] the actual concentration the feeling can be changed.

There is no fault. Because he has admiration on seeing the actual absorption, but has no admiration on seeing the feeling of pleasure; because

he already previously obtained the feeling of pleasure. {17a-b}

F. The ways of possessing faculties.

1. Definitely possessing.

2. Possibly possessing.

1. Definitely possessing.

If one asks: For one who possess a certain faculty, how many faculties will definitely be possessed? [p.99; 56a6]

One who possesses any of the three, neutral feeling, life or mind, will definitely possess three faculties, because these three are inseparable.

By possessing life, it is not definite that one will possess the four faculties of the eye etc., as in the case of not obtaining, or losing after obtaining, the four faculties of the eye etc. in the Desire Realm.

Possessing the body faculty is not definite, as in the case of taking birth in the Formless Realm.

Possessing the male and female faculties, suffering, and mental unhappiness, is not definite, as in the case of taking birth in the Form Realm.

Possessing pleasure is not definite, as in the case of an ordinary individual who takes birth in the fourth concentration.[48]

Possessing mental happiness is not definite, as in the case of an ordinary individual who is born in the third concentration. Possessing the five faculties of faith etc. is not definite, as in the case of an individual who has cut the root of virtue.

Possessing the last three faculties is not definite, as in the case of an ordinary individual.

One who possesses pleasure will definitely possess four faculties, because on top of the ever-present three [that faculty of pleasure] is itself added. It does not pervade that one who possesses pleasure definitely possesses the body faculty, as in the case of Āryans born in the Formless Realm.

For one possessing pleasure, possessing mental happiness is not definite, as in the case of ordinary individuals born in the third concentration.

One who possesses the body faculty will definitely possess four faculties, adding [the body faculty] itself to those three [ever-present faculties.]

One who possess the eye etc. will definitely possess five, because on top of the four possessed by one who possesses the body faculty, [the eye] itself is added.

Also one who possesses mental happiness will definitely possess five, because on top of the four possessed by one who possesses pleasure,

[mental happiness] itself is added.

If one asks: How does the ordinary individual born in the second concentration possess pleasure? He does possess it. Because he can possess the afflicted pleasure that is included on the level of the third concentration.[49]

One who possesses the faculty of suffering will definitely possess seven faculties: possessing four feelings excluding mental unhappiness, body, life, and mind. [p.100; 57a2] Possessing mental unhappiness is not definite, as in the case of an individual of the Desire Realm who has abandoned attachment of the Desire Realm.

It pervades that one who possesses the female faculty or the male faculty will definitely possess eight, because on top of the seven possessed in the case of suffering, [one of these faculties] is itself added.

"And so forth" (Sogs; ādi) {18d} means that one who possesses the five faculties of faith etc. will also definitely possess eight faculties, because on top of the three ever-present faculties, these five are themselves added.

One who possesses the faculty of knowing all or endowment with knowing all will definitely possess 11 faculties, because on top of the nine [faculties that serve as their] bases of designation, life and one of these faculties itself is added.[50]

It pervades that one who possessess the faculty of knowing all that is

not known will definitely possess 13 faculties, because on top of the nine bases of designation, life, body, suffering and [that faculty] itself are added.[51] {17c-19}

2. Possibly possessing.

If one asks: For one who possesses the minimum number among the faculties, how few is it possible to possess?

For one who possesses the minimum number of faculties in the case of someone who, having cut the roots of virtue is without them, it is possible to possess eight faculties: because it is possible to possess the faculties of the five feelings, body, life and the mental faculty.

Similarly, immature beings (Byis Pa; bāla) born in the Formless Realm also have the possibility of possessing eight, because they can possess neutral feeling, life, the mental faculty, and the five virtues of faith etc. {20}

If one asks: How many can one possess if one possess the maximum number of faculties?

One who possesses the maximum number of faculties possesses 19 faculties. Which are not included? The three stainless faculties are not included.

If one asks, which individual possesses these? It is one who has two

sex organs, who has not cut the root of virtue, and has all the [sense] faculties.

Not only such a one, but Āryans who have attachment also possess [19 faculties.] Which are excluded? Either the male or female sex organ and two stainless faculties are excluded. [p.101; 56b2] That is, if it is someone on the Path of Seeing, the last two stainless faculties are excluded. If it is someone on the Path of Meditation and with attachment, the first and the last stainless faculties are excluded. {21}

II. <u>The manner of arising of saṁskṛta phenomena</u>.

There are two topics:

A. The actual explanation.

B. The ancillary explanation of causes and conditions together with results.

A. <u>The actual explanation</u>.

1. The manner of arising of the physicals.

2. The manner of arising of the non-physicals.

1. <u>The manner of arising of the physicals</u>.

If one asks: Do saṁskṛtas only arise separately, in accordance with their separate definitive characteristics? Or are there those that definitely arise simoultaneously?

There are ones that arise simoultaneously. In general phenomena are subsumed in five basic groups: They are subsumed in the basic groups of form, mind, mental factors, non-associated formative forces, and asaṁskṛtas. Since asaṁskṛtas have no arisal, they do not arise simoultaneously with any other phenomena. But the manner of arisal of the others is definitely twofold: the manner of arisal of the physicals, and the manner of arisal of the non-physicals. So, for the first:

In the Desire Realm, the very smallest physical unit, which is a collection (bSags Pa; saṁghāta) of subtle atoms (rDul Phra Rab; paramāṇu) without an atom (rDul; aṇu) of sound or an atom of a faculty, is the simoultaneous arising of atoms of eight substances: It is the simoultaneous arising of the four elements ('Byung Ba; mahābhūta) and form, smell, taste and tangibility.[52]

For one that has the body faculty nine substances arise simoultaneously.

For one that has other faculties, the eye etc., ten substances arise simoultaneously.

If it has sound, 11 substances arise simoultaneously.

Since there are neither smell nor taste in the Form Realm, [the smallest possible unit] in the Form Realm--without a faculty and without sound--has the subtle atoms of six substances. Seven substances if it has the body faculty. Eight substances if it has another faculty. It should be explained in this way. [p.102; 58a2]

Some say: In that case, if in a small unit of a collection of subtle atoms the four elements cannot be separated, why is it that some units appear as hard and some appear fluid?

The Vaibhāṣikas say: It is by way of the natures of the four elements. For example, it is like the taste [of salt which predominates in] a mixture of flour and salt. Or, it is because of the activities of the four elements, sometimes [one or the other activity] becomes manifest; so some appear fluid and some appear hard.

The Sautrāntikas say: It is because [a unit] has the seeds of the four elements, but not by way of [having] the natures [themselves], that it appears as hard or fluid.

If one says: If the very smallest unit of a collection of subtle atoms arises simoultaneously as eight substances; should that substance be taken as the substance of an atom; or should it be taken as the substance of an āyatana. In the first case the numbers [given for the smallest possible unit] would be too few, because there would also be the substance of shape. In

the second case, the numbers would be too many, because the four elements are included within the āyatana of tangible objects.

There is no fault. The four elements are taken as the substance of atoms. The four [types of] complex matter [derived from elements] are taken as the substance of āyatanas. Although this is the case, there is not the faulty consequence of there being too many, because there are no more in terms of the types of the various elements that exist.[53]{22}

2. The manner of arising of the non-physicals.

There are two topics:

a. The presentation.

b. The explanation.

a. The presentation of the manner of arising of the non-physicals.

If one asks: If such is the manner of arisal of the physicals, then what is the manner of arisal of the non-physicals?

Mind and mental factors definitely arise simoultaneously, because these two are the simoultaneous causes of arisal for each other. As it says in sūtra:

> Without mental factors, the mind will never arise,
> like the sun and its rays.

Therefore these arise simoultaneously. [p.103; 58b3]

All [phenomena] that arise, arise simoultaneously with the four characteristics that mark them as saṁskṛtas.

And those phenomena to be obtained that are included within the continuum [of sentient beings] arise simoultaneously with their coincident obtainments. But it does not pervade that the obtainment of a phenomenon must arise simoultaneously with the phenomenon to be obtained; because, for example, a past phenomenon to be obtained has three [aspects of obtainment]--its own obtainment which is past at its own time, and so forth. Because it is taught {ii.36}, "There are three aspects [of obtainment of phenomena] of the three times."

Saying "or" ('Am; vā) shows that phenomena to be obtained which are not included in a continuum do not arise simoultaneously with obtainment. Because most phenomena to be obtained which are not included in the continuum have no obtainment.

Although the two cessations have obtainment, because these two have no arisal they are not mentioned. {23a-c}

b. <u>The explanation of the manner of arising of the non-physicals</u>.

(1) The manner of arisal of concomitants.

(2) The manner of arisal of non-concomitants.

(1) The manner of arisal of concomitants.

(a) Determining those that are definite in category.

(b) Concomitants that are indefinite.

(c) Differences in what seem similar.

(d) Uniformity in what seem different.

(a) Determining those that are definite in category.

1) The presentation.

2) The explanation.

1) The presentation.

As it says {ii.23}, "Mind and mental factors are definitely simultaneous." If one asks: How many mental factors are there?

There are five types of mental factors that are definite in category, because they are in these various great grounds (Sa Mang Po Pa; mahābhūmika):[54] the great grounds of mind and so forth--the virtuous great grounds; the great grounds of great afflictions; the non-virtuous great

grounds; the great grounds of minor afflictions. {23c-d}

2) The explanation.

In this there are five topics, from which the first is:

a) The great grounds of mind.

As it says {ii.23}, "There are five types of mental factors, the great grounds and so forth, according to their distinctions." {23d} If one asks: How many [mental factors] are there in the great grounds of mind?

The subject is:

1) Feeling. (Tsor Ba; vedanā)

2) Intention, which makes [the mind] move to the object. (Sems Pa; cetanā)[55]

3) Discrimination. ('Du Shes; saṁjñā)

4) Prediliction, which seeks the object. ('Dun Pa; chanda) [p.104; 59a4]

5) Contact, which utilizes the object after the three--object, faculty and consciousness--have assembled. (Reg Pa; sparśa)

6) Intelligence, which distinguishes phenomena. (Blo Gros; mati)[56]

7) Recollection, which doesn't forget the referent object. (Dran Pa; smṛti)

8) Mental Engagement, which directs the mind to a particular referent object. (Yid La Byed Pa; manaskāra)

9) Appreciation, which grasps the referent object in its qualities. (Mos Pa;

adhimokṣa)

10) Meditative Stabilization, which is single-pointedness of mind. (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi)

They are the [10] great grounds of mind, because they are mental factors which arise in the retinue of all minds. {24}

b) The virtuous great grounds.

The subject is:

1) Faith, which clears the mind of afflictions and secondary afflictions. (Dad Pa; śraddhā)[57]

2) Conscientiousness, which esteems virtue. (Bag Yod; apramāda)

3) Pliancy, which is a serviceability of mind. (Shin Tu sByangs Pa; praśrabdhi)

4) Equanimity, which is an effortless arising [of mind] without [letting it] go under the influence of drowsiness or excitement. In general there are three "bTang sNyoms" (upekṣā): the formative force equanimity, neutral feeling of the feelings, and equanimity of the immeasurables. From among these, this is the first. (bTang sNyoms; upekṣā)

5) Shame. (Ngo Tsa Shes Pa; hrī)

6) Embarassment. (Khrel Yod Pa; apatrāpya) [These two will be explained later {ii.32}.]

The two roots are:

7) Non-attachment. ('Dod Chags Med Pa; alobha)

8) Non-hatred. (Zhe sDang Med Pa; adveṣa)

These two are, respectively: a mind which, by its own nature (Rang sTobs) is without attachment to its object; and a mind which, by its own nature, engages its own object without hatred.

9) Non-harming, which does not engage others in an injurious manner. (rNam Par Mi 'Tse Ba; avihiṁsā)

10) Persevering Effort, which is a mind that delights in virtue. (brTson 'Grus; vīrya)

They are the [10] virtuous great grounds, because they are the mental factors that invariably come in the retinue of all virtuous minds, but do not arise in the retinue of others. {25}

c) <u>The great grounds of great afflictions</u>.

The subject is:

1) Delusion, which is ignorance. (rMongs Pa; moha)

2) Non-conscientiousness, which is the opposite of conscientiousness. (Bag Med; pramāda)

3) Laziness, which is the opposite of persevering effort. (Le Lo; kauśīdya)

[p.105; 59b4]

4) Non-faith, which is the opposite of faith. (Ma Dad Pa; āśraddhya)

5) Torpor, which obscures the mind. (rMugs Pa; styāna)

6) Excitement, which scatters outwards. (rGod Pa; auddhatya)

They are the [6] great grounds of great afflictions, because they are the mental factors which invariably arise as the retinue of all afflicted minds, but do not arise in the retinue of others. {26a-c}

d) The non-virtuous great grounds.

The subject is:

1) Immodesty. (Khrel Med; āhrīkya)

2) Shamelessness. (Ngo Tsa Med Pa; manapatrāpya)

They are the [2] great grounds of non-virtuous mind, because they are the mental factors that arise in the retinue of all non-virtuous minds, but do not arise in the retinue of others. {26d}

e) The great grounds of minor afflictions.

The subject is:

1) Belligerence, which is ill-will other than covetousness or malice. (Khro Ba; krodha)

2) Resentment, which increases ill-will in the wake of belligerence. (Khon Du 'Dzin Pa; upanāha)

3 ) Dissimulation, which is the deceit of a dishonest mind. (Gyo; śāṭhya)

4) Jealousy, which is intolerance of others' good fortune. (Phrag Dog; īrṣyā)

5) Obstinacy, which is holding firmly to sin. ('Tsig Pa; pradāsa)

6) Concealment, which hides faults. ('Chab Pa; mrakṣa)

7) Avarice, which doesn't give dharma, material things, and so forth to others, and is an attitude that is contradictory to giving. (Ser sNa; matsarā)

8) Deceit, which misleads others by pretending to have qualities which one does not have. (sGyu; māyā)

9) Haughtiness. (rGyags Pa; mada)

10) Harmfulness, which injures others. (rNam 'Tse; vihiṁsa)

These are the [10] great grounds of minor afflictions, because they are the mental factors which are minor by way of their class of object of abandonment; minor by way of associated concomitants; and minor by way of their supporting level of arisal. The first is established because they are only to be abandoned by Meditation. The second is established because they are concomitants only of mental consciousness. The third is established because they are based only on the mind.[58] {27} [p.106;60a5 ]

(b) <u>Concomitants that are indefinite</u>.

If one asks: If there are five that are definite in category, how many mental factors are there which are indefinite in category?

There are eight mental factors which are indefinite in category. As the Ācārya Vasumitra says:[59]

These eight are explained as indefinite:

1) Investigation. (rTog Pa; vitarka)

2) Analysis. (dPyod Pa; vicāra)

3) Regret. ('Gyod; kaukṛtya)[60]

4) Sleep. (gNyid; middha)

5) Anger. (Khong Khro; pratigha)

6) Attachment. (Chags; rāga)

7) Pride. (Nga rGyal; māna)

8) Doubt (The Tsom; vicikitsā)

Then if one asks: How many mental factors, including indefinite ones, arise in the retinues of which minds?

With a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm, 22 mental factors arise: Since it is mind, it has the ten great grounds of mind; since it is virtuous mind, it has the ten virtuous great grounds; since it is a mind of the Desire Realm, it arises together with investigation and analysis. With some minds of the Desire Realm, by adding regret, 23 mental factors arise.

For a non-virtuous mind, 20 arise, which are concomitant with

exclusively unmixed ignorance,[61] and [20 are] also concomitant with [any of] the three last views:[62] the ten great grounds of mind; the six great grounds of great affliction; the two non-virtuous great grounds; and the two, conceptuality and analysis.

If one asks: Don't 21 arise by adding the view? [Twenty-one] do not arise because the views are afflicted wisdom, and [wisdom] is already counted here among the great grounds of mind.

Twenty-one arise [for a mind] that has [one of the following:] attachment, anger, pride or doubt--the four remaining afflictions;[63] or the ten [great grounds of minor afflictions]--belligerence and so forth; or regret; because on top of the previous 20, [one of these] is itself added.

For an obscuring neutral mind (bsGribs La Lung Du Ma bsTan Pa; nivṛta-avyākṛta), which is concomitant with the first two views, 18 arise: the ten great grounds of mind; the six great grounds of great afflictions; and the two, investigation and analysis arise. [p.107; 60b5]

The other, non-obscuring neutral [mind,] is held to have 12: The ten great grounds of mind, and the two, investigation and analysis arise.

Because it is not contradictory for sleep to be in the retinue of all three, virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral [minds,] in those where there is sleep it should be added. How? It should be applied in this way:

With sleep:

For a virtuous mind,
since it has investigation and analysis
it has 23 mental factors.
To some regret is added.

For those which have a view there are 21.
With [any] the four afflictions, belligerence etc.
or regret, there are 22.

The obscuring have 19,
the other neutrals have 13, it is held.[64] {28-30}

From among those which are in the Desire Realm, regret, sleep and non-virtue are not in the first concentration. There is no regret there because regret is concomitant with mental unhappiness, and there is no mental unhappiness there.

There is no sleep there, because sleep is what gathers the mind inward, and in the first concentration when one gathers the mind inwards it becomes meditative stabilization.

There is no non-virtue there, because without having abandoned that, there can be no birth in the first concentration.[65]

Investigation as well does not exist in the [actual absorption] of a Special first concentration, because [there they have] separated from attachment to investigation.

Above that, from the second concentration on up, there is also no analysis, because having separated from attachment to analysis, it is abandoned.

The term "also" (Yang; api) {ii.31} indicates that dissimulation and deceit also do not exist there. Because wherever there is a chief and his retinue, there, in order for the chief to gather his retinue, there are dissimulation and deceit; but from the second concentration upwards, there is no chief and retinue.[66] There are chiefs and retinues in the first concentration and below, because this is explained as: the subjects of the royal race; the followers of brahmans; the staff of a householder; disciples of a monk; the retinues of the Four Great Royal Lineages; the retinues of the Thirty-three; the subjects of Māra; the subjects of Brahma. {31} [p.108; 61b1]

(c) Differences in what seem similar.

If one asks: Since in the world, what are called shamelessness and immodesty are spoken of as the same, so do they have one meaning or are they different?

They have different meanings: Not having respect for virtue and those who have virtuous qualities is shamelessness. And immodesty is what does not regard disgraceful conduct (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; avadya) with fear.

Some groups say: Not refraining from non-virtue in regard to oneself is shamelessness. Not refraining from transgression in regard to others is immodesty. And the opposite of these two are shame and embarassment.

If one asks: Since in the world affection (dGa' Ba; preman) and respect (Gus Pa; gaurava) are spoken of as the same thing, do they have one meaning or are they different?

They have different meanings, because affection is faith, whereas respect is shame. In general, affection is twofold, afflicted and not [afflicted.] The first is a case such as affection for one's son or wife. The second is like affection for the Teacher, a guru or a virtuous being.

Affection and faith are two-fold, affection and faith with a person as an object; or with a phenomenon as object. Each one of these has four possibilities:

Taking phenomena as object:

What is affection but is not faith; such as afflicted affection with phenomena as object.

What is faith but is not affection; such as the faith of believing in the [two Truths of] Suffering and its Causes.

What is both [faith and affection]; such as the faith of believing in [the Truths of] Cessation and Path.

What is neither; such as everything other than these [three possibilities.]

Taking a person as object:

What is affection but is not faith; such as affection for one's son and wife.

What is faith but not affection; such as faith in another's preceptor (Khen Po). [p.109; 62a1]

What is both; such as affection for one's own preceptor.

What is neither; such as what is other than these.

If one asks: Where are affection and respect with a person as object? They are in the Desire and Form Realms, but not in the Formless Realm, because formless persons are not objects of each other. {32}

Investigation has an aspect of coarseness. Analysis has an aspect of subtlety.

If one says: In that case, there is the consequence that the two, investigation and analysis, would not arise simoultaneously in the retinue of a single mind, becuse it is contradictory that a single mind is [both] coarse and subtle.

There is no mistake: Just as when new butter is placed in cold water and is then struck by the rays of the sun, the cold water won't harden it too much and the sun won't melt it too much; in the same way, investigation will not make [the mind] too coarse, and analysis will not make it too subtle.

The Sautrāntikas say: Since it occurs [in sūtra,][67] "After having

investigated and analyzed one speaks. Without investigating, without analyzing, words are not spoken." So, the two minds which motivate the words which express the nature and particularity of meaning are investigation and analysis.

The Cittamātrans say: Based on intention or wisdom, the two--investigation and analysis--are mental analyses which, [respectively,] search out; and individually ascertain.

For example, [investigation is] the thought, "Which among these clay pots is hard?" And [analysis is] the thought which ascertains, "This is hard." Therefore, the two, investigation and analysis, do not arise in the retinue of a single mind.[68]

If one says: In that case, it is contradictory with the explanation that the first concentration possess the five limbs.[69]

There is no contradiction. Because the idea is that [there are five limbs] in succession, but not [necessarily all] at the same moment. So [the Cittamātrans] say.

Pride (Nga rGyal; māna) is a mind with an aspect of being puffed up (Khengs Pa; unnati). Haughtiness (rGyags Pa; mada) is a mind which is the culmination (Yongs Su gTugs Pa; paryādāna) of attachment to one's own qualities of long life and so forth. {33} [p.110; 62b2]

(d) Uniformity in what seem different.

If one asks: Since mind (Sems; citta), mentality (Yid; manas), and consciousness (rNam Shes; vijñāna) are spoken of as different, do they have the same meaning or are they different?

They have the same meaning, because they are synonymous terms.

And according to the Vaibhāṣikas: It is called mind (citta) because it distinguishes ('Byed; cinoti) virtue and non-virtue.[70] It is called mentality (manas) because it knows (manute) the object. It is called consciousness (vijñāna) because it discerns (vijñānāti) a referent object. So they say.

The Sautrāntikas say: It is mind because it accumulates the subtle propensities (Bag Chags; vāsanā) of virtue and non-virtue. By way of being the support it is called mentality. By being what is based it is called consciousness.

Cittamātrans say:

> Mind (sems) is the consciousness basis of all (Kun gZhi rNam Shes; ālayavijñāna).
> Grasping at a self is mentality (Yid).
> The specific awareness of objects
> is held to be consciousnesses.

Not only that, [the statements that] the mind and mental factors "have a support", "have a referent object", "have an aspect", and "are concomitants", also have the same meaning, because they are synonymous terms.

As for these: Because they are based on the faculties they have a support. Because they grasp an object they have a referent object. Because they grasp the specific characteristics [of a referent object] they have an aspect. Because they grasp together they are concomitants.

There are also five aspects to [the way in which they] are concomitant, because they are similar in terms of substance,[71] support, referent object, aspect and time. {34}

(2) The manner of arisal of non-concomitants.

There are three topics:

(a) The presentation.

(b) The explanation.

(c) Summarizing the meaning.

(a) The presentation.

If one asks: If this is the manner of arisal of the concomitants, how many non-concomitants are there?

The formative forces not associated with concomitants are the subject. There are 14:

The two,

1) Obtainment. (Thob Pa; prāpti)

2) Non-obtainment. (Ma Thob Pa; aprāpti)

3) Homogeneity. (sKal mNyam; sabhāgatā)

4) Non-discrimination. ('Du Shes Med Pa; āsaṁjñika)

5-6) The two types of absorptions.

7) Life. (Srog; jīvita)

8-11) [The four] characteristics. (mTsan Nyid; lakṣaṇa) [p.111; 63b2]

12-14) The collection of words and so forth.

"Also" (Yang; ca) {ii.35} indicates that this also includes, causing a schism in the sangha (dGe 'Dun dByin; sangha-bheda) and such non-associated phenomena of a disagreeable nature.[72] {35}

(b) The explanation.

There are seven topics. Explaining:

1) Obtainment and non-obtainment.

2) Homogeneity.

3) Non-discrimination.

4) The two absorptions.

5) Life.

6) The characteristics.

7) The expressors.

1) Obtainment and non-obtainment.

There are two topics:

a) The actual explanation.

b) Explaining their qualities.

a) The actual explanation.

As it says {ii.35}, "The non-associated formative forces are obtainment, non-obtainment..." If one asks, what are obtainment and non-obtainment?

Obtainment is a substance that makes an individual possess the phenomenon that is to be obtained. There are two obtainments: acquisition (rNyed Pa; pratilambha), and possessing by having obtained (Thob Nas lDan Pa; pratilabdhena samanvāgama).

Acquisition is also [two-fold,] acquisition with no previous obtainment, and acquisition after losing.

The first--[acquisition with no previous obtainment]--is like the obtainment, and the obtainment of obtainment, at the time of the arisal of the first uncontaminated moment. From the second moment onwards it is possessing by having obtained.

Acquisition after losing is like the obtainment, and the obtainment of obtainment, that occurs at the time of generating virtue that is included on

the level of a concentration, for [someone with] the basis of a Desire Realm individual. From the second moment onward after that it is possessing by having obtained.

Moreover, from beginningless time ordinary individuals possess by having obtained the afflictions of the Peak of Existence (Srid rTse; bhavāgra), but these are not acquired; because they are neither acquired with no previous obtainment nor acquired after losing.[73]

[But for someone who] has deteriorated from the state of Arhatship, at the time the afflictions of the Peak of Existence arise, they are both acquired after losing and possessed by having obtained.

Some say: Obtainment, possession and acquisition are synonymous terms. Because it is taught {ii.19}, "One who possessess the faculty of knowing all that is not known will possess 13 faculties..." [p.112; 63b2]

Non-obtainment is a substance that makes the individual dispossess the phenomenon to be obtained. It also is twofold:

Non-acquisition and non-possession.

In the first there is: Non-acquisition with no previous obtainment and non-acquisition after losing.

The first--[non-acquisition with no previous obtainment]--is like the non-obtainment of the afflictions of the peak of cyclic existence at the time

of generating the first moment of the Path of No More Learning.

The second--[non-acquisition after losing]--is like the non-obtainment of [the concentration] at the time of the first moment of losing a concentration.

The non-obtainment which is from the second moment onward [after losing a concentration,] and during the time when an ordinary individual has not generated an uncontaminated path--these are non-possession.

If one asks, what is the reason that obtainment is substantially existent?

The Vaibhāṣikas say: Obtainment is substantially existent. Because it is taught in sūtra: "By generating, obtaining and possessing these ten qualities of no more learning, one becomes an Arhat who has abandoned the five limbs."[74] If one says this:

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu] says: There is the consequence of there being an obtainment of seven jewels for a Cakravartin king. As it says in sūtra, "The Cakravartin king possesses seven jewels."[75]

Moreover, when one asks, what is this so-called obtainment? If one says that obtainment is the cause of the arisal of the phenomenon to be obtained, there is the consequence that the obtainment of the two cessations would not exist; because these two do not have arisals.[76]

If one says: Nonetheless, the obtainment that arises simoultaneously

with the phenomenon is the cause of the phenomenon to be obtained: There is the consequence of there being no sense in accepting arisal, and the arisal of arisal, because of your position.[77]

If one says: Obtainment is a reason for designating, because it is by way of having or not having the obtainment of the uncontaminated path that one is designated as an ordinary or an Āryan being; if this were not so, then, when the Āryan, arising from meditative equipoise, manifests mundane mind, since he would not have obtainment of the uncontaminated path, nor would he be manifesting the uncontaminated path, it would be unacceptable that he is an Āryan. [p.113; 64a3]

There is no fault: Because even though there is no obtainment of the uncontaminated path, it is by way of their abandonment of the the seeds of affliction that they are established as Āryans.

Obtainment is included within one's own continuum, and not within the continuum of another. Because if the obtainment of one being's continuum arose within another being, the consequences would be completely absurd.

Moreover, [phenonema] that are included within a continuum have obtainment, but there is no obtainment of saṁskṛtas which are not included within a continuum; because they are common to oneself and others,

whereas an obtainment is not common to anything else.

If one asks: Is this definite for all [saṁskṛtas and asaṁskṛtas?] It is in reference to saṁskṛtas, but it is not definite for asaṁskṛtas. Because, although the two cessations are not included within a continuum, since the objects of cessation of these two are included within a continuum, the obtainment of the two cessations exists and is included in the continuum.[78]

Non-obtainment also is included [only] within one's own continuum, and [is restricted to phenomena that are] included within a continuum; because there is no obtainment within the continuum of another; and there is no obtainment that is not included within a continuum; and the tenet of the [Vaibhāṣikas] is that, "What has no obtainment also has no non-obtainment."[79] {36}

b) Explaining their qualities.

i) The qualities of obtainment.

ii) The qualities of non-obtainment.

i) The qualities of obtainment.

The obtainment of the phenomenon to be obtained, which is of the three times, also has three aspects of time. As for example, even a single past phenomenon to be obtained, has the three--past, future and present obtainment.

For a virtuous phenomenon to be obtained, its obtainment is virtuous "and so forth" (La Sogs; ādi) {ii.37}--which means that the obtainment of a non-virtuous phenomenon to be obtained is non-virtuous, and the obtainment of a neutral phenomenon to be obtained is neutral.

For phenomena to be obtained that are included within the three realms, their obtainment is also included within their own realm. For example: When an individual with a Desire Realm basis generates the obtainment of a Desire Realm phenomenon in his continuum, that obtainment is included in the Desire Realm. [p.114; 64b4] When the obtainment of a phenomenon of the Form Realm arises in his continuum, it is included within the Form Realm. When the obtainment of a phenomenon of the Formless Realm arises, it is included in the Formles Realm. And it is the same for the continuum of an individual who has a support of the Form Realm.

If one asks: What kind of obtainment arises in the case of obtainment of a phenomenon of the Desire Realm by a being with a basis of the Form Realm? An obtainment of the emanation mind (sPrul Sems; nirmāṇa-citta) {vii.49} of the Desire Realm arises.

On a basis of the Formless Realm an obtainment of phenomena of the two lower realms does not arise. When an obtainment of the phenomena of the Formless Realm arises, it is included in the Formless Realm.

Phenomena to be obtained which are not included in the realms are the two cessations and the truth of the path. Their obtainments are of four types: those included in the Desire Realm; those included in the Form Realm; those included in the Formless Realm; and those that are not included in the realms. The obtainment of non-analytical cessations is included in the three realms. The contaminated obtainment of analytical cessations[80] is included in the two upper realms. The uncontaminated obtainment of these, as well as the obtainment of Truth of the Path are not included in the realms.[81]

The obtainment of [phenomena of the level of] Learning is [of the level of] Learning.[82] The obtainment of [phenomena of the level of] No more learning is No more learning. As these two points are easy to understand they are not stated explicitly in the root text.

The phenomena to be obtained which are neither Learning nor No more learning are the two cessations and contaminated phenomena; but their obtainments are of three types: Learning, No more learning, and neither Learning nor No more learning. The obtainment of an analytical cessation of Learning is Learning. The obtainment of an analytical cessation of No more

learning is No more learning. [p.115; 65a5] The contaminated obtainment of an analytical cessation; the obtainment of non-analytical cessations; and obtainment of contaminated [phenomena;] are neither Learning nor No more learning.

The obtainment of objects to be abandoned by Seeing are to be abandoned by Seeing. The obtainment of objects to be abandoned by Meditation are to be abandoned by Meditation.

Objects of obtainment which are not to be abandoned are the two cessations and the Truth of the Path; and their obtainments are held to be twofold: to be abandoned by Meditation, and objects not to be abandoned. Because the contaminated obtainment of analytical cessations, and the obtainment of non-analytical cessations are to be abandoned by Meditation. The non-contaminated obtainment of analytical cessations, and the obtainment of the Truth of the Path, are objects not to be abandoned.

If one asks: As it says {ii.37}, "There are three aspects of [obtainment of phenomena] of the three times," is that definite for all? The obtainment of a non-obcuring neutral phenomenon arises simoultaneously [with the phenomenon] and does not arise before or after it, because it has little force.[83]

If one asks: Is this definite for all non-obscuring neutrals? This does

not include the divine eye (lHa'i Mig; divya-cakṣur-abhijñā), the clairvoyant ear (rNa Ba'i mNgon Shes; divya-śrotrābhijñā),[84] and the emanation mind (sPrul Pa'i Sems; nirmāṇa-citta)--which do have [obtainment of] the three times. These have force because they must be accomplished with effort.

Also, the obtainment of obscuring [neutral] forms of the Form Realm arise simoultaneously [with those forms] and not before or after. Since its nature is material it is posited as dull (Blun Pa; jaḍa); and since the motivation is of little force it is posited as being of little force.[85]

In the Desire Realm, prior obtainment of virtuous or non-virtuous form does not arise, because it is material and it does not follow mind. {37-39b}

ii) <u>The qualities of non-obtainment</u>.

As it says {ii.37}, "The [obtainments of] virtuous [phenomena] etc. are virtuous etc.," if one asks: Is that also definite for non-obtainment.

Non-obtainment is non-obscuring neutral; but it is not virtuous, because even the continuum of one who has cut the roots of virtue has it. [p.116; 65b6] It is not afflicted, because even the continuum of one who is separated from attachment has it.

If one asks: As it says {ii.37}: "There are three aspects of [obtainment of phenomena] of the three times," is this also definite for non-obtainment?

The non-obtainment of phenomena to be obtained of past and unarisen [phenomena] have the three aspects of time. But present objects of obtainment do not have present non-obtainment, because however weak may be the phenomenon to be obtained, it arises simoultaneously with its obtainment.

The non-obtainment of phenomena that are included in the three realms, the Desire Realm and so forth; and also the non-obtainment of pure phenomena,[86] the two [Truths of] Cessation and the Path, are included in the three realms:[87] the generation of non-obtainment of any phenomena in the continuum of an individual of the Desire Realm is included in the Desire Realm. The generation of non-obtainment of any phenomena in the contimuum of an individual of the Form Realm is included in the Form Realm. The generation of non-obtainment of any phenomena in the contimuum of an individual of the Formless Realm is included in the Formless Realm.

If one asks: Since the obtainment of the Truth of the Path is Truth of the Path, is the non-obtainment of the Truth of the Path similarly Truth of the Path? It is not. Because one with non-obtainment of the Truth of the Path is considered to be an ordinary individual and not an Āryan.

If one asks: How is such non-obtainment of the Truth of the Path lost? It will be lost by obtainment of the Truth of the Path, or by passing to a higher or lower level.

If one asks: In that case is there obtainment of obtainment and non-obtainment of non-obtainment and so forth? There is.

If one says: If there is, it will be infinite regression. One can say there is infinite regression based on simoultaneous [obtainmentl; or one can say there is [infinite regression] based on prior or subsequent [obtainment.] For example: In the first case there will not be [infinite regression] because, at the time of arisal of a virtuous phenomenon, for example, the obtainment of that [phenomenon] causes the individual to possess that phenomenon to be obtained and the obtainment of obtainment. The obtainment of obtainment causes the indivividual to possess the obtainment. [p.117; 66b1]

In the second case [infinite regression] is accepted: At the time of arisal of a virtuous phenomenon, for example, it's obtainment and obtainment of obtainment arise simoultaneously. In the second moment, six arise simoultaneously, [because these three] having become phenomena to be obtained, there are their three obtainments, and the obtainments of their obtainments. In the third moment, the phenomena to be obtained having become nine, there are their nine obtainments, and the nine obtainments of the obtainments, arising simoultaneously, and so forth.

As for non-obtainment, if there is no possession of the phenomenon to be obtained, there is no other arisal of non-obtainment of non-obtainment, because there is definitely only the two, possession of or non-possession of

the phenomenon to be obtained. {39c-40}

2) Homogeneity.

If one asks: As it says {ii.41}, "Homogeneity...," what is that? Homogeneity is a substance that causes similarity in the activities, thought, and nature of sentient beings.

If one clasifies it, it is twofold: Specific (Tha Dad; bhinna); and generic (Tha Dad Min Pa; abhinna). The latter is a substance that causes the mere similarity among sentient beings. Since all sentient beings have an individual substance of homogeneity, and although the substances are distinct they are of the same type, they are called generic.[88]

The first, [specific homogeneity,] is a substance that causes the mutual similarities within groups such as gods, humans, novice monks, and so forth.[89]

If one asks: What is the reason that homogenity is a substance?

There is a reason for it. It is in order to apply the commonality of these things in terms and concept.[90] And it says in sutra: "If in this case one is born with the homogeneity of human beings..."[91]

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu] replies: The consequence would be that even external [non-sentient] things like rice would have the substance of homogeneity, because a commonality of terms and concepts is applied to

them. Also, that quotation, "If in this case...etc." is not suitable as a proof of that, because the intention there is to indicate only the similarity in saṁskāras for birth among humans.[92] [p.118; 67a1]

Moreover, this is putting forth the principles of the Vaiśeṣikas because it agrees that there is a generality (sPyi; sāmānya) which is a different substance from the particular case (gSal Ba; vyakta). {41a}

3) Non-discrimination.

If one asks: As it says {ii.35}, "The absorption of non-discrimination...," what is this non-discrimination? Non-discrimination is a substance that arrests mind and mental factors in the continuum of an individual born [on the level of] non-discrimination.

If one asks: How long is [discrimination] arrested? In the *Prajñapti-śāstra* it says:

> It is for five hundred great eons. If one asks, is that definite for all? It is not definite. Because other than in [the Northern continent of] Kuru there is uncertainty of time of death.
>
> If one asks, in their continuum is there never any mind at all? There is [mind.] Because at the time of birth and at death the mind becomes manifest.

If one asks: From among the three arisals,[93] which type is non-discrimination? It is the fruition (rNam sMin; vipāka) of cultivating the absorption of non-discrimination. Because it is by cultivating it that one takes

birth as a being of non-discrimination.

If one asks: Where do these beings abide? They live in one part of Bṛhatphala ('Bras Bu Che Ba) [in the fourth concentration,] but in no other place. For example, it is like the Mahābrahma gods, who do not have any dwelling place other than the [heaven of the] Brahma-purohitas (Tsangs Pa mDun Na 'Dun).

If one asks: Where are these beings of non-discrimination born after that? Afterwards they are born in the Desire Realm. At that time the previous force of meditation on the absorption of non-discrimination is exhausted; and since they were unconscious during that time, they did not collect any new karma. There is a reason why they are born afterwards in the Desire Realm: Because in their continuums they have a karma to be experienced in a subsequent existence (Lan Grangs gZhan La Myong 'Gyur Gyi Las; karma-apara-paryāya-vedanīya)[94] to be reborn later in the Desire Realm. For example: It is like the beings of the Northern continent of Kuru who [have the karma to be born] later [as gods of] the Desire Realm.[95] {41b-d} [p.119; 67b2]

4) <u>The two absorptions</u>.

There are three topics:

a) The explanation of the

absorption of non-discrimination ('Du Shes Med Pa'i sNyoms 'Jug; asaṁjñi-samāpatti).

b) The explanation of the absorption of cessation ('Gog Pa'i sNyoms 'Jug; nirodha-samāpatti).

c) The explanation of the common support of these two.

a) The explanation of the absorption of non-discrimination.

Just like non-discrimination, what is called the absorption of non-discrimination is also a substance which arrests the mind and mental factors from the time of entering the absorption until arising from it.

If one asks: On which level is this included? It is included on the last, fourth concentration. Because by cultivating this, one is born in the fourth concentration.

If one asks: With what kind of mental engagement (Yid Byed; manasikāra) or motivation does one undertake this absorption? It is with the desire for liberation, the mind that renounces cyclic existence, because one engages in the absorption having perceived non-discrimination as liberation, and the absorption of non-discrimination as the path to liberation.

If one asks: Is it virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral? By way of

motivation it is virtuous, because of perceiving the absorption of non-discrimination as the path of liberation.

If one asks, from among the three times to be experienced (Myong 'Gyur; vedanīya) which is it? It is to be experienced in the next life (sKyes Nas Myong 'Gyur; upapadya-vedanīya). Because having based on this meditation, in the next [life] one is born as a being of non-discrimination. For example, it is like the beings of the Northern continent of Kuru who will definitely be born afterwards as Desire Realm gods.

If one asks: For which type of individual is it? It is an absorption [cultivated by] ordinary individuals but not by Āryans. By cultivating this one will be born as a being of non-discrimination; but the Āryan sees this as a pitfall, like a place of bad migration.[96]

If one asks: At the time of generating the virtue that is included on the level of the fourth concentration in the continuum of an Āryan, the obtainment of that has the three aspects of time; is there likewise the three aspects of time for this obtainment [of non-discrimination?] For this the obtainment of one time [only] arises, but past and future [obtainments] do not arise. Because there is not mind; and because it is necessary to accomplish it with great effort.[97] {42} [p.120; 68a3]

b) <u>The explanation of the</u>

absorption of cessation.

If one asks: If the absorption of cessation, just like non-discrimination, is a substance that arrests the concomitants, then with what kind of mental engagement is the absorption undertaken? It is undertaken in order to abide in pleasure in this life.[98]

If one asks: On which level is it included? It is included on the level arising in the Peak of Existence, because by cultivating this, one is born in the Peak of Existence; and the subtlest mind of the three realms is the mind of the Peak of Existence, and one enters the absorption of cessation after making this [mind] still more subtle.[99]

If one asks: Is it virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral? By way of motivation it is virtuous. Because one undertakes the absorption in order to abide in the pleasure of the present life.[100]

If one asks: Which of the three times to be experienced is it? It has three [possibilities,] two [times to be experienced]--to be experienced in the next life to be experienced in subsequent existences; or its experience of fruition can be indefinite.[101] [Cases of these three possibilities are] respectively: One is born in the Peak of Existence in the life following that in which one cultivated the absorption of cessation. One is born there from the second life onwards after having cultivated [the absorption of cessation.] One attains Nirvāṇa in this life. These are the three [possibilities.]

If one asks: Is it for ordinary individuals or Āryans? It is for Āryans, and not for ordinary individuals. Because one must obtain it by the force of the supermundane path.[102]

If one asks: How is it obtained?: It is obtained through effort, but it is not obtained [merely] by obtaining separation from attachment. Because it is an unconscious absorption, a phenomenon with which one has no previous familiarity in cyclic existence.[103]

However, for the Sage, the absorption of cessation is obtained by having acquired the knowledge of extinction (Zad Pa Shes Pa; kṣaya-jñāna) [at the moment] of enlightenment (Byang Chub; bodhi). But [for the Sage] it is not to be obtained by effort, because the Sage does not have any dharmas whatsoever that arise from effort. [p.121; 68b4]

Here, the Vaibhāṣikas residing to the west of Kāśmīr (Pāścātya)[104] say: According to the treatise[105] of the system of the Sthavira Upagupta (gNas brTan Nye Srungs), "The Tathāgatas generate the knowledge of exhaustion having first generated the absorption of cessation." If one follows this statement, the Bodhisattva who has obtained the mind of the Peak of Existence first generates the Path of Seeing, basing it on the actual absorption of the fourth concentration; then, having already actualized the mind of the Peak of Existence, he enters the absorption of cessation. Having arisen from that, basing on the actual absorption of the fourth concentration,

he generates the knowledge of extinction. If one says this:

There is the consequence that the Bodhisattva does not actualize the absorption of cessation first, before enlightenment. Because [a Bodhisattva] obtains the knowledge of extinction, enlightenment, having generated the 34 moments of the uncontaminated path without interruption. If one asks: What are the 34 moments? They are the 16 moments of realizing the Truths (bDen Pa mNgon Par rTogs Pa; satyābhisamaya); the nine Uninterrupted Paths (Bar Chad Med Lam; ānantarya-mārga) that abandon the afflictions of the Peak of Existence, and the nine Paths of Liberation (rNam Grol Lam; vimukti-mārga).[106]

Some say: The reason is not established that he generates the uncontaminated path without interruption; because he [could] enter the absorption of cessation in between. If one says this:

In that case there would be the consequence that the Bodhisattva would have a failure of his resolution. Because, as one who has resolved with the thought, "Until I obtain enlightenment I will not arise from the uncontaminated path," he would then, in between, be actualizing a worldly path. This can not be accepted because, by perfectly accumulating the collections of merit and wisdom he has a steadvast vow. If one says this: [p.122; 69a4]

The Bahirdeśakas (Nyi 'Og Pa) say: It is agreed that the Bodhisattva

does not break his resolution. But he does not resolve with the thought "Until I obtain enlightenment I will not arise from the uncontaminated path." Rather, he resolves with the thought, "I will not break my meditative posture (sKyil Krung; paryaṇka) until I attain enlightenment." Because it is in one sitting that he accomplishes all of his purposes. So they say. {43-44c}

c) The explanation of the common support of these two.

If one asks: On what support does one actualize this absorption of cessation? Both [this absorption and the absorption of non-discrimination] have as their support the Desire and the Form Realms. However, the absorption of non-discrimination is not actualized on a support of the Formless Realm, because it is included in the level of the fourth concentration. The absorption of cessation is not actualized on a support of the Formless Realm, because, if in the Formless Realm all the concomitants of formless [existence] cease, then, since it is not possible to remain only [on the support of] the non-associated formative forces, there would be the fault that one would immediately be in Nirvāṅa.

If one asks: In that case, what is the difference between these two? The absorption of cessation arises for the first time among humans. Since humans have coarse feelings and discriminations they can easily generate

disgust [for cyclic existence], and they have clear minds. It is afterwards that there can be arisal on a support of the Form Realm.

The absorption of non-discrimination is first generated on a support of the Form Realm. Because it is not done in order to pacify coarse feelings and formative forces; but rather, it is undertaken due to having perceived the absorption of non-discrimination as the path of liberation. {44d-e}

5) Life.

If one asks: As it says {ii.35}, "Life...", what is this life? Life (Srog; jīvita) is longevity (Tse; āyus). Because it says in the *Prajñapti-śāstra*: "If one asks what is life? It is the longevity of the three realms."[107]

If one asks: What is longevity? Longevity is what provides the support of warmth and consciousness.[108] [p.123; 69b5] Furthermore, in the Desire and Form Realms it is the support of both warmth and consciousness; but in the Formless Realm it is only the support of consciousness.

If one asks: What is the support of longevity? It is warmth and consciousness.

The Sautrāntikas say: There is the consequence that longevity, warmth and consciousness would not be ended (lDog Pa Med Pa; anivṛtti). By being the supports of each other, until longevity is eliminated, warmth and consciousness will not end. And until those two are eliminated, longevity

will not end.

The Vaibhāṣikas, believing that that fault is removed, say: Warmth and consciousness are not the support of longevity, but previous karma is the support of longevity. Because longevity remains to the extent that it is projected ('Phangs Pa; ākṣipta) by previous karma.

If one says: In that case, what is the reason for karma [itself] not being the support of consciousness? It is not, because if it were, the consciousness would become fruition, when in fact consciousness is variously virtuous and non-virtuous.[109]

If one says: Then is death only because of the exhaustion of longevity? Here there are four possibilities:

Death from the exhaustion of longevity without the exaustion of merit: such as [death through] the exhaustion of karma which ripens as longevity; but without the exhaustion of the karma that ripens as objects of enjoyment.[110]

Death where longevity is not exhausted but merits have been exhausted: such as death without the exhaustion of karma that ripens in longevity; but having exhausted the karma that ripens as the objects of enjoyment.

[Death] which is both: such as death having exhausted both karmas that ripen in longevity and those which ripen as objects of enjoyment.

[Death] which is neither: such as untimely death (Dus Ma Yin Par 'Chi Ba; akāla-maraṇa), when neither the karma that ripens in longevity nor that which ripens as the objects of enjoyment is exhausted.[111] {45a-b}

6) The characteristics.

The characteristics [of saṁskṛta phenomena] are: arising (sKye Ba; jāti), aging (rGa Ba; jarā), duration (gNas Pa; sthiti), and impermanence (Mi rTag Pa; anityatā). And because these mark phenomena as saṁskṛta, they are the definitive characteristics [of saṁskṛta phenomena.]

Arising is what causes [a phenomenon] to arise.

Aging is what causes [a phenomenon] to decay. [p.124; 70a5]

Duration is what causes [a phenomenon] to persist.

Impermanence is what causes [a phenomenon] to perish.

If one says: If there are four characteristics, why does it say in sūtra: "These three are the definitive characteristics of saṁskṛtas: The arisal of saṁskṛtas is known. Their passing away is known. And their transformation of duration (gNas Pa La gZhen Du 'Gyur Ba; sthityanyathātvam) is known?"[112]

The Vaibhāṣikas say: It was in order to generate aversion to cyclic existence among sentient beings that duration is not explicitly mentioned. But it does not say that duration does not exist.

Some say:[113] [The sūtra] also teaches duration. Because in the statement, "Their transfomation of duration is known," it teaches duration by joining it together with "transformation." If one asks: What is the purpose of teaching this by putting these together? There is a purpose. Duration is a basis of attraction, so it is in order to eliminate attraction [for duration that it is combined with transformation.][114]

If one asks: Since [the four characteristics] of arisal etc. are also saṁskṛtas, don't they [each] have another [four characteristics of] arisal and so forth? They do have them. Arisal etc. also has the arisal of arisal and so forth.

If one says: Since the arisal of arisal etc. are also saṁskṛtas, they also must have arisal and so forth, and if this is the case, there will be infinite regression.

There will not be. For example, when a pot arises, that arisal applies to ('Jug Pa; vṛtti) eight dharmas, and the arisal of arisal applies to one dharma. How is that? For example, when a pot arises, nine dharmas arise simoultaneously: Itself, the four [characteristics of] arisal etc., and the four [secondary characteristics of] arisal of arisal etc. At that time, the arisal generates eight dharmas not including itself; and the arisal of arisal only generates arisal.

If the Sautrāntikas say: This arisal and so forth imagined by the

Vaibhāṣikas is not established. It is not established either by direct perception or by inference; nor is it taught in scripture. [p.125; 70b8]

The Vaibhāṣikas reply: There is not the fault that it is not taught in scripture, because it says: "These three are the definitive characteristics of saṁskṛtas: The arisal of saṁskṛtas is known...etc."

The Sautrāntikas reply: That [is taught] because immature beings embrace the continuum of produced phenomena ('Du Byed; saṁskāra) as a self or belonging to a self; and it is in order to counteract the embracing [of this error] that [the Buddha] taught arisal and so forth in terms of a continuum of produced phenomena. But he did not teach [arisal etc.] in terms of a single moment.

If one says: In that case, how does a continuum of produced phenomena have arisal etc.? It does have them. The beginning of the continuum is arisal. The consistent continuity (rJes Su mThun Par 'Jug Pa; anuvartamāna) is duration. The differences in the series at earlier and later [stages] is aging. The cessation of the continuum is its passing away. So the [Sautrāntikas] say.

If one says: If a phenomenon is generated by a future arising, then all phenomena would arise simultaneously.

All phenomena to be generated are not simoultaneously generated by

arising, because there is no power to generate them in the absence of causes and conditions.[115] {45c-46}

7) The expressors.

If one asks: As it says {ii.36}, "The collection of words and so forth," what are these? The collection of words and so forth are the collections words (Ming Gi Tsogs; nāma-kāya); phrases (Ngag; pada); and phonemes (Yi Ge; vyañjana).

If one asks: What are their natures?

Words are terms that indicate the mere entity of objects. For example, like saying "pot."

Since phrase (Ngag; pada) and discourse (Tsig; vākya) have the same meaning, discourse is terms which indicate differences of meaning. For example, like saying "Alas! saṁskṛtas are impermanent."

The nature of phonemes is a tone of voice that acts as the support of designation for the two, words and discourse. Like, for example, saying "ka."

Collection (Tsogs; kāya) has the meaning of many.

(c) Summarizing the meaning.

If one asks: For the collections of words, discourse and phonemes: In which of the three realms are they included? Are they indicative or not

indicative of a sentient being (Sems Can Du sTon Pa; sattvākhya)? Among the three arisals, which are they? Are they virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral? [p.126; 71a8]

These three are included in the Desire and Form Realms, but not in the Formless Realm, because there is no sound there.

They are indicative of a sentient being, because they are included within the continuum [and not as part of the object they refer to.]

They are naturally flowing arisals (rGyu mThun Las Byung Ba; naiḥṣandikā), because they arise from homogeneity. They are not arisen from fruition because they arise as desired [by the expressing individual.] They are not arisen from development because they are not physical.

They are non-obscuring neutral, but they are not virtuous, because they exist even in the continuum of an individual who has cut the roots of virtue.

They are non-afflicted, because they exist even in a continuum that is separated from attachment. {47a-d}

Similarly, homogeneity (sKal mNyam; sabhāgatā) is a naturally flowing arisal; indicative of a sentient being; and non-obscuring neutral. It is also [arisen from] fruition, because this substance which makes the similarity in the eye and so forth--things which are born from fruition--is [itself] fruition. It

is included in the three realms, because all sentient beings have the substance that makes them like sentient beings, or they have their individual substance of homogeneity. {47d-48b}

Obtainment also has both aspects of being a naturally flowing arisal and arisen from fruition. The latter is true because that obtainment of the eye and so forth--which are born from fruition--is [itself] fruition.

The [four] characteristics are also naturally flowing arisals and arisen from fruition.

The two [non-conscious] absorptions and "non-possession" [which means] non-obtainment are naturally flowing arisals, but not arisen from fruition. Because the two absorptions are definitely virtuous; and non-possession is arisen incidentally and is not caused by karma previously thrown by the mind. {48b-d} [p.127; 71b2]

B. <u>The ancillary explanation of causes and conditions together with results</u>.

1. The explanation of the causes together with results.

2. The explanation of conditions.

1. The explanation of the causes together with results.

a. The explanation of causes.

b. The explanation of results.

c. The explanation of qualities that are common to both of these.

a. The explanation of causes.

(1) The presentation.

(2) The explanation.

(3) Summarizing the meaning.

(1) The presentation.

If one asks: As it says {ii.46}, "In the absence of causes and conditions [arising does not generate the objects to be generated,"] how many of these causes are there?

Causes are held to be of six types: Efficient cause (Byed rGyu; kāraṇa-hetu). Connate cause (lHan Cig 'Byung Ba'i rGyu; sahabhū-hetu). Homogenous cause (sKal mNyam Gyi rGyu; sabhāga-hetu). Concomitant cause (mTsungs Par lDan Pa'i rGyu; saṁprayuktaka-hetu). Omnipresent

cause (Kun 'Gro'i rGyu; sarvatraga-hetu). Fruitional cause (rNam sMin Gyi rGyu; vipāka-hetu). {49}

(2) The explanation.

From among the six the first is:

(a) Efficient cause.

If one asks: As it says {49}, "Efficient cause, connate cause and..." What is efficient cause?

When a particular phenomenon arises, all phenomena other than itself are posited as its efficient cause, because their condition is a state of not obstructing the arisal of that phenomenon. For example: It is like saying "The king has made me happy," of a king who has [merely] not done any harm.

Some say: It is not correct that when a particular phenomenon arises all phenomena other than itself remain in the state of not obstructing the arisal of that phenomenon. Because objects to be abandoned by Seeing obstruct the arisal of the Path of Seeing; and the rays of the sun obstruct the arisal of awareness of the stars. If one says this:

There is no fault. Because arisal takes place as soon as the causes are assembled, and in that case there is nothing that has the power to obstruct it.

All efficient causes do have the potential [for causing arisal,] because,

[for example,] having taken an asaṁskṛta as an object a mental consciousness arises; [and taking objects] other than that, an eye consciousness and so forth arises.[116]

Some say: We can agree that something which has the potential to obstruct arisal but does not enact the obstruction is an efficient cause. But it is not acceptable that what does not have the potential to obstruct arisal, and does not obstruct it, is an efficient cause. If one says that: [p.128; 72b1]

There is no fault. Because efficient cause is posited by way of merely being a state that does not obstruct arisal. For example: It is like saying of a king who does not have the power to do harm, and does no harm, "The king has made me happy." {50a}

(b) Connate cause.

There are two topics:

1) The definition.

2) Examples.

1) The definition.

The definition of connate cause is that which provides assistance in terms of yielding reciprocal results.[117] {50b}

2) Examples.

In this there are two topics:

a) The general presentation.

b) Explaining in detail the attendants of mind.

a) The general presentation.

If one asks: What is an example of this connate cause?

It is like the four elements which arise simoultaneously; or like the mind and the attendants of mind; or it is like the [four] characteristics of arisal etc. and the thing characterized. {50c-d}

b) Explaining in detail the attendants of mind.

If one asks: As it says {ii.50}, "The attendants of mind...," what are these?

The mental factors; the two restraints (sDom Pa; saṁvara), the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint; the [four] characteristics of the mind; and the [four] characteristics--arisal etc.--of those mental factors and two restraints; these are the subject.

They are the attendants of mind, because they have the same time--

arising, cessation and duration--as mind; and although they are not identical to that [mind,] they are identical at least in terms of time.

[They are the same in terms of result because:] They have the same result of human effort (sKyes Bu Byed 'Bras Bu; puruṣa-kāra-phala) and sovereign result (bDag Po'i 'Bras Bu; adhipati-phala);[118] "and so forth" {ii.51} means they have the same fruition result (rNam sMin 'Bras Bu; vipāka-phala) and naturally flowing result (rGyu mThun Gyi 'Bras Bu; niṣyanda-phala).

And they are the same in the nature of the mind, being virtuous "and so forth"--non-virtuous or neutral.

If one asks: Which minds act as the concurrent conditions (lHan Cig Byed rKyen)[119] for how many phenomena?

Among the minds, the non-obscuring neutral has the least [number of phenomena] in its retinue, as it acts as the concurrent condition for 58 phenomena:[120] It acts as concurrent condition for the ten great grounds of mind; their 40 characteristics--arisal etc.; its own four root characteristics; and its four secondary characteristics (rJes mThun Gyi mTsan Nyid; anulakṣaṇa). [p.129; 73a2]. The latter is established because it is close [to the four root characteristics,] and the mind itself [is strong enough to have] force.

Going back in the other direction (Tsur) it acts as the concurrent

condition for 54, by not including the four secondary characteristics; and those four are not included because they are weaker than the mind.

The Bahirdeśakas say: It is not acceptable to say: even the forty characteristics of the ten great grounds of mind can not act as the concurrent condition when going back in the other direction, because they have insufficient force. This is unacceptable because the *Prakaraṇa-grantha* (*Rab Tu Byed Pa*)[121] already explained that the [characteristics of] arisal etc. of the mental factors that are concomitant with the view of the transitory collection ('Jig lTa; satkāya-dṛṣṭi) are a cause of the view of the transitory collection and its naturally flowing [result]. {51}

(c) Homogeneous cause.

Homogenous cause is similar in type to its result. And the meaning of same type is [to be the same in terms of:] contaminated virtue; uncontaminated formative forces; the afflicted; and non-obscuring neutrals. Therefore the five aggregates [which are one of these types] are homogenous cause [to aggregates of the same type.]

If one asks: Are all things that are similar in type homogenous cause? From among the five types of objects to be abandoned, those that are the same type as itself are [homogenous cause.] But if they are a different type they are not [homogenous cause.] For example: An object to be abandoned

by Seeing the Truth of Suffering is homogenous cause with objects to be abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering; but it is not homogenous cause to objects to be abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Origination.

Furthermore, all those that are of the same level as itself are homogenous cause; but those of a different level are not. As, for example, objects to be abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering of the Desire Realm are homogenous cause with objects to be abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering of the Desire Realm; however, they are not homogenous cause with objects to be abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering which are of the Form Realm.

If one asks: Are all those that are of the same level [homogenous cause?] Previously arisen past and present phenomena are homogenous cause, but future phenomena are not. [p.130; 73b3] Because a future phenomenon is out of order. So, past phenomena are homogenous cause of present and future phenomena; and present phenomena are homogenous cause of future phenomena.

If one asks: Is it definite for all homogenous cause that [the phenomena] must be of the same level? It is definite for contaminated phenomena, but in the case of the uncontaminated nine levels of the path[122]--they are mutually homogenous cause to equal or superior [levels.]

For example: The path of a Follower by Faith (Dad Pa'i rJes 'Brang;

śraddhānusārin) is homogenous cause for paths that are equal or superior, from the path of a Follower by Faith up to that of an Immoveable Holder of the Dharma (Mi Gyo Ba'i Chos Can; akopyadharman).[123] And the Path of Seeing is homogenous cause to three paths, the Path of Seeing, Path of Meditation and Path of No More Learning. The Path of Meditation is homogenous cause to the Path of Meditation and the Path of No More Learning. And the Path of No More Learning is homogenous cause to the Path of No More Learning.[124]

If one says: In that case, there is the consequence that the uncontaminated path of Followers by Faith which is included on the level of the second concentration could not be the equal homogenous cause of the uncontaminated path of Followers by Faith that is included on the level of the first concentration. Because the first concentration is inferior to those from the second concentration on up.

There is no fault. Because these two will be homogenous cause of [paths that are] equal or superior by way of faculties, or extensiveness of causes (rGyus rGyas Pa; hetu-pacayatas). The path of Followers by Faith that belongs to the level of the second concentration, and the path of Followers by Faith that belongs to the first concentration, are equal by way of faculties, because these two are equal in being paths for those of dull faculties. The path of Followers by Reason (Chos Kyi rJes 'Brang; dharmānusārin) that

belongs to the first concentration is superior to the path of Followers by Faith that belongs to the second concentration, because it is a path for those with sharp faculties. [p.131; 74a3] The uncontaminated Path of Meditation that belongs to the level of the first concentration is superior to the Path of Seeing that belongs to the level of the second concentration by way of the extensiveness of causes, because it has [more] extensive uncontaminated homogenous causes.[125]

If one asks: Is it definite only for uncontaminated [phenomena that they are homogenous cause of] equal or superior [phenomena]? Contaminated phenomena that are acquired by effort (sByor Ba Las Byung Ba; prayogaja) are also homogenous cause only to equal or superior phenomena. For example: The [qualities] that proceed from hearing are homogenous cause of the three qualities which proceed from hearing, reflection and meditation. The qualities that proceed from reflection are homogenous cause to those that proceed from reflection and meditation. The qualities that proceed from meditation are homogenous cause with those that proceed from meditation.

[The qualities] that proceed from hearing in the Desire Realm are homogenous cause to themselves and to what proceeds from reflection in the Desire Realm. But they are not homogenous cause to the qualities that proceed from meditation in the Desire Realm; because phenomena that

proceed from meditation in the Desire Realm do not exist. They are not the cause of qualities that proceed from hearing etc. in the Form Realm, because they are not of the same level.

The [qualities] that proceed from hearing in the Form Realm are homogenous cause to themselves and what proceeds from meditation [in that realm;] but they are not the cause of qualities that proceed from reflection [in that realm;] because in the Form Realm there are no qualities that proceed from reflection.[126] They are also not [homogenous cause of qualities] that proceed from hearing and so forth in the Desire Realm; because those are inferior.

The [qualities] that proceed from meditation in the Formless Realm are homogenous cause to what proceeds from meditation [in their own realm,] but they are not homogenous cause to what proceeds from hearing or reflection there because those two do not exist there. {52-53b}

(d) Concomitant cause.

Concomitant cause are minds and mental factors which have the same support.

If one says: In that case, what is the difference between saying that the minds and mental factors are connate cause, and saying that they are concomitant cause? They are connate cause because they are mutually the

result of each other. [p.132; 74b4] They are concomitant cause in the sense of being similar because they have five similarities.[127]

For example, [connate cause] is like companions [in a caravan] who, by increasing each other's strength, take to the road. [Concomitant cause is like:] They use in common the food and so forth that is to be taken.

(e) Omnipresent cause.

The cause that is called omnipresent is [a cause of phenomena that are] afflicted and which are of the same level as itself; but they do not have to be of the same type.[128]

If one asks: Is it sufficient that they merely be of the same level? Omnipresent cause must arise previous to its result. {54a-b}

(f) Fruitional cause.

As for fruitional cause: Non-virtuous and contaminated virtuous phenomena only are the subject. They are fruitional causes, because by their nature they possess the force [necessary for maturation;] and they are accompanied by the moisture of desire. It is like for example, a fertile seed together with moisture.

Neutral phenomena are the subject. They are not fruitional cause, because even though they have the moisture of desire, by their nature they

are lacking the force. It is like for example, a rotten seed together with moisture.

Uncontaminated phenomena are the subject. They are not fruitional cause, because, although by their nature they do possess the force, they are devoid of the moisture of desire. It is like for example, a fertile seed without moisture. {54c-d}

(3) Summarizing the meaning.

If one asks: In which of the three times are these six causes?

Two causes, omnipresent and homogenous cause, are in two times, past and present. They are not in the future, because in the future they would be out of order.

Three causes, connate, concomitant and fruitional causes are in the three times.

Because efficient cause is [both] included in the three times [saṁskṛtas], and not included in the three times [asaṁskṛtas], it is not explicitly shown [in the kārikas.] {55a-b}

b. The explanation of results.

(1) The presentation.

(2) The explanation.

(1) The presentation. [p.133; 75a4]

If one asks: Since cause and result depend upon each other, as there are the six causes, how many results are there? Saṁskṛtas along with the separation of analytical cessations are results; because the treatise says:[129] "If one asks, which are results? Saṁskṛtas and analytical cessations."

If one says: There is the consequence that analytical cessations would have a cause, because they are results. There is the consequence that they would have results, because they are causes.[130]

Asaṁskṛtas do not have causes and results. Because they do not have the six causes, and they do not have five results. The first is established because they do not have efficient cause, because [efficient cause] is that which does not obstruct arisal, and asaṁskṛtas do not have arisal. The second is established because they do not have sovereign result (bDag 'Bras; adhipati-phala), because sovereign result only applies to saṁskṛtas.

Nonetheless, analytical cessations are results, because they are obtained by the power of the Truth of the Path. They are efficient cause, because that is posited as merely remaining in a state of not obscuring the arisal of other phenomena. {55c-d}

(2) The explanation.

(a) Which result is from which cause.

(b) Explaining the characteristics of each.

(a) Which result is from which cause.

If one asks: Of which cause are each of these results the result?

Fruitional result is the result of the last cause, fruitional cause.

Sovereign result is the result of the first cause, efficient cause.

Naturally flowing result is the result of homogenous cause and omnipresent cause.

The result of human effort is the result of the two, connate and concomitant causes. {56}

(b) Explaining the characteristics of each.

Fruitional result is a non-obscuring neutral phenomenon. It is not virtuous, because it exists even in the continuum of one who has cut the roots of virtue. It is not afflicted, because it exists even in the continuum of one who has abandoned afflictions. [p.134; 75b5]

It is included within a continuum, so it is indicative of a sentient being: what is not included within a continuum [can be experienced in] common; and if a fruitional result were common there would be the consequence that karma which was performed might be wasted (Chud Zos Pa), while [the result of] karma that was not performed might be met with.

Since some [other] causes and results also meet these recquirements, in order to eliminate those [it is said that fruitional result] is arisen from determinate--either virtuous or non-virtuous [actions.] Since [results] that are arisen from the development of meditative stabilization also meet those requirements, in order to eliminate those [it is said that fruitional result] does not arise together with or immediately following a determinate [action,] but arises later than the determinate [action].[131]

Naturally flowing result is the same type as its own cause. [It has two causes, homogenous cause and omnipresent cause:] Homogenous cause is of the same aspect as its own result. And although omnipresent cause is not [necessarily] of the same aspect[132] to its own result; it is definitely similar in being of the same level, and in being afflicted.

Result of separation (Bral Ba'i 'Bras Bu; visaṁyoga-phala) is termination of the objects of abandonment by the power of a wisdom mind.

The result of human effort is twofold: Generated result of human effort; and obtained result of human effort. The first, generated result of human effort, is that result which arises by the force of something [that generates it.] Obtained result of human effort is that result which is obtained by the force of something.[133]

Saṁskṛta phenomena that do not arise before their own cause are sovereign results. Moreover, these are exclusively saṁskṛta phenomena,

asaṁskṛtas are not sovereign result.[134] {57-58}

c. The explanation of qualities that are common to both of these.

(1) The time in which the result is grasped or delivered.

(2) Which things are produced by how many causes.

(1) The time in which the result is grasped or delivered.[135]

Five causes, with the exception of efficient cause, grasp their result [when they are] in the present, but do not grasp their result in the past or the future. Because in the past the grasping is finished; and in the future there is no power to grasp results.[136] [p.135; 76a6]

The two, connate cause and concomitant cause, deliver their result first [in the present,] and "pra-" (Rab Tu) [in pra-√yam; Rab Tu 'Byin] {ii.59} means first; because their causes and effects are at the same time [as each other.]

The two, homogenous cause and omnipresent cause, deliver their result [when they are] in the present and the past, because they deliver their

result immediately after themselves.

One, fruitional cause, delivers its result [when it is] in the past, but not simoultaneously or immediately following [itself;] because it yields its result later. {59}

(2) Which things are produced by how many causes.

If one asks: Which things are produced by how many causes?

In general, there are four [categories] of things: afflicted; arisen from fruition; the first Āryan [moment;] and the remaining phenomena. Taking them in order:

Afflicted phenomena arise from the causes other than fruitional cause.

Phenomena arisen from fruition arise from the causes other than omnipresent cause.

The remaining phenomena arise from the causes other than fruitional and omnipresent causes.

The first Āryan moment arises from the causes other than those two--[fruitional and omnipresent causes]--and also excluding homogenous cause.[137]

This, however, is in terms of the mind and mental factors. But the non-associated phenomena should be understood to arise from the remaining

causes with the exception of concomitant cause, in accordance [with the same rules described above.] {60-61b}

2. The explanation of conditions.

a. The presentation.

b. The explanation.

a. The presentation.

Since we have finished the explanation of the causes together with their results, if one asks: What are the conditions mentioned in the statement {ii.46}, "In the absence of causes and conditions..."?

The sūtra mentions four conditions, there are: causal condition (rGyu'i rKyen; hetu-pratyaya); similar and immediately preceding condition (mTsungs Pa De Ma Thag Pa'i rKyen; samanantara-pratyaya); referent object condition (dMigs Pa'i rKyen; ālambana-pratyaya); sovereign condition (bDag Po'i rKyen; adhipati-pratyaya).[138]

Then, if one asks, what is the difference between causes and conditions? There is no difference. [p.136; 76b5] As it says in sūtra: "From two causes and two conditions Right View is generated, because [it comes from] the sound of another's [teaching] and one's own inner contemplation (Yid La Byed Pa) in accordance [with the teaching."]

If one asks: If there is no difference, why were they taught separately? They were explained separately in consideration of the disciples. It is like, for example, the dhātus and āyatanas. {61c}

b. The explanation.

There are four topics:

(1) The definition of each condition.

(2) Which condition will produce its result in which of the three times.

(3) Which things are produced by how many conditions.

(4) The extensive explanation of [similar and] immediately preceding condition.

(1) The definition of each condition.

If one asks: As it says "causal condition", what is that?

What is called causal condition is the five causes excluding efficient cause. Because results are generated by any of them.

Similar and immediately preceding condition is the mind and mental factors. But it is not the non-associated formative forces nor physical phenomena, because for these the number of causes and effects is unequal,

their condition is mixed up ('Chol Ba; akula). Because right after a form of the Desire Realm, [another form of the Desire Realm like] itself, as well as a form of the concentrations, or an uncontaminated form, can arise; because without the cessation of one physical [form] a second one can arise. And so, from many causes few results can arise, and from few causes many results can arise.[139]

If one asks: Are all minds and mental factors [similar and immediately preceding conditions?] Those whose arisal is in the past and the present are, but not those in the future. Because there is no order [of prior or subsequent] in the future.

If one says: In that case there is the consequence that the Bhagavan would not [be able to] know the future as an orderly sequence [of events.]

Some say: By means of observing the past and the present he comprehends the order of the future.[140] If one says this:

It is incorrect. Because there is the faulty consequence that the Bhagavān, without knowing the full extent of the past could not know the full extent of the future. [p.137; 77a6]

Then again some say: The Bhagavan knows the order of the future because there is a non-associated formative force in the mental continuum of all sentient beings that is an indication of what will arise [for them] in the future.

But that is incorrect. If that was the case, the Bhagavan would merely be a reader of signs, and there would be the fault that he was not omniscient.

If one asks: Are all arisals of minds and mental factors [similar and immediately preceding conditions?]

Except for the arisal of the last minds and mental factors of an Arhat, because they have no connection with any other subsequent minds.

If one asks: Why is it called similar and immediately preceding condition? Because it is equal (mNyam Pa; samāna) it is called similar (mTsungs Pa; sam-). Because there is nothing of the same type that interrupts [between the condition and the result] it is called immediately preceding. Because it is a condition, it is called [a condition.]

It is not that no other phenomena interrupt, because, for example, in between the mind entering the absorption of cessation, and the mind of arising from it, other phenomena do intervene. Nevertheless, the mind entering [absorption] is the immediately preceding condition of the mind arising from it.

There are four possibilities:

Those that are similar and immediately preceding conditions but are not immediately preceding, such as the entering and arising minds.

Those that are immediately preceding, but are not similar and

immediately preceding conditions, such as the entering mind and the [characteristic of] arisal of the first moment of the absorption.

Those that are both, such as the entering mind and the first moment of absorption.

Those that are neither, such as the mind entering the absorption of cessation and the [characteristic of] arisal of the second moment of the absorption of cessation.[141]

All phenomena are referent object conditions because they are suitable as objects for a consciousness that takes them as its referent object.[142]

What is called efficient cause is explained as sovereign condition. It is the sovereign condition because it has so many results.[143] {61d-62}
[p.138; 78a1]

(2) Which condition will produce its results in which of the three times.

If one asks: On the results of which of the three times do these four conditions exercise their action?

[Of the five causes that constitute causal condition:]

The two causes, connate and concomitant cause, exercise their action

on present perishing ('Gag Pa; nirudhyamāna) results.[144] Because the cause and the result are at the same time.

Three causes, homogenous, omnipresent and fruitional cause exercise their action on future arising results. The first two produce their results immediately following themselves. The last produces its result later.

As for the conditions other than causal condition--immediately preceding condition and referent object condition: in the reverse order of the previous ones, they exercise their actions respectively on future arising results and on present perishing results.[145] {63}

(3) Which things are produced by how many conditions.

If one asks: Which things are produced by how many conditions?

The mind and mental factors are produced by four conditions because they arise from: the causal condition--any of the five causes other than efficient cause; the similar and immediately preceding condition, the preceding minds and mental factors; the referent object condition, the five objects [of sense consciousness] or all phenomena--[the object of mental consciousness;] and sovereign result [the cause of everything] except itself.

The two absorptions are produced by three conditions: causal condition, similar and immediately preceding condition, and sovereign

condition. They are produced by similar and immediately preceding condition because they depend on the mind entering the absorptions which accomplishes (mNgon Par 'Du Byed Pa; abhisaṁskāra) [the absorption.][146] The proof of the other two is the same.

As for the remaining phenomena other than the mind and mental factors and the two absorptions--the non-associated phenomena and the physicals: They arise from two conditions, causal condition and sovereign condition, but they do not arise from similar and immediately preceding condition or from referent object condition; because they do not depend on an accomplishing mind, or they are material. [p.139; 78b2]

Therefore the number of these four conditions is definite. And there is no arisal from God (dBang Phyug; Īshvara), a supreme being (gTzo Bo; pradhāna), or from an eternal cause (rGyun rTag Pa). Because things arise successively "and so forth" (Sogs; ādi), which means they arise occassionally (Res 'Ga').[147] {64}

If one asks: Since it is explained that the physicals arise from causal conditions and sovereign condition, by saying {ii.64}, "The others arise from two..."; and since it is definite that the physicals are twofold, the elements ('Byung Ba; bhūta) and complex matter ('Byung Gyur; bhautika): What is the manner in which they act as causal conditions and sovereign condition when

elements produce other elements; and complex matter produces elements and other complex matter?

The elements act as two types of cause, connate cause and homogenous cause of those [other] elements. Because the elements act as connate cause for elements that are simoultaneous with themselves; and preceding elements act as homogenous cause for subsequent elements.

Omnipresent cause does not operate because [the elements] are not afflicted. Fruitional cause does not operate because they are neither virtuous nor non-virtuous. Concomitant cause does not operate because they are material.

It is not necessary to examine the way in which elements act as causal conditions for complex matter; but they act as sovereign condition in five ways: The elements cause complex matter as, the cause of arisal (sKye Ba'i rGyu; janana-hetu); the cause of reliance (rTen Pa'i rGyu; niśraya-hetu);[148] the cause of support (gNas Pa'i rGyu; pratishthā-hetu); the cause of maintaining (sTon Pa'i rGyu; upastambha-hetu); the cause of development ('Phel Ba'i rGyu; vṛddhi-hetu).

Now to establish the reasons respectively:

The elements [are the cause of arisal] because they newly produce complex matter.

[They are the cause of reliance] because complex matter follows the

increase or diminishment of the elements.

[They are the cause of support] because complex matter is supported on other objects, the elements.

[They are the cause of maintaining] because the elements cause the non-interruption of the continuum of complex matter. [They are the cause of development] because the elements cause the ever-greater increase of complex matter.

Complex matter acts mutually on other complex matter in three ways: As connate cause, as homogenous cause and as fruitional cause: [p.140; 79a2]

[As non-revealing form] it is connate cause of the seven abandoning [restraints] of the uncontaminated concentrations.

Preceding complex matter is homogenous cause of subsequent complex matter.

From the virtuous and non-virtuous informative form of this life, arises, in the subsequent [life,] the eye and so forth, which are arisen from fruition.

Complex matter acts in one way, as the fruitional cause of the elements: From the virtuous and non-virtuous informative form of this life arise, in the subsequent [life,] the elements that exist in the collection of faculties, which are arisen from fruition. {65}

(4) The extensive explanation of [similar and] immediately preceding condition.

(a) Divisions of the mind as 12.

(b) Divisions as 20.

(c) Examining which are newly acquired from which of the 12.

(a) Divisions of the mind as 12.

1) The actual explanation.

2) Applying [the rules] to the conditions and what possess the conditions.

1) The actual explanation.

If one asks: As it explains {ii.62}, "The mind and mental factors that have arisen...[are similar and immediately preceding conditions,"] and so forth, how many [types of] mind are there?

There are 12 [types of] mind? In the Desire Realm there are four: virtuous mind, non-virtuous, obscuring [neutral,] non-obscuring [neutral.] There are three in each of the Form and Formless Realms, those other than non-virtuous mind. The uncontaminated have the two minds of Learning (Slob; śaikṣa) and No More Learning (Mi Slob; aśaikṣa). {66}

2) Applying [the rules] to the conditions and what possess the conditions.

If one asks: How many minds that have a similar and immediately preceding condition arise immediately after which minds?

Since this is to be understood by way of the eight times (Tse) or occassions (gNas sKabs; avasthā), the eight times are: the time of a continuum; the time that is similar in level; the time of conception; the time of entering absorption; the time of arising from absorption; the time of being bothered by afflicted absorptions; the time of entering emanations; the time of arising from emanations.

In the first, [the time of a continuum,] a subsequent mind arises from a preceding one of the same type. [141; 79b3]

In the second, [the time that is similar in level,] though not of the same type another mind of the same level arises.

In the third, [the time of conception,] the afflicted minds of the three realms arise. Furthermore, the three--virtuous, afflicted, and non-obscuring neutral minds are able to act as the mind of death. From an afflicted mind acting as the mind of death there can be birth on its own level or on a lower level, but not on a higher level. Because it is not possible to be born on a higher level without abandoning the afflictions of the lower level. As it is explained {viii.16}, "From an afflicted mind there is no [birth] on a higher

[level]."

When a virtuous or non-obscuring neutral mind acts as the mind of death, there can be birth in any of the levels, one's own level, a higher or a lower level.

In the fourth, the time of entering absorption, from a virtuous mind of a lower level a virtuous mind of a higher level is born. Because from a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm a virtuous mind of the Form Realm and the two uncontaminated minds [of Learner and No more learner] arise. From a virtuous mind of the Form Realm, a virtuous mind of the Formless Realm and the two types of uncontaminated minds arise. From a virtuous mind of the Formless Realm the two types of uncontaminated minds arise.

From a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm a virtuous mind of the Formless Realm does not arise, because those two are distanced by the four types of remoteness (Ring Ba rNam Pa bZhi; dūratā), remoteness of: support (rTen; āśraya); referent object (dMigs Pa; ālambana); aspect (rNam Pa; ākāra); and antidote (gNyen Po; pratipakṣa).[149]

In the fifth, [the time of arising from asorption,] from a virtuous mind of a higher level a virtuous mind of a lower level arises, because from the two uncontaminated minds a virtuous mind of the Formless Realm arises. From a virtuous mind of the Formless Realm and from the two uncontaminated minds a virtuous mind of the Form Realm arises. From that

[virtuous mind of the Form Realm] and from the two uncontaminated minds a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm arises.

In the sixth, [the time of being bothered by afflicted absorptions,] from an obscuring [neutral mind] of a higher level a virtuous mind of a lower level arises; because from an afflicted mind of the Formless Realm a virtuous mind of the Form Realm arises. From an afflicted mind of the Form Realm a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm arises.

In the seventh, [the time of entering emanations,] from a virtuous mind of the Form Realm an emanation mind of the Desire Realm arises. [p.142; 80a3]

In the eighth [the time of arising from emanations,] from an emanation mind of the Desire Realm a virtuous mind of the Form Realm arises.

Therefore, from a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm nine minds arise: four of its own level[150] at the time of the continuum and similar level; the two obscuring [minds] of a higher level at the time of conception; at the time of entering absorption--a virtuous mind of the Form Realm and the two uncontaminated minds.

That virtuous mind of the Desire Realm arises only from eight minds: It arises from the four of its own level at the time of the continuum and [similar] level; the two uncontaminated minds and the virtuous mind of the Form Realm, at the time of arising from absorption; and the obscuring

[neutral mind] of the Form Realm at the time of being bothered by afflicted [absorptions.]

The non-virtuous mind of the Desire Realm arises from ten: from the four of [its own] continuum and level; and from six of a higher level at the time of conception.

From that non-virtuous [mind of the Desire Realm] four arise: the four of [its own] continuum and [similar] level.

An obscuring [neutral mind] of the Desire Realm is like the non-virtuous mind as well, because it arises from ten, and four arise from it.

A non-obscuring [neutral] mind of the Desire Realm arises from five: It arises from the four of [its own] continuum and [similar] level; and at the time of entering an emanation mind it arises from a virtuous mind of the Form Realm.

Following that [non-obscuring neutral mind] seven minds arise: the four of the continuum and level; two afflicted [minds] of the higher levels, at the time of conception; and at the time of arising from an emanation mind a virtuous mind of the Form Realm arises.

In the Form Realm, from a virtuous mind eleven minds arise: the three of continuum and level; at the time of conception, two afflicted minds of the Desire Realm, and one afflicted mind of the Formless Realm; at the time of absorption, a virtuous mind of the Formless Realm, and the two

uncontaminated [minds;] at the time of arising from absorption, a virtuous mind of the Desire Realm; at the time of entering an emanation mind the non-obscuring [neutral mind] of the Desire Realm. [p.143; 80b3]

That virtuous mind of the Form Realm arises after nine: the three of the continuum and level; at the time of absorption, the virtuous mind of the Desire Realm; at the time of arising [from absorption] the virtuous mind of the Formless Realm, and the two uncontaminated minds; at the time of arising from an emanation mind the non-obscuring [neutral mind] of the Desire Realm; at the time of being bothered by afflicted [absorption,] the obscuring [neutral mind] of the Formless Realm.

The obscuring [neutral mind] of the Form Realm arises from eight: from the three of the continuum and level; at the time of conception, the three minds of the Formless Realm, and the virtuous and non-obscuring [neutral minds] of the Desire Realm.

From that [obscuring neutral mind of the Form Realm] six arise: the three of the continuum and level; at the time of conception, the two afflicted minds of the Desire Realm; at the time of being bothered by afflicted [absorption,] the virtuous mind of the Desire Realm arises.

The non-obscuring [neutral mind of the Form Realm] arises from three: from the three of its own level.

From that six arise: The three of the continuum and level; at the time

of conception, the three afflicted minds of the higher and lower levels arise.[151]

This is also the manner of arising of the non-obscuring [neutral mind] of the Formless Realm: It arises from the three of its own level. From it, the three of its own level; and at the time of conception, the three afflicted minds of the lower levels arise.

From a virtuous mind of the Formless Realm nine minds arise: the three of the continuum and level; at the time of conception, the three afflicted minds of the lower levels; at the time of absorption, the two uncontaminated minds; at the time of arising [from absorption,] the virtuous mind of the Form Realm arises.

That virtuous mind of the the Formless Realm arises after six: the three of the continuum and level; at the time of absorption, the virtuous mind of the Form Realm; at the time of arising [from absorption] the two uncontaminated minds.

From the obscuring [neutral mind] of the Formless Realm seven arise: the three of its own continuum and level; at the time of conception, the three afflicted minds of the lower level; at the time of being bothered by afflicted [absorption], the virtuous mind of the Form Realm arises.

Likewise, that obscuring [neutral mind] of the Formless Realm arises after seven minds: at the time of the continuum and similar level, the three

minds of its own level; at the time of conception, the two virtuous minds of the two lower realms and the two non-obscuring [neutral minds.] [p.144; 81a5]

The mind of a Learner arises from four minds: at the time of the continuum, from itself; at the time of absorption, from the three virtuous minds of the three realms.

From that Learner's mind five arise: at the time of the continuum, itself and a mind of No More Learning; at the time of arising [from absorption,] the three virtuous minds of the three realms.

The mind of No More Learning arises from five: at the time of the continuum, from itself and a Learner's mind; at the time of absorption, from the three virtuous minds of the three realms.

From that mind of No More Learning four minds arise: at the time of the continuum, itself; at the time of arising from absorption, the three virtuous minds of the three realms arise. {67-71a}

(b) Divisions as 20.

These twelve minds can also be classified as twenty: by distinguishing two types of virtuous [minds in each of] the three realms--[the virtuous minds] obtained by birth (sKyes Nas Thob Pa; aupapatti-lābhika), and those arisen from effort (sByor Byung; prāyogika);[152] by distinguishing four types

of non-obscuring neutral minds of the Desire Realm: arisen from fruition, the mind of behavior (sPyod Lam Pa; airyāpathika), the mind of skill in arts (bZo'i gNas; śailpasthānika),[153] the mind of emanation; and in the Form Realm, [three types of non-obscuring neutral minds are distinguished] by not including the mind of skill in arts.[154]

There is no mind of skill in arts in the Form Realm because [beings there are born] completely clothed.

If one asks: Which of the two [classifications] of minds pervades more, that of 12 or 20 minds? The [classification] of 12 minds pervades more, because there are also other non-obscuring neutrals which are not included in the four non-obscuring neutrals [that are counted among the twenty.][155]

If one asks: What is the purpose of distinguishing 20 minds? When a virtuous mind acts as the mind of death it is produced by a [virtuous mind] obtained by birth, but it is not produced by a [virtuous mind] that arises from effort, because the mind of death is not clear.

The minds of entering and arising from absorption are produced by a mind that arises from effort, but not by a mind obtained by birth, because it is not clear. However it is produced by a [virtuous mind] obtained by birth of the Desire Realm, because that is clear. [p.145; 81b5]

When the a non-obscuring neutral mind acts as the mind of death, it is produced by a mind arisen from fruition or a mind of behavior, but it is not

produced by a mind of skill in arts or a mind of emanation. Because these two are clear, and the mind of death is not clear.

It is in order to understand this that 20 minds are distinguished. {71b-72}

(c) Examining which are newly acquired from which of the 12.

If one asks: How many minds are newly acquired at the time of manifesting any of the 12 minds?

From among the three afflicted [minds] of the three realms, when an afflicted mind of the Desire Realm is manifested six minds are newly acquired: when one is born in the Desire Realm from the Formless or Form Realms, the two afflicted minds of the Desire Realm, and a virtuous mind obtained by birth; when one degenerates from the fruit of Arhatship because of an afflicted mind of the Desire Realm, the two afflicted minds of the Form and Formless Realms, and the mind of a Learner are newly acquired.

When an afflicted mind of the Form Realm is manifested, six minds are newly acquired: when one is born in the Form Realm from the Formless Realm, the afflicted mind of the Form Realm, a virtuous mind obtained by birth, the two minds of emanation; when one degenerates from the fruit of Arhatship because of an afflicted mind of the Form Realm, an afflicted mind

of the Formless Realm, and the mind of a Learner are newly acquired.

When an afflicted mind of the Formless Realm is manifested, two minds are newly acquired: when one degenerates from the fruit of Arhatship because of an afflicted mind of the Formless Realm, an afflicted mind of the Formless Realm and the mind of a Learner are newly acquired.

When a virtuous mind arisen in the Form Realm is manifested, three minds are newly acquired [p.146; 82a6]: at the time of separation from attachment of the Desire Realm by the preparatory level of the first concentration, a virtuous mind of the Form Realm is newly acquired; and at the time of separation from attachment of the Desire Realm by means of the mundane path, the two minds of emanation are newly acquired.[156]

When the mind of a Learner is manifested, four minds are newly acquired: at the time of the first uncontaminated mind, the mind of a Learner [itself;] at the time of separation from attachment of the Desire Realm by the uncontaminated path, the two minds of emanation; and at the time of separation from attachment of the Form Realm by the uncontaminated path, the virtuous mind of the Formless Realm is newly acquired.

When the remaining minds [which were not mentioned above] are manifested, they are newly acquired when they [manifest] themselves, but they are not newly acquired when other minds [are manifested.]

Moreover, when the [roots of virtue] are regenerated (Nying mTsams

bByor Ba; pratisañgha) by Right View, the virtuous mind of the Desire Realm only is newly acquired, because an afflicted mind of the three realms was there before; and the non-obscuring neutral minds which mostly arise simultaneous with obtainment, and the two emanation minds, were previously obtained--therefore these are not obtained; and one also does not obtain the virtuous minds of the two higher realms, nor the two uncontaminated minds. Also for a non-obscuring neutral mind of the Desire Realm, that alone [is newly acquired,] because some of the virtuous minds and so forth of the Desire Realm are already obtained; and others are not obtained.

In the same way, the [other] two non-obscuring neutral minds, the virtuous mind of the Formless Realm, and the mind of No More Learning are to be understood. {73}

This is the explanation of the second chapter entitled, "The Presentation of the Faculties from the Verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*."

## NOTES--CHAPTER 2

1. Geshe Sopa comments that the sense of "uncommon cause" here is that the faculties have authority over determining that a particular type of object will be engaged by a particular type of faculty and produce a particular type of consciouness; thus a sound can not produce an eye consciousness.

2. Here (*ADKB* p.137; *bShad Pa* p.69) Vasubandhu refers to the opinion of other previous masters who say that the male and female faculties also have authority over the process of affliction and purification (Kun Nas Nyon Mongs Pa Dang rNam Par Byang Ba; saṁkleśa-vyavadāna) because "those who do not have them or in whom they are damaged, and hermaphrodites" cannot acquire an unrestraint {iv.44}, automatic transgression {iv.98}, and the cutting of the roots of virtues {iv.81}. Nor are they able to acquire the restraints {iv.44}, the fruits {vi.51}, or to become free of the afflictions of attachment and so forth.

This point leads Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p.137; *'Grel bShad* p.97b1) into the question of, who are those in whom the male or female faculty is not there, or in whom it is damaged. They are the natural-born eunuch (Za Ma; ṣaṇḍha), those of confused gender (Ma Ning; paṇḍaka), and hermaphrodites (mTsan gNyis Pa; ubhayavyañjana). Yaśomitra explains:

> What are the ṣaṇḍha-paṇḍaka-ubhayavyañjana? Those who are "without those [male and female faculties]" {iv.1b} are the ṣaṇḍha and paṇḍaka, because they do not have the male and female faculties. What is the difference between [them?]
>
> The ṣaṇḍha is naturally without the male or female faculty. For the paṇḍaka it has been damaged (Nyams Pa; upahata) due to injury (gNod Pa; upakrameṇa).

Yaśomitra then goes on to explain that in the Vinaya five types of paṇḍaka are taught. These have been thoroughly analyzed from numerous Buddhist sources by Leonard Zwilling in his seminal article "Homosexuality as Seen in Indian Buddhist Texts."

The first of these five types, the prakṛti-paṇḍaka, is called ṣaṇḍa here in the Abhidharma, says Yaśomitra. And the definition of the prakṛti-paṇḍaka is "one who does not have the sex organ (mTsan; vyañjana) by nature." The remaining four types named in the Vinaya, are called paṇḍaka here in the Abhidharma, says Yaśomitra.

Based on Yaśomitra's explanation I translate ṣaṇḍa as natural-born eunuch. Zwilling (p.204), based on Buddhaghosa, equates prakṛti-paṇḍaka

with napuṁsaka-paṇḍaka and defines it as "one who is congenitally impotent."

While Zwilling demonstrates that some of these types of paṇḍakas are not eunuchs at all but either homosexuals or sexually dysfunctional, it seems clear that in this Abhidharma context the ṣaṇḍha is a natural-born eunuch. The confusion stems from Zwilling's interpretation of the term "indriya" (dBang Po)--what I translate as faculty--as an abstract "power"--a power of femininity or a power of masculinity. He says, "the possession of these 'powers' has no inherent connection with the possession of a particular set of sexual organs." He cites Buddhagosa that, "they are not the 'cause of the sexual organs (bhañjana-karaṇam).'"

However, the discussion of the male and female faculties are set in the context of other faculties such as the eye, ear, nose and body faculties, which have authority over their own particular domain. In this context the faculty as "power" is inextricably entwined with the faculty as physical organ. Although it is possible to have the physical organ but to be without the faculty because it is damaged to the extent that it can not perform its function, it is certain that if the organ is cut out or not there at birth, the faculty will not be there either.

Yaśomitra could hardly be more explicit when he says that the ṣaṇḍa is one who is "by nature without the sex organ (mTsan; vyañjana)." Zwilling himself admits that this term "vyañjana" refers to sexual organ when he translates it that way in the above quotation.

To complete Yaśomitra's analysis, he says that the lūna-paṇḍaka is one who's faculty is damaged (vikala)--or incomplete, "Ma Tsang Ba" in the Tibetan translation--because it has been, to some extent, cut off.

The other three types are those whose faculties are damaged by virtue of them being dysfunctional (Las Su Mi Rung Ba; akarmaṇya). Here Yaśomitra is discreet enough to define only one of these three types, the pakṣa-paṇḍaka who is impotent at certain times. He provides no details on the īrṣya-paṇḍaka which Zwilling (p.204) defines as, "that individual who, out of frustration, satisfies his sexual desires by watching others engage in sexual relations...voyeurism;" nor on the āseka-paṇḍaka, defined by Zwilling as, "that person who satisfies his sexual desires by fellating another to ejaculation."

These three types, says Yaśomitra, have dysfunctional faculties; and dysfunctional means, "they are incapable of generating the distinctive pleasure of a man; and they cannot beget offspring."

Yaśomitra explains that the reason ṣaṇḍha is taught separately from paṇḍaka here in the Abhidharma is, "in order to counteract the notion that they in fact have the faculty. If it were not done that way, the meaning of paṇḍaka in the Abhidharma might be read as being just the same as it is in

the Vinaya."

To summarize: According to the Abhidharma there are three types of individuals who do not have the male or female faculty or in whom they are damaged. The natural-born eunuch (Za Ma; ṣaṇḍha) has no faculty. The second type is called paṇḍaka (Ma Ning) which includes the other four types listed in the Vinaya, the occasionally impotent, voyeurs, fellators, and those with maimed sex organs--this I translate as "those of confused gender." The third type is the hermaphrodite. The hermaphrodite has a damaged faculty because the site [of the faculty] is ruined (sthāna-bhraṁśa-vaikalyāt), and because they enjoy diminished pleasure (alpa-sukha-hetutva-vaikalyāt).

3. See {ii.41}.

4. *ADKB* p.138; *bShad Pa* p.69. Conformity with the nature of the authority is explained with the quote:

> cittenāyaṁ loko nīyate//
> "This world is brought about by the mind."

*SAKV* p.138 gives the whole sutra quote (*Saṁyukta Nikāya* 1.2.7):

> cittena nīyate lokaḥ, cittena parikṛṣyate /
> ekadharmasya cittasy sarvadharmā vaśānugāḥ //
> The world is brought about by the mind, it is governed by the mind; all dharmas conform to one dharma of mind.

Geshe Sopa points out that "dBang Po'i Ngo Bo Dang mThun Pa" can also be read to mean that the mental faculty has authority over the consciousness being in conformity with the nature of the faculty. That is, in the sense mentioned above, that the mental faculty is what determines that the subsequent consciousness will be in conformity with the last faculty consciousness. That is, the mental faculty is the faculty consciousness in the last moment of causing the mental consciousness.

5. Vasubandhu disagrees with the analysis being presented here, and below {ii.2-4} he presents the view of the Sautrāntikas.

6. This is elaborated in *ADKB* p.139; *bShad Pa* p.70:

> Others state: Since dangers are removed once they have been understood, it is not the eye and ear that protect the body but rather consciousness which has authority over these two.

And there is nothing other than consciousness which sees forms or hears sounds; therefore those two [eye and ear] are not faculties because they individually have authority over the uncommon causes.

7. See *SAKV* p.137; *'Grel bShad* p.97b1.

8. The five faculties of faith etc. are the five virtuous faculties of faith, persevering effort, memory, meditative stabilization and wisdom.

9. This is a Sautrāntika position appearing in the verses of the root text.

10. That is, rewording the root text {ii.4} (Shad Pa p.71) from:

Mya Ngan 'Das Sogs Gong Nas Gong /
'Thob Pa La Ni dBang Byed Phyir //

to:

Gong Nas Gong Dang Ma Byas 'Thob /
Sogs Pa La Ni dBang Byed Phyir //

11. i.e. Each one of these faculties has authority over the one above it, and the last has authority over the attainment of Nirvāṇa. See {ii.10}.

12. *ADKB* p.143; *bShad Pa* p.73 says "six faculties", because it includes the mental faculty with the five sense faculties as the support of saṁsāra. The way dGe 'Dun Grub explains it there are only 13 faculties.

13. *ADKB* p.146; *bShad Pa* p.75:

In the third concentration, because one is separated from attachment to joy (dGa Ba; prīti), there is only the faculty of pleasure and there is no mental happiness; because joy is mental happiness.

See *SAKV* p.146; *'Grel bShad* p.103b6 and {viii.9} for further comment.

Above the third concentration there is neither pleasure nor mental happiness.

14. *SAKV* p. 147; *'Grel bShad* p.104a4:

The meaning of "most" (Phel Cher; prayeṇa) is that joy and pleasure that arises from meditative stabilization (samādhi) or arises from fruition (vipāka-phala) are excepted.

See {ii.57}.

15. *SAKV* p.147; *'Grel bShad* p.104a8:

> It is arisen from fruition or a naturally flowing arisal.

16. *ADKB* p.148 ; *bShad Pa* p.76:

> On the Path of Seeing one undertakes to know all that one does not know. On the Path of Meditation there is nothing that one does not already know, but in order to eliminate the remaining polluting tendencies one [undertakes] to fully know (Kun Shes Par Byed; ājānāti) that [which one has come to know, by the repetition of meditation.] On the Path of No-more-learning the realization that one knows is fully known; and because one has this [knowledge,] or because one has the nature of protecting that knowledge, it is the endowment of knowing all.

17. The seven physical faculties are the five sense faculties plus the male and female faculties.

The remaining nine are: the mental faculty, pleasure, mental happiness and neutral feeling, and the five virtuous faculties of faith, persevering effort, memory, meditative stabilization and wisdom.

18. *Jñānaprasthāna*, Taisho 26, p.981a12.

19. This is the sixth type of Arhat who is firm and does not degenerate from the attainment. See {vi.57}.

20. See Pruden fn#49 for citations.

21. Jñānaprathāna, Taisho 26, p.993b2.

22. *ADK* p.153; Shad Pa p.80:

> The saṁskāra of longevity is the fruit of previous karma; the saṁskāra of life is the fruit of present karma.

23. *ADKB* p.154 ; *bShad Pa* p.80:

> Some say: the term life refers to many saṁskāras and it does not constitute a single substance. Otherwise, there would be no use of the term saṁskāra.

Poussin is instructive here (Pruden p.167):

According to another opinion, the plural condemns the teaching of the Sarvāstivādins that sees an entity or dharma in the jīvita and āyus. The terms jīvita and āyus designate a number of saṁskāras existing simultaneously and belonging either to four or five skandhas according to their sphere of existence. If it were otherwise the sūtra would not use the expression "the jīvita-skandhas"; it would say, "The Blessed One extends some jīvitas, and casts off some āyus."

24. See Pruden fn#60 for citations.

25. See {i.37}.

26. All fruitions are neutral--neither virtuous nor non-virtuous. Feelings can be virtuous or non-virtuous by being concomitant with those types of minds. For example, the feeling of mental happiness while having the intention of killing, motivated by hatred.

27. This point is debated at length here by Vasubandhu (*ADKB* p.156; *bShad Pa* p.81) who maintains that mental unhappiness, just like mental happiness, can be the fruition of karma.

28. *SAKV* p.158 explains:

It is not neutral because it arises from the discriminations of concepts. [i.e. The concept of things liked or hated etc.] It is not uncontaminated because it [does not arise from] absorption.

29. i.e. The mental faculty and the five faculties of faith etc.

30. See discussion at {i.30}. Here, the *ADKB* p.161; *bShad Pa* p.84 explains that the Form Realm gods are considered males despite not having male organs:

How do they come to be called males? As it says in sūtra, "That a woman should become Brahmā, it does not happen and is impossible. That it should be a male does happen." There are [in the Form Realm] the other qualities which males have in the Desire Realm.

31. Sarnath Edition p.92 corrected from "Yid Mi bDe Ba" to conform with 'Bras sPung Edition p.53a1:
bSam gTan bZhi Pa Dang dNgos gZhi Khyad Par Can Na bDe Ba Dang Yid bDe Ba gNyis Ka Med Do //

32. See {i.40}.

33. *ADKB* p.163; *bShad Pa* p.86 is clear:

> Because these two are, without doubt, afflicted at the moment of conception.

34. See {iii.98}.

35. *ADKB* p.164; *bShad Pa* p.86 has an interesting sidebar here explaining in what ways the Formless is higher than the Form Realm:

> The Formless Realm is higher than the Form Realm because of the superiority of its absorptions, and because it is a better rebirth.

Poussin's version elaborates (Pruden p.176):

> "Above" means in ārūpyadhātu. This sphere of existence is not situated above rūpadhātu (iii.3); but it is said to be above it because it is superior to rūpadhātu from the point of view of absorption: the absorptions of ārūpyadhātu are cultivated after those of rūpadhātu; and because it surpasses it from the point of view of its mode of existence, and from the point of view of the duration of its existence.

36. Although the mental continuum will continue into the next rebirth, mind ceases for that particular form.

37. i.e. The five faculties of the eye etc., life, one or two sex organs, mind and neutral feeling.

38. i.e. Birth from womb, egg and heat. The previous discussion referred to supernatural birth.

39. See {vi.51}.

40. See {vi.48}. At the moment of attaining the fruit of Stream Enterer one is always in the state of anāgamya, which includes the faculty of neutral feeling.

41. *ADKB* p.167; *bShad Pa* p.88:

> In the case of the fruit of Stream Enterer, [the five faculties of] faith etc. and the faculty of knowing all that is not known should be

understood as the uninterupted path (Bar Chad Med Lam; ānantarya-mārga). The faculty of knowing all should be understood as the path of liberation (rNam Par Grol Ba'i Lam; vimukti-mārga). [The fruit of Stream Enterer] is obtained by both. Because they, respectively, bring about, and make firm the obtainment of the separation.

42. *SAKV* p.167-8; *'Grel bShad* p.116a6:

> The fruit of Arhatship is attained at the time of the vajra-like meditative stabilization...On that occassion, at the moment of the vajra-like meditative stabilization which is the uninterrupted path, the faculty of knowing all is itself present...On that occassion, at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion which is the path of liberation, the faculty of endowment of knowing all is itself in the process of arising (sKye Ba La mNgon Du Phyogs Pa; utpādābhimukha).

43. See {vi.33}.

44. The Gradualist is a Stream Enterer who does things in order, i.e. he obtains Stream Enterer before he obtains Once-Returner.

In the first case he attains Once-Returner via the mundane path, comparing subtle and rough qualities of progressive levels. Using this route he does not meditate on the Four Truths, and so will not have the faculty of knowing all when he attains Once-Returner.

In the second case he attains Once-Returner by the supermundane path, meditating on the Four Truths, in which case he will have the faculty of knowing all.

These terms are discussed at {vi.29ff}.

45. The objects to be abandoned by Meditation can be removed temporarily by the mundane path or permanently by the supermundane path.

Someone who has attained śamatha before attaining the Path of Seeing, and with śamatha meditates the mundane path and removes the first six afflictions of the Desire Realm (temporarily) then enters the Path of Seeing and uproots all the objects to be abandoned by Seeing. Upon the sixteenth moment of the Path of Seeing, on reaching the Path of Meditation, he has already removed the first six objects to be abandoned by Meditation of the Desire Realm. This person on the sixteenth moment obtains the fruit of Once-returner and skips the fruit of Stream Enterer. Such a person is called a Returner Previously Freed of Attachment (Chags Bral sNgon Song; bhūyo-vītarāga). He has skipped over one of the fruits.

The commonly used Tibetan term, here used by GDD, is Chags Bral

sNgon Song, but the original Sanskrit is slightly different--bhūyo-vītarāga = Largely Free of Attachment.

46. *GDD* p.97; 'Bras sPung p.55b6 read: Thengs for Thebs.

47. The Non-Returner Previously Freed from Attachment can not degenerate "because he has achieved freedom from attachment by means of two paths."(*ADKB* p.172; *bShad Pa* p.90) i.e. This makes it especially firm and solid.

See Pruden fn#86 for why he can not reobtain the fruit by the faculty of pleasure.

48. *SAKV* p.174; *'Grel bShad* p.122a2:

> It is specified that "an ordinary individual does not possess it" (*ADKB* p.174) because Āryans definitely possess it. Their uncontaminated [faculty] of pleasure is not relinquished when they change levels.

49. In both Sarnath (p.99) and 'Bras sPung (p.56b6) editions read: bSam gTan gNyis Par // for bSam gTan gSum Par //

*SAKV* p.175; *'Grel bShad* p.123a7:

> In the Desire Realm there is a faculty of pleasure in relation to the five sense consciousnesses; in the first concentration there is [one] in relation to three consciousnesses [smell and taste being excluded;] and in the third concentration there is a faculty of pleasure related to the mental consciousness {ii.7}; [but in the second concentration there is no faculty of pleasure {viii.12}.] Thus, one born in the the second concentration will not possess a faculty of pleasure from a lower level because that was relinquished when he changed levels; and will not possess [a faculty of pleasure] of the level of the third concentration, because he has not attained that level.
>
> With this thought the argument is made (*ADKB* p.175): "What faculty of pleasure is possessed [by one who is born in the second concentration but has not attained the third concentration?"]
>
> They reply: ["They possess] the contaminated [faculty] of the third concentration." The tenet [of the Vaibhāṣikas] is that: all beings born in a lower level possess the contaminated [faculty] of the higher levels if they have not abandoned it.

50. These 11 are: Mental happiness, pleasure, neutral feeling, life, mind, the five of faith etc., and either knowing all or endowment with knowing all.

51. Poussin (Pruden p.182):

> In fact, it is only in the Desire Realm that one cultivates the Path of Seeing the Truths. Thus the possessor of this faculty is a being of the Desire Realm. He necessarily possesses the faculty of life, the mental faculty, the body faculty, the four feelings, the five moral faculties, and knowing all that is not known. He does not necessarily possess mental unhapinness, nor the eye faculty etc.

52. Stated a bit more clearly at *ADKB* p.180; *bShad Pa* p.94:

> In the Desire Realm an object having neither a faculty nor sound arises as a combination of eight substances; it could not arise if any one of them were missing. The eight substances are: the four great elements and the four derived forms (rGyur Byas Pa'i gZugs; upādāyarūpa): form, smell, taste and tangibility.

Poussin (Pruden fn#95) quotes Saṁghabhadra (Taisho 29, p.799a24-29):

> Among the rūpas "susceptible of resistance" (sapratigha), the most subtle part, which is not susceptible of being divided again, is called paramāṇu; that is to say: the paramāṇu is not susceptible of being divided into many parts by another rūpa, or by the mind. This is what is called the smallest rūpa; as it has no parts, it is called the "smallest..." An agglomeration of these aṇu which is not susceptible of disaggregation is called saṁghātāṇu. In Kāmadhātu, a minimum of eight things (dravya) arise together in order to constitute a saṁghātāṇu which is not sound, nor an organ. What are these things? Four mahābhūtas and four upādāyas, namely, rūpa, rasa, gandha and sprasṣṭavya.

53. This discussion is most clearly laid out in Poussin's version (Pruden p.187):

> Are we to understand dravyas as individual substances, as things that have their own characteristics, or as āyatanas that one can term dravyas, substances, since they each possess distinctive general characteristics?.....
>
> [The Vaibhāṣikas answer.] Our definition of a molecule is the best one. The word dravya is to be understood, in this case, as substances properly so-called, and as āyatanas. Among the eight

dravyas of a molecule, there are 1) four substances properly so-called, the four primary elements, the supports and sources of derived matter; and 2) four āyatanas, four types of derived matter, supported by the primary elements: visibles, odors, tastes and tangibles (abstractions created from the primary elements, and included within tangibles.)

This answer is not good, for each of these four derived elements is supported by all four of the primary elements. The molecule will then consist of twenty dravyas.

No [answer the Vaibhāṣikas,] for we are speaking of the nature of the primary elements, solidity, etc. The nature of all four of the primary elements remains the same, in that they support the derived element of odor or the derived elements of visibles, tastes, and tangibles.

54. mahābhūmika is glossed by Vasubandhu (*ADKB* p.186; *bShad Pa* p.97):

bhūmirnāma gativiṣayaḥ / yo hi yasya gativiṣayaḥ sa tasya bhūmiḥ ityuchyate //

And Yaśomitra adds *SAKV* p.186; *'Grel bShad* p.131a1):

gativishayaḥ iti / utpattiviṣaya ityarthaḥ / mahābhūmikā iti mahattvaṁ sarvacittabhavattvāt //

55. *ADKB* p.187 ; *bShad Pa* p.97:

cetanā citta-abhisaṁskāro //
Intention is that which conditions the mind.

*SAKV* p.187; *'Grel bShad* p.131a4:

cetanā cittābhisaṁskāra iti / cittapraspandaḥ //
"Intention is that which conditions the mind," means it is what moves the mind.

56. *ADKB* p.187 ; *bShad Pa* p.98:

matiḥ prajñā dharmapravicayaḥ //
Intelligence is wisdom that discerns dharmas.

*SAKV* p.187; *'Grel bShad* p.131b2:

It should be called wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā) because it is recognized as that, but in order to conform to the arrangement of the śloka it is called intelligence (Blo Gros; mati) in the kārikās.

57. *ADKB* p.188; *bShad Pa* p.98:

> Others say that it is belief in the Truths, the [Three] Jewels, and karma and results.

58. Poussin (Pruden fn#145):

> Dharmatrāta: Because they are abandoned through Meditation and not through the Seeing of the Truths, because they are associated with the mental consciousness and not with the five other consciousnesses, and because they do not arise with all minds and exist separately, they are parītta-kleśa-bhūmika.

They will be explained in the fifth chapter.

59. GDD cites this list from Yaśomitra p.195, who quotes Vasumitra's verse:

> vitarka[vi]cārakaukṛtyamiddhapratighasaktayaḥ /
> mānaśca vicikitsā cetyaṣṭavaniyatāḥ smṛtāḥ //

60. *ADKB* p.195; *bShad Pa* p.103:

> What is this term regret? Regret is [actually] the nature of that which is wrongly done (kukṛta-bhāva). But here the dharma which is the feeling of remorse (Yid La gCags Pa; cetaso vipratisāraḥ) towards the wrongdoing is called regret.

61. *ADKB* p.197; *bShad Pa* p.104:

> The term unmixed (Ma 'Dres Pa; āveṇika) means a mind in which there is exclusively ignorance, and no other affliction such as attachment and so forth.

62. The five views are: view of the transitory collections, wrong view, view holding to the extremes, esteeming mistaken views, esteeming mistaken morality and asceticism. See {v.3}.

63. These are the four remaining <u>root</u> afflictions among six, view and ignorance are already mentioned.

64. This is a partial quotation of verses {ii.28-30}, with one mental factor--sleep--added to the original numbers.

65. *ADKB* p.199; *bShad Pa* p.106:

> With the exception of dissimulation, deceit and haughtiness.

66. e.g. Leader and follower, king and subject, teacher and student. In order to gather followers, the leader will use dissimulation and deceit.
*ADKB* p.200; *bShad Pa* p.106 says:

> Deceit can occur up to the world of Brahma, because there they are together with assemblies, but not above that.

67. See Pruden fn#169.

68. Pruden fn#171 summarizes this view from *SAKV* (p.206), where it is attributed to the "pūrvācārya." The *ADKB* attributes this view merely to "others". Poussin, following Yaśomitra, says that it is Vasubandhu's position (Pruden p.204).

69. The five limbs of the first concentration are investigation, analysis, joy, pleasure, meditative stabilization. See {vii.7} and *MS* p.115ff.

70. Sanskrit has been provided to make sense of these etymologies. The Sanskrit (*ADKB* p.208) says cinoti from the root √ci--to accumulate or gather. So Yaśomitra (p.208) says: "The meaning is that it accumulates (cinoti) virtue and non-virtue."
The Vaibhāṣikas (*bShad* Pa p.111) seem to have taken it as the root √cit or √cint, as they have translated it as 'Byed Pa--distinguishes.

71. *SAKV* p.209 explains that "the same in substance" means that for each moment of mind, one each of the mental factors, feeling, discrimination and intention arises.

72. *SAKV* p.210; *'Grel bShad* p.148a5:

> The term "also" is in order to indicate [other] non-associated things that are consistent with [the formative forces] like these. Things not associated with mind such as causing a schism in the sañgha and so forth are considered to be substantially [the same.]

73. One possesses these afflictions from beginningless time, so they are never newly acquired. They can not be abandoned by means of the contaminated mundane path, so an ordinary individual can not abandon them and then acquire them after losing them. This however is not the case for one who deteriorates from Arhatship, as we see in the next paragraph.

74. *Madhyamāgama* 49.13--Taisho 1, p.735b29.

*SAKV* p.212; *'Grel bShad* p.150b3:

> The ten dharmas of No More Learning are the Eight Limbs of the Noble Path of No More Learning, with Right Liberation (Yang Dag Pa'i rNam Par Grol Ba; samyag-vimukti) and Right Wisdom (Yang Dag Pa'i Ye Shes; samyag jñāna).

The five limbs that are abandoned are: rūparāga, ārūpyarāga, auddhatya, māna, avidyā.

75. *Cakravarti-sūtra*, *Digha Nikāya* 3.59.

Here Vasubandhu is commencing his sustained attack on the Vaibhāṣika conception of prāpti by citing sūtra. Since the sūtra says the king possesses the seven jewels they must have been obtained. But obtainment refers exclusively to phenomena within a mental continuum, not to external things.

76. Because they are asaṁskṛta.

77. There are the four characteristics--arising, aging, duration and impermanence. Every phenomenon has the four characteristics and then each characteristic has the four characteristics. So you get the arisal of arisal etc. See {ii.45c}.

So if the cause of a phenomenon is obtainment, the characteristic of arisal would be unneccessary.

78. Sarnath Edition p.113 corrected from: Thob Pa Yod Cing Rang rGyud Kyis bsDus So // to conform to 'Bras sPung Edition: Yod Cing brGyud...

79. Sarnath Edition p.113; 'Bras sPung Edition p.64b1 ammended to read: rGyud Kyis Ma bsDus Pa rNams Kyi <u>Ma</u> Thob Pa Med De//

80. i.e. The obtainment of analytical cessations obtained by means of the contaminated mundane path.

81. i.e. Because they separate one from the realms of saṁsāra.

82. In general, the level of learning refers to the attainment of an individual who has not yet attained Arhatship but has reached the Path of Meditation--such a person is called an Āryan Learner.

The phenomena of the level of no more learning are those of an Arhat.

83. Explained at *ADKB* p.222; *bShad Pa* p.118:

> The obtainment of non-obscuring neutrals, because they are of little force, only arise simoultaneously with [their objects,] and not before or after. Therefore, the [obtainment] of these is of the past only when they are of the past; and for those of the present it is only of the present.

84. See {vii.45}.

85. This refers to the revealing (vijñapti) forms of body and speech which are motivated by an obscuring neutral mind. Even though the mind may be of great strength it does not give rise to a non-revealing form and so it is determined to be not of great strength and the obtainment is only simoultaneous with the form that is obtained.

All material forms are dull, so ordinary vijñapti form does not have the force to continue in a continuum; but by the power of motivation of a strong virtuous or non-virtuous mind, forms can become strong, as in the case of avijñapti form.

86. Here pure means uncontaminated, i.e. obtained by supermundane path.

87. The non-obtainment of Truth of the Path is included in the three realms, because there is no non-obtainment of the Truth of the Path for Āryans. The non-obtainment of the Truth of the Path has to be for an ordinary individual.

88. The nature of the substance that makes gods sentient beings and that makes humans sentient beings is not different. Both humans and animals have homogenity that is similar to each other, and that substance is the homogeneity of being sentient beings. The individual substances are different in each individual, but they are the same type of substance.

89. This is the substance that makes a god who sees another god of the same category recognize him as of the same type. The substance that makes the similarity for each category of being is a different type of substance.

90. *ADKB* p.230 ; *bShad Pa* p.122:

> If there were no such substance with a uniform nature as homogeneity, there would not be a conception or an expression distinguishing "this being from that being" among beings who are separate from each other by being different.

See also *SAKV* p.230; *'Grel bShad* p.164b1.

91. See Pruden fn#218 for citations.

92. i.e. It does not intend to say that there is a separate substance of homogeneity; only that there is a similarity of karmic causes.

93. 1. Naturally flowing result (rGyu mThun Pa Las Byung Ba; naiḥṣyandika).
2. Arisen from development (rGyas Pa Las Byung Ba; aupacayika).
3. Arisen from fruition (rNam sMin Las Byung Ba; vipāka-ja).

94. i.e. Not in the life in which the karmic seed was planted; not in the life after that; but in some subsequent life after that.
See {iv.50}.

95. See {iii.90}.

96. *ADKB* p.125; *bShad Pa* p.235:

> Even those who, having generated this state degenerate from it, will undoubtedly, when they are reborn, be reborn among the beings of non-discrimination. So it is held. Because of this, one who attains this state does not enter the predestined stage (Nges Pa; niyāma) {vi.26} [when one is certain to become and Āryan.] And further it is held that this state is only [cultivated by] ordinary individuals. "Not by Āryans." {ii.42} Since the Āryans view this state as like a pitfall, they do not enter the absorption of non-discrimination. But it is those who have the perception that it is salvation that enter this absorption.

97. There is past and future obtainment for mental states, but there is no mind in the absorption of non-discrimination. Similarly, innate states such as afflictions, have past obtainment, but states acquired by effort have their obtainment newly arise with the acquisition of the new state.

98. "To abide in the pleasure of the present life," here means to abide in a peaceful state where all the desires and troubles of this life are pacified. As it says at *ADKB* p.236; *bShad Pa* p.126:

> They undertake the absorption with the mental conception consisting of the thought of abiding in peace (Zhi Bar gNas Pa'i 'Du Shes; śānti-vihāra-saṁjñā).

99. One uses the absorption of neither discrimination nor non-discrimination ('Du Shes Med 'Du Shes Med Min; naiva-saṁjñā-nāsaṁjñā) {viii.4} of the Peak of Existence as a mental basis for entering the absorption of cessation. This is the primary absorption of the Peak of Existence. It is called that because discriminations are weak there, but they are not completely absent.

100. i.e. One engages in this absorption in order to abide in a peaceful state, where the desires and afflictions of this world are pacified.

101.i.e. The karma might not reach maturation because one might attain Nirvāṇa in this life, in which case this karma to be born in the Peak of Existence would not ripen.

102. Also: *ADKB* p.237; *bShad Pa* p.126:

> Ordinary individuals are not able to generate the absorption of cessation because of their fear of annihilation.

Since the Peak of Existence is in the Formless Realm, ordinary individuals mistake the cessation of their mind and mental factors, in the context of no physical body, for total annihilation, and so they fear it. The absorption of non-discrimination does not have this effect since it is in the Form Realm and one still has a body to provide a sense of existence. In fact, while in the absorption of cessation one still possesses homogeneity, life and other formative forces not associated with mind.

103. i.e. An Arhat doesn't automatically attain it, as he does some other states.

104. See Pruden fn# 235.

105. *Netrīpada-śāstra*.

106. For the 16 and the 18 see respectively {vi.27} and {vii.23-25}.
Since this transition through the Path of Seeing and Path of Meditation is carried out all in one sitting by the Bodhisattva, there is no opportunity to enter the absorption of cessation; and it is impossible for an unsimilar type of mind to arise during this period.

107. See {ii.10} for a discussion of the difference between the two.

108. *ADKB* p.248; *bShad Pa* p.133:

> The Blessed One has said this:
>
> When longevity, warmth and consciousness throw the body away,
> having abandoned it, then what remains is without mind, like a piece of wood.

109. *ADKB* p.249; *bShad Pa* p.134, the Sautrāntikas explain their own view of longevity:

> It is not that we say that it does not exist, but that it is not a separate substance...It is the projection, by karma of the three realms, by which homogeneity remains for a given period of time; [which determines that] "one is to remain for just this length of time." That is, for the length of time that karma projects homogeneity, for that length of time one will remain, and that is what is called longevity. It is like the projection of the amount of time it takes for grain to ripen or like the amount of time that a projected arrow remains in the air.

110. Objects of enjoyment here refers to such necessities of life as food, clothes and housing, but especially food.

111. A variation from *ADKB* p.250 *bShad Pa* p.134:

> The fourth is from not avoiding adverse conditions.
> caturthī--viśamāparihāreṇa //

*SAKV* (p.250):

> Not avoiding adverse conditions such as overeating (atyaśana) etc.

112. The quotation is supplied by *SAKV* p.254; *'Grel bShad* p.179a5, from the *Trilakṣaṇa-sūtra*. See Pruden fn#284 for other sources.

113. The Sautrāntikas, according to Poussin (Pruden, p. 239.)

114. GDD has made this point a bit difficult by leaving out the word "aging" which appears at *ADKB* p.254; *bShad Pa* p.138. The point is that the sūtra combines the two, duration and aging, into one characteristic. Why? Because duration might seem attractive but aging will not.

115. *ADKB* p.266; *bShad Pa* p.145:

> If the collection of causes and conditions are not present, arising will not generate [the phenomenon.]

116. i.e. All dharmas have efficacy with regard to all other dharmas. Even asaṁskṛtas have efficacy to produce mental consciousnesses.

117. *ADKB* p.283; *bShad Pa* p.153:

> Connate is whatever are reciprocal results. The term reciprocal means one for the other. Whatever dharmas are the results one of the other, they are each other's connate cause.

118. Here GDD has diverged from the *ADKB* by choosing sovereign result as the example to mention. *ADKB* p.284; *bShad Pa* p.154 mentions fruitional result and naturally flowing result. *SAKV* comments (p.284; *'Grel bShad* p.198a4):

> Here, the results are: the result of human action (sKyes Bu Byed Pa'i 'Bras Bu; puruṣa-kāra-phala) and result of separation ('Bral Ba'i 'Bras Bu; visaṁyoga-phala); fruitional result and naturally flowing result were already separately mentioned. But sovereign result (bDag Po'i 'Bras Bu; adhipati-phala) is not mentioned because it is common to all.

He goes on to say that the meaning of their being "identical" is that they arise simoultaneously.

119. Geshe Sopa comments that these are secondary, contributing causes.

120. Poussin says (Pruden fn# 341) this is the non-obscuring neutral mind after the second concentration--it is without investigation, analysis and the virtuous great grounds.

121. Taisho 26 p.745a25 according to Japanese editor, Saeki, quoted by Poussin. A lengthy excerpt is quoted in *SAKV* p.285 and translated by Poussin (Pruden fn#343).

122. The nine levels of absorption based on which one can cultivate the path: anāgamya, the special first concentration, the four concentrations and [the first] three levels of the Formless Realm.

123. The paths of śraddhānusarin, śraddhādhimukta and samayavimukta are, respectively, the Paths of Seeing, Meditation and No More Learning for a practitioner of weak faculties. For those of sharp faculties they are, dharmānusarin, dṛṣṭiprāpta and asamayavimukta.
For akopyadharman see {vi.56}.

124. *ADKB* p.299; *bShad Pa* p.161:

> The path is temporarily in these levels and is not included within them, because it is not itself affected by the craving for the levels. Therefore, a common type [of path,] even when [based on] a different level, is homogenous cause.

125. See Pruden fn #354 for this last point.

126. Because as soon as one begins to reflect, one immediately enters into absorption.

127. The mind and mental factors are similar in terms of substance, support, referent object, aspect and time. {ii.34}

128. *ADKB* p.308; *bShad Pa* p.165:

> The omnipresent dharmas that arise previously on their own level are the Omnipresent cause of the afflicted dharmas that arise subsequently. And these will be be explained later in the [fifth] chapter of this treasury, "The Presentation of the Subtle Propensities."
>
> Since this is a cause common to afflicted dharmas it is posited separately from Connate cause. Also, because it is the cause of [dharmas] of different types [of objects to be abandoned,] it is by the power of these that afflictions which are other types [of objects to be abandoned] are caused to arise. [See Pruden fn#360 for details.]

129. *Prakaraṇa*, Taishio 26 716b9; Pruden fn#377.

130. See the definition of efficient cause {ii.50} above, which includes asaṁskṛta phenomena.

131. See Pruden fn#405 for details.

132. The result of an omnipresent cause is always similar to its cause in terms of being 1) of the same level; and 2) moral quality--afflicted etc. But it can be of a different aspect in terms of how it is to be abandoned--by Seeing one of the four Truths, or by Meditation {ii.52}. When this last aspect is also similar, then the omnipresent cause is at the same time a connate cause.

133. *ADKB* p.332; *bShad Pa* p.179

> "That result which arises due to the force of something arises from human effort." For example: the effort of a mind on a lower level [which attains] mental stabilizaiton of a higher level; the contaminated [producing] the uncontaminated; a mind of the concentrations producing an emanation mind, and so forth.

Poussin's text adds (Pruden p.291):

> The definition does not apply to nirodha which, being eternal, does not arise. We say then that it is the result of the virile activity of the dharma by the force of which one obtains possession of it.

134. *ADKB* p.333; *bShad Pa* p.180

> Saṁskṛta phenomena other than those that arose previously are the sovereign result of all saṁskṛtas.

135. Definitions, inserted here by Poussin from {vi.22}; see Pruden p.291 and fn#409 & 410:

> A dharma grasps a result when it becomes its seed.
>
> A dharma produces a result at the moment when it gives this result the power of arising, that is, at the moment when, the future result being turned towards arising or is ready to arise, this dharma gives it the power that causes it to enter into the present.

136. *ADKB* p.333; *bShad Pa* p.180:

> Efficient cause is also like this; but since it does not definitely have a result, it is not mentioned.

137. *ADKB* p.340; *bShad Pa* p.183:

> And what are "the remainder?" Those that are neutral, except for those that are arisen from fruition; and those that are virtuous, except for the first uncontaminated moment.

The first uncontaminated moment is also referred to as the first Āryan [moment.] It is the first uncontaminated moment on the Path of Seeing, the duhkhe-dharma-jñāna-kṣanti.

138. See Pruden fn#417 for citations and other sources.

139. This refers to non-revealing forms, which arise from restraints such as the pratimokṣa vow. After taking a vow in the Desire Realm a non-revealing form is produced and continues; while at the same time one may enter an afflicted or pure concentration, at which time a second, restraint of concentration, would be produced and with it a second non-revealing form, which would exist simoultaneously with the first.

Minds, on the other hand, are always equal--one causal mind produces one resultant mind.

140. i.e. It is done by inference--rJes Su dPags Pa; anumāna. (*ADKB* p.345; *bShad Pa* p.185)

141. The main points here are that in the case of the absorption of cessation the similar and immediately preceding condition is not actually immediately preceding.

And in the case of the characteristics, in particular the characteristic of arisal, they do not have similar and immediately preceding conditions because they are non-associated with mind.

142. If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears, it is still the referent object condition for ear consciousness--*ADKB* p.348; *bShad Pa* p.188:

> Any dharma that is the referent object for [a certain] dharma, even when that [subject] dharma is not directed to the [object] dharma, it is never not the referent object, because that is its definitive characteristic.

143. Although all phenomena are referent object conditions, this only means that they are suitable to be objects of minds, but as the *ADKB* (p.349) explains, when they are connate, when they coexist with a certain mind, they are not its object, but they are its efficient cause.

All saṁskṛta phenomena except the phenomenon itself are its efficient cause. Therefore efficient cause is called "sovereign" condition because it pertains to the greatest number of phenomena.

144. *ADKB* p.350; *bShad Pa* p. 189:

> The term "perishing" means present, because they are facing cessation (mNgon Du Phyog; abhimukha).

145. *ADKB* p.350; *bShad Pa* p.189:

> The immediately preceding condition operates on [future] results that are coming into being because they give up their place [to succeeding states of mind.]
>
> The referent object condition operates on perishing [present] results because these [results] are grasped by present minds and mental factors.
>
> Since the nature of the sovereign condition is to not obstruct [the arising of any dharma] in any of the times, its activity is merely remaining in that state.

146. *ADKB* p.350; *bShad Pa* p.190:

> Because they arise from the minds that accomplish them, the absorptions have minds as immediately preceding conditions. But because they obstruct the arising of minds they are not [themselves] immediately preceding conditions.

147. In the *ADKB* there follows several pages of proofs of the non-existence of a creator god.

148. I have reversed the second and third in this list as given in the text. It is different from the order found in *ADKB* p.355; and *bShad Pa* p.193. And the following list of definitions is given in accordance with these other texts.

149. See *ADKB* p.358; *bShad Pa* p.195. Poussin provides root text citations for each point (Pruden fn# 449).

150. As we saw just above at {i.66} the four types of mind in the Desire Realm are virtuous, non-virtuous, obscuring neutral, non-obscuring neutral.

151. Non-virtuous and obscuring neutral in the Desire Realm, and obscuring neutral in the Formless Realm.

152. Thereby making six virtuous minds corresponding to the three in the list of 12.

153. See Pruden fn#452 for citations.

154. To clarify the math here, 12 are expanded into 20: three virtuous become six virtuous; two non-obscuring neutral become seven non-obscuring neutral; and seven are unchanged.

155. The 20, by being more specific, leaves out certain specific cases, whereas the classification as 12, consisting of more general categories, is more complete.

156. i.e. The three minds are: That virtuous mind of the Form Realm itself; and the non-obscuring neutral minds of the Desire and Form Realms, that is, the emanation minds capable of creating emanations in these two realms.

# CHAPTER THREE

# THE PRESENTATION OF THE WORLD

## Outline to Chapter Three

I. The world of sentient beings, who is born.
- A. The divisions of the world of sentient beings.
  - 1. The divisions of the three realms.
  - 2. The divisions of the five types of rebirth.

- B. The distinctions of qualities.
  - 1. The seven abodes of consciousness.
  - 2. The nine dwellings of sentient beings.
  - 3. The four abodes of consciousness.
  - 4. Distinguishing what is included in the seven and the four.

- C. The extensive explanation of their natures.
  - 1. The manner of entering in the beginning.
    - a. Where they enter, the birth-source.
    - b. Who enters, the intermediate existence beings.
      - (1) Their nature.
      - (2) Establishing proof.
        - (a) By reason.
        - (b) By scripture.

      - (3) Their shapes.
      - (4) The distinctions of qualities.
      - (5) The manner of entering a birth-source.

  - 2. The manner of abiding in the middle.
    - a. The dependent origination of those sentient beings who abide.
      - (1) The presentation.
      - (2) The explanation.
        - (a) The dependent origination of states.
          - 1) Nature.
            - a) The divisions.
            - b) The definitions of each.
            - c) What is ascertained.

          - 2) Condensed divisions.

3) Reasons for the certainty of number.

4) Differences between arising and arisen [phenomena.]

(b) The nature of each when it comes up.
1) Explaining ignorance.
2) Explaining name.
3) Explaining contact.
4) Explaining feeling, and things that are explained elsewhere.

(c) Applying examples of the three [groups of] limbs.

(3) The summary.

b. The dependent origination of food by which they survive.
(1) The presentation.
(2) The explanation.
(a) The nature of food.
(b) Tangentially, the list of synonymns of the intermediate existence.
(c) Their ascertainment.

3. The manner of going in the end.

II. The [inanmimate] receptacle world, where they are born.
A. The stages and actual measurements.
1. Explaining the support.
a. Explaining the wind maṇḍala.
b. Explaining the water and gold maṇḍalas.

2. Explaining what is supported.
a. Explaining the mountains.
b. Explaining the oceans.
c. Explaining the continents.
(1) The main continents.
(2) The minor continents.
(3) Explaining the special qualities of

Jambudvipa.

3. Explaining in particular the abodes of sentient beings.
   a. The actual explanation.
      (1) The abodes of bad migrations.
         (a) The hot hells.
         (b) The cold hells.

      (2) The abodes of higher rebirths.
         (a) Associated with a level.
            1) The abode of the group of Four Great Kings.
               a) Those based in palaces.
               b) Those based on mountains.
            2) The abode of the Thirty-three.
         (b) Not associated with a level.

   b. Their elaboration.

B. Incidentally, the measurements of sentient beings.
   1. The measure of bodies.
   2. The measure of lives.
      a. The actual explanation.
         (1) The measure of lives in the higher rebirths.
         (2) The measure of lives in the bad migrations.

      b. Incidental subjects.

C. Explaining the measurements in detail.
   1. The concise presentation of the basic unit.
   2. The extensive explanation.
      a. The measures of physical objects.
      b. The measures of time.
         (1) Explaining years.
         (2) Explaining kalpas.
            (a) The actual explanation.
               1) The presentation.
               2) The explanation.
                  a) Kalpas of dissolution.
                  b) Kalpas of evolution.
                  c) Kalpas of duration.
                  d) Great kalpas.

(b) What arises incidentally.

1) Incidental points concerning great kalpas.

a) The way Buddhas arise.

b) The way Pratyekabuddhas arise.

c) The way Cakravartin kings arise.

2) Incidental points concerning the kalpa of dissolution.

a) The divisions of dissolution.

b) The highest point [above which] something remains.

c) The order of dissolution.

In the explanation of the third chapter, The Presentation of the World, there are two topics:

I. The world of sentient beings, who is born.

II. The [inanimate] receptacle world, where they are born.

I. The world of sentient beings, who is born.

There are three topics:

A. The divisions.

B. The distinctions of qualities.

C. The extensive explanation of their natures.

A. The divisions of the world of sentient beings.

1. The divisions of the three realms.

2. The divisions of the five types of rebirth.[1]

1. The divisions of the three realms.

As it says {ii.73}, "By the afflicted [minds of each] of the three realms..." If one asks: If the divisions of the minds, mental factors and so forth are explained according to the three realms, what are those three realms?

They are the Desire, Form and Formless Realms.

The first, the Desire Realm, consists of: The hells (dMyal Ba; naraka) which are without joy.[2] The hungry ghosts (Yi Dwags; preta) who have gone to a place from which it is extremely difficult to return; or, who are extremely thirsty.[3] The animals (Dud 'Gro; tiryañc) who move in a horizontal position (Dud De 'Gro Ba; tiryag gamana). Humans, whose minds are developed (Shas Che Ba; udbhūtatva). The six types of Desire Realm gods who have their homes in the sky.[4]

There is also a division of the Desire Realm into 20 parts: By dividing the hells into eight hot hells [plus the hungry ghosts and the animals] there are ten bad migrations; and by dividing the humans into the four continents [plus the six types of gods] there are ten abodes of good migration.

There is a reason for not counting the eight cold hells and the occasional hells which would increase the number: the former are not primary; and for the latter, the time, place and so forth are not definite.

In the *Basic Topic of the Levels*[5] the Desire Realm is explained as 36: Since the abode of animals is not definite it is not counted. There are the eight hot hells; the eight cold hells; hungry ghosts; demigods (lHa Ma Yin; asura), which makes 18; for the humans, the 12 continents of humans; and the six types of Desire Realm gods.

The hells and so forth together with their abodes are the subject. They are of the Desire Realm. Because they are of a realm which is capable of

nourishing afflictions which are non-virtues. [p.148; 83b1]

If one asks: Since the emanation mind is possessed [only] by an individual who is free of attachment [to the Desire Realm,] how can it be capable of nourishing [afflictions of the Desire Realm]?[6]

Another [person in the Desire Realm,] hearing that such [emanation minds] exist, has attachment arise. Or someone, remembering that, "I myself have degenerated from that [attainment,"] has attachment arise. Or else, seeing an emanation mind as delightful one thinks, "An emanation mind like this is great," and so attachment arises. Moreover, even though [attachment] may not actually increase, it is capable of increasing it, because [the emanation mind] can emanate the smells and tastes [which can only be] of the Desire Realm.

If one asks: Why is it called the Desire Realm? Because it is a realm that possesses desire, it is called that.

If one asks: What is this desire? It refers to the craving (Sred Pa) that pursues sexual intercourse and morsel food.

The 17 levels above the Desire Realm are the subject. They are the Form Realm, because it is the realm of those superior forms which are beyond the Desire Realm and are capable of nourishing the afflictions of their own [Form] Realm.

The Form Realm has 17 levels: The levels of the first three concentrations which are the individual causes of birth in the Form Realm are each three-fold; and the fourth concentration is eight-fold.

From meditating on [one of] the three--weak, medium or strong causal absorptions of the first concentration; one is born, respectively, among one of the three, Brahmakāyika (Tsangs Ris), Brahmapurohita (Tsangs Pa mDun Na 'Don), or Mahābrahman (Tsangs Chen).

From meditating on the second concentration in these ways one is born, respectively, among one of the three, Parīttābha ('Od Chung), Apramāṇābha (Tsad Med 'Od), or Ābhāsvara ('Od gSal).

From meditating on the third concentration in these ways one is born, respectively, among one of the three, Parīttaśubha (dGe Chung), Apramāṇaśubha (Tsad Med dGe), and Śubhakṛtsna (dGe rGyas). And from meditating in these ways on the contaminated fourth concentration of an ordinary individual one is born in the three, Anabhraka (sPrin Med), Puṇyaprasava (bSod Nams sKyes), and Bṛhatphala ('Bras Bu Che Ba).[7] [p.149; 84a2] Āryans are born, respectively, among the five pure levels (gNas gTzang Ma; śuddhāvāsika) [of the fourth concentration] by meditating on the fourth concentration--at the weakest level by alternating [meditation of the contaminated path with meditation of the uncontaminated path] three times; at the middle level, alternating six times; at the strong level, nine

alternations; at the very strong level, 12 alternations; at the greatest level, meditating by alternating 15 times.

If one asks, why is it called the Form Realm? It is so-called because it is the realm that is defined by the excellent quality of form.

The Bahirdeśakas[8] say that because the Mahābrahmans are different from the Brahmapurohitas in terms of longevity, body, feeling and cognition (rNam Par rTog Pa), there are 17 parts to the abodes in the Form Realm.

The Kāśmīrans say: The Mahābrahmans are slightly elevated from Brahmapurohitas by steps, but it is not a place apart. Therefore, they say, there are 16 parts to the abodes in the Form Realm.

According to Ācārya Ārya [Asaṅga] (sLob dPon 'Phags Pa), by including the coarse Akaniṣṭha, there are 18 parts to the abodes in the Form Realm.[9] {1-2}

In the Formless Realm there are not separate places. An individual who has attained the meditative stabilization of the Formless Realm and has not degenerated from it, wherever he passes away, having established the [four] basic aggregates of name right there, he is born into the Formless Realm. However, [depending on whether] the birth [in the Formless Realm is based on] excellent or inferior meditation in the causal absorption, there are the four types, the Ākāśānantya-āyatana (Nam mKha' mTha' Yas sKye mChed) and

so forth.[10]

If one asks, if there is no form in the Formless Realm, upon what is a mental continuum based? In the Formless Realm the mental continuum is based upon homogeneity (Ris mThun Pa; nikāya-sabhāgatā) as well as life (Srog; jīvita). By saying "also" (Yang; ca) {iii.3} it indicates that it is also based on ordinary individual-ship, non-possession, obtainment, birth and so forth.

If one asks: Isn't it the case that in the two lower realms the mind is not based on homogeneity and life without regard to form? [p.150; 84b3]

It is not so-based, because [the mental continuum] is not free of the discrimination of form, and so its force is weaker. But for a mind in the Formless Realm, having no regard for form because it is free of the discrimination of form by the power of meditative stabilization, it possesses the force [to be based on homogeneity and life.][11]

The Ākāśānantya-āyatana and so forth are the subject. They are the Formless Realm, because they are beyond the two lower realms, and they constitute a realm that is capable of nourishing the afflictions of the formless.

If one asks: Why is it called the Formless Realm? Because it is a realm totally without form it is called that. {3}

2. The divisions of the five types of rebirth.

In these three realms there are five types of rebirth, the hell-beings and so forth. They are taught by each of their names, the hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods.

If one asks, what are their natures? They are non-virtuous, because there are those that have cut the roots of virtue. They are non-afflicted, because there are those who have abandoned afflictions. Therefore, they are non-obscuring neutral.

Because they are included in what has a mental continuum they are known as sentient beings. But the intermediate existence, although [made up of sentient beings] is not a type of rebirth. As it is taught in the *Prajñapti-śāstra*:

> The four birth-sources (sKye gNas; yoni)[12] subsume the five types of rebirth; but the five types of rebirth do not subsume the four birth-sources. What is not included? The intermediate existence.

And also from *The Sūtra Teaching the Seven Existences*:[13]

> Existence is seven-fold: existence of hell-beings; existence of hungry ghosts, animal existence, human existence; existence of gods; karmic existence;[14] and intermediate existence.

If one asks, if the types of rebirth are definitely five, in which type of rebirth are the demigods (Lha Ma Yin; asura) included? [p.151; 85a3] According to Ācārya Ārya Asaṅga they are included among the gods because they jealously pursue the body and wealth of the gods, and they are consorts

of the gods. However, because they have degenerated from the qualities of the gods, their inferiority is indicated by the negating term ('Gag sGra) demigods (lHa Ma Yin; a-sura).

In the *Smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* (*mDo Dran Pa Nyer gZhag*)[15] the demigods are included among the hungry ghosts and animals; and in some sūtras the types of rebirth are explained as six.

Some yakṣas (gNod sByin) are included in the gods and some in the hungry ghosts. Gandharvas (Dri Za) are included among the gods, because they are the musicians of the gods. Garuḍa (Nam mKha lDing), [the serpent] Urogati [or Mahoraga] (lTo 'Phye), Kinnara (Mi'am Ci), and nāgas are explained as included among the animals. Piśāca (Sha Za) [a class of demons,] unmada (sMyo Byed) [crazy-makers], apasmāra (brJed Byed) [forgetfulness-makers,] and mātṛka (Ma Mo) [a type of wicked demon,] are included among the hungry ghosts. {4}

B. The distinctions of qualities.

There are four topics.

1. The seven abodes of consciousness.
2. The nine dwellings of sentient beings.
3. The four abodes of consciousness.
4. Distinguishing what is included in the seven and the four.

1. <u>The seven abodes of consciousness</u>.

The Abhidarmikas like to explain the sūtras and say that in the sūtra it says "seven abodes of consciousness" (Nam Shes gNas Pa; vijñāna-sthiti), and also say that it says "nine abodes of sentient beings." So, if one asks, what are the seven abodes of consciousness?

There are seven abodes of consciousness: various in both body and discrimination; various in body but alike in discrimination; the opposite, alike in body but various in discrimination; alike in both body and discrimination; and the first three [levels] of the Formless [Realm.]

The first of these consists of humans, [the six types of] Desire Realm gods and gods born later in the first concentration;[16] because their bodies are various in color, shape and size, and their discriminations are variously happy, suffering or neutral. [p.152; 85b4]

The second [abode of consciousness] consists of Mahābrahmā and those gods in his retinue who are born first. Because their bodies are [various] as mentioned above. But Mahābrahmā thinks that, "These were created by me." And they also think that, "We were created by Mahābrahmā." So in thinking that, they have the same discrimination.

The third [abode of consciousness] consists of the Ābhāsvara gods.[17] They are alike in having bodies of the nature of light. In discrimination [they are various:] having grown weary of the mental happiness of the actual

absorption they enter the equanimity of the preparatory level; having grown weary of the equanimity of the preparatory level, they enter the mental happiness of the actual absorption.[18]

The Sautrāntikas say: Those who have been born in the second concentration but have not been there long, not expert in the process of the destruction of the universe, when they see the empty palace of Brahmā being burned by fire [at the time of the destruction of the world] they have the discrimination of fear. While those who have passed a long period after birth in the second concentration, who are expert in the ways of the destruction of the universe say, "Do not be afraid! That has been burned up by fire before, and it disappeared from there." So saying, they have a discrimination without fear. And so there are various discriminations.

The Śubhakṛtsna gods are the fourth [abode of consciousness.] Because they are the same in having bodies which are of the nature of light; and in discrimination they are the same in engaging in the mental happiness of the actual absorption.

If one asks: What is the reason that the remaining ones are not taught as abodes of consciousness?[19]

There is a reason for this: Because the remainder possess what destroys consciousness. In the case of the bad migrations [consciousness] is overwhelmed by suffering. In the fourth concentration it is destroyed by the

cause and effect of the absorption of non-discrimination ('Du Shes Med Pa'i sNyoms 'Jug; asaṁjñi-samāpatti) and the beings of non-discrimination ('Du Shes Med Pa Pa; asaṁjñika). In the Peak of Existence it is destroyed by the absorption of cessation ('Gog Pa'i sNyoms 'Jug; nirodha-samāpatti). {5-6b} [p.153; 86a5]

2. The nine dwellings of sentient beings.

If one asks: What is the explanation of the nine dwellings (Sems Can Gyi gNas; sattvāvāsa) of sentient beings?

For sentient beings the dwellings are taught as nine, because on top of the seven just taught there are the Peak of Existence and those beings [of the fourth concentration] who are without discrimination.

If one asks: In that case, what is the reason for not teaching as dwellings the bad migrations and those sentient beings of the fourth concentration who are other than those without discrimination?

There is a reason for not mentioning the others--the bad migrations--here, because [beings] remain there by [the force of] the demons of karma (Las Kyi Srin Po; karma-rākṣasa), not according to their own wish. As an example, it is like a prison. Moreover, those two are not mentioned here because a dwelling of sentient beings [is a place to which] those who live in other places have the desire to come; and those who live there do not desire

to go somewhere else. The bad migrations have neither of these conditions. And the ordinary individuals of the fourth concentration who are other than the beings of non-discrimination have the desire to enter non-discrimination. The Āryans have the desire to go higher, to Nirvāṇa. {6c-d}

3. The four abodes of consciousness.

The abodes of consciousness are also explained as four, because of the four contaminated aggregates.

If one asks: Then are all the contaminated aggregates [abodes of consciousness?]

Those [contaminated aggregates] that are of the same level [as the consciousness] are [abodes of consciousness.] Those of a different level and the uncontaminated are not. Because the meaning of "abode of consciousness" is that the consciousness abides [there] by the power of craving (Sred Pa; tṛṣṇa) and it does not abide that way among uncontaminated [aggregates] and those of a different level.

If one asks: Then what is the reason that consciousness is not mentioned as an abode of consciousness?

Consciousness alone is not explained as an abode of consciousness. Here [for the Vaibhāṣikas,] it is [defined] in terms of the abode and the abider being distinct, and that consciousness is the abider. For example, the king is

not his own throne. {7-8a} [p.154; 86b5]

4. Distinguishing what is included in the seven and the four.

If one ask: Then are there any that are included in the seven abodes of consciousness that are not included in the four and so forth?

If summarized there are four possibilities. How is that?

Those that are included in the seven but not included in the four: like a consciousness aggregate that occurs at the time of the seven.

Those that are included in the four but not included in the seven: like an abider in the fourth concentration, one in the Peak of Existence, and the contaminated aggregates of a bad migration which occur at the time of the four.

Those that are not included in either: like the consciousness aggregate of an abider in the fourth concentration, one in the Peak of Existence, or in a bad migration.

Those that are included in both: like the four contaminated aggregates other than consciousness which occur at the time of the seven abodes of consciousness. {8b}

C. The extensive explanation of their natures.

1. The manner of entering in the beginning.

2. The manner of abiding in the middle.

3. The manner of going in the end.

1. The manner of entering in the beginning.

There are two topics:

a. Where they enter, the birth-source.

b. Who enters, the intermediate existence beings.

a. Where they enter, the birth-source.

If one asks, how many birth-sources (sKye gNas; yoni)[20] of sentient beings are there in the three realms?

In the three realms there are four birth-sources of sentient beings: birth from an egg and so forth--birth from a womb, birth from moist heat, and miraculous birth.

If one asks, then which types of rebirth have how many birth-sources?

Humans have all four types of birth-sources. Because those miraculously born are like the humans at the beginning of a kalpa.[21] Those born from moist heat are like the King Māndhātar (rGyal Po Nga Las Nu).[22]

Those born from eggs are like the case of the Sthaviras Śaila (gNas brTan Brag) and Upaśaila (Nye Ba'i Brag), who were born based on the one

time association of their crane mother with the merchants from the damaged ship.[23] And like the 32 sons born from the 32 eggs of the Upāsakī Viśākhā (dGe bsNyen Ma Sa Ga).[24] And like the case of the 500 eggs born from the Queen of the King of Pañcāla (lNga Len). [The King] putting them into a box abandoned them on the Ganges river. A youth of the Licchavis who was bathing saw it, and upon opening the box 500 children appeared.[25] [p.155; 87a1]

Those born from wombs are most humans nowadays.

The animals have four types of birth-sources. It is explained that garuḍas having the four birth-sources eat the nāgas from all four birth-sources.[26]

Hell beings, gods and intermediate state beings are born miraculously, because they have very strong karma.

Most hungry ghosts are miraculously born, but there are also those born from wombs. This occurs in the account of the hungry ghostess who said to the great Bhadanta Maudgalyāyana, "I gave birth to five sons at night and likewise five sons during the day, and although I ate them I still was not satisfied."[27]

Then if one asks: From among these birth-sources which is the best?

Their goodness is ranked in the order: miraculous birth; birth from moist heat; birth from a womb; birth from an egg. Because they are,

respectively, births that do not harm either oneself or others; do not harm others; cause oneself to experience suffering one time; cause the experience of suffering twice.

If one asks: If miraculous birth is the best, then what is the reason that the Bodhisattva Prince Siddhārtha, who, in his last existence had obtained control over his rebirth, was not born by miraculous birth but rather was born from a womb?

There was a reason. It was in order to lead the Śākya clan to the teachings; and in order to encourage human disciples; and in order to dispel the conception that might arise if we saw the Teacher displaying great magical emanations or extraordinary powers, and we wondered, who is this, a magician or something?

Some say: It was in order to favor (rJes Su gZung; anugraha) his disciples by revealing his bodily relics, because those who are miraculously born do not leave a corpse when they die. [p.156; 88a1]]

The Ācārya Vasubandhu says: It is not [an adequate] answer to believe that [a relic body] appears [to a miraculously born Buddha] by the power of his blessings.

If one says: If the miraculously born have no corpse, it is contradictory to the statement [in sūtra] that "the miraculously born garuḍa pulls out the miraculously born nāga in order to eat it."

It is not contradictory. It says "in order to eat", it does not say "he ate" it. Or, the idea is that he eats it as long as it is not dead.

Then if one asks, which birth-source is the most numerous? They are numerous in the same order as their goodness.[28] {8c-9}

b. Who enters, the intermediate existence beings.[29]

There are five topics:

(1) Their nature.

(2) Establishing proof.

(3) Their shapes.

(4) The distinctions of qualities.

(5) The manner of entering a birth-source.

(1) Their nature.

As it says {iii.9}, "...intermediate existence beings are miraculously born." If one asks, what is their nature? It is that continuum of aggregates that arises between the existence at death and the birth existence.

If one asks: What is the reason that this is not an arrival (Byung Ba; upapanna)? The intermediate existence is not an arrival, because one has not yet arrived at the region to which one is travelling.[30] {10}

(2) Establishing proof.

The proof is established in two ways:

(a) By reason.

(b) By scripture.

(a) Establishing proof by reason.

The Mahāsaṃgikas (Phal Chen sDe Pa) say: There is no intermediate existence, because the birth existence occurs immediately upon the interruption of the death existence. If one says this:

The birth existence is the subject. It does not occur immediately upon the cessation of the death existence. Because it is analogous to a continuum of grain or phenomena that are engaged in a continuum (rGyun Gyis 'Jug Par Chos; santāna-varttina dharma).[31]

Some say this does not pervade. Because for example, the reflection of a face in a mirror is the continuum of the face but it is established with the occurrence of a break from the face. If one says this:

Objects of knowledge are the subject. There is the consequence that [the statement that] "the reflection of a face in the mirror is the continuum of the face," is absolutely not an example [that proves] that although the birth existence is a continuum of the death existence, it occurs with a break from [the death existence.] Because that reflection of a face in the mirror is not

established as an entity of face. [p.157; 88b1] Because in one place there can not be two physical things that are different substances at the same time.

And the above argument also pervades here. Because [the statement that] "the reflection of a face in the mirror is a continuum of the face;" and [the statement that] "the birth existence is a continuum of the death existence," are different. Because the reflection is not a continuum of the face; and the reflection of that [face] arises from two principal causes, the face and the mirror's reflectivity (gYa' Dag Pa). Whereas the birth existence arises from the death existence but does not arise from two principal causes. {11-12b}

(b) Establishing proof by scripture.

There is an intermediate existence. Because from the throat of the Bhagavan, it says in *The Sūtra Teaching the Seven Existences*: "There are seven existences: The hell existence..." and so forth.

Also, the intermediate existence exists because it says in [another] sūtra:

> If three conditions manifest, a child will be conceived in the mother's womb. The mother must be capable and fertile;[32] the father and mother must be united in passion, and a gandharva must be in attendance.

Which is to say, the gandharva of that [sutra] is none other than an

intermediate state being.[33]

Some say that is incorrect. Because the meaning [of a gandharva being in attendance] is that, "Perishing aggregates (Phung Po Zhig Pa; skandha-bheda) must be in attendance."[34] If one says this:

It is not established. Because the *Āśvalāyana-sūtra*[35] says:

> [Do you know whether] this gandharva which must be in attendance is a kṣatriya, or a brāhmaṇa, or a vaiśya, or a śūdra? And is it a resident of the east...

It would be inappropriate to [use the term] perishing aggregates for such things.

Also, the intermediate existence exists, because the Non-returners are taught as five-fold, those who attain [Nirvāṇa] in the intermediate state (Bar Dor 'Da' Ba; antarā-parinirvāyin) and so forth.[36]

If one says, the idea there is that the [one who attains Nirvāṇa in the intermediate existence] is a type of god:

That is not acceptable. Because if that was the case, it would entail that [the other four types of Non-returners,] those who attain after a rebirth (sKyes Nas 'Da' Ba; upapadya-parinirvāyin) and so forth would also be some type of god. [p.158; 89a2]

Also, the intermediate existence is established because the *Sūtra of the Seven Rebirths of Righteous People*[37] also says: "Among those who attain in the intermediate existence there are three types, those who attain

quickly and so forth."

Some say: If there were an intermediate existence, it would be contradictory with the [*Sūtra on Māra*[38]] which says: "The demon Dūṣin (Sun 'Byin Byed), having smashed the brain of the Buddha Kāśyapa's disciple Vidura (Nyan Thos mKhas Pa mGu Ba) with his stone-like fist, his dead body was surrounded by fire, and he was born in hell."[39] If one says this:

There is no mistake. Because in that same life his karma to be experienced in the present life ripened. But his karma to be experienced in the next life will ripen later.

And if one says: If there is an intermediate existence it is contradictory to the teaching that as soon as one performs the five automatic transgressions (mTsams Med lNga; pañcānantarya) one is born in hell.

There is no fault. The sense is that afterwards one will not be born in any other type of rebirth. If that were not the case, then by committing an automatic transgression one would be born in hell the next instant.

And if one says: If there were an intermediate existence it would contradict the Bhagavan saying to a sinful Brahmin:[40]

> Oh Brahmin, your youth is fled, old and sick, you come before Yama,
> There is no resting place for you along the way,
> and you have no provisions for the journey.

There is no fault. Because the sense here is merely that one shall not remain long among humans. {12c-d}

(3) Their shapes.

Then if one asks, what is the shape of intermediate existence beings?

An intermediate existence being has the form of the "previous-time-existence" (sNgon Dus Kyi Srid Pa; pūrva-kāla-bhava) which is to arise [as the upcoming rebirth,] because they are projected by the same throwing karma.

The previous-time-existence is the five or four aggregates from the second moment after birth onwards, up until [the moment of] death.[41]

Then if one asks, what is the color of intermediate existence beings? [p.159; 89b3] Intermediate existence beings of hell are like the stump of a tree burned by fire. Animals are like smoke. Hungry ghosts are like water. Intermediate existence humans and Desire Realm gods are like the color of gold. Form Realm intermediate existence beings are white in color.

For the Formless Realm there is no intermediate existence because there is no form there.

Then if one asks, what is the size of intermediate existence beings?

Desire Realm gods and humans of the intermediate existence are like a child that has reached the age of five or six. Furthermore, those of the Form Realm, due to very strong shame and embarrassment, are born fully-developed in size[42] and with clothes. But those of the Desire Realm, because of very strong shamelessness and immodesty, are born naked.

However, the Bhikṣunī Śuklā, by the force of previous prayers, was born with clothes.[43] And the Bodhisattva in his last existence [is born] as a youth adorned with the major and minor marks and with clothes.

If one says: In that case there is a contradiction with the dream in which his mother dreamt that a white baby elephant entered her womb.

There is no contradiction. Because that was in order to display a few omens. It is like, for example, King Kṛkin, who was shown ten dream omens.[44]

If one says: Then what about the statement by Bhadanta Dharmasubhūti (bTzun Pa Chos lDan Rab 'Byor) who says:

> Assuming the form of a beautiful white elephant with six tusks and four legs,
> Just as the ṛṣi knows his hermitage, he enters the abode of his mother's womb.

This shows [the Bodhisattva] in accordance with [his mother's] dream.[45]

Then if one asks: How long does an intermediate existence being survive?

The Upāsaka Bhadanta of the Sautrāntikas says, "It's duration is indefinite because it survives up until the conditions for it's birth come together."[46]

Bhadanta Vasumitra says they survive seven days. At that time, if one does not find a place for rebirth, one passes away and is born there again [in

the intermediate state.][47] [p.160; 90a4]

Some say that they survive for seven weeks or 49 days.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: Because it is disposed to search for a birth existence it does not remain long but is quickly re-conceived. Furthermore, if it is definite that one is to be reborn in a particular place, even though the conditions for birth [in that place] have not come together, the collection of conditions will be brought about by karma and one will be born there. If it is not definite that one will be born there [in that particular place] one will be born in a different place.

If one acquires an intermediate existence as a cow in the winter, but these cows breed in the summer (dByar Ka; varṣa), one will be born as a gayal,[48] because the gayal breeds at no specific time. If one acquires an intermediate existence as a horse in the winter, but they breed in the spring (Sos Kha; vasanta), one will be born as a donkey, because donkeys breed at no specific time. If one acquires an intermediate existence as a tawny bear (Dom; ṛkṣa) in the summer but they breed in the winter, one will be born as a red bear (Dred Mo; tarakṣa),[49] since they do not breed at a specific time. If one acquires an intermediate existence as a dog in the summer, but they breed in the fall, one will be born as a jackal because they do not breed at a specific time.[50]

If it is like that, how are these [fruitions] reversed? It says [in sūtra,]

"They collect new karma [while in the intermediate existence,"] and this is well established. And the statement that "karma is newly collected" means that karma to be experienced in the present life is newly collected; and by establishing that, it is established that karma to be experienced in the next life and karma to be experienced in subsequent lives is also collected. So they say. {13}

(4) The distinctions of qualities.

If one asks, who sees intermediate state beings? They are seen by the intermediate state beings of the same class.

Some say: Intermediate existence gods see all others. Intermediate existence humans, hungry ghosts, animals and hell beings see all except those on a higher level.

The pure divine eye [which arises from superior knowledge (mNgon Par Shes Pa; abhijñā),] devoid of the 11 faults, also sees them. [p.161; 90b4] The 11 faults are: Doubt, unattentiveness, physical depravity of body, lethargic sleep, excitement, overexertion, uncertainty, timidity, mixed up discrimination, too much talk, excessive meditation.

By their supernatural power [deriving from] karma they can travel through space, and they are able to move at especially high speed. Their faculties, eyes etc., are complete. They have the ability to enter mountains

and so forth without obstruction. The proof of that can be understood from the appearance of frogs and so forth within rocks that have no cracks.

Then if one asks: Having earned an intermediate existence as a hell-being, can one be diverted to another type of rebirth? It is irreversible. Because both the hell intermediate existence and the previous-time-existence [into which one is about to take birth derive from] the same throwing karma.

If one attains intermediate existence as a Brahmakāyika god it is not definite that one will be born there, because they have [the possibility of attaining] enlightenment in the intermediate existence.

If one asks: Do intermediate existence beings of the Desire Realm eat morsel food? They do not eat coarse morsel food, but merely eat odors. Furthermore, the more powerful eat tasty fragrances and the less powerful eat unpleasant odors. {14}

(5) The manner of entering a birth-source.

If one asks: What is the way in which the intermediate existence being enters into a birth-source?

For a human intermediate existence being: when, from a far distance it sees it's father and mother in coitus, with a mind confused [by attachment or anger,] with thoughts of sexual sport and pleasure, it goes to the place of its rebirth, in the uterus between the stomach and intestines. Furthermore, if it

is to be born as a male it lies to the right of the mother's belly, and faces the rear, and [is born] squatting.[51] If it is to be born a female it lies to the left of the mother's belly, facing the front. If it is to be born as a being of confused gender (Ma Ning; napuṁsakaṁ), it is situated according to whether male or female sexual desire predominates.

As for the others: in birth from moist heat, they go [to their rebirth] because of their desire for odor. [p.162; 91a5] For beings of miraculous birth they go from their desire for an abode.

If one asks: But how can there be a desire for an abode in hell? There is. Because the mind has become confused.

If one asks: In what form do intermediate existence beings travel? The hell intermediate existence beings go upside down. As it says in sūtra:

> Those who abuse the restrained, the ascetic and the ṛṣi,
> they will only come to fall upside down into hell.[52]

Intermediate existence gods go upwards. The others, humans and so forth, go straight ahead. Ācārya Pūrṇavardhana says, "Intermediate existence hungry ghosts, just like the hungry ghosts, go backwards."

Then if one asks: Is the statement that [they go to their rebirths] "with a confused mind" definite for all of these? It is not definite. One type enters the womb in an aware manner and abides without awareness; others are aware not only [while entering] but also while they remain; still others are aware not only at these times, but also when they emerge. Others are

ignorant for the whole thing, while entering, abiding and emerging. In the case of those born from eggs, even though there are Pratyekabuddhas [born from eggs,] they are always exclusively ignorant.

Then if one asks: What are instances of these three, awareness upon entering but non-awareness while abiding and so forth? They are respectively: The Cakravartin, and the two self-arisen ones (Rang Byung; svayaṁbhū)--the Pratyekabuddha and the [Perfected] Buddha. These are the three [types of] descent into the womb (mNgal Du 'Jug Pa; garbhāvakrānti), because they have [respectively] a great accumulation of karma and merit, or of wisdom, or of both.[53] {15-17}

2. The manner of abiding in the middle.

There are two topics.

a. The dependent origination of those sentient beings who abide.

b. The dependent origination of food by which they survive.

a. The dependent origination of those sentient beings who abide.

There are three topics.

(1) The presentation.

(2) The explanation.

(3) The summary.

(1) The presentation.

The Outsiders say: There is the consequence that there is a self of persons. Because [the being] comes from a previous existence to this one; and from here, subsequently, there is the intermediate existence of their type of rebirth. If one says this: [p.163; 91b5]

Although it does work this way there is no self of persons, because there is no permanent, partless and independent person.

Some say: In that case the consequence is that an agent who casts off previous aggregates and subsequently takes up others is not established. Because there is no self of persons. If one says this:

It does not pervade. Because the mere continuum of aggregates is the person.

Some say: Because the aggregates are momentary, there would be no entering [a subsequent rebirth] by a continuum. If one says this:

There is no fault. Although a lamp-flame is momentary its continuum can move to another place. Like that, a continuum of the intermediate existence, composed by afflictions and karma goes into the womb. Then, in

accordance with what kind of karma has projected it, the continuum of the aggregates grows progressively, and then by the power of karma and afflictions it goes into the world outside.

The way the continuum of the aggregates develops: there are five stages in the womb and five stages after birth. The five stages in the womb are: The kalala (Nur Nur Po). The arbuda (Mer Mer Po). The peśin (Nar Nar Po). The ghana (mKhrang 'Gyur). The praśakhā (rKang Lag 'Gyus).

The five stages after birth are: A baby (Byis Pa; śiśu). Youth (gZhon Nu; yuvan, kumāra). The prime of life (Dar Ma). Middle age (Dar Yol; madhya). Old age (rGas Pa; jīrṇa).[54]

The five stages after birth having developed in this way, by the power of karma and affliction one goes to a further world. Therefore cyclic existence is beginningless.

(2) The explanation.

There are three topics.

(a) The dependent origination of states.

(b) The nature of each when it comes up.

(c) Applying examples of the three [groups of] limbs.

(a) The dependent origination of states.

There are four topics.

1) Nature.

2) Condensed divisions.

3) Reasons for the certainty of number.

4) Differences between arising and arisen [phenomena.]

1) Nature.

There are three topics.

a) The divisions.

b) The definitions of each.

c) What is ascertained.

a) The divisions. [p.164; 92a6]

The continuum of the aggregates has 12 limbs of dependent origination: Ignorance. Formative forces. Consciousness. Name and form. The six āyatanas. Contact. Feeling. Craving. Grasping. Existence. Birth. Old age and death.

These 12 have three sections: At the beginning end there are the two,

ignorance and formative forces; at the latter end are the two, birth, and old age and death; and in the middle there are eight, from consciousness up to existence.[55]

Then if one asks, which individuals have these? A womb-born fully complete life has them, but [beings born from] other birth-sources and those who die in the intermediate existence do not.[56] {20}

b) The definitions of each.

As it says {iii.20}, "Twelve limbs..." If one asks what is the nature of these?

The limb of ignorance is the five aggregates, in a previous life, in a state in which the afflictions are active.[57]

The formative forces are the five aggregates, in a previous life, in a state of collecting karma that is meritorious and so forth.[58]

Consciousness is the aggregates upon conception in the womb in this life.

Name and form are the five aggregates from that conception on, up to the formation of the six āyatanas.[59]

The six āyatanas are the aggregates from then on until the three, object, faculty and consciousness meet.

Contact is the aggregates from the meeting of the three until one is

capable of experiencing the causes of [the feelings of] pleasure, pain and so forth.

Feeling is the aggregates from the time of being able to experience the causes in this way, until there is the capacity for copulation but before that activity begins.[60]

Craving is the aggregates from then on, having desire for the state of engaging in sensual enjoyments and copulation.[61] [p.165; 92b6]

Grasping is the five aggregates from the time of having the capacity [for copulation,] in a condition of racing around in order to obtain the sensual enjoyments of sex, food, clothing and so forth.

The five aggregates in the state of creating the karma, the fruit of which will become the future existence of the individual, that is existence.[62]

The conception in the future [life] is birth.[63]

From that until feeling is old age and death.[64] {21-24}

Then if one asks: From among the four types of dependent origination which is this?

This [exposition] is held to be (Lo; kila) the dependent origination of states (gNas sKabs Pa; āvasthika).

Then if one asks: If [each of] the states possesses [all] five aggregates, why were the limbs declared as "ignorance" and so forth?

There is no fault. Because, for [the period of each of] these states [one of the limbs,] ignorance and so forth, is predominant, [the states] were declared in terms of the [predominant] limb.

[As for the other three types of dependent origination:]

When [the 12 limbs] arise in each moment, it is momentary (sKad Cig Ma; kṣaṇika) dependent origination.

When they arise as the interconnection of cause and result it is interrelated ('Brel Pa Can; sāṁbandhika) dependent origination.

When the states of the five aggregates arise without interruption over three lifetimes, it is continuous (rGyun Chags Pa; prākarṣika) dependent origination. {25a-b}

c) What is ascertained.

If one asks: What is the purpose of teaching the 12 limbs of dependent origination in three lives?

There is a purpose in teaching them in this way. It is in order to counteract the confusion of wondering about past lives (sNgoṅ Gyi mTha'; pūrvānta), future lives (Phyi Ma'i mTha; aparānta), and the intermediate [present] time (Bar Dag; madhya): Did I exist or not exist previously? As what did I exist? How did I exist? Will I exist or not exist in the future? As what will I exist? How will I exist? What am I now? {25 c-d}

2) Condensed divisions.

Then if one asks: If the 12 limbs of dependent origination are condensed, in how many can they be subsumed? When condensed they are subsumed in three: Because they are subsumed in the three [groups,] afflictions, karma, and bases.

In afflictions there are three: Ignorance, craving and grasping. [p.166; 93b1]

In karma there are two: Formative forces and existence.

The remaining seven are bases because karma and afflictions arise from them. Likewise they are also result, because they arise from karma and afflictions.[65]

What is the reason that for the past [life] the cause [factors] are abbreviated, and for the future [life] the result [factors] are abbreviated?

The subject is the abbreviation of cause [factors] and result [factors] in, respectively, the past and the future [lives.] There is a reason for this. Because these can be understood by inference from the extensive explanation of the cause and result of the intermediate [present] life. {26}

3) Reasons for the certainty of number.

If one says: Does or does not ignorance have a cause and old age and

death have a result? If they do, then the number of limbs of dependent origination as 12 would be indefinite. If they don't, then cyclic existence would have a beginning and an end.

Although ignorance has a cause and old age and death have a result, the number of limbs of dependent origination as 12 does not become indefinite. Because from the affliction craving, arises the affliction grasping. From that [grasping,] the action [i.e.karma] existence arises. From that the basis birth arises. From that the basis old age and death arises. And from that the affliction craving arises.

In the same way, from the affliction ignorance arises the karma formative forces. From that [the limbs from] the basis consciousness up to the basis feeling arise. And from that the affliction craving is born. This is the process [of arising] of the limbs of existence.[66] {27}

4) Differences between arising and arisen [phenomena].

As the Bhagavan said:

> Oh Bhikshus, I will teach you dependently arising phenomena, as well as dependently arisen phenomena.[67]

If one asks: What is the difference between these two?

The śāstras say that there is no difference. [p.167; 94a2]

But in this statement from sūtra the [dependently] arising are causes

because results arise from them. The [dependently] arisen are held to be results, because they are arisen from causes. Therefore, since all 12 are cause and result, it is agreed that they are both arising and arisen. However, what is arising from a certain point of view, is not arisen from that point of view. Like a father [who is also] a son.[68]

The Sthavira Pūrṇāśa (bSam rDzogs)[69] says that in the case of the [dependently] arising and arisen there are four possibilities:

What is arising but is not arisen, like future [phenomena.]

What is arisen but is not arising, like the last mind and mental factors of an Arhat.

What is both, like present [phenomena] other than those [last minds of an arhat.]

What is neither, like asaṁskṛta phenomena.

Then, from sūtra: "If this exists, that will arise. By the birth of this, that will be born." If one asks, then what is the meaning of this?

The Ācārya Vasudharma[70] (Chos Kyi dByig) says: "The first [statement] refutes arisal without cause. The second [statement] refutes arisal from a permanent entity."

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu] says[71] that there is the consequence that the first statement is unnecessary in order to refute arisal without cause. Because the second [statement alone] serves to refute [both] arisal without

cause and arisal from a permanent entity. Therefore, [the statement can be explained in this way:] Teaching that, "If this ignorance exists, these formative forces will arise," is not the same as teaching that formative forces arise from nothing but ignorance. For example, by teaching that, "If the eye exists, this eye consciousness will arise," it does not teach that that [eye consciousness] does not arise from forms as well.[72]

Furthermore, [the statement can be interpreted as:] "If this ignorance exists, these formative forces will arise. By the arisal of these formative forces this consciousness will arise." Thus the limbs are shown to be a succession.

Furthermore, [the statement can be interpreted as:] "If that previous life exists, this present life will arise. By the arisal of this present life, that future life will arise." Thus they would be shown as a succession of causes. [p.168; 94b1]

Furthermore, [the statement can be interpreted as:] "If this ignorance exists, these formative forces will arise," which shows the principal condition. "By the arisal of these formative forces this consciousness will arise," which shows the successive conditions. {28a-b}

(b) The nature of each when it comes up.

There are four topics:

1) Explaining ignorance.

2) Explaining name.

3) Explaining contact.

4) Explaining feeling, and things that are explained elsewhere.

1) Explaining ignorance.

If one asks, what is the nature of ignorance? Ignorance is not merely not knowing, nor merely what is other than knowledge; rather it is another phenomenon the opposite of (Mi mThun Phyogs; vipakṣa) and contradicting ('Gal Ba) knowing wisdom. For example, an adversary is not merely someone who is not a friend, or merely someone who is other than friends; rather it is defined as the opposite of a friend. And lying words are defined as the opposite of true words. So it is like these examples and others.

If one asks, what is the reason that ignorance is not merely the absence of knowing or merely anything other than knowledge?

There is a reason. Because ignorance is characterized by such terms as "a fetter" (Kun sByor; saṁyojana)[73] and so forth.

If one says: Bad wisdom, the view of the transitory collection ('Jig Tsogs La lTa Ba; satkāyadṛṣṭi), is ignorance: There is the consequence that the view of the transitory collection is not ignorance. Because that is a

view, and ignorance is concomitant with that view; and ignorance is taught as what makes wisdom afflicted.[74] {29}

2) Explaining name.

The non-physical aggregates that are the basis of name are the subject. They are the dependent origination of name, because it is as its name that they engage (gZhol Ba; namati) an object. For example, we understand form from the name, "form", that is known in the world. {30a}

3) Explaining contact.

It is what arises upon the assembly of object, faculty and consciousness. [p.169; 95a3]

Contact is the subject. It is sixfold. Because it is contact from the assembly of the eye [faculty, object and consciousness,] up to the assembly of the mind [faculty, object and consciousness.]

The first five of these are the subject. They are contact with obstruction, because the physical faculties are obstructive, and it is based on these that there is contact.

The subject is the sixth, contact upon the assembly of the mind [faculty, object and consciousness.] It is contact of designation (Tsigs Bla Dags Kyi Reg Pa; adhivacana-sparśa) because a designation is a name, and

this is contact that has a [mere] name as the [predominant] referent object.[75]

Again, the six contacts are the subject. If condensed they are subsumed in three: Contact of knowing, contact of ignorance, and contact that is other than these two. These three are, respectively, stainless contact, afflicted contact, contact left over from these two.

Contact of ignorance is the subject. It is two-fold: Contact of harmful mind and contact of attachment. These two are explained separately because they arise easily.

Again, the six contacts are the subject. They are included in three: Contact that is to be experienced as happiness, and the others, contact that is to be experienced as suffering, and contact that is to be experienced as neutral. {30b-31}

4) Explaining feeling, and things that are explained elsewhere.

Feeling, which arises from this contact, is the subject. It is six-fold: from the feeling produced with contact as its condition when the eye [factors] are assembled up to the feeling produced with contact as its condition when the mind [factors] are assembled.

The first five are the subject. They are the feelings of the body,

because they are feelings based on the physical faculties.

The subject is the other feeling which is produced with contact as its condition when the mind [factors] are assembled. It is mental feeling, because it is a feeling based solely on the mind. [p.170; 95b3]

The mental feeling also has 18 aspects by distinguishing the range of activities of mental objects (Yid Yul La Nye Bar rGyu Ba; manopavicāra). Objects of mental happiness, objects of mental unhappiness, and objects of equanimity each has six ranges of activity.[76]

Then if one asks: How many of these are in each of the realms? In the Desire Realm there are all 18, because [the three mental feelings] attend to the six objects of their own level.

Since mental feelings of the Desire Realm attend to physical objects (sPyod Yul; gocara); and because, in the Form Realm, there is neither smell or taste, there are 12 ranges of mental activity [in the Form Realm for the three mental feelings of the Desire Realm.]

Above, in the Formless Realm, [Desire Realm mental feelings] attend to three ranges of mental activity.[77] [This concludes the explanation of which mental ranges of activity exist for mental feelings of the Desire Realm.]

In the first two concentrations, since there is no mental unhappiness, there are twelve ranges of activity of mind, because they also proceed to the

Desire Realm and attend to the six objects.

There are eight [when the feelings of the first two concentrations attend to objects of] their own level, the Form Realm.[78]

In the Formless Realm, [feelings of the first two concentrations] attend to two ranges of activity of mind.

In the third and fourth concentrations there are six ranges of mental activity of equanimity; the six referent objects are the six objects of the Desire Realm, to which [neutral feeling] can attend.

As for [attending to objects on] its own level of the Form Realm, it attends to four ranges of activity.[79]

Above, in the Formless Realm, it attends to one range of activity of mind.[80]

Then if one asks: Why do you not posit the range of activity of [mental] happiness for the third concentration?

There is a reason for not positing it. The happiness of the third concentration is firm, but the range of activities of mind are not firm. [This concludes the explanation of which ranges of activity of mind exist in the Form Realm.]

In the preparatory level of the Āyatana of Infinite Space, [the first

level] of the Formless Realm, there are four ranges of activity. Because [the neutral feeling] proceeds to the Form Realm and attend to [objects of] the fourth concentration. When it proceeds above [its own level] to the Formless Realm, it attends to one range of activity of mind.

On the actual absorption of the Formless Realm there is one range of activity of mind; that [neutral feeling] has [only the mental] objects of its own level, the Formless Realm.

All 18 ranges of activity of mind are contaminated, because they further the development of cyclic existence, and the uncontaminated can not do that. {32-35} [p.171; 96a5]

If one asks: What is the reason that [the nine limbs] other than these three, ignorance and so forth, are not explained here?

There is a reason for this. Some are already explained, and others will be explained below. Consciousness was explained where it said {i.16}, "Consciousness is cognition with respect to individual [objects]..." and so forth. Form was explained where it said {i.9}, "Form is the five faculties, the five objects and non-revealing form." [The six āyatanas were explained] where it said {1.9}, "The supports of the consciousnesses of these things are the clear forms, the eye and so forth." So these things are already explained.

Formative forces and existence will be explained in the presentation of karma; and the two, craving and grasping will be explained in the fifth chapter. {36a}

(c) Applying examples of the three [groups of] limbs.

If one asks: What are examples of the 12 limbs of dependent origination as they are condensed in three parts? Here are [examples of] those 12 as condensed into three parts:

Afflictions should be understood as like a seed: Just as the stalk, leaves and fruit grow from a seed, from affliction arise afflictions, and from that [karmic] actions, and from that arise the bases.

And affliction should be understood as like a nāga: Just as an ocean in which nāgas dwell does not dry up, so the ocean of existence in which the nāga of affliction dwells does not dry up.

And affliction should be understood as like the root of a tree: Just as the leaves and so forth grow from the root of a tree if it is not cut, in the same way cyclic existence grows from the root of affliction if it is not abandoned.

And it should be understood as like a tree: Just as from a tree the leaves and so forth grow again and again, so from this [affliction,] karma and

the bases also grow again and again.

Similarly, affliction is held to be like a husk: Just a sprout grows from a rice-grain with its husk, so results grow from karma connected with [the husk of] affliction. [p.172; 96b5] As for karma, it is like rice with its husk as was just explained.

Similarly, karma should be understood as being like medicine: Just as medicine yields its potency one time, this [karma] also yields its fruition one time.

Karma is also to be understood as like a flower: Just as the flower is the proximate cause of the fruit, this [karma] is also the proximate cause of the bases.

As for the seven bases, they are like food and drink that has been well-cooked: Just as [food] that is well-cooked [is only] to be enjoyed, in the same way these [bases] are only to be experienced, and do not produce any further fruition.[81] {36b-37c}

(3) The summary.

When one explains the four existences,[82] if one asks, what is their nature? From among these four existences the birth existence is afflicted.

Then if one asks, with which of these afflictions is one conceived in the birth existence? One joins [the existence] with all of the root afflictions of

that level; but one does not have the afflictions of the other levels.

As for the other three existences, they can be any of the three types, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral.

Then if one asks, in which of the realms are these [existences?]

In the Formless Realm there are three existences, but there is no intermediate existence. In the lower two realms there are all four. {37d-38c}

b. The dependent origination of food by which they survive.

There are two topics:

(1) The presentation.

(2) The explanation.

(1) The presentation.

Then if one asks: By means of what do sentient beings survive in the three realms?

Sentient beings survive by means of food. As it says in sūtra: "A short while after attaining enlightenment the Teacher proclaimed one dharma like this, 'Sentient beings survive by means of food.'"[83] [p.173; 97a5]

(2) The explanation.

There are three topics.

(a) The nature of food.

(b) Tangentially, the list of synonyms of the intermediate existence.

(c) Their ascertainment.

(a) The nature of food.

As it says {iii.38}, "Sentient beings survive by means of food." If one asks: How many [types of] food are there?

There are four: Morsel food (Kam Gyi Zas; kavaḍīkāra-āhāra), contact food (Reg Pa'i Zas; sparśa), intentional food (Sems Pa'i Zas; mahaḥsañcetanā), and consciousness food (rNam Shes Kyi Zas; vijñāna).[84]

Then if one asks, in which realms are these? Morsel food is in the Desire Realm, but not in the upper realms, because those who have abandoned attachment to morsel food are born there.

If one asks: How can there be food in the great hells? There is food. It is said that red hot iron hammers and molten copper are put in the mouth; and in the occasional and neighboring hells there is food similar to human food. It says so in the oral tradition (gTam rGyud; ākhyāna) concerning Sañgha-pala (dGe 'Dun Srung) and Śroṇa-koṭī (Gro bZhin sKyes).[85]

If one objects that this contradicts [the definition] given in the

*Prakaraṇapāda*: "What is morsel food? It is those morsels based upon which the faculties will develop and the great elements will be nourished and thoroughly supported."

There is no contradiction. The idea there is food that causes development; but since iron hammers and so forth have the ability to dispel hunger, they do possess the characteristics of food.

If one asks, what is the nature of morsel food? Its nature is that of the three āyatanas, smell, taste and tangible objects. If one asks, why is it called morsel food? It is so-called because it is food that is swallowed having been separated into morsels by the nose, tongue and body.

If one says: There is the consequence that the smell and taste that exist in sunlight and shade are not morsel food, because they are not to be swallowed after having separated them into morsels.

There is no fault. Although [those particular cases of odor etc.] are not [food, food] consists of those types [of āyatanas.] And anyway, the idea is that this [definition is a general statement which] applies to most cases. [p.174; 97b6]

The form āyatana is not morsel food, because it does not benefit the development of its corresponding subject faculty or [the elements which are] its support; and they aren't even the type of thing that could be of benefit.[86]

If one says: The reason is not established, because when one sees a pleasing display of food, pleasure and mental happiness will arise.

In that case it is the contact which is to be experienced as pleasure, which takes that [display of] food as its referent object, which acts as food. It does not mean that the form āyatana is the food. If that were the case, it would have to benefit the Arhats and Non-returners who are liberated [from desire for morsel food,] but it does not benefit them. {38d-39}

If one asks: What is the nature of contact food and the others?

Contact, intention and consciousness are food when they are contaminated; when uncontaminated they are not food. Because the meaning of food is that which nourishes existence, and the uncontaminated is that which exhausts existence. And from sūtra: "It causes sentient beings who are born to survive; it sustains them; it benefits those who pursue existence."[87] And also: "The four foods are the root of disease (Nad; roga), boils ('Bras; gaṇḍa), and pain (Zug rNgu; śalya). They are a condition of old age and death." The sūtras say this [about the foods,] and the uncontaminated is not like that.

If one asks: How many foods cause survival and benefit [to those who seek existence?] All of the foods do so.

If one says: It is agreed that intention does so because it is of the

nature of karma; and consciousness because it is concomitant with that; and contact by which sentient beings are caused to come forth; it is agreed that these [three] do benefit those who seek existence. However, how does morsel food cause them to come forth?

It does so. By the power of craving after morsel food beings are caused to be born into existence again.

If one says: It is agreed that morsel food; contact that is to be experienced as pleasure; and consciousness which is concomitant with that; it is agreed that these cause sentient beings to survive. However, how does intention cause them to survive? [p.175; 98b1]

Intention combined with hope can cause one to survive. At the time of a famine, a father, not able to bear his two children dying at the same time, tied up with thread the opening of a leather sack full of sand, and told them that it was flour. As long as they were not without hope they did not die. But when the sack came open and they saw the sand, being without hope they died.

And the ship-wrecked merchant, mistaking the foam of the sea for land, as long as he was not without hope he did not die; but [when he learned it was not land,] being without hope he died.

And it is like the explanation from the *Saṁgītiparyāya*:[88] "Great beasts emerging from amidst the sea hide their eggs in the sandy strand.

Those [eggs] which the mother remembers will not rot; those she does not remember will rot."

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu] says: If it were like that, there would be the faulty consequence that someone else's--the mother's--intention would become food for the baby. So the meaning must be: those eggs that remember their mother do not rot; those that do not remember, rot.

In this regard Nel Pa Pandit says: This is incorrect. Because it is taught that those born from eggs are always ignorant.

But his statement is not correct. Because there is no contradiction between saying that they are always ignorant and that they remember their mother.

Then if one asks: In which of the realms are the three [foods besides morsel food?] They are in all three realms.

If one asks: Is it the case that whatever is a morsel is also food that develops the faculties together with their supports? Here there are four possibilities:

Smell, taste and tangible objects which behave as morsels but harm the faculties and supports; these are morsels but are not food that develops the faculties and supports.

The remaining three foods, which are foods that develop the faculties

and supports but are not morsels.

Those that are both, like food which, acting as morsels develop the faculties and supports.

Those that are neither, [everything not included in the first three, such as] sound and suffering with its retinue.

If one asks: If something harms the faculties and supports, is it [definitely] not morsel food? [Some things,] although they may do harm at a later time, since they give benefit immediately after [they are eaten,] they are a type of morsel food. Food performs its function at two times.[89] [p.176; 99a2]

Then if one says: The Bhagavan said: "The results of giving to one ordinary individual who is living in a Jambu (rose-apple) grove ('Dzam Bu'i Tsal; jambuṣaṇḍa) is greater than giving food to 100 outsider ṛṣis who have abandoned attachment to the Desire Realm." As he said this, who is this ordinary individual that lives in the Jambu grove?

Some say that the explanation that it means everyone in Jambudvīpa who possesses a stomach is incorrect. Because that would contradict his using the word "one", and there would not be anything amazing in that.[90]

Others say it is the state in which one is certain to become a Bodhisattva who has reached the predestined stage.[91]

The Vaibhāṣikas say: That is incorrect. Because in that case the merit

would be greater than giving to ten million Arhats. Therefore, they say, [the meaning is] a Bodhisattva who abides in the states conducing to insight (Nges 'Byed Cha mThun; nirvedha-bhāgīya).[92]

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu] says: This is not correct. In this [explanation] the meaning [asserted] does not correspond to the terms [used:] Nowhere in the sūtras or śāstras is the Bodhisattva who resides in a state conducing to insight described as a Bodhisattva residing in a Jambu Grove. Therefore, it refers to the [one] Bodhisattva who accomplished all purposes, who attained the first concentration under a Jambu tree. Although there is no difference between him and those outsiders insofar as they have abandoned attachment to the Desire Realm, there is an enormous difference in that there is much greater merit in giving to him alone than in giving to 100 of them.

To this some say: Isn't giving to him more meritorious than giving to even an infinite number of outsiders like that?

This is true. However, it is stated that way because [sūtra] states things in terms of one hundred's in order to indicate [large] groups, as [for example] it says, "It is to be hoped that giving to one immoral human will have a fruition 100 times greater than giving to 100 [beings] who previously entered the birth-source of animals." {40-42} [p.177; 99b3]

(b) Tangentially, the list of synonyms of the intermediate existence.

As it says {iii.40}, "It benefits those who seek existence." If one asks, what is the seeker of existence? This is a synonym for the intermediate existence being.

If one asks, why are they called seekers of existence and so forth? Because they arise from the mind alone, without depending on the elements, they are called "arisen from mind" (Yid Las Byung; manomaya); because they have a natural disposition to seek a birth existence they are "seeking existence" (Srid Tsul; saṁbhavaiṣin); because they eat mere odors as food they are "odor eaters" (Dri Za; gandharva); because they have attained a state in between a death existence and a birth existence they are "the intermediate existence" (Srid Pa Bar Ma; antarābhava); because they are about to accomplish the birth existence they are called "coming into existence" (mNog Par 'Grub Pa; abhinirvrtti). {40c-41a}

(c) Their ascertainment.

If one asks: Aren't all contaminated phenomena food? Why is it definite that these foods can be counted as four?

It is definite. Because they are posited according to the order: the two--morsel food, with the purpose of developing the faculties and surviving in

this life; and contact food, with the purpose of developing the supported consciousness; and the two--intention food, with the purpose of projecting other future existences; and consciousness food with the purpose of establishing other existences.[93] {41a-d}

3. The manner of going in the end.

If one asks: Those minds that cut the roots of virtue, that rejoin and so forth: are they mental consciousness or faculty consciousnesses?

The minds that cut the root of virtue by wrong view, and that rejoin by right view and so forth; the meditative equipoise that abandons attachment; and the minds that deteriorate from that; and the minds of death and birth; these [six] are held to be exclusively mental consciousness. Most [of these minds] are mistaken conceptions. Some, although they are not that, the faculty consciousnesses are not involved in them.[94]

If one asks: Upon which feelings are the minds of death and birth based?

The minds of death and birth are based on neutral feeling, because these minds of death and birth are not clear. [p.178; 100a3]

There is no death for a mind that is in a state of single pointed meditative stabilization; because death does harm to the mind, and meditative stabilization benefits the mind. For the birth mind also there is no

mind of meditative stabilization; because meditative stabilization is virtuous; whereas, since the existence of one's birth is afflicted, in order to be born into that existence one must manifest an afflicted mind.[95]

The two non-conscious absorptions do not have death; because they do not die on their own, and nothing, not even a vajra etc. has the power to destroy them. They do not have a birth mind, because of the above reasons.[96]

Then, as it explains that the death existence is three-fold, [virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral,] if one asks: What is the final mind of death of an Arhat?

The mind of Nirvāṇa without remainder of aggregates has two neutral minds, arisen from fruition and the mind of behavior.[97] Then if one asks: At the time of death, from what part of the body will how many faculties cease along with the body [faculty?]

When death is sudden two faculties, [the mental faculty] along with the body [faculty] cease at the same time.

When death is gradual, in the case of those going below to births in bad migrations, the mind passes away in the feet. When death is gradual, in the case of those going to human rebirths, [the mind passes away] at the navel; for those going to god rebirths and for the Arhats who will not be reborn, the mind passes away at the heart.

If one asks: As it says [in sūtra] that when someone sinful dies the suffering of the severing of a vital organ (gNad; marman) arises, based on what does this arise? The suffering of the severing of the vital organs arises based on the agitation of the elements of water etc., fire and wind. But it does not come from the agitation of the earth [element,] because this [process] is analogous to the disintegration of the inanimate world.[98]

And as it says in sūtra, "Among beings there are three groups: the group that is positively righteous; the group that is positively improper; and the group that is indefinite." If one asks, what are these? [p.179; 100b4]

The Āryans are positively righteous, because righteousness is Nirvāṇa, and they have eliminated every type of obstacle to the cause of obtaining that.

Those who have committed the automatic transgressions (mTsams Med; ānantarya) are positively improper, because impropriety is the evil migrations, and even among these [migrations] it is definite they will be born in the hells.

Those who are other than these two are the group that is indefinite, because the conditions are variable. {42-44}

[This concludes the explanation of the world of sentient beings.]

II. The [inanimate] receptacle world, where they are born.

There are three topics:

A. The stages and actual measurements.

B. Incidentally, the measurements of sentient beings.

C. Explaining the measurements in detail.

A. The stages and actual measurements.

There are three topics.

1. Explaining the support.

2. Explaining what is supported.

3. Explaining in particular the abode of sentient beings.

1. Explaining the support.

There are two topics.

a. Explaining the wind maṇḍala.

b. Explaining the water and gold maṇḍalas.

a. Explaining the wind maṇḍala.

After explaining the world of sentient beings we shall explain the receptacle [or inanimate] world (sNod Kyi 'Jig rTen; bhājana-loka). And here, because the worldly realms are limitless, diverse and various it is impossible

to present them all. But we will explain a little bit of the arrangement of the realms of the unbearable world (Mi mJed 'Jig rTen Gyi Khams; sahā-lokadhātu),[99] the sphere of our Teacher. Here is the system that is believed to be the arrangement of the receptacle world by the Abhidharmikas.

The base below, at first is empty illumined space. A gentle wind, presaging the evolution of the universe, arises, and for a vast number of years it coalesces. It becomes a wind maṇḍala which is of such great extent that even a vajra could not destroy it.[100] It is 1,600,000 yojanas in height. In expanse it is one "measureless length." {45}

b. Explaining the water and gold maṇḍalas.

On top of this wind maṇḍala, because of the fall of a constant rain [of drops] the size of chariot poles, a water maṇḍala having an essence of gold comes forth; in height it is 1,120,000 yojanas. [p.180; 101a5]

As for why it does not spill over the edge: Some say it is due to the force of the karma of sentient beings. Like, for example, food which, before it is digested, does not fall into the intestines. Some say, the wind holds it by the power of its own gravitational force (sByangs; uttāpana).

Then in the upper part [of the water maṇḍala] the waters are churned by the wind, and having made it very hard, it becomes golden ground.[101] After this, the water maṇḍala becomes 800,000 [yojanas] and the remaining

320,000 become gold.

Then if one asks: What is the diameter of the water and gold maṇḍalas? It is just 1,203,450 [yojanas.] Since the perimeter is circular, it is three times [the diameter.] {46-48a}

2. Explaining what is supported.

There are three topics:

a. Explaining the mountains.

b. Explaining the oceans.

c. Explaining the continents.

a. Explaining the mountains.

On top of the water and gold maṇḍala, due to the falling of a continuous rain as before, the outer ocean with the various regions comes forth. Due to the churning of its [center] region by the great wind, Mount Meru, greater and more resplendent than the other mountains, comes forth.

Due to the churning by the wind of the intermediate regions, the mountain peaks, well-formed and pleasing to the eye, stand surrounding Sumeru: Yugandhara, so-called because it is lovely like a chariot yoke. Īṣādhara, so-called because it is lovely like the beam of a plough. Khadiraka, so-called because it is beautified by Acacia forests. Similarly, Mount

Sudarśana, so-called because the mountain peak is beautiful to look at. Aśvakarṇa, so-called because it is lovely like the ear of a horse. [p.181; 101b5] Vinataka, so-called because the mountain peak is lovely like a respectful bow. Mount Nimindhara, so-called because the mountain peak is lovely like the rim of a wheel.

It is from the churning of the last regions that the continents are produced. Outside of these is the Cakravāla mountain. Since this surrounds the four continents in the manner of a wheel, it is called the Cakravāla mountain.

Then if one asks: What is the nature of the nine mountains? Seven, from Yugandhara to Nimindhara are gold. The Cakravāla mountain is iron. Meru is of the nature of four jewels: In the east, silver; in the south, lapis lazuli; in the west, ruby; in the north, gold. The *Prajñapti* says that in the east it is ruby; in the west it is silver.

Due to the natural influence of whichever jewel is on each slope of Sumeru, the sky of that direction also appears in the color of that side. Thus, in the south, the sky of Jambudvipa also appears blue.

Then if one asks, how big are they? The nine mountains sink 80,000 yojanas into the water. In the same way, Meru rises 80,000 yojanas above the water. The remaining eight are, [in order,] 40,000, 20,000 and so forth, being diminished by half the height [of the previous mountain.] They are in

width, equal to their height. {48b-51c}

b. Explaining the oceans.

The seven oceans in between these [mountains] from Meru to Nimindhara are the playing oceans (Rol mTso; śītā).

If one asks, why are they called playing oceans? They are filled with water possessing the eight qualities, and, because they are the oceans where the nāga kings play and sport, they are called by that name.

If one asks, what are the eight qualities? Cool, delicious, light, soft, clear, not smelling badly, not harming the stomach when drunk, and also not harming the throat. [p.182; 102a6]

Then if one asks, what is their size? The first ocean is 80,000 yojanas [in width.] That one, as between being either outer or inner, is an inner ocean.[102] It's [outer] circumference is three times its width.

The other playing oceans diminish by halves from this one. The remainder, the ocean from Nimindhara to Cakravāla, is the great outer ocean. It size is 322,000 yojanas. {51d-53c}

c. Explaining the continents.

There are three topics:

(1) The main continents.

(2) The minor continents.

(3) Explaining the special qualities of Jambudvipa.

(1) The main continents.

As it says {iii.49}, "Beyond are the continents." If one asks, what are the continents?

Of the four continents that exist, to the south of Mount Meru is Jambudvipa. Because the fruit of the Jambu tree falls into the ocean and makes the sound, "Jambu", it is called Jambu. Because it is a surrounded by water it is called "dvīpa". So that southern [continent,] Jambudvipa, has three sides of 2,000 yojanas each. Shaped like a carriage (Shing rTa'i dByibs 'Dra Ba; śakaṭā-kṛti), it has one side that is three and a half yojanas.[103]

To the east of this is Videha, so called because the bodies [of the inhabitants] are twice as great [as the previous continent.] Its shape is like a half-moon. On three sides it is like Jambudvīpa in size, 2000 yojanas each. On one side it is 350 yojanas.

To the west of [Meru] is the western continent of Godānīya, so-called because they utilize cows[104] and jewels, and it is a continent surrounded by water. In shape it is round; in circumference it is 7500 yojanas. If measured through the center it is 2500 yojanas.

To the north of [Meru] is northern Kuru, so-called because seven days

before the time of death an unpleasant sound appears. It is 8000 yojanas in circumference. [p.183; 103a1] It is square in shape with each side being equal, 2000 yojanas. {53c-55a}

(2) The minor continents.

In between these four continents are eight subordinate continents. Dehas and Videhas are the eastern subordinate continents. Kurus and Kauravas are the northern subordinate continents. Cāmaras and Avaracāmaras are the southern subordinate continents. Śāṭhas and Uttaramantriṅs are the western subordinate continents. These are the eight minor continents.

Humans live on all of these, but on Cāmara demons (Srin Po; rakṣasas) live. {56}

(3) Explaining the special qualities of Jambudvipa.

At the center of Jambudvīpa is the vajra-throne in India. Going north from there beyond the nine black mountains,[105] are the glorious Snow Mountains (Gangs Ri; Himavat). North of that is the Mountain of Intoxicating Fragrance. Just this side of ten yojanas from there is the lake where the nāga King Anavatapta lives, called Lake Anavatapta, full of water possessing the

eight qualities, covered with blue lotus (utpala), lotus (padma) and red lotus (kumuda) flowers and so forth. The lake is square and the width is 50 yojanas on each side, or 200 around the edge.

From the eastern side of it, from an outlet like an elephant's mouth, the river Gangā descends; from the south, from an outlet like a bull's mouth (Khyu mChog; vṛṣabha), the Sindhu descends; from the west, like a horse's mouth, the Vakṣu; and from the north, like a lion's mouth the river Sītā descends. And in Lake Anavatapta they circle seven times towards the right; and then [each river] uniting with 500 other streams, they descend to the great outer sea. In The Section on the World in the *Prajñapti* (*'Jig rTen gDags Pa*; *Loka-Prajñapti*) it says:

> The rivers Gangā, Sindhu, Vakṣu and Sītā descend, with their string of foamy waves, and all their waters are cool; they rise in a circling pattern from the four directions. The Gangā goes to the eastern ocean; and the Sindhu goes to the western ocean; the Vakṣu goes to the southern ocean; and to the ocean north of that the Sītā flows. [p.184; 103b1] These four most excellent rivers, supremely excellent in their individual descents, each one carrying 500 [other streams]; the flow of the rivers travels to the great sea.

Twenty yojanas north of Intoxicating Fragrance there is the rock formation known as the "Golden Overhang with the Face of a Demigod", which is square. Each side is 50 yojanas, or 200 around the edge. It is three and a half yojanas in height, lovely and pleasing to the eye. Around the edge there are 100,000[106] golden rock overhangs.

Twenty yojanas north of there is the tree called "Very Firm King

of the Sal Trees", whose roots penetrate [the ground] for 40 hands ('Dom); surrounded by seven progressive rings of Sal trees; rising up its great branches have gradually, over the years, subdued and covered the sky, and in this way it stands.

Twenty yojanas east of there is the pool called Flowing with Leisure, which is similar in extent to Lake Avanatapta. Surrounding it are 100,000 pools, and in these are the stalks, leaves and flowers of lotuses, which are the size of plow blades, cow skins, and chariot wheels.

There resides Steadfast (Rab brTan), the elephant used by Indra on the battlefield, with a white body, blue head, red midsection, and six tusks. He is two and a half yojanas in length, one in width, one and a half in height, seven [yojanas] all the way around. With a retinue of 100,000 elephants who remain four months [in each of the three above-mentioned places][107] respectively in winter, spring or summer. {57}

3. Explaining in particular the abodes of sentient beings.

There are two topics:

a. The actual explanation.

b. Their elaboration.

a. The actual explanation. [p.185; 104a2]

There are two topics:

(1) The abodes of bad migrations.

(2) The abodes of higher rebirths.

(1) The abodes of bad migrations.

There are two topics:

(a) The hot hells.

(b) The cold hells.

(a) The hot hells.[108]

Twenty thousand yojanas beneath this continent of Jambudvipa is the top of the structure (Khang Pa'i Yas sTeng) of Avīci. In height and breadth it measures 20,000 yojanas. Because [it is the place where beings] experience limitless sufferings without interruption (vīci) [it is called] Avīci.

Some say, it is called that because there is no instance of pleasure there.[109]

Above that are the seven hells. The Reviving (Yang Sros; saṁjīva), where [the beings] attack each other with weapons and it is as if they were killed; but then from the sky a voice says, "Revive!" and based on that they do revive.

The Black Line (Thig Nag; kālasūtra), where the hell guardians, having

marked your body with a black line, cut you up with weapons.[110]

The Crushed Together ('Dus 'Joms; saṁghāta), where [the beings are] gathered and overcome by the hell guardians [by being crushed between mountains of burning iron.]

The Crying (Ngu 'Bod; raurava), where you are exposed to the sufferings of heat and so you begin wailing.

The Great Crying (Ngu 'Bod Chen Po; mahāraurava), where you are tortured by even greater sufferings of heat and so you begin great wailing.

The Hot (Tsa Ba; tāpana), where you experience the suffering of heat inside a blazing iron house.

The Very Hot Hell (Rab Tu Tsa Ba; pratāpana), even more unbearable than the last, where you experience the suffering inside a dGa' Ba or Nyer dGa crucible. These are the [seven] hells.[111]

Surrounding each of the eight hot hells are the sixteen supplementary hells (Lhag Pa; utsada) [in groups of four at each of four corners of each hot hell.]

Burning Ashes (Me Ma Mur; kukūla), where you sink up to your knees in burning ashes and when your legs sink into that your skin and bone is destroyed, and when the foot is taken out it is restored.

Mud of Corpses (Ro Myags; kuṇapa), where you sink in the corpse-filled mud up to the neck and what are called Sharp Beak Bugs with white

bodies and black heads bore into your body. [p.186; 104b2]

Close upon that is the Road of Razors (sPu Gri gTams Pa'i Lam Po Che; kṣuramārga). And here, when you put your foot down the flesh and bone are destroyed, and when you lift it up it recovers.

And then there is the Grove of Sword-leaves (Ral Gri Lo Ma'i Nags Tsal; asipattravana), where the leaves are swords, and when these are blown about by the wind they cut up the body.

And living in that grove are the black and spotted dogs (Khyi Sre Bo; śyāma-śabala)[112] with iron teeth who eat your body. Being terrified [by the dogs one runs away and] then [encounters] the Iron Grater ([lCags Kyi Shing] Shal Ma Li; ayaḥśālmalīvana). The trunk of the Śalmalī is many yojanas long and has thorns 16 finger-breadths long; and when one climbs up, the thorns point downwards and puncture the body; and when you reach the top a hawk[113] with an iron beak plucks out your eyeballs. Since this is unbearable, you climb back down but then the thorns point upwards and pierce your body.

And then you go into the Extremely Hot River (Chu Bo Rab Med; nadī vaitaraṇī) of hot ashes which is difficult to cross.

Three of these are counted as one, because they are of the same type in terms of weapons. And the dogs and the hawk are special features of, respectively, the Grove of Sword-leaves and the Śalmalī [Iron Grater.] [114]

In front of these hells the hell guardians (Myal Srungs; naraka-pāla) of Yama block the way with various weapons, so the hell beings are prevented from fleeing to another place.

If one asks: In that case are those hell guardians sentient beings or not?

The Sautrāntikas say: They are not sentient beings because they are merely special [forms] of the elements and complex matter. Like, for example, mountains with faces like goats and sheep [in the Crushed Together hell.]

Then Bhadanta Dharmasubhūti says: "Those who are angry, who enjoy cruel actions and sins, who enjoy the suffering [of others,] they will be born as the demons of Yama (gShin rJe'i Srin Po; yama-rākṣasa)."[115] If one says [the above opinion] is contradictory with that: [p.187; 105a3]

There is no mistake. Those are hungry ghosts in the retinue of Yama Dharmarāja who cast ('Khrid Pa; prakṣipanti) sentient beings into the abodes of hell, but there is no contradiction in calling them the "demons of Yama."

The Vaibhaṣikas say: They are sentient beings, and having died, they are reborn in hell with the fruition to do harm to the hell beings. Now [that they are in hell,] the fire and so forth does not harm them because a boundary is fixed [between them and the fire] by their karma. {58-59c}

(b) The cold hells.

Aside from the hot hells there are eight cold hells, Blistering and so forth. They are: Blistering (Chu Bur Can; arbuda). Bursting Blisters (Chu Bur rDol Ba; nirarbuda). Chattering (So Tham Tham Pa; aṭaṭa). Groaning (A Chu Zer Ba; hahava). Moaning (Kyi Hud Zer Ba; huhuva). Split like an Utpala (Utpala lTar Gas Pa; utpala). Split like a Lotus (Padma lTar Gas Pa; padma). Split like a Great Lotus (Padma lTar Cher Gas Pa; mahāpadma).

If one asks: How can Avīci and these other hells fit under just this continent? They do fit. Because, like a heap of grain, the continents are wider at their bases.

The root home of the animals is the great outer ocean, where most of them live with limitless sufferings. Those that live in the regions of gods and humans are scattered elements (Kha 'Thor Ba; visṛta) [from the main body of animals.]

The root home of the hungry ghosts is a place called Rājadhāni (rGyal Po'i Khab), located 500 yojanas beneath this continent of Jambudvīpa.

There lives Yama Dharmarāja; [his rebirth] projected by non-virtuous projecting [karma] he has taken the form of a hungry ghost; but [his rebirth] being filled out by virtuous completing [karma] he experiences splendor like the gods. He is the one who shows what will happen to those who are about to be born in hell but are ignorant of what is in store.

In his retinue are 36 types of hungry ghosts. In short they are subsumed in three groups: Those with outer obstructions. Those with inner obstructions. Those with obstructions of food and drink.[116] [p.188; 105b4]

Those hungry ghosts who live in areas of gods and humans are scattered elements [from that main body of hungry ghosts.] {59d}

(2) The abodes of higher rebirths.

The human abode has already been explained. The abodes of the gods are:

(a) Associated with a level.

(b) Not associated with a level.

(a) Associated with a level.

There are two topics:

1) The abode of the group of Four Great Kings.

2) The abode of the Thirty-three.

1) The group of Four Great Kings.[117]

There are two topics:

a) Those based in palaces.

b) Those based on mountains.

a) Those based in palaces.

These are the sun, moon and stars.

Then if one asks: How far is it to the sun and moon? The sun and moon are half way up Mount Meru from the surface of the water, 40,000 yojanas.

Then if one asks: How big are the sun and moon? The moon is 50 yojanas in diameter. The sun is 51 yojanas in diameter. In circumference they are three times that. In height, five and a half and one eighteenth.

Then if one asks: What are they made from? The moon is made from water crystal (Chu Shel; āpya);[118] its action is cooling and beneficial to the eyes; it ripens crops and it has the action of radiating light. The sun is made of fire crystal (Me Shel; sphaṭika taijasa); its action is hot and it harms the eyes; in other respects, it is similar [to the moon.]

On top they are encircled by a golden enclosure, one half a yojana in height, and on that is a protecting wall made out of four precious substances. Below, the ground is radiant with 101 different colors; wonderful structures made of jewels; parks (sKyed Mos Tsal; udyāna); wish-granting trees; Mandhāra flowers that cover you up to your knees--the old

ones are scattered by the winds while the new ones spread easily; and so forth.

As for the size of the stars, the *Prajñapti* says that the larger ones are 18 krośa (rGyang Grags),[119] the smaller are three, and most are between ten and twelve. [p.189; 106a5] But Pūrṇavardhana says: "The explanation that the size of the largest of them all is 16 yojanas is not correct. If it was like that, then the largest stars would be just short of one third the size of the moon, and that is perceptibly not the case."

Then if one asks: How does the sun appear in the four continents?

It works in this way: at one time it is midnight in the north, sunset in the east, midday in the south, and sunrise in the west. And according to this illustration, at one time it is midnight in the west, sunset in the north, midday in the east, and sunrise in the south. In this way it is to be explained.

Then if one asks: When are the solstices (Nyi Ma lDog)[120] between summer and winter?

In the second summer month, on the eighth day of the waxing moon which was preceded by the waning [15 days from the full moon,] on that day there are 18 muhūrtas in the day, and 12 muhūrtas in the night. From that day the summer sun reverses, so from the ninth day the nights become longer and the days become shorter.

In the fourth winter month, on the eighth day of the waxing moon which was preceded by the waning [15 days from the full moon,] on that day the days are 12 muhūrtas long and the nights are 18 muhūrtas long. From that day the winter sun reverses, so from the ninth day the nights become shorter and the day, which is the reverse of that, become longer.[121]

Then if one asks: By how much do they get longer and shorter?

The lengthening and shortening of is by one lava.

Then if one asks: How long is one lava?[122]

It is one nine-hundredth of a day and night.

Then if one asks: By virtue of what do the days become shorter and longer? [p.190; 106b5]

During six months when the sun is travelling to the south, it passes beyond Jambudvipa [to the south] at a distance of five and a half and one eighteenth yojanas, travelling above the ocean; because it is travels [past the landmass] faster, the days become shorter. At that time, because the sun's rays fall on the ocean, the water of the ocean is warmer and the water of the continent is cooler; and that is the reason that the spring water in lakes (Lu Ma) [which comes from the ocean] becomes warmer.

During the six months when the sun is travelling to the north, travelling above the continent, it passes beyond the ocean [to the north] by

five and a half and one eighteenth yojana, and because it goes slower [by taking more time to cross over the landmass] the days become longer.

Then if one asks: What is the reason that the moon appears to wax and wane?

The moon, when it [passes] close to the sun, is struck by [the sun's] rays, due to which it appears to be in shadow due to its own shadow.[123]

According to Ācārya Ārya [Asaṅga:] "When the side of the moon made from lapis lazuli appears it is the new moon [30th day of the month] (gNam Gang); when the side made from water-crystal appears, it is the full moon (Nya Gang); at other times, it appears otherwise."

Then if one asks: What are those black things in the middle of the moon?

Some say: The four continents together with Mount Meru appearing in the middle are those dark marks (Ra Ri), and the outer ocean appearing at the edges appears clear. Some say: On top of the moon is a garden and so forth and this appears as those black marks. Some say: Śakra, the lord of the gods, drew an image of the Bodhisattva--in his birth as a rabbit--on the moon, in order to teach human beings. {60-62}

b) <u>Those based on mountains</u>.

On Mount Meru there are four terraces (Bang Rim; pariṣaṇḍa). If one

asks, how far is it between them? The distance between them is 10,000 yojanas.

Then if one asks: How far do the terraces extend out? The first terrace extends out 16,000 yojanas; the second, 8,000; the third, 4,000; the fourth, 2,000. [p.191; 107a6]

If one asks: What is there on these terraces? On the first terrace are Yakṣas [called Bowls in Hand (Lag Na gZhon Thogs; karoṭa-pāṇi)] holding precious bowls filled with nectar in their hands. On the second are Yakṣas [called Holding Garlands (Phreng Thogs; mālā-dhāra)] holding garlands of precious flowers in their hands. On the third they are always intoxicated with grape wine [and are called Always Intoxicated (rTag Myos; sadā-matta).]

And on the fourth reside the gods of the group of Four Great Kings (rGyal Chen bZhi; catur-mahārāja-kāyikā).[124] And these are: on the eastern side of the fourth terrace is the palace of Dhṛtarāṣṭra (Yul 'Khor Srungs; Realm Protector) [called] Realm Protector; in the south, the palace of Virūḍhaka ('Phags sKyes Po; Noble Born) [called] Noble Born; in the west, the palace of Virūpākṣaḥ (sPyan [Mig] Mi bZang; Not-Good Eyes) [called] Variegated Form (sNa Tsogs gZugs); in the north, the palace of Vaiśravaṇaḥ (rNam Thos Sras) [called] Having a Braid (lCang Lo Can; Aṭakāvatī).

The gods of the Four Great Kings do not only live there, but also on the seven golden mountains. {63-64}

2) <u>The abode of the Thirty-three</u>.

At the peak of Mount Meru live the gods of the Thirty-three. If one asks: Why are they called the Thirty-three?

There are eight jewel gods; 11 wrathful [gods;] 12 sun [gods;] and the two young sons of the Aśvins (Tha sKar Gyi Bu gZhon Nu; aśvinī-kumārau).[125] Since there are 33 of these main [gods,] that is what they are called. And it is also called that because there are 33 residences of the gods, [such as] Sudharmā (Chos bZang) the meeting place of the gods (lHa'i mDun Sa; Deva-sabhā).[126]

If one asks: What is its size? It is 80,000 yojanas on each side. Around the perimeter it is 320,000.

At the four corners of Meru are the peak houses (brTzegs Pa; kūṭa), 125 yojanas on a side and 500 yojanas tall. In the *Prajñapti* it says that they are four and a half in height. In those four peak houses live the Vajrapāṇi Yakṣas, in order to guard against those who behave indiscreetly.

And in the middle of the Thirty-three is the city called Sudarśana (lTa Na sDug). [p.192; 107b6] Each side is 2500, the perimeter is 10,000, and the height is one and a half yojanas. Its walls consist of gold. The floor is made of 101 variegated colors; it is soft so that when you step on it, it gives way and when you lift up your foot it rises. There are 999 doors and in each door are 500 gods of the Thirty-three standing guard, and these guards are

wearing armor and carrying various weapons.

In the middle of the city of Sudarśana is the residence of Śakra, lord of the gods, the Palace of Vaijayanta (rNam Par rGyal Byed), 250 yojanas on each side, 1000 around the perimeter; in height, it is five and a half and one eighteenth yojanas. It has 101 lots (Ba Gam), and each one of these has 100 buildings; and each one of these has seven rooms; and each one of these has seven goddesses; and each one of these has seven lady servants; and each one of these has seven cymbals.

If you go 20 yojanas outside of the city of Sudarśana there are the parks called Caitraratha (Shing rTa sNa Tsogs) in the east; Pāruṣyaka (rTzub 'Gyur) in the south; Miśraka ('Dres Tsal) in the west; and Nandana (dGa' Bas brGyan Pa) in the north.

If one asks: Why are they called Caitraratha Park and so forth? Because there are various chariots, ponds, leaves, flowers and fruit it is called Caitraratha [Various Chariots] Park. Because the ponds are rough, and the trees, leaves, flowers, fruit and ornaments are rough, and as soon as you go there your body and mind become rough and you are inclined to make war, so it is called Pāruṣyaka [Rough] Park. [p.193; 108b1] Because the ponds are called "mixed", and the trees, leaves, flowers, fruit, clothes and ornament are mixed, and even the male and female gods live mixed together, it is called Miśraka [Mixed] Park. Because the ponds are pleasant, and the

trees etc. are pleasant, and the male and female gods live happily, it is called the Nandana [Pleasing] Park.

On the four sides of these parks if you measure 20 yojanas out, there are four excellent fields. In the east is Caitraratha Field; in the south is Pāruṣyaka Field; in the west is Miśraka Field; and in the north is Nandana Field--these are the names of the four excellent fields that adorn [the parks.]

At the northeast edge of the city of Sudarśana is the magnolia tree (Sa brTol; kovidāra)[127] called Pārijāta (Yongs 'Du).[128] It penetrates 50 yojanas down; it goes 100 yojanas upwards; the branches cover 50 yojanas; the fragrance pervades 100 yojanas in the direction of the wind and pervades 50 yojanas in the direction opposite to the wind.

Then if one says: That is contrary to the statement [in sūtra] that "the fragrance of flowers does not go against the wind."[129]

It is not contradictory. Because that conception refers to flowers in human realms.

This tree is a place where the gods experience delight. In the spring, when the leaves turn yellow, they think, "It won't be long before the leaves and the flowers will be on the wind," and they experience delight and pleasure.

In front of that tree is a flat stone like marble (Ar Mo Nig lTa Bu'i rDo Leb; pāṇḍu-kambala-ṣilā-talam);[130] each side is 50 yojanas, 200 around the

edge; in height five and a half and one eighteenth. On top of that is the lion throne of the god Indra, having been arranged by other Upendras (Nye dBang),[131] where the gods reside for four summer months. [p.194; 109a1]

In front of that is the elephant Airāvata (Sa Srungs Kyi Bu);[132] two and a half yojanas in length and one yojana wide, seven yojanas all around. Having emanated 32 [additional] heads, on the center one rides Indra (brGya Byin; Śakra), lord of the gods; on the others ride the 32 Upendras; on the main part of the body (Lus Byin Pa) ride the other gods. And on top of the flat Ar Mo Nig stone they race like the wind that creates and destroys a kalpa. And then, having put aside his elephant body, he stands in his nature as the fabulous emanation of a young god.

At a distance of 12 yojanas from the southeast of the city of Sudarśana is Sudharmā (Chos bZang) the meeting place of the gods (lHa'i mDun Sa; Deva-sabhā). It is 300 yojanas across and 900 in circumference. It is three and a half yojanas higher than the city of Sudarśana; the floor, top story, pillars, central beams (gDung) and so forth are all made of crystal. In the center are lapis lazuli pillars with eight facets; and the central beams do not touch by a hair's breadth. And there, also, are the thrones of the lord of the gods and the Upendras; and the gods having assembled there, consider the purposes and qualities of gods and men.[133] {65-68}

(b) Not associated with a level.

Above these Thirty-three are the palaces of the gods from the Yāmas up to Akaniṣṭhas.

If one asks why are they called Yāmas? Below this level there is combat ('Thabs), but from here on they are free of combat, so they are called Yāma (Without Combat; 'Thabs Bral).[134]

If one asks: How can there be combat at levels below this? There is. Although they are gods, if they fight with the demigods, what need is there to mention that [they fight] with others. And the demigods have the capacity to fight with the gods, because they are jealous of the gods' bodies and wealth, and they can be the consorts of the gods. [p.195; 109b3]

How do they fight? When non-dharma is spreading in the world the population of the gods declines and the population of the demigods increases.

The demigods live between the edge of the water [at the base of] Meru and the golden ground [at the base of the ocean.] They are jealous of the gods' nectar. Out of greed for their women a force of them all together at one time comes out from under the edge of the water and rising up above into the sky, they fight with the five [groups of] guards successively. But when the guards can not turn them back, the Four Great Kings tell Indra the lord of the gods, "Oh Kauśika, we have been overcome by the demigods,

please understand the circumstances."

The lord of the gods, seeing his god companions in such a state, understanding the circumstances, commands them to, "Go and fight."

Then the gods go to the Rough Park,[135] and being incited to battle, the combined force carrying the four types of arms go to battle on the south side of Meru.

Then, if the demigods are defeated they flee to the water's edge. If the gods are defeated, having fled to the city of Sudarśana they bar the door.

Without Combat is also called Twins (mTse Ma), because a god and a goddess can be born as a pair.

The place of victory of the Bodhisattva one birth before [his birth in this world,] is called Tuṣita (Joyous Land; dGa' lDan) because it is a place of transcendent happiness.

Because one can enjoy whatever emanation of oneself one desires [the next level] is called the Nirmāṇarati (Land Enjoying Emanation; 'Phrul dGa').

Since one can enjoy whatever emanation of another one desires [the next level] is called Paranirmitavaśavartin (Land of Controlling Others' Emanations; gZhan 'Phrul dBang Byed).

The form of the Desire Realm gods is any color such as white, red or yellow. And for palaces they live in any of [intentionally] constructed or not constructed [but naturally occurring] abodes of humans of the three

continents.[136] [p.196; 110a4]

If one asks: Why are the [gods who live in the first concentration] called the Brahma Type (Tsang Ris; brahma-kāyika) and so forth?

They are pure of non-virtuous sins and they are included within that type so they are called the Brahma Type.

Because, in the presence of Great Brahmā they behave like brahmans reciting the Vedas, [the second group is] called Reciting Before Brahma (Tsangs Pa mDun Na 'Dun; brahma-purohita).

Because he is born before the other Brahma [class of gods] and dies last; and because he is greater in the size of his body and so forth [the third] is called Great Brahma (Tsangs Chen; mahābrahman).

Because, when they view other higher levels their radiance illuminates a smaller area, [the first group in the second concentration] is called Little Light ('Od Chung; parīttābhā).

Because their bodies emit limitless light [the second group] is called Limitless Light (Tsad Med 'Od; apramāṇābhā).

Because their light pervades the other levels without exception [the third group] is called Bright Light ('Od gSal; ābhāsvara).

Because, when they view other higher levels, they experience a little mental happiness [the first group in the third concentration] is called Little Happiness (dGe Chung; parītta-śuba).

Because they have measureless mental happiness [the second group is] called Limitless Happiness (Tsad Med dGe; apramāṇa-śuba).

Because there is no mental happiness more exalted than this [the third group] is called Vast Happiness (dGe rGyas; śubha-kṛtsna).[137]

Because the base of this [level] is not coalesced [into a solid mass] ('Dab Chags Pa; nirantara) the way clouds are, [the first group in the fourth concentration] is called Cloudless (sPrin Med; anabhraka).[138]

Because they are born from immoveable merit [the second group] is called Born from Merit (bSod Nams sKyes; puṇya-prasava).

Because there is no greater fruit than this for an ordinary individual [the third group] is called Great Fruit ('Bras Che; vṛhatphala).

Above these are the five Pure Places (gNas gTzang Ma; śuddhāvāsakāyika). Because they are places for Āryans only and not for ordinary individuals they are called Pure Places. And the five are:

Because their qualities are less than those above, the Not Great (Mi Che Ba; avṛha).

Because they do not have the pain of the afflictions, Without Pain (Mi gDung Ba; atapas).

Because their vision is extraordinarily clear, Great Perception (Shin Tu mThong Ba; sudarśana).

Because their appearance is excellent, Excellent Appearance (Gya Nom sNang Ba; sudṛśa).

Because there is no other level higher than this, Not Low ('Og Min; akaniṣṭha).

If one asks: What is the size of the bases of these?

Some say, the four [regions of those who live above Meru,] Without Combat and so forth, are equal in size to the [summit of] Meru.

Others say that since each higher level is twice as large as the previous, the four, Without Combat and so forth also increase by a factor of two. [p.197; 110b5]

Some say the first concentration is the size of the four continents; and the other three are, respectively, equal to the three chiliocosms--[small, bi-, and tri-chiliocosm] (sTong gSum Pa'i 'Jig rTen Gyi Khams; tri-sāhasra-loka-dhātu)[139].

Others say that the first three concentrations are, [respectively,] equal to a the three chiliocosms, and the fourth is "measureless." {72d}

Then if one asks: What are the ways in which the Desire Realm gods enjoy intercourse?

There are six who enjoy love ('Dod Pa; kāma). They satisfy the fires of passion in the following ways: The Four Great Kings and the Thirty-three both do it by the joining of organs.[140] The gods of Without Combat do it by embracing. Those of Tuṣita by holding hands. Those of Enjoying Emanation, by smiling. Those of Controlling Others' Emanations by merely looking [at one another] dispel the passion of intercourse.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: Since the desire is compelling in proportion to the compelling potency of the object, all of them [unite] only by the joining of their two organs. The teaching [of the *Prajñapti*] here is that [copulation, embracing, holding hands etc.] indicates the [relative] duration of the union.

Furthermore, it is wind that comes forth from their organs, not semen.[141]

If one asks: If the gods are miraculously born how can the terms "son or daughter of a god" be applied to them? The terms son or daughter of a god are applied to a boy or girl who are born at the lap (Pang; utsaṅga) of a god.

Then if one asks: How big are they when they are born? The six Desire Realm gods are at birth, respectively, the size of children who have reached the age of five up to children who have reached the age of 10; [children, that

is,] during the [present] era when [humans] live to the age of 100.

Form Realm gods are born fully developed in size, and due to surpassing shame and embarrassment they are born with clothes. Those of the Desire Realm, because of a predominance of shamelessness and immodesty, are born naked. However there are some special cases that are not included here.[142] {69-70}

b. Their elaboration.

In sūtra it mentions "three occurrences of desire ('Dod Pa sKye Ba; kāma-upapatti)."[143] If one asks, what are these? The three occurrences of desire that are mentioned in the sūtras are the Desire Realm gods along with human beings.[144] [p.198; 111a6]

Now, the subject is humans and the [first] four classes of gods. They are the first occurrence of desire, because they enjoy, according to their desire, whatever has already arisen.

The Enjoying Emanation gods are the subject. They are the second occurrence of desire, because they enjoy, according to their desires, what they emanate them themselves.

The Enjoying Others' Emanations gods are the subject. They are the third occurrence of desire, because they enjoy, according to their desires, in common with others, what others emanate.

The sūtra mentions "three occurrences of pleasure." If one asks, what are these?

The three occasions of pleasure that are mentioned in the sūtras are the nine levels made by distinguishing three [sources of pleasure] in each of the first three concentrations. They are respectively: the pleasure that occurs from separating from non-virtuous sins, by which one abides in this pleasure for a long time and without suffering; the pleasure of abandoning the disturbances of the mental continuum caused by investigation and analysis, in which one abides for a long time and without suffering; the pleasure of separating from mental happiness, which is for a long time and without suffering. [Due to their absence of suffering and duration, these three] possess pleasure.

If one says: In that case, since those born in the special [first] concentration do not have the pleasure of joy (dGa' bDe; prītika-sukha) there is no occurrence of pleasure there.

There is no fault. Because [this level of concentration] is the fruition of virtuous [actions] that belong to levels that have pleasure.[145] {71}

Then, what is the distance between different abodes?

From the fourth terrace, the principal abode of the group of the Four Great Kings, down to the abode below, Jambudvipa, is 40,000 yojanas. And

it is the same distance up to the Thirty-three as the distance down to [Jambudvipa.] "The abode below" {iii.72} should be understood in all cases to mean Jambudvipa.[146]

Then if one asks: Having gone from a lower to a higher abode, can one see the higher beings?

Except by possessing supernatural power oneself, or by depending on another who has supernatural power, lower beings who go to higher abodes can not see higher beings. [p.199; 112a2] Because they do not have the capacity to go to higher abodes.[147] {72}

As sūtra mentions, "A single chiliocosm, a dichiliocosm, and a trichiliocosm..."[148] If one asks, what are these?

One thousand [of each of] the four continents, the sun and moon, Meru, the Desire Realm gods and worlds of Brahma, is considered a small chiliocosm (sTong sPyi Phud; sāhasra-cūḍika); because, from among the three chiliocosms, it is the smallest (sPyi'i Phud; cūḍika).[149]

One thousand small chiliocosms is a middle universe ('Jig rTen; loka-dhātu) or a dichiliocosm; because it is the middle [sized] universe of the three chiliocosms.

One thousand of these middle [sized] chiliocosms is called a trichiliocosm; because it is the greatest of the three chiliocosms.[150]

For the receptacle world of the wind maṇḍala etc. of a trichiliocosm, the period of dissolution ('Jig; saṁvarta) is equal to the period of evolution ('Chags; vivarta) or arisal ('Byung Ba; saṁbhava).[151] {73-74}

B. Incidentally, the measurements of sentient beings.

There are two topics:

1. The measure of bodies.

2. The measure of lives.

1. The measure of bodies.

If one asks: In the same way that the measurements of the receptacle world are definite, are the sizes of the sentient beings also definite?

The sizes of bodies in the bad migrations are not definite, so they are not taught here. But in the case of the happy migrations, the size of the bodies of the humans of Jambudvipa at the time of 100 year life-spans is four good-sized (Tsad Dang lDan Pa) hasta (Khru),[152] but most of them are three and a half hasta.

The bodies of those in the [continents] called Pūrva, Goda and Uttara, are each double the size [of the previous one;] so they are [respectively] eight hasta, 16, and 32.

As for the size of the bodies of the six gods of Desire: they increase

progressively [by one quarter krośa increments] from one quarter of a krośa up to one and a half krośa.

The sizes of the bodies of the gods of Form are: The first gods of Form, the Brahmakāyikas, are one half a yojana; above there and from Parīttābha down, they increase by one half yojana as they go higher; from the upper edge of Parītābha on up, they progressively double in size [at each level.] [p.200; 112b2] In this way the body of the Anabhraka should be 128 yojanas; but the Anabhrakas, having given up three yojanas, are [only] 125.

If one asks: What is the reason they gave up [three yojanas?] Some say it is because it is easier to calculate, but they were lost due to the power of karma. {75-77}

2. The measure of lives.

There are two topics:

a. The actual explanation.

b. Incidental subjects.

a. The actual explanation.

There are two topics:

(1) The measure of lives in the higher rebirths.

(2) The measure of lives in the bad migrations.

(1) The measure of lives in the higher rebirths.

If one asks: Is the length of life of sentient beings definite in the same way that the measure of their bodies is definite?

The Kurus reach (Thub) a life-span of 1000 years. In the west and the east it is decreased, progressively, by half, so that the life-spans are [respectively] 500 and 250 years. Here in Jambudvipa it is indefinite. But at the end the life-span is ten years, at the beginning the life-span is measureless.

As for the measure of the life-span of the Desire Realm gods: For the lowest gods of the Desire Realm, the group of the Four Great Kings, 50 human years is equal to one day and night. Thirty of these equals one month. Twelve of those makes one year, and [their life-span] is 500 of their own years.

Each higher level, the Thirty-three and so forth, increases by doubling the previous level, both in the length of the day and night and the life-span.

If one says: Since there is no sun and moon above Yugandhara there should be no way to establish day and night or to be illuminated.

There is no fault. Because, although there are no sun and moon, the birds still sing or do not sing; sleepiness comes and goes; flowers open and close; and from these [indications] day and night are designated. And light arises from their bodies.

Concerning the measure of the life-span of beings of the Form Realm: If one says, since there is no day and night in the Form Realm the measure of life-span should be inconceivable.

This is not a problem. Although there is no day and night in the Form Realm, the life-span is measured in kalpas proportional to the number of yojanas in the measure of their bodies. [p.201; 113a3]

Accordingly, the first level of the Form Realm, [the Brahmakāyika, are one half a yojana in height and have a life-span of] one half kalpa. Above them each level increases by half a kalpa. Above Parītābha the life-span doubles at each level; but in Anabhraka they give up three kalpas. In this way [the formula of body size] should be translated [into life-spans.]

As for the measure of life-span in the Formless Realm: In the first Formless Realm it is 20,000 kalpas. In the three higher Formless Realms the increase is by exactly that amount, so that they reach 40,000, 60,000, and 80,000 kalpas respectively.

If one asks: Which type of kalpa is it?[153] From Parītābha on, it refers to great kalpas (bsKal Chen; mahākalpa). Below that, half great kalpas are referred to as kalpas. {78-81}

(2) <u>The measure of lives in the bad migrations</u>.

Now for the measure of life-spans in the hot hells: One full day for the

six hells--Saṁjīva and so forth--is equal to the life-span of the corresponding Desire Realm god. Thus an entire life of the Four Great Kings is called one day in Saṁjīva; and the beings of Samjīva reach 500 of their own years. Thus the life-span of Saṁjīva and so forth is the same in number [of years] as that of the [corresponding] Desire Realm gods.[154]

In Pratāpana the life-span is half an intermediate kalpa; and in Avīci it is one intermediate kalpa.

Now the measure of life-span for the animals: The shortest is uncertain; the greatest in length reaches one intermediate kalpa. As it says in sūtra: "These eight great nāga kings who live for an intermediate kalpa and uphold the earth; even Garuḍa, the king of the birds can not pull them out;[155] the gods and demigods enjoy their battles. And who are they? They are the nāga kings: Nanda, Upananda, Aśvatarin, Mucilinda, Manasvin, Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Mahākāra, and Elapatra."[156] [p.202; 133b4]

Now the measure of life-span of the hungry ghosts: Calculating one human month as one full day, their life-span is 500 years.

Now the life-span in the cold hells: If a Magadhan storage room (sByangs or rDzang; vāha) was filled with eighty khāris (Khal) of

sesame,[157] and every one hundred years one sesame seed was taken out, the amount of time it would take to exhaust those sesame seeds is the measure of a life-span in Arbuda. The other [eight cold hells,] Nirarbuda and so forth, increase at each level by multiplying by a factor of 20. {82-84}

b. Incidental subjects.

If one asks: Is it definite that one will reach the life-spans described above? With the exception of Uttarakuru there is untimely death (Dus Ma Yin Par 'Chi Ba; antarāmṛtyu). In Kuru they definitely live for 1000 years, due to the inconceivable power of karma.{85a}

C. Explaining the measurements in detail.

1. The concise presentation of the initial unit (rTzom Pa'i Dang Po; prathama ārambha).

2. The extensive explanation.

1. The concise presentation of the initial unit.

In the course of explaining the abodes of sentient beings and the measures of their bodies, they were explained in terms of hasta (Khru), krośa (rGyang Grags) and yojanas (dPag Tsad); during the explanation of the measure of life-spans it was explained in terms of years (Lo; varṣa), kalpas

(bsKal Pa) and so forth; and so these were established by means of these terms. So it is an opportune time to explain these very [terms] and they now will be explained.

The ultimately smallest unit of form is the subtle atom (rDul Phra Rab; paramāṇu). It is from aggregations of these that krośa and yojanas are established.

The ultimate unit of terms is the phoneme (Yi Ge; akṣara, vyañjana). It is from aggregations of these that verses (śloka), explanations (Rab Byed; prakaraṇa) and commentaries (bsTan bCos; śāstra) are established.

The ultimately shortest unit of time is the instant (sKad Cig Ma; kṣaṇa). It is from aggregations of these that days, months, years and kalpas are established. {85b-c}

2. <u>The extensive explanation of the basic unit</u>.

There are two topics:

a. The measures of physical objects.

b. The measures of time.

a. <u>The measures of physical objects</u>.

If one asks: How are krośas and so forth established from collections of subtle atoms which are the smallest final units of form? [p.203; 114a5]

Subtle atoms (rDul Phra Rab; paramāṇu), atoms (rDul Phran; aṇu), loharajas (lCags rDul), abrajas (Chu rDul), śaśarajas (Ri Bong), eḍaka (or: avi; Lug), gorajas (Glang), chidrarajas (Nyi Zer), likṣā (Sro Ma); and what comes from that, yūka (Shig) and likewise yava (Nas), and añguli-parvan (Sor Tsigs); each equals the previous amount multiplied times seven.

Twenty-four añgulis equals one hasta. Four hasta equals one dhanus (gZhu or 'Dom). Five hundred dhanus equals one krośa, which is the distance that a monastery should be situated from an inhabited place. Eight krośa equals one yojana. {85c-88a}

b. The measures of time.

(1) Explaining years.

(2) Explaining kalpas.

If one asks: How are years and kalpas formed from the aggregation of instants?

One hundred twenty instants--which are the final units of time--equals one tatkṣaṇa (De'i sKad Cig). And 60 tatkṣaṇas equals one lava.

The three, lava, muhūrta and a "day and night" (Nyin Zhag; ahorātra) each equals the previous number multiplied by thirty, and multiplying a day and night by thirty equals one month (Zla Ba; māsa). However, because not every month definitely reaches a full [30 days,] one year (Lo; saṁvatsara)

equals 12 months plus [six] ūnarātras.[158] {88b-89c}

(2) Explaining kalpas.[159]

There are two topics:

(a) The actual explanation.

(b) What arises incidentally.

(a) The actual explanation.

1) The presentation.

2) The explanation.

1) The presentation.

Many types of kalpas are mentioned: kalpas of dissolution ('Jig Pa'i bsKal Pa; saṁvarta); kalpas of evolution ('Chags Pa'i bsKal Pa; vivarta); kalpas of duration (gNas Pa'i bsKal Pa); and great kalpas (bsKal Pa Chen Po; mahākalpa). {89d}

2) The explanation.

There are three topics:

a) Kalpas of dissolution.

b) Kalpas of evolution.

c) Kalpas of duration.

d) Great kalpas.

a) Kalpas of dissolution.

As it says, "Many types of kalpas are mentioned," if one asks: What are the kalpas of dissolution and so forth?

The kalpa of dissolution is the period from the time sentient beings are no longer [born] in the existence of Avīci hell, to the destruction of the receptacle world. [p.204; 114b6]

Moreover, it is at the same time that the birth of sentient beings in Avīci is interrupted, the life-span of humans in Jambudvipa increases to 80,000 years, the [kalpa of] duration finishes and the kalpa of dissolution begins. At that time the sentient beings who are [already] in Avīci, having completed their lives there, will die and be reborn [elsewhere.] And those who have accumulated the karma to be born in Avīci will be born in the hells of another world system ('Jig rTen Gyi Khams; loka-dhātu).

Beings in the other hells and the animals and hungry ghosts living in the nether worlds (Byings) will go through the same process. The animals and hungry ghosts living in the regions of gods and humans will go through this at the same time [as the gods and humans.]

Then one human from Jambudvipa, by the dharmatā,[160] attains the

first concentration, and arising from that proclaims, "Oh! The pleasure and joy that arise from detachment (dBen Pa Las sKyes Ba; viveka-ja) are pleasant." Others, hearing this, attain the first concentration which is attained by means of the dharmatā, and are born in the first concentration.

Following that, successively, the eastern continent and the western Avaragodānīya, go through the same process. The northern Uttarakurus, due to an obstruction of fruition, are not capable of becoming free of attachment in that life; so they are subsequently born as Desire Realm gods.

The six Desire Realm gods also, successively attain the first concentration which is attained by means of the dharmatā. [Someone,] arising from that proclaims, "Oh! This pleasure and joy that arises from detachment are pleasant." The others, hearing that, having attained the first concentration which is attained by the dharmatā, are born among the Brahmakāyika gods.

Then someone from the first concentration attains the second concentration by means of the dharmatā. And arising from that proclaims, "Oh! The joy and pleasure that arises from meditative stabilization is pleasant." [p.205; 115a6] Others, hearing this, attain the second concentration which is attained by means of the dharmatā, and are born in the second concentration.

It takes 19 intermediate kalpas for these processes.[161]

At that time, because of the gods, the timely rains cease,[162] and so the plants and forests of Jambudvipa become dry. Then after a long time, two surpassingly hot suns shine and the streams and ponds dry up. Then three suns shine and the small and large rivers dry up. Then when the fourth sun shines the oceans get hot and dry up. Then when the fifth sun shines the great outer oceans also dry up. Then when the sixth sun shines the four continents along with Meru emit smoke. Then when the seventh and hottest sun shines it catches fire in one tongue of flame and burns. Due to that, fire belonging to the level of the first concentration burns up the empty palaces of the first concentration. But [the first concentration] is not burned by the fire of the Desire Realm, because they are different levels [so they are burned by separate fires.]

This process takes one intermediate kalpa. So the destruction of the world takes 20 intermediate kalpas.

Furthermore, following the pattern of destruction by fire, when there is destruction by water: the beings of the second concentration attain the third concentration which is attained by the dharmatā and are born in the third concentration. When there is destruction by wind, the beings of the third concentration attain the fourth concentration which is attained by the dharmatā and they are born in the fourth concentration.[163] {90a-b}

b) Kalpas of evolution.

From the primordial rising of a gentle wind[164] until the rebirth of one sentient being in Avīci hell is a kalpa of evolution. [p.206; 115b6]

Furthermore, at first space remains empty. Then a gentle wind that is a foreshadowing of the evolution of the world rises. This alone is not capable of evolving the receptacle world, so it evolves from Brahmakāyika to Yāma.

Then for many years these early winds coalesce, and from the bottom up, the base maṇḍala of wind up to the Thirty-three evolves. This process takes one intermediate kalpa.

Then a sentient being of Ābhāsvara [in the second concentration] who has exhausted his life-span, merits and karma, is born into the empty palace of Brahma [in the first concentration.] That which is destroyed last is the first to evolve, because that is the dharmatā.[165]

Then [the abodes] up to Jambudvipa are successively established. At that time the humans of Jambudvipa have miraculous birth; they eat [mental] joy (dGa' Ba) as their food; light emanates from their bodies; by supernatural powers they can travel in space; they have life-spans of immeasurable length. From that time until one sentient being is born in Avīci is 19 intermediate kalpas. At that time, at the same time, the life span decreases from immeasurable length to 80,000 years; one sentient being is born in Avīci; evolution is completed; and the period of duration begins. {90c-d}

c) Kalpas of duration.

A kalpa of duration is twenty intermediate kalpas.

As for the measure of each intermediate kalpa: there is one intermediate kalpa that runs from the decrease of the [human] life-span from immeasurable to 80,000 years, up to the time when the life-span is ten years. And from that time there are 18 other [intermediate] kalpas during which the life-span again increases to 80,000 years and then again decreases down to ten years. Then there is one kalpa of increase. If one asks: How much does it increase? Their life-span goes up to 80,000 years. [p.207; 116b1]

If one says: In that case, since the first and last intermediate kalpas are all of one type, [i.e. either decrease or increase,] while the middle [18] are both up and down (Khug Pa), they should be of shorter duration.

There is no problem. The first and last [change] slowly, whereas the middle [18] go quickly.

Thus, this evolved world endures for 20 intermediate kalpas. The evolution of the world, its dissolution, its remaining in a state of dissolution, each equally lasts 20 intermediate kalpas. {91-93b}

d) Great kalpas.

Eighty intermediate kalpas are called a great kalpa. {93d}

(b) What arises incidentally.

There are two topics:

1) Incidental points concerning great kalpas.

2) Incidental points concerning the kalpa of dissolution.

1) Incidental points concerning great kalpas.

There are three topics:

a) The way Buddhas arise.

b) The way Pratyekabuddhas arise.

c) The way Cakravartin kings arise.

a) The way Buddhas arise.

If one asks: Which kalpas are referred to in the teaching that Buddhahood comes from the accumulation of the collections [of merit and wisdom] for three numberless (Grangs Med Pa; asaṁkhyeya) kalpas?

Buddhahood arises from the accumulation of the collections for three

numberless great kalpas.

If one says: If they are numberless isn't it contradictory to say three.

There is no fault. The term numberless does not mean that it can not be calculated in numbers. The basic number, one, taken to the sixtieth place (gNas gZhan; sthānāntara) is the number that is referred to as numberless.[166]

This kalpa is also called a "good kalpa" and a "kalpa with a lamp" because, as it says in the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* (*Dam Chos Padma dKar Po*):

> Within the maṇḍala of water of the evolving world 1000 golden lotuses with 1000 petals arise. The gods of the pure places (gNas gTzang Ma; śuddhāvāsa)[167], wondering what this is, examine it, and they understand it to be an omen of the appearance of 1000 Buddhas. They exclaim, "Aha! In this kalpa 1000 Buddhas will appear, so this kalpa is excellent!" And so it is known as an excellent kalpa.[168]

At which times do they appear? They do not appear when the life-span is increasing. [p.208; 117a2] Because at that time sentient beings have little disgust (sKyo Shas; duḥsamudveja) for cyclic existence. From the time that the decline from a life-span of 80,000 years begins, until the life-span of 100, these Buddhas appear. They do not appear below that point because the five corruptions[169] proliferate greatly, such that [the beings] would not be proper vessels for the dharma teachings. {94a-b}

b) The way Pratyekabuddhas arise.

If one asks: Do Pratyekabuddhas also only appear when life-spans are decreasing?

Pratyekabuddhas appear both during periods of increase and periods of decrease. Because they act primarily for their own benefit and not for the benefit of others.

Then if one asks: For how long do they accumulate the collections from which [their attainments] arise?

The Pratyekabuddhas who are like a rhinoceros arise from the cause of accumulating the collections for 100 great kalpas. {94c-d}

c) The way Cakravartin kings arise.

Cakravartins appear in the world from the period when the life-span of human beings is immeasurable to the period when it is 80,000 years,[170] but not later than that; because from then on the beings are not suitable vessels for their great prosperity.

If one asks: Why are they called Cakravartin kings? Because they rule over the four continents with a precious wheel, they are called that. There are four types of wheel-holders: holders of gold, silver, copper, and iron wheels.

If one asks: Over how many continents do each of these hold power?

They hold power over one, two, three or four continents respectively, from the last to the first; that is, the holder of the iron wheel has power over one continent, and so forth.

Two Cakravartin kings do not appear simultaneously, because they have accumulated the karma not to have a rival. It is like, for example, Buddhas.

Then if one asks: Is it in one [trichilichosm] world system ('Jig rTen Gyi Khams; loka-dhātu) that two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously, or is it in all world systems that two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously? [p.209; 117b4]

The Vaibhāṣikas say: Two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously in all world systems. Because, if there are sentient beings who are suitable to be trained by a Buddha, one Buddha alone has the capacity to train them. If that were not the case there would be an impediment to the power of the Buddha.

The Mahāsaṁghikas say: In one [trichiliochosm] world system several Buddhas do not appear at the same time, but in all world systems there can be several. Because there are many types [of trainees at different stages and rates of training:] generating the mind [of enlightenment] at the beginning; in the middle stage, training on the path rapidly, slowly or at an even pace.

Ācārya Ārya [Asañga] says: In one world system several Buddhas with

different mental continuums do not arise. But it is not the case that several Buddhas with the same continuum do not arise. Because in one billion Jambudvipas one billion emanation bodies of a single mental continuum arise.

If one asks: How do the wheel holders take sovereignty over an area?

The holder of a golden wheel takes sovereignty merely by going out (Phas; pratyudyāna) to receive [the adversary.][171] The holder of a silver wheel, not being able to take sovereignty by that alone, takes sovereignty merely by marching on them himself. The holder of a copper wheel, not being able to take sovereignty by that alone, takes sovereignty by merely displaying his battle-readiness. The holder of an iron wheel, not being able to take sovereignty by that alone, takes sovereignty by merely beginning to cause a fierce rain of missiles to fall.

Then if one asks: Doesn't it happen that the Cakravartin king is touched by the disgrace (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; avadya) of committing the act of killing?

He does not. Because he does not kill or harm anyone at all.

Moreover, the body of the Cakravartin king is adorned with 32 wonderful marks. If one says: In that case there would be no difference from a Buddha. [p.210; 118a5]

There is no fault. The Sage's marks are especially superior in their

placement, their brilliance, and in being more complete. Then if one asks: Did we have Cakravartin kings from the beginning, or did they appear later?

Earlier sentient beings, the humans of the first kalpa, were similar to the gods of the Form Realm in that they were miraculously born, they could travel in space by means of supernatural power, and light radiated from their bodies.[172]

At that time the juice of the earth emerged, with a color like that of fresh butter and a taste like unboiled honey.[173] Then one, with a craving for the taste, with an outstretched finger tip on the tongue, tried it. Then the others also tasted it in the same way. Gradually, because of attachment to taste, their bodies became solidified and heavy, the radiance of their bodies dimmed; and when they were grieving over this, by the dharmatā the sun shined, and saying that, "This thing ('Di Re) is the shining of the light rays of the gods in the world," and they used that term ['Di Re] for the daytime. And when the sun set, saying, "This thing ('Di Re) is the light rays of the gods turning red," and they used that term ['Di Re] for the night-time. Then when the moon shone, saying "This ('Di Re) thing is to beautify the darkness," and they used that term ['Di Re] for the moon.

Depending on how little or how much of the juice of the earth they ate, their complexion became good or bad. And because of bullying each other, the juice of the earth disappeared.[174]

Then the grease (Zhag; parpaṭaka)[175] of the earth appeared, with a color like the Karnikāra flower (Dong Ka'i Me Tog)[176] and a taste like unboiled honey. And depending on how little or how much of that they ate their color became good or bad; and because of bullying each other that [grease] also diminished.

After that a forest creeper (Myu Gu'i Tsal; vana-latā) appeared which [grew spontaneously,] in the evening showing no sign of a harvest that morning, and in the morning showing no sign of a harvest that evening; its color was like the Kadamba (Ka Dam Yu Ka'i Me Tog) flower[177] and its flavor was like unboiled honey. And once again, by eating more or less of this their complexions became better or worse and they fought and so this [food] also diminished. [p.211; 118b6]

Then a crop of Shāli rice, that grew without cultivating or planting, appeared; it had no husk or unformed grains and had the finest color and taste.[178] By eating this the male and female faculties were formed.[179]

Then, staring at each others' forms (Mig Tsugs Su blTas), attachment arose, and they engaged in polluted [sexual] activities (Phyin Ci Log; viprati-panna).

When others saw this, one being repudiated (Sun 'Byin Pa) another, and saying, "It is not right to do what is improper," they threw clods of earth (Bong Ba; loṣṭa) [at them.] Then they built houses and said, "Those improper

things should be done here." And they called it by the term "house".

Living in the house, when they needed rice in the morning they collected it in the morning; for the evening meal they collected it in the evening. Then one lazy person collected a little bit (Phyi Ma Red) that was to be eaten the next day. Then when another said to [the lazy one,] "Hey! The people want to go collect rice."[180]

He answered, "You go ahead. I already got mine." Then thinking that this idea was a wise method, they collected rice for seven days and stored it. And because of this, the morning harvest became evident in the evening; and the evening harvest became evident in the morning.[181] Then the rice came to possess a husk and unformed grains.

And they divided the rice up among them, each one piled up their own heaps. Some came to take [rice] without it being given. Then they came to hold the land as owners, and so one person who had a naturally strong body was appointed as a field protector. Because he was given a sixth of the harvest he was respected by many people; so he was called King Mahāsammata (Mang Pos bKur Ba). King Mahāsammata's son was Roca ('Od mDzes). His son was Kalyāna (dGe Ba). His son was Varakalyāna (dGe mChog). His son was Upoṣadha (gSo sByong 'Phags). On the top of his head a harmless protuberance of flesh arose, and by piercing that King Mūrdhatah (sPyi Bo sKyes) was born. [p.212; 116b1] These were the Cakravartin kings

who controlled the four continents, and they are known as the "five early kings."[182]

Then, do to excessive actions of non-virtuous karmic paths (Las Kyi Lam; karma-patha) {iv.65}, the life-span became shorter until finally the length of life was only ten years.[183] {95-98}

Then if one asks: How do these intermediate kalpas come to conclusion?

Intermediate kalpas terminate by weapons, disease and famine.

If one asks: How long do these last? The kalpa of weapons lasts seven days; the kalpa of disease lasts seven months and seven days; the kalpa of famine lasts seven years seven months and seven days; thus they arise successively.[184]

The way this happens is that when the life-span reaches ten years, harmful thoughts increase excessively; and, just like when a hunter sees a deer, they grab whatever is at hand--a piece of wood or a clod of earth (Bong Ba; loṣṭa)--and making it a weapon, they slaughter each other. Those who die at that time are born in hell.

During those seven days those who live in the mountains and forests go to the cities. Seeing each other they say, "I saw living beings," and they are happy, and having affection for each other they spontaneously gather.

They say, "Our friends and our relatives have been destroyed by these killers. From now on we will give up killing." And so they abandon killing. And practicing the ten virtues exceedingly well, their sons and daughters and so forth increase their life-span to 20 years. Then gradually the life-span increases to 80,000 years.

At that time, on this continent, there is widespread prosperity, happiness, rich harvests, many living creatures and humans. The cities spread out until they reach the range of flight of the śālika bird.[185] Excellent grain grows, with large ears, each of which produces four large droṇa (Bre Mo) of grain,[186] and so forth. And the women become brides from the age of 500. [p.213; 120a1]

Then, once again declining, the life-spans reached ten years because of an exceeding amount of non-virtuous actions; and due to this the Non-humans (Mi Ma Yin; piśāca) became angry ('Khrugs) and spread epidemics (Nad Yams; īti), from which most [humans] died and were born in hells.

The remainder gathered together and abandoned killing and the life-spans of their children and so forth increased.

Then again it decreased and when the life-span was ten years, because of excessive non-virtuous actions, the gods did not send down timely rains, so great and terrible famines occurred, called famine of the boxes (Gab Tse; cañca); famine of the utensils (Thur Ma; śalākā); and famine

of the white bones (Rus Gong dKar Po; śvetāshti).

The famine of the boxes is called that because those who have found a little bit of grain put it into a box; having put it there so that future generations would have seeds, their own life-span expires.

The famine of utensils is called that because having found a little food, the mother and children eat it with a utensil. Also, having dug out with the utensil the grain storage closet where the grain was previously put, they find only one or two grains and put them in a pot and pour in a lot of water and boil it and drink it.

The famine of white bones is called that because, endangered by hunger, their bones become like those of a dead person, coarse and without the color of fat, and like that their life expires. Also, having found their ancestors' old bones they boil them in water until they become white, and they drink that.

These last seven years seven months and seven days. Those who die at that time are reborn as hungry ghosts. The survivors assemble, and by exceedingly strong practice of the ten virtues, the life-spans of their children and so forth increase to 20 years. Then it gradually increases up to 80,000, as before. {99}

2) <u>Incidental points concerning the</u>

kalpa of dissolution.

a) The divisions of dissolution.

b) The highest point [above which] something remains.

c) The order of dissolution.

a) The divisions of dissolution.

[p.213; 120b2]

If one asks: If you analyze the kalpa of dissolution, how many divisions are there?

There are three: Dissolution by fire; dissolution by water; and dissolution by wind. {100a-b}

b) The upper limit [above which] something remains.

If one asks: When there is the dissolution by fire and so forth, what is the upper limit of the destruction?

The three, the first concentration and so forth--the second and third concentrations--are, respectively, the upper limits of destruction above which something remains, at the time of destruction by fire, water and wind.

The three lower concentrations are destroyed by fire and so forth

because in them the faults of the sentient beings have natures consistent with (Chos mThun Pa; sādharmya) fire and so forth.

In the first concentration investigation and analysis are like fire. In the second concentration the pleasure of joy is like water. In the third concentration the inhalation and exhalation of breath is like the wind.

The fourth concentration is not destroyed by fire and so forth because it is unmovable (Mi gYo Ba; ānejya) by faults that have a nature consistent with fire and so forth. Because these faults do not exist in the fourth concentration.

If one says: In that case, the palaces of the fourth concentration would be eternal. They are not eternal. Because the palaces of the fourth concentration arise and are destroyed at the same time as the sentient beings with whom they are associated. {100c-101}

c) The order of dissolution.

As it says {iii.100}, "There are three dissolutions..." If one asks: What is the sequence of [the types of] dissolution?

There are seven dissolutions by fire, and then one by water. After seven such cycles of seven by fire followed by one water, when there have been seven by water, there are again seven by fire, and then there is a final dissolution by wind.

And so it says in the *Prajñapti*:

> The Mahābrahmas live one and a half kalpas; the Ābāsvara live eight great kalpas; the Śubhakṛtsnas live 64 great kalpas.

It all adds up nicely. {102}

This is the explanation of the third chapter entitled "The Presentation of the World from the verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*." [p.215; 121a3]

## NOTES--CHAPTER 3

1. These divisions are sometimes stated as six, sometimes as five. When given as five it combines the gods and the demigods into one.

2. *SAKV* p.380; *'Gral bShad* p.275a3:
na rañjayantīti rañjeḥ
i.e. the etymology is = na √ram

3. *SAKV* p.380; *'Gral bShad* p.275a4:

bhṛśamito 'punarāvṛtteritaḥ pretāḥ
'Di Nas Shin Tu Phyir Mi lDog Pa Song Bas Na Yi Dags rNams So

Others say:
pipāsayā parītā
sKom Pa Dang lDan Pa'i Phyir Ro

4. *SAKV* p.380; *'Gral bShad* p.275a5:

The rest of the etymologies are:

tiryaggamanāt tiryañcaḥ//

manasa udbhūtatvānmanuṣyāḥ//

manorapatyā iti laukikāḥ//

dyauroko yeṣāmiti divaukasaḥ//

5. This is the *Bahu-bhūmi-vastu* section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*.

6. See {vii.49} for emanation mind.

7. The first three levels of the fourth concentration are abodes of ordinary individuals; the last five levels (of eight) are exclusively for Āryans. Bṛhatphala is the highest level for an ordinary individual.

8. See Pruden fn#4 for discussion of the identity of these groups of Sarvāstivādins.

9. Geshe Donyo explains: According to Yogācāra tenets there are two Akaniṣṭhas, one is only for saṁbhoga-kāyas and bodhisattvas; the other is for Āryans of the Hīnayāna.

Also see Pruden fn#5 for a discussion of the various positions.

10. The four levels of the Formless Realm are, in descending order:

1. Bhavāgra; Srid rTse--Peak of Existence.
2. Akiṁcanya-āyatana; Ci Yang Med Pa'i sKye mChed--Nothingness.
3. Vijñānāntya-āyatana; rNam Shes mTha' Yas sKye mChed--Limitless Consciousness.
4. Ākāśānantya-āyatana; Nam mKha' mTha' Yas sKye mChed--Limitless Space.

11. *ADKB* p.384; *bShad Pa* p.209:

> Then why isn't the continuum of sentient beings of form also established as being based on those two alone?
>
> Because they are too weak.
>
> Why are they strong enough there [in the Formless Realm?]
>
> Because they are born from a special absorption which has discrimination that is free of form.

12. See {iii.8}.

13. *Sapta-bhava-sūtra*; *Srid pa bDun bsTan Pa'i mDo*, discussed in *Vibhāṣā*, Taisho 27, p.309b15. Poussin points out (Pruden fn#29) that the schools which deny intermediate existence deny the authenticity of this sūtra.

14. *ADKB* p.390; *bShad Pa* p.214:

> Here [in this sūtra] the five types of rebirth together with their cause and together with their way of going (gamana) is explained. Because of that they are established as non-obscuring neutrals, because they are set apart from their cause [which is karma existence.]

*SAKV* adds p.390; *'Gral bShad* p.233a2:

> [In the above passage] "cause" means the karma existence; "way of going" means the intermediate existence. By means of these one will go to a rebirth ('Gro Bar 'Gyur Ba; gamyate). gatistu gamyate iti gatiḥ// The meaning of "they are set apart from their causes" is: virtuous and non-virtuous karma existence [which is the cause] is set apart from those types of rebirth.

Geshe Sopa explains that karma existence is the karmic state just before the projecting karma is actualized and comes to fruition in the next life.

15. *Mv* 1401.

16. The first to be born in the retinue of Mahābrahmā all believe that he has created the world--see below. But those who are born there subsequently have various discriminations.

17. *ADKB* p.394; *bShad Pa* p.218:

> Here, by mentioning [only] the upper limit [of the second concentration] the entire second concentration should be understood. Otherwise, into which of the abodes of consciousness would the Parīttābha and Apramāṇābha gods be allocated.

18. This is the view of the Vaibhāṣikas.

19. *ADKB* p.396; *bShad Pa* p.220:

> And which are the remainder? The bad rebirths, the fourth concentration and the Peak of Existence. Because in these [states] there exist the destroyers of consciousness, they are not abodes of consciousness.

20. See Pruden fn#61 for various sources of this theory.

21. See {ii.14} and {iii.98}.

22. Poussin informs us (Pruden fn#71):

> Māndhātar was born from a swelling (piṭaka) which formed on the head of Upoṣadha.

See the footnote for references.

23. Quoted from *SAKV* p.402; *'Gral bShad* p.290b7.

24. See Pruden fn#69.

25. Quoted from *SAKV* p.402; *'Grel bShad* p.290b8.

26. Three are plainly evident. These are examples of miraculous birth. (*ADKB* p.402; *bShad Pa* p.224)

See Pruden fn#83.

27. See Pruden fn# 75 for sources.

28. The miraculously born includes all the gods, all the hell beings (the most numerous realm), most hungry ghosts, some humans and animals, and beings of the intermediate existence.

Born from moist heat includes insects, worms etc. Born from womb and egg includes only some humans, animals and some hungry ghosts.

29. Poussin provides a "bibliographic summary of antarābhava" (Pruden fn#85) and a list of which sects accept it and which do not.

30. *ADKB* p.405; *bShad Pa* p.226:

> How is it that this is a birth (sKye Ba; jāta) but is not an arrival (Byung Ba; upapanna)?
>
> BECAUSE IT HAS NOT REACHED (Ma Phyin; anupetatva) THE PLACE TO WHICH IT IS GOING, INTERMEDIATE EXISTENCE IS NOT AN ARRIVAL.

31. *ADKB* p.406; *bShad Pa* p.226:

> It is seen that those dharmas that are engaged in a continuum manifest ('Byung Ba; pradur-bhāva) in another location without interruption, like the continuum of a grain of rice. Therefore, the mental continuum of a sentient being also should manifest in another place without interruption.

32. Zla mTsan Dang lDan Pa; ṛtumat = fertile phase of the menstrual cycle.

33. See Pruden fn#92 for sources and quotations.

34. See Pruden fn#93 for Hsuan-tsang's comments on this confusing passage. Yaśomitra says that perishing aggregates means the death existence. In other words, the aggregates of the being that is dying must be in attendance for the rebirth to occur.

35. *rTa'i Len Gyi Bu'i mDo* Poussin (Pruden fn#94) cites *Majjhima* ii.157.

36. See Pruden fn#95 for references. Poussin points out that the definition of the Non-returner who attains Nirvāṇa in the intermediate existence (antarā-

parinirvāyin) given at *Anguttara* i.134 "presupposes an intermediate existence."

See {vi.38} for explanation of the five types on Non-returners.

37. *Sapta Satpuruṣa-gatayaḥ Sūtra*; *sKyes Bu Dam Pa'i 'Gro Ba bDun bsTan Pa'i mDo*

See Pruden fn#96 for citations. See {vi.40} for discussion. And see *SAKV* p.411; *'Grel bShad* p.297a4 for extended quotation of the text.

38. Pruden p.388.

39. *SAKV* p.418 in the Sanskrit says it is a disciple of Krakucchanda (Log Pa Dang Sel); but in Tibetan the *'Grel bShad* p.304b6 says Kāśyapa ('Od Srungs) which is probably where GDD gets it.

40. See Pruden fn#103 for citations.

41. *ADKB* p.422; *bShad Pa* p.234:

> The term "existence" (Srid Pa; bhava), without exception, means the five appropriating aggregates. It is classified as four types: The intermediate existence is as was explained. The birth existence is the moment of conception among the types of rebirth. From then on, except for the moment of death, all other existence is the previous-time-existence. The final moment is the death existence; after which comes the intermediate existence if one is to be born among the sentient beings of form.

42. i.e. They have in the intermediate existence the full size that they will attain in their rebirth.

43. See Pruden fn#113 for citations.

44. See Pruden fn#109 for various citations.

45. *ADKB* p.422; *bShad Pa* p.233:

> This is not necessarily something that needs to be interpreted. This is neither sūtra, nor vinaya, nor abhidharma; this is an [independent] composition (Rang bZo; kāvya). And some of the ideas (bSam Pa; bhāva) supplied by these authors reach a state of pretension (sGro 'Dogs Par Yang 'Gyur; samāropitā gacchanti). However, if it must be interpreted: just as, in her dream, he was seen by his mother to enter

[her womb,] in that same manner it was written in the verse.

46. This and the following opinions are from the *Vibhāṣā*, Taisho 27, p.361b14.

47. According to Poussin (Pruden fn#122) the Chinese commentators say the previous opinion was preferred by Vasubandhu. However Geshe Donyo says this opinion of Vasumitra is the Rang Lugs, and it is the one commonly held in the Tibetan tradition: if one does not find a mother in seven days one dies and is born again in the bardo. This can happen up to seven times, for a total of 49 days. Geshe Donyo says that most find a rebirth within the first week.

48. Ba Min; gavaya. *MW*: a species of ox, Bos gavaeus.

49. The *Index* has Dred Mo = tarakṣa, which *MW* says is a wolf. Goldstein says Dred Mo is type of bear found in Tibet. Poussin (Pruden p.394) says "a brown bear instead of a black bear."

50. This is the view of "other" Vaibhāṣikas. See *Vibhāṣā* Taisho 27, p.360c25.

51. *ADKB* p.427; *bShad Pa* p.238: utkuṭukaḥ sambhavati; Tzog Tzog Por sKye'o = born squatting. GDD's simplified 'Dug does not tell the whole story.

52. See Pruden fn#139 for citations.

53. The fourth type of descent into the womb includes everyone else--those who are not aware at any stage of the process. See *ADKB* p.432; *bShad Pa* p.242.

54. This passage on stages of growth after birth does not appear in *ADKB*. The Sanskrit terms are from other passages as cited in the *Index*.

Geshe Donyo explains: gZhon Nu is age 14-16. Dar Ma is from 30 to 40. Dar Ma Yol Pa is around 50. rGas Pa is 60's and 70's.

55. *ADKB* p.245; *bShad Pa* p.435: These three groups of the 12 correspond, respectively, to births of the past, the future and the present.

56. *ADKB* p.436; *bShad Pa* p.246:

Then if one asks: Are these eight limbs present in the birth of all

[beings?] The answer is no. Then who has them? THOSE WHO ARE COMPLETE....In this case it means that individual who reaches (Reg Pa; spṛṣati) all of these states; not those who die in the intermediate existence, nor those who function in the Form or Formless Realms.

57. *ADKB* p.436; *bShad Pa* p.246:

> IGNORANCE IS THE STATE OF PREVIOUS AFFLICTION. Whatever is [included in] the state of affliction in a previous life, is called here, ignorance; because they act in concert, and it is the force of that [ignorance] that motivates those [afflictions.]

Poussin (Pruden p.402) emphasizes the point that ignorance here does not refer to an isolated state of ignorance, nor merely to the totality of the afflictions. Rather it is the very condition of being afflicted of the aggregates in a previous life.

58. *ADKB* p.437; *bShad Pa* p.246:

> THE FORMATIVE FORCES ARE PREVIOUS KARMAS. The word "occasion" (gNas sKabs; daśa) is to be added. Those occasions of meritorious etc. karma in previous lives, are here called formative forces; the karmas of which this [life] is the fruition.

59. The six āyatanas here refers to the six sense faculties. The *ADKB* p.437 (*bShad* Pa p.247) points out that it should say "up until the four āyatanas are developed" because the mental faculty and the body faculty already exist from the moment of conception; but, "Six āyatanas is said because at that time they are [all found to be] arranged [as a group of six."]

60. *ADKB* p.438; *bShad Pa* p.247:

> The state of feeling lasts for as long as the desire for sexual intercourse is not activated.

61. *ADKB* p.438; *bShad Pa* p.247:

> The state in which the desire for sensual pleasures and sexual intercourse is activated, up until one engages in seeking out those objects, is called craving.

62. *MOE* p.281:

> The tenth member, existence, is a case of giving the name of the effect to the cause. For it is the potency established by the second member, action, when it has been thoroughly nourished by attachment and grasping and has become empowered to develop into the next life.

63. *ADKB* p.439; *bShad Pa* p.248:

> What is the limb of consciousness here [in this life,] is, in another life, [the limb of] birth.

64. *ADKB* p.439; *bShad Pa* p.248:

> What are the four limbs of name and form, six āyatanas, contact and feeling in this life, are aging and death in another life.

65. *ADKB* p.442; *bShad Pa* p.650:

> SEVEN ARE BASES. The seven limbs that have the nature of bases are: consciousness, name and form, the six āyatanas. contact, feeling, birth, old age and death; because they are the support (rTen; āśraya) of afflictions and karma. And just as these seven limbs are bases, LIKEWISE THEY ARE RESULTS. The seven limbs are results. The remaining five are causes, because they are of the nature of karma and affliction.

66. This is not very clearly explained, either here or at *ADKB* {iii.27}. The principle is that from afflictions both 1) afflictions and 2) karma arise: e.g. 1) grasping from craving; 2) existence from grasping. From karma bases arise: e.g. consciousness from formative forces or birth from existence. From bases both 1) other bases and 2) afflictions arise: e.g. 1) the series from consciousness to feeling; 2) craving from feeling.

Thus the affliction ignorance can arise from a basis, such as feeling in the previous life, and so it has a cause that does not add to the 12 limbs. In the same way old age and death can have a result, such as craving in the future life.

The main idea is that it is a cycle, and each effect can also be a cause and vice versa--it just keeps cycling. There is no beginning, no end, and there are no more than twelve limbs.

67. *Saṁyutta,* ii.25.

68. i.e. From the point of view of him being a cause he is a father. From the point of view of him being an effect he is a son.

69. See Pruden fn#184 for problems in the translation of this name.

70. Possibly Vasuvarman. *SAKV* p.457; *'Grel bShad* p.330b6 says it is the opinion of Sthavira Vasuvarman.

71. *SAKV* p.457; *'Grel bShad* p.330b6 says these are the opinions of the Ācārya.

72. Vasubandhu's view is that both sentences in the sūtra passage have the same meaning, they are not to be distinguished.

73. See {v.34}.

74. *ADKB* p.464; *bShad Pa* p.265:

> If ignorance were [a type of] wisdom, then it could not be concomitant with the view, because two substances of wisdom can not be concomitant.

78. *ADKB* p.471; *bShad Pa* p.270:

> As it is said: "The eye consciousness cognizes blue but does not cognize, 'This is blue.' The mental consciousness cognizes both blue and 'This is blue.' One is distinguished on the basis of the support [the faculty]; the other is distinguished on the basis of the referent object."

For source of the quote see Pruden fn#258.

76. i.e. Each of the three types of mental feelings can be in response to any of the six types of object āyatanas.

77. i.e. Because there is no form, there is only mental happiness, mental unhappiness and neutral feeling with regard to mental objects.

78. i.e. Mental happiness and neutral feeling which can attend to the four objects of the Form Realm [which exclude smell and taste.]

79. i.e. Neutral feeling only, which attends to the four objects of the Form Realm.

80. i.e. Neutral feeling attending to mental objects.

81. *ADKB* p.490; *bShad Pa* p.283:

> For example: Just as food and drink that is already prepared is only to be experienced and can not be produced again, the bases, which are called "fruition", are the same way. There is no production ('Brel Ba; pravardhate), beyond that fruition, of another fruition in another life. If there were such a production there could be no liberation.

82. See {iii.10}: Intermediate existence, birth existence, previous-time-existence, and death existence.

83. See Pruden fn#305 for citations.

84. See Pruden fn#306 for sūtra sources.

85. These are stories from the Vinaya in which these travellers became lost and happened upon various hells.

86. i.e. Visible forms, which are the object of the eye faculty, are not in any way capable of nourishing that faculty or its elemental parts.

87. See Pruden fn#313 for citations.

88. Taisho 26, number 1536, chapter 8, folio 8. Also *Vibhāṣā* Taisho 27 p.676b16.

89. *ADKB* p.497; *bShad Pa* p.289:

> ...at the time that it is being eaten and at the time that it is digested. So the Vaibhāṣikas say.

90. i.e. Giving to all the beings in Jambudvīpa with stomachs would, of course, be more meritorious than giving to 100 ṛṣis.

91. For the bodhisattva who has reached the predestined stage see {iv.108}.
*GDD* has-- Byang Sems Nges gNas So// *ADKB* p.499; *bShad Pa* p.290 has "a bodhisattva near to (Nye Ba; sannikṛṣṭa) [bodhi]."

92. The four levels of the Path of Preparation, Heat, Peak, Patience, and Supreme Mundane Dharmas, are called the states conducing to insight, or nirvedha-bhāgīyas (Nges Byed Cha mThun).
This means that they are favorable to, or lead to, or introduce one to

(bhāgīya) the Path of Seeing, where one attains insight.

93. *ADKB* p.496; *bShad Pa* p.288:

If one asks: Why are there only four foods? Don't all contaminated dharmas nourish existence? That is true, however it is the primary ones that are mentioned.

TWO HAVE THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING THE SUPPORT AND THE SUPPORTED; TWO HAVE THE PURPOSE OF PROJECTING AND ESTABLISHING ANOTHER EXISTENCE; IN THAT ORDER.

The support is the body together with its faculties. What makes that develop is the morsel food. The supported is the dharmas of the mind and mental factors. What develops them is contact. These two are the primary factors in nourishing the existence that has been born here. The intention of the mind projects the future existence. Once projected, it is established (mNgon Par 'Grub Pa; abhinirvṛtti) by the seed of consciousness which is inspired (Yongs Su bsGos Pa; paribhāvita) by karma; so these two are the primary factors in producing that existence which has not yet been born.

Therefore four [foods] are taught. The former two sustain what has already been born and therefore they are like nurses. The latter two cause it to be born and therefore they are like mothers.

94. *SAKV* p.501; *'Grel bShad* p.360b2:

The cutting of the roots of virtue is due to wrong view, and that is mental because it is in the nature of reflection (rTog Par Byed Ba; santīraktva).

The rejoining of the roots of virtue is due to right view or doubt and they also are mental {iv.79}.

Separation from the attachment to a realm or level can only be in the mental consciousness, because it can only be attained in a mind in meditative equipoise (Sems mNyam Par bZhag Par; samāhita eva citte).

The deterioration from that is the activity of superficial attentiveness (Tsul bZhin Du Ma Yin Pa Yid La Byed Pa; ayoniśomanasikāra); and superficial attentiveness is of the mental consciousness because it is due to discursive thought (rNam Par rTog Pa; vikalpa).

Death takes place in a consciousness that is propitious to the cutting of the continuum, having the range of activity of the five faculties contracted ('Dus Pa; saṁkṣipta).

And birth is exclusively of the mental consciousness because it takes place with a confused mind (Phyin Ci Log Gis bLo; viparyasta-mati) {iii.17}.

95.See {iii.38}.

96. i.e. At birth and death the mind must be manifest; at these times it is not manifest: *ADKB* p.502; *bShad Pa* p.292:

> There is also no [birth and death] for the non-conscious states. Because it is not possible to harm the non-conscious states. At the time when the body of such a one begins to perish, unquestionably death will not occur until after the mind connected with that body is manifested again, and not otherwise.
>
> Also for birth, it would not be proper for it to occur in the case of non-conscious states, since there is no cause for the cessation of mind, and because there is no birth when there are no afflictions.

97. See {ii.71b}: "The divisions of the mind as twenty." There are four types of non-obscuring neutral minds: arisen from fruition, the mind of behavior, the mind of skill in arts, the mind of emanation.

98. *ADKB* p.504; *bShad Pa* p.293:

> The vital organs are those parts of the body which, if harmed, will bring about death. If any of the elements of water, fire or wind is severely agitated, [the vital organs] are seized by a terrible sensation which is like being split by sharpened weapons. [Here, split does not have the meaning] as in the splitting of wood. Or else the term split means that since [the vital organs] are no longer active, it is as if they were split.
>
> If it is asked: Why is it that this does not occur with the element of earth? It is because there is no fourth defect (sKyon; doṣa). The winds (rLung; vāta), bile (mKhris Pa; pitta) and phlegm (Bad Kan; śleṣman) are the three defects and their principle elements are, respectively, water, fire and air.
>
> Others say: It is analogous with the destruction of the inanimate world [which is destroyed by these three elements.]

99. See *BC* p.6 fn#1 for references on the term "sahā."
Geshe Donyo says: This world is unbearable because of the suffering experienced here.

100. See Pruden fn#365 for citations concerning the uncertainty of the meaning of: Tsan Po Che Chen Po'i.

101. *ADKB* p.507; *bShad Pa* p.296:

> And then by a wind arisen by the power of the karma of sentient beings, the waters are agitated, and just as churned milk becomes cream, the top of [the water maṇḍala] becomes gold.

102. *ADKB* p.510; *bShad Pa* p.299:

> There are two oceans: the outer and the inner. The playing oceans are the inner oceans.

103. Shaped like a carriage means like a triangle with the point chopped off--three sides of 2000 yojanas and a fourth side of three and a half.

104. In *MS* p.37 we see that this is a wish-granting cow.

105. *ADKB* p.513; *bShad Pa* p.301 has kīṭādrinavakāddhimavān // *SAKV* p.513; *'Grel bShad* p.: This means nine mountains that are shaped like insects.
Poussin (Pruden p.456) translates this as "ant-Mountains." His fn#392 points out that the Chinese translators also translate it as black mountains.

106. Both editions of *GDD* read brGya sTong--100,000 for the number of the attendants in the next three paragraphs. However this may be a misprint from mChims p.159b-160 who consistently says brGyad sTong--8000.

107. This is according to mChims p.159b6.

108. See Pruden fn#395 for partial bibliography of sources on the Buddhist hells.

109. *ADKB* p.514; *bShad Pa* p.302:

> Others say: It is called Avīci because there is not a moment of pleasure (bDe Ba'i gNas sKabs; sukha-vīci). However in the other [hells,] although there is no feeling of pleasure that is a fruition, [pleasure] that

is a naturally flowing result is not ruled out.

110. Correct both 'Bras sPung and Sarnath editions from: mTson Gyis 'Dra Bar Byed// to mTson Gyis Dra Bar Bye//

111. See *MS* p.26ff. for more details on the hells.

112. *MW*: Yama's two watchdogs.

113. This is a thoroughly confused bird: Geshe Donyo says it is a black crow, based on GDD's Khwa Ta. The *bShad Pa* p.303 reads Khra, a hawk according to Goldstein and Candra Das. The *Index* cites Kha as a translation of the *ADKB*'s vāya which is, according to *MW* a derivative of vi = bird. However the *Index*'s source, the Peking Edition p.169b6 gives Khra (hawk) not Kha.

114. *ADKB* p.515; *bShad Pa* p.303:

> Three of these, the Road of Razors and so forth, are combined into one because they are similar in that one is attacked by weapons.

So the Road of Razors and the Iron Grater with its hawks are included in the Grove of Sword-leaves with its dogs.

115. See Pruden fn#411 for speculation on identity of Dharmasubhūti.

116. For details on hungry ghosts see *MS* p.34. For other sources see Pruden fn#417.

117. Etymology for this name is at Yaśomitra p.520: cāturmahārājakāyikā iti // caturmahārājānaṁ kāyaḥ, tatra bhavāś-cāturmahārājakāyikāḥ //

118. *SCD* p.421: "The 'moonstone' described by Sanskrit poets as having the power of emitting water at the sight of the moon."

119. In one yojana there are eight krośa.

120. i.e. The longest and shortest days of the year, when the sun (Nyi Ma) reaches the limit of its northern or southern passage and begins moving in the other direction (lDog).

121. There are three seasons of four months each. Each month begins on the day after the new moon, the first day of the waxing moon. So the second summer month is six months from the fourth winter month.

122. See {iii.88} for definitions of times and distances.

123. *ADKB* p.519; *bShad Pa* p.307:

> When the palace of the moon passes (rGyu; vahati) in the vicinity of the palace of the sun, the rays of the sun fall upon the [moon's] palace. Then, because a shadow falls on the other side [of the palace of the moon,] the disk (dKyil 'Khor) appears incomplete. This is the teaching of the *Prajñapti*, and so they believe.

124. *ADKB* p.520; *bShad Pa* p.308:

> All of these gods belong to the group of the Four Great Kings; but on the fourth [terrace] live the Four Great Kings themselves, and their retinues.

125. *MW* p.116: the two sons of the Aśvins, viz. Nakula and Sahadeva, *MBh* v, 1816.

126. For more details and citations see Pruden fn#443.

127. Poussin (Pruden p.463) says it is a magnolia.
*MW*: easily split; Bauhinia variegata.
For other references see Pruden fn#439.

128. *MW*: Erythrina Indica.

129. See Pruden fn.#441 for citations. He gives the whole quote (p.464):

> The fragrance of flowers does not go against the wind, neither does the fragrance of good go against the wind; but the satpuruṣa goes in all directions.

130. *Mv* 7127.

131. Geshe Donyo: These are the ministers and underlings of Indra. There are 32 of them.

132. This is the elephant that Indra (brGya Byin) rides.
*MW*: Considered as the prototype of the elephant race and the supporter of the east quarter.

133. *ADKB* p.524; *bShad Pa* p.311:

> It is the place where the gods, having settled down [together,] ponder the proper and improper actions.

134. *MW*: Yāma: cessation, end, restraint, forbearance.

135. This is the place where the normally placid and friendly gods naturally become hostile and bellicose.

136. i.e. Not including the northern continent.

137. The Sanskrit word śubha is sometimes translated by the Tibetans as bDe Ba--pleasure; sometimes, as in our text, as dGe Ba--virtue. See *MS* Chapter 2, fn#5.

138. *MS* p.43: Cloudless because its parts are scattered, like clouds that do not meet.
Geshe Sopa explains that each god has its own separate ground.

139. A trichiliochosm is the four continents along with the abodes of the gods one billion times over. See below {iii.73-4}.
See *BC* p.52ff for a discussion of the tri-sāhasra-mahā-sāhasra-loka-dhātu.

140. *ADKB* p.525; *bShad Pa* p.312:

> But they satisfy the heat of passion by the emission of wind, because they do not have semen.

See below.

141. Geshe Donyo adds that there is no semen because that requires the eating of food and these gods do not eat coarse food.

142. See {iii.13}.

143. See Pruden fn#451 for citations.

144. The form and formless gods do not have occurrences of desire.

145. There is only neutral feeling on the special first concentration (dhyānāntara) {viii}. See Yaśomitra p.526 and Pruden fn#454 for the full discussion.

146. *GDD* here gives one example for the pattern: The distance from any given abode down to Jambudvipa ("the abode below") is the distance from that abode up to the next highest abode.

See Pruden fn#455 for many sources of disagreement on these figures.

147. The Four Great Kings are of the same bhūmi as the Thirty-three--they both inhabit Meru--and so they can go there. The other four Desire Realm gods each occupies its own bhūmi. And each of the four concentrations in the Form Realm and each of the formless absorptions is its own bhūmi. The beings on each of these bhūmis do not see the beings above.

148. See Pruden fn#463 for sūtra citations.

149. Geshe Sopa comments that sPyi'i Phud often means the offering of the first gathering of a harvest and so forth. Cūḍika is also the term for the Hindu ceremony of tonsure. In this sense it could have the meaning of, "the first portion of the universe."

*SAKV* (p.528) says that because it is smaller (cūḍa) than the great loka-dhātus it is called cūḍika.

150. So a small chiliochosm is 1000 world systems; a dichiliochosm is one million world systems; and a trichiliochosm is one billion world systems.

151. See *SAKV* p.428 for etymological explanation of these terms. Further discussion of creation and discussion of the universe comes at {iii.93}.

152. lit.-- a hand = the length from the elbow to the tip of the fingers. It equals 24 aṅgulas or about 18 inches. Recognizing that such measures are variable from person to person, dGe 'Dun Grub specifies that these are "good-sized" hands.

153. The three types of kalpas are explained below at {iii.89}.

154. i.e. The six hells, Saṁjīva, Kālasūtra, Saṁghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, and Tapana, have life-spans which correspond in number of years to, respectively, the six Desire Realm gods starting with the Four Great Kings. However, the years in the hells are made up of days each of which is as long as the entire life-span of the corresponding god.

155. Geshe Donyo says Garuḍa can not eat them because their life-span is certain.

156. The full quote is given by *SAKV* p.535, with some variation. Poussin (Pruden fn#472) cites other sources using this list.

157. A confusing phrase: see *ADKB* p.535; *bShad Pa* p.321, and Pruden fn#474.

158. See Pruden fn#490 for explanation of ūnarātra and calculation of religious calendars.

159. This section is summarized in *BC* Chapter IV, p.73-76.

160. *SAKV* p.539:

> The term dharmatā means the special transformations that the virtuous dharmas undergo at that time. It is by means of that [dharmatā] that the [first concentration] is attained.

See {viii.38} for discussion of this.

161. Geshe Donyo explains: From the beginning of the interruption of the birth of beings in Avīci hell, until everything from the first concentration down is empty and all the humans and gods are born into realms from the second concentration on up--this period is 19 intermediate kalpas.

162. Geshe Donyo says this is because the virtuous gods who normally make the rain are not around.

163. *ADKB* p.541; *bShad Pa* p.326:

> Thus, the period from the time that hell sentient beings pass away and are no longer born in the hells, until the receptacle world is destroyed, is known as a kalpa of dissolution.

164. 'Bras sPung Edition 115b6 (Sarnath p.205) reads: rLung 'Dzam Bu lDang Ba Nas // Corrected to: rLung 'Jam Po. See *bShad Pa* p.327.

165. Gehse Donyo says that this is just the way it naturally works.

166. i.e. 10 to the 59th power.
*ADKB* p.544; *bShad Pa* p.329 provides the entire list of the names of the sixty numbers--except for eight that are missing from the middle. It can also be found at *Mv* 249. Poussin (Pruden fn#507, 508) gives various references on the great numbers and some interesting discussion,

culminating in this quote from Alberuni (i.363):

> If those dreamers had more assiduously studied arithmetic, they would not have invented such outrageous numbers. God takes care that their trees do not grow into heaven.

167. The top five levels of gods in the Form Realm from Avṛha to Akaniṣṭha.

168. Geshe Donyo says it is good because 1000 Buddhas appear. It is with a lamp because there is the light of dharma.

169. The five corruptions (Nyigs Ma lNga; pañca kaṣāya:)
1. Tse; āyu--degenerated life-span
2. lTa Ba; dṛṣṭhii--degenerated view
3. Nyon Mong; kleśa--degenerated delusion
4. Sems Can; sattva--degenerated person
5. Dus; kalpa--degenerated time

Explained at *ADKB* p.547; *bShad Pa* p.333.

170. i.e. At the begining of a kalpa of evolution.

171. Geshe Donyo says that when he goes to receive the enemy, merely by showing his wheel he obtains power.

172. For a bibliography of "Buddhist Genesis" see Pruden fn#549.

173. Geshe Donyo says that at first they did not eat morsel food, but lived on meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi).

174.Geshe Donyo elaborates: At first all the people were the same. But those who ate a just little juice maintained their beautiful color, while those who ate a lot became heavy and discolored. Thus people became distinguished, one was beautiful and another ugly. So they fought, and from doing that the juice disappeared.

175. *BHS* p.333 gives:

> parpaṭaka = a thin paper-like dried cake.

i.e. like a papadum in an Indian restaurant. *BHS* goes on:

> bhūmi-, pṛthvī- seem clearly to mean a kind of edible mushroom.

Poussin (Pruden fn#551) among other citations quotes Hsuan-tsang as "earth skin-cake" and Paramārtha as "earth skin-dried".

Geshe Sopa says that Zhag is usually a top layer of grease or fat that is considered to taste good.

176. *SCD* p.642: Pterospermum acerifolium.

177. *SCD* p.4: Ka Dam Pa = Nauclea cadamba, a tree with orange colored fragrant blossoms.

178. Geshe Donyo says that sBun Pa means an unformed grain, where only the husk grows with nothing inside.

*SCD* p.1263: 'Bras Sa Lu = śāli taṇḍula = Oryza saliva, wild rice which according to the Buddhists was the food of our first parents.

179. *ADKB* p.554; *bShad Pa* p.341:

> At that time, because they were eating solid food, in order to perform the function of leading out the flow [of waste,] sentient beings developed the male and female organs with paths of urine and excrement; and they took different forms.

180. The Sarnath Edition errata (p.211) corrects 'Dod to 'Dong = to go; but there is no evidence for that in tha 'Bras sPung Edition.

181. i.e. The crops did not automatically grow back by the time of the next harvest.

182. This list is quoted and continued at *Mv* 3551. Also see Pruden fn#553 for other sources of lists of Cakravartins. (His citation for *Mv* is wrong.)

'Bras sPung Edition first words of 116b1 are corrected to:
brTol Bas rGyal Po sPyi Bo sKye Sa Byung //

183. *ADKB* p.555; *bShad Pa* p.342:

> Thus there are two factors that are the root source of this entire sorry sequence (Phung Khrol Gyi Chu Bo; kṛtsnasya-anarthya-aughasya): attachment to taste and laziness.

184. *SAKV* p.556 points out that there are two opinions, one opinion is that one of these causes arises at the end of successive kalpas; the other is that they arise successively at the end of one kalpa. Yaśomitra prefers the former explanation.

185. Bya Gag: *SCD* p.880 gives several Sanskrit possibilities: śālika; kvami; vaka; nakulī. The *Index* in another context gives kukkura--the name of a plant.

186. *MW* p.502: a measure of capacity. He gives Sanskrit equivalent measures.
*SCD* p.897: a measure for dry things as well as fluids, about two pints.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# THE PRESENTATION OF KARMA

## Outline to Chapter Four

I. The connection [with the previous chapters.]

II. The actual explanation of karma.
A. The nature of karma.
1. The presentation.

2. The explanation.
a. The nature of karma.
(1) Revealing karma.
(a) Revealing karma of body.
(b) Revealing karma of speech.

(2) Non-revealing karma.
(a) Proof from scripture.
(b) The distinctions of the elements which act as cause.
(c) The distinctions of qualities.

b. The differences in the general qualities of the three types of karma.
(1) The actual explanation.
(2) Incidental points.
(a) The divisions of virtue etc.
(b) Explaining the origins.
(c) The distinctions of qualities.

c. The divisions of non-revealing karma.
(1) The presentation.
(2) The explanation.
(a) Restraint.
1) The presentation.
2) The explanation.
a) Prātimokṣa restraint.
i) Divisions.
ii) Nature.
iii) Meaning of the terms.

iv) The individual who possesses them.

b) Concentration and uncontaminated restraints.

c) Incidental points.

(b) The manner of possessing.

1) The manner of possessing non-revealing karma.

2) The manner of possessing revealing karma.

a) The actual topic.

b) Incidental points.

3) Explaining the four possibilities of possessing.

(c) Obtainment and giving up.

1) The manner of obtaining.

a) The manner of obtaining restraint.

i) How they are obtained.

(A) The manner of obtaining the uncontaminated restraint and restraint of concentration.

(B) The manner of obtaining the prātimokṣa restraint.

(i) The actual topic.

(ii) Incidental points.

(I) The certainty of the length of time of restraint and unrestraint.

(II) The distinctions of the restraint of upavāsa.

A) The method of taking it.

B) The certainty of the branches.

C) The certainty of the basis.

(III) The distinctions of the restraint of upāsaka.
A) The actual topic.
B) Explaining in detail the object of refuge.
C) The certainty of the branches.

ii) Relative to what are they obtained.

b) The manner of obtaining unrestraint.

c) The manner of obtaining the in-between state.

2) The manner of giving up.

a) The manner of giving up restraint.

i) The manner of giving up the prātimokṣa restraint.

ii) The manner of giving up the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint.

b) The manner of giving up unrestraint.

c) The manner of giving up the in-between state.

(d) Explanation of the individual who possesses.

B. The list of synonyms that appear in the sūtras.
1. The introduction: the divisions by means of definitions.
2. The divisions by way of fruit.
a. The presentation.
b. The explanation.
(1) Explaining meritorious karma etc.
(2) Explaining [karma to be experienced as]
(a) Individual examples of the three ways to

be experienced.

1) Our own system.
2) Others' systems.

(b) The divisions of the ways to be experienced.

1) The five divisions.
2) The detailed explanation of [karma] which is to be experienced as fruition.

a) The general presentation.

i) The divisions of karma.
ii) How many projections of karma there are in which realms and rebirths.

b) The specific explanation of karma that is certain to be experienced.

(c) Which feelings are the fruit of which karmas.

1) The actual explanation.
2) The detailed explanation of deranged mind (gYengs Pa'i Sems; citta-kṣepa).

3. The divisions by way of causes.
4. Divisions by way of both cause and fruit.
    a. The presentation.
    b. The explanation.

5. Divisions by way of basis.
6. Divisions by way of the agents [of purification].
7. The explanation of good conduct and bad conduct.
    a. Establishing the karmic paths.
        (1) The presentation.
        (2) The explanation.
            (a) The certainty [of having] revealing and non-revealing karma.
            (b) Divisions of the three karmic paths by three.
            (c) The specific explanations of the non-virtuous karmic paths.
                1) The causes of the non-virtuous karmic paths.

2) The individual definitions.
a) The four roots.
b) The four expressions.
c) The explanation of the six branches.

3) The meaning of the term karmic path.

(d) The manner of cutting the roots of virtue, and regeneration.
(e) How many karmic paths arise simoultaneously with intentions.
(f) How many karmic paths are there in which realms and rebirths?
(g) The results of the karmic paths.

b. The reason for teaching wrong livelihood separately.
c. Which karmas have how many results.

8. The divisions of karma as prescribed behavior and improper behavior.
9. The divisions of projecting and completing.
10. The explanation of the three obstructions.
11. The explanation of the automatic transgressions.
12. The explanation of the the five near transgressions
13. The explanation of the three occasions of meritorious action.
14. The explanation of the three that coincide with [virtue.]
15. Karma that is accomplished through a discipline.

In the explanation of the fourth chapter, the Presentation of Karma, there are two topics:

I. The connection [with the previous chapters.]

II. The actual explanation of karma.

I. <u>The connection [with the previous chapters.]</u>

If one asks: This manifold world which has been explained--the inanimate receptacle and its living essence (bCud)--where does it come from?

It does not arise without cause nor from a discordant cause, because it arises occasionally. And, "it does not arise from Ishvara and so forth because it arises gradually."[1] As it says this {ii.64}, if one asks, from what does it arise? The manifold world of the inanimate receptacle and its living essence arises from karma. {1a}

II. <u>The actual explanation of karma</u>.

There are two topics:

A. The nature of karma.

B. The list of synonyms that appear in the sūtras.

A. <u>The nature of karma</u>.

1. The presentation.

2. The explanation.

1. The presentation.

If one asks: As it says {iv.1}, "The manifold world arises from karma," if one classifies that karma, how many categories will there be?

Karma is twofold, as there are the two types: Intention karma (Sems Pa'i Las; cetanā-karma); and karma-having-intended (Sam Pa'i Las; cetayitvā-karma) which is produced by that intention.

If one asks: What are the natures of these? Intention is karma of the mind (Yid Kyi Las; manas-karma), because it is karma that is concomitant with mental consciousness.[2]

The karma-having-intended, which is produced by that intention, has two types: karma of body and karma of speech.

Furthermore, each of these is twofold, having both revealing karma (rNam Par Rig Byed; vijñapti) and non-revealing karma (rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa; avijñapti). {1b-d}

2. The explanation.

There are three topics:

a. The nature of karma.

b. The differences in the general qualities of the three

types of karma.

c. The divisions of non-revealing karma.

a. The nature of karma.

There are two topics:

(1) Revealing karma.

(2) Non-revealing karma. [p.216; 121b2]

(1) Revealing karma.

There are two topics:

(a) Revealing karma of body.

(b) Revealing karma of speech.

(a) Revealing karma of body.

If one asks: As it says {iv.2}, "They are revealing and non-revealing," what is this revealing karma of body?

The Vaibhāṣikas believe that revealing karma of body is a shape of the body when, motivated by intention, it is in a state of action at the time of, [for example,] making prostrations or killing.

To this the Vātsīputrīyās (gNas Ma Bu Pa'i sDe Pa) say: It is the movement of the body to another position without ceasing from one

moment to the next.[3]

To this the Sautrāntikas say: There is the consequence that it is not the movement of the body to another state without ceasing from one moment to the next. For the reason that saṁskṛtas are momentary; because as soon as they are established their dissolution is certain.

If one says: The reason is not established. Because the decay depends on a cause that arises subsequent [to production:][4]

Then there would be the consequence that some entities, because they lack a cause of decay, would in fact not decay; because the decay of the entity would depend on a cause that arises subsequently. Moreover, there is the consequence that the flames which are the cause that makes a clay pot red by cooking it, would also become the destroyer of the clay pot. Because by the [same flame] which, destroying the red makes it non-existent, [the pot] is made still more red.[5]

To this system of the Vaibhāṣikas the Sautrāntikas say: A long shape of body is the subject. [If shape were a separate substance] there is the consequence that it would be an object grasped by two different faculties; because it would be known [as a particular shape] based on the eye [seeing the shape,] and also known based on the body [touching the shape.] There is also the consequence that [shape] is not substantially existent because if it were, then a collection of subtle atoms would need to have [shape,] however

it does not.[6] {2-3c}

(b) Revealing karma of speech.

Revealing karma of speech is the sound of the voice. [p.217; 112a3]

If one asks, why is it called revealing? Because it enables others to understand one's own motivation, it is called revealing. {3d}

(2) Non-revealing karma.

There are three topics:

(a) Proof from scripture.

(b) The distinctions of the elements which act as cause.

(c) The distinctions of qualities.

(a) Proof from scripture.

If one asks: As it says {iv.2}, "non-revealing", what is the proof that non-revealing form exists?

There is proof of it: As it says in sūtra,

> All forms are subsumed in three states of form: form that is visible and obstructive; invisible but obstructive form; and invisible and non-obstructive form.[7]

Of those three types that are mentioned, invisible non-obstructive form is

none other than non-revealing form.

And from sūtra:

> If one asks, what are the uncontaminated phenomena? The uncontaminated phenomena are those forms that arise in the past, present and future, up to consciousnesses [in the past, present and future,] with respect to which attachment or anger do not arise.[8]

If those stainless forms that are mentioned are not [referring] to non-revealing form, then [to speak of a] stainless form would not be proper.[9]

And from sūtra:

> The son or daughter of good family who possesses the seven acts of merit derived from substances or the seven acts of merit not derived from substances, whether they are sitting, or walking, whether sleeping or not sleeping, that merit will always and without interruption increase.[10]

Such a teaching, if it did not [refer to] non-revealing form, it would not be suitable.[11] [p.218; 122b4]

And the teaching that: even though one does not commit an action oneself, if one orders others to do it, one completes a karmic path (Las Lam; karma-patha); such a teaching would also not be suitable if it was not [referring to] that [non-revealing form.]

"And so forth" (Sogs; ādi) {iv.4b} [refers to] the teaching that even while one is in meditative equipoise on the Path of Seeing one possesses [all] of the limbs of the Eightfold Noble Path. If there were no [non-revealing form] it would be unsuitable [that one in meditative equipoise possessed] right speech and right action.[12]

And there is the teaching that even when the mind of a bhikṣu is distracted by something else he still possesses his vow. And this also, if there were no non-revealing form, would not be suitable.

And there is the teaching that such a vow is like a water-diverting dam. If there were no [non-revealing form,] that [teaching] would also be unsuitable.[13]

And there is the teaching that there is form within the āyatana of phenomena, and that also would not be suitable if there were no non-revealing form.

Then if one asks: What are the seven acts of merit derived from substances (rDzas Las Byung Ba'i bSod Nams Bya Ba'i dNgos Po; aupadhika puṇya-kriyā-vastu) and the seven acts of merit not derived from substances?[14]

The first consists of [offering:] a home for the saṅgha; a prayer hall; [within this,] seats or cushions; offering regular food [to the saṅgha]; [sustenance to] occasional [guests or travellers]; to the sick and medical practitioners; [food to the saṅgha inside the monastery] when the conditions are foul from wind and rain. These are called the seven acts of merit derived from substances.[15]

The second is when joy and faith arises when: one hears or sees that [the Tathāgata or a śrāvaka] is dwelling [in one's area]; is preparing to come;

has entered the path; has gone [to a nearby place]; in order to see, one goes and looks; listens to the Dharma; grasps the basis of the trainings [which is to take refuge.] These are called the seven acts of merit that do not depend on substances.

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu] says[16]: These [citations] are not suitable as proofs that non-revealing form exists, because:

The idea intended in the teaching of invisible and non-obstructive form is that, by the power of meditative stabilization there arises the appearance of forms [as the objects of meditation.][17]

And the teaching that there is stainless form is only intended to mean that the forms that are caused to appear by the power of uncontaminated meditative stabilization [are themselves uncontaminated.] [p.219; 123a5]

And concerning the increase of the seven merits that arise from substances and the seven merits that do not arise from substances: the idea is that because the intention is directed to a special object, there is a special transformation of the continuum which is the depositing on the mental continuum of subtle propensities (Bag Chags; vāsanā) that will definitely yield fruition in the future.

And concerning [the statement that] actions not done by oneself complete a karmic path: the idea is that when oneself previously orders

another to do something, and the other does the action, one accumulates subtle propensities that will definitely yield fruition and so forth.

As for the form within the āyatana of phenomena: the meaning is that by the power of meditative stabilization [the objects of meditation] are caused to appear as forms.

And concerning the teaching on the Eightfold Noble Path: the idea is that the attainment of the uncontaminated [path] is the reason why one engages in right speech and does not engage in wrong speech in the post-meditation period.

As for the teaching that vows [are maintained] when the mind is distracted by other things: by the intention that accepts the vows through a previous ritual, one is restrained from actions that are to be abandoned; then, when the mind is distracted by other things, the antidote to that--mindfulness--remains abiding close by; so it is based on that [that the vow is maintained.]

And concerning the teaching that a vow is like a water-diverting dam: the idea is merely that by feeling shame, and by remembering the promise that one will not commit non-virtuous sins, one does not engage in degenerate conduct.

So says [Vasubandhu for the Sautrāntikas.] {4a-b}

(b) The distinctions of the elements which act as cause.

As it says {i.11}, "[non-revealing form] which has the great elements[18] as its cause..." If one asks: Does [non-revealing form] arise from elements [that exist] at the same time as itself; or does it arise from the elements that are not of the same time?

The first instant of non-revealing form that is included in the Desire Realm, arises from elements that are simultaneous with itself. After that first instant it arises from elements of the past. [p.220; 123b5]

Then if one asks: Does it arise from elements of the same level or from elements of a different level?

For revealing and non-revealing contaminated karma of body and speech, they arise from elements of their own level but they do not arise from elements of other levels acting as cause. Because they are separated by [not having] attachment to different levels.[19]

As for uncontaminated non-revealing form: It arises from the elements of the body (rTen; āśraya) which generates it. Because it is complex matter ('Byung Gyur; bautika) it must depend on elements; because it is uncontaminated it is not restricted in realm, so you can't say for sure that it arises from the elements of any particular level; and it can not arise elements which are uncontaminated. {4c-5c}

(c) The distinctions of quality.

If one asks: Is non-revealing form appropriated [by consciousness] (Zin Pa; upātta) or not appropriated?[20] From among the three originations,[21] which is it?

That [non-revealing form] is the subject. It is not appropriated, because it is non-obstructive.

It is a naturally flowing result (rGyu mThun Las Byung Ba; naiṣyandika) because, except for the first moment of an Āryan, it arises from homogenous cause (sKal mNyam Gyi Rgyu; sabhāga-hetu). It is not arisen from fruition (rNam sMin Las sKyes Ba; vipāka-ja), because it is definitely either virtuous or non-virtuous. It is not arisen from development (rGyas Byung; aupacayika), because it is not a physical [thing] that exists as an aggregation of [atoms].

It is indicative of a sentient being (Sems Can Du sTon Pa; sattvākhya), because it is included within a mental continuum.

If one asks: Then for the elements that are the cause of the non-revealing form, which are they, appropriated or non-appropriated etc.?

In the case of the causal elements of a non-revealing form of the Desire Realm, it arises from elements that are naturally flowing results and are appropriated [by consciousness.]

Moreover, in terms of the vow of seven abandonments in the Desire Realm,[22] for non-revealing form that arises from meditative stabilization, the

causal elements are non-appropriated, arisen from development, and [all seven abandonments] arise from the group of four elements acting as a collective cause which is not different [for each of the abandonments.][23] {5d-6} [p.221; 124a6]

b. The differences in the general qualities of the three types of karma.

There are two topics:

(1) The actual explanation.

(2) Incidental points.

(1) The actual explanation.

Then if one asks: What are these three types of karma, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral?

The non-revealing form is not neutral, because it is definitely either virtuous or non-virtuous.

The others, revealing and intentional karma can be any of the three, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral. Revealing karma is all three by way of motivation. Intentional karma is all three by way of concomitants.

Then if one asks: Where do these [virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral karmas] occur?

Non-virtue occurs in the Desire Realm, but not in the higher realms, because above that they do not have the three roots of non-virtue[24] and there is no shamelessness or immodesty.[25]

Non-revealing form is also in the Form Realm, because there is the pure vow of the concentration. The term "also" ('Ang; api) {iv.7c} indicates that it also exists in the Desire Realm.[26]

Revealing karma exists from the first concentration on down where there is analysis (sPyod Pa; vicāra), but it does not exist above there; because there is no investigation and analysis which motivate revealing karma.[27]

In the Desire Realm there is also no obscuring [neutral] revealing karma. The reason is that an obscuring [neutral] of the Desire Realm would be an object to be abandoned on the Path of Seeing, and they could not give rise to a revealing karma.[28] {7-8a}

(2) Incidental points.

There are three topics:

(a) The divisions of virtue etc.

(b) Explaining the origins.

(c) The distinctions of qualities.

(a) <u>The divisions of virtue etc</u>.

If one asks: Is virtue etc. posited only on the basis of what gives rise to it (Kun sLong; samutthāna)?

No. There are four [factors,] absolute virtue and so forth. If one asks what are they?[29]

Liberation is the subject. It is the ultimate virtue (Don Dam Pa; paramārthatas), because it is supreme happiness free of all suffering without exception. [p.222; 124b6] Like, for example, an individual who is by nature free of illness.

The three roots of virtue[30] and shame and embarrassment are the subject. They are virtue by their very nature (Ngo Bo Nyid; svabhāvatas); because they are virtuous by themselves, without depending on anything else [such as being concomitant or what gives rise to them.] Like, for example, salutary medicine.

The minds and mental factors that are concomitant with these [roots of virtue, shame and embarrassment] are the subject. They are virtue by being concomitant (mTsungs Par lDan Pa; saṁprayogatas); because they are posited as virtuous by being concomitant with virtue. Like a drink with which the salutary medicine has been mixed.

The actions of body and speech and so forth which are given rise to by these [roots of virtue etc., and their concomitants] are the subject. They

are virtue by way of their origin (Kun Nas sLong Ba; samutthānatas); because they are posited as virtuous by way of virtue giving rise to them. Like, for example, milk made from a drink mixed with salutary medicine.

The opposite of these is non-virtue. How is that?

Cyclic existence is the subject. It is the ultimate non-virtue; because it is the supreme unhappiness, bound up with suffering. Like disease.

The three roots of non-virtue and shamelessness and immodesty are the subject. They are non-virtue by their very nature; because they are non-virtuous by themselves, without depending on other factors. Like unsalutary medicine.

The mind and mental factors which are concomitant with these are the subject. They are non-virtues by being concomitant; because they are posited as non-virtues by being concomitant with non-virtue. Like a drink that is mixed with unsalutary medicine.

The karmas of body and speech which are given rise to by these is the subject. They are non-virtue by way of their origin; because they are posited as non-virtues by means of non-virtuous origins. Like milk made from a drink mixed with unsalutary medicine. [p.223; 125a6]

As for an ultimate neutral, it is the [two asaṁskṛtas,] non-analytical cessation that was presented earlier and asaṁskṛta space. {8b-9}

(b) Explaining the origins.

If one says: If [a mind which is] an object to be abandoned by Seeing does not have the power to give rise to revealing karma, it contradicts the statement in sūtra: "From wrong view come wrong thoughts, wrong speech and wrong livelihood."

There is no contradiction. In general there are two types of origin: causal origin (rGyu'i Kun Nas sLong Ba; hetu-samutthāna) and timely origin (Dus Kyi Kun Nas sLong Ba; tatkṣaṇa-samutthāna).

From these, the first is: Before engaging in an action, [one thinks,] "I will do this, or that," so it is the initiating force (Rab Tu 'Jug Par Byed Pa; pravartaka).

The second is: After that, [one thinks] "I will do this," so it is the proceeding force (rJes Su 'Jug Byed; anuvartaka).[31]

From these two, the consciousness which is to be abandoned by Seeing is [the first,] the initiating force; and this is the meaning of the sūtra passage; but this is not meant to apply to timely origin.[32]

The mind (Yid; manas) that is to be abandoned by Meditation can be both [the initiating force and the proceeding force.] Because it has investigation and is directed outward.

The five faculty consciousnesses are exclusively the proceeding force, because they are without investigation and they are directed outward.[33]

{10-11}

(c) The distinctions of qualities.

If one asks: Following an initiating force that is virtuous etc., is it definite that the proceeding force will also be virtuous etc.?

Following an initiating force that is virtuous etc. the proceeding force can be any of the three, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral.

For the Sage they are the same: from a virtuous initiating force follows a virtuous proceeding force; and from a neutral initiating force follows a neutral proceeding force. Or, from a neutral initiating force a virtuous proceeding force can follow; but from a virtuous initiating force a neutral proceeding force can not follow, because [what is shown by (sTon Pa; deśana)] the Sage never becomes lower. [p.224; 126a1]

Some schools say[34]: Since the Sage never has a mind that is not in meditative equipoise, he never has a neutral mind, [it is always virtuous.] And, they say, it also says this in sūtra: "When the Elephant (Glang Chen; nāga) [i.e. the Buddha] walks he is in meditative equipoise. When the Elephant rises he is in meditative equipoise. When the Elephant reclines he is in meditative equipoise. When he sits he is in meditative equipoise."[35]

To this the Vaibhāṣikas say: That is not a proof that He is always without any state that is not meditative equipoise. What that says is that

when the Tathāgata moves in terms of the four minds of behavior (sPyod Lam; airyapathika),[36] he is aware of the discrimination of walking and so forth.[37]

The [mind] that is arisen from fruition is neither initiating force nor proceeding force. Because it does not depend on [an intentional] formative action (mNgon Par 'Du Byed Pa; abhisaṁskāra) but arises automatically (Rang Gi Ngang Gis).[38] {12}

c. The divisions of non-revealing karma.

There are two topics:

(1) The presentation.

(2) The explanation.

(1) The presentation.

Non-revealing karma should be understood to be of three types. It should be understood as restraint (sDom Pa; saṁvara), unrestraint (sDom Pa Ma Yin Pa; asaṁvara), and other than these. {13a-b}

(2) The explanation.

There are four topics:

(a) Restraint.

(b) The manner of possessing.

(c) Obtainment and giving up.

(d) Explanation of the individual who possesses.

(a) Restraint.

There are two topics:

1) The presentation.

2) The explanation.

1) The presentation.

Similarly, restraint should be understood as three-fold: the restraint that is called prātimokṣa; uncontaminated restraint; and restraint that arises from concentration.

And the definition of prātimokṣa restraint is: That morality of renunciation[39] which is included in the Desire Realm.

The definition of the restraint of concentration is: The morality that is included in the Form Realm.

The definition of uncontaminated restraint is: Uncontaminated morality. [p.225; 126b1]

Then if one asks: Is the morality that arises from a properly taken

[vow] of an Outsider prātimokṣa restraint or not?

It is not. Because it does not invariably free one from sin. {13c-d}

2) The explanation.

There are three topics:

a) Prātimokṣa restraint.

b) Concentration and uncontaminated restraints.

c) Incidental points.

a) Prātimokṣa restraint.

There are four topics:

i) Divisions.

ii) Nature.

iii) Meaning of the terms.

iv) The individual who possesses them.

i) Divisions.

If one asks: As it says {iv.13}, "The restraint that is called prātimokṣa..." If one asks: If one distinguishes that, how many divisions are

there?

In the restraint that is known as prātimokṣa there are eight types: bhikṣu and bhikṣunī (dGe sLong); śikṣamāṇā (dGe sLob Ma); śrāmaṇera and śrāmaṇerikā (dGe Tsul); upāsaka and upāsikā (dGe bsNyen); and upavāsa (bsNyen gNas).

If one asks: What is the reason that they do not distinguish a male and a female upavāsa?

There is a reason. The thought is that since it is a restraint for [only] one full day, it is too short a time [to bother with separate names.]

If grouped as substances there are four types: the restraints of the bhikṣu and bhikṣunī are one substance; the restraints of the śikṣamāṇā, the śrāmaṇera and the śrāmaṇerikā are one substance; the upāsaka and upāsikā are one substance; the upavāsastha restraint is one substance. A restraint is not given up because the sex (mTsan; vyañjana) changes; it is merely that the name changes.[40]

Then if one asks: In a case where one takes the three restraints, [upāsaka, śrāmaṇera and bhikṣu,] successively, does the precept (sPong Ba; virati) of not killing, for example, remain, and the other [new] restraints are added [on top of it like the stacking up of coins;] or does the precept of not killing, for example [for each set of] restraints arise as a separate substance?[41]

It is the latter. Having cast off the restraint of a bhikṣu, one can still remain in the restraint of a śrāmanera.

If one asks: Don't the three precepts of not killing which are separate substances but exist in the continuum of a single individual contradict each other?

There is no contradiction. Because the taking of the later restraint does not cause the giving up of the previous restraints. {14} [p.226; 127a1]

ii) Nature.

If one asks, what is the nature of these?

Accepting the precepts of abandoning the five things to be eschewed--the four roots and alcohol--for as long as one lives, that is the [restraint of] upāsaka.

If one asks, why is it called upāsaka? Because they are suitable to befriend bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs as attendants they are called upāsaka (servant; dGe bsNyen).

Accepting as precepts for one full day eight things to be eschewed is [the restraint of] upavāsa (bsNyen gNas); the eight precepts are, on top of the above five, eschewing: dance and so forth--[song and music], and flower garlands and so forth--[perfume, and ointments], is one; a large or high bed is one; and eating in the afternoon.

If one asks, why is it called that? By being in a state that approaches (bsNyen; upa) or abides close to (Nye Bar gNas Pa; vāsa) accepting the restraints for their entire lives, they are called upavāsa.

Accepting as precepts for as long as one lives ten things to be eschewed is [the restraint of] śrāmaṇera: by counting dance and so forth separately from garlands and so forth, and adding the taking of gold and silver.

If one asks why is it called that? Because they perform work for their guru to the point of exhaustion (Ngal Ba; śrama), they are called śrāmaṇera (dGe Tsul).[42]

If one asks: What is the reason that in the case of the upavāsa the two--dance and so forth, and garlands and so forth--are taken as one; whereas in the case of śrāmaṇera, these two are taken separately?

The restraint of upavāsa is primarily for laypeople. Because their faculties are dull, the two are combined into one in accordance with the ability of their minds to learn the many things there are to learn.

Accepting the precepts of abandoning all things to be eschewed of body and speech for as long as one lives is [the restraint of] bhikṣu. That is also called the one who approaches completion (bsNyen Par rDzogs Pa; upasaṁpad). If one asks, why is it also called the one who approaches completion?

The completion (rDzogs Pa) is Nirvāṇa which is free of all the harms of cyclic existence; and because they are approaching that they are called the ones who approach that completion. {15}

iii) Meaning of the terms.

If one asks, why are they called morality (Tsul Khrims; śīla) and so forth?

Because it cools (śītalatvāt) the scorching pain of degenerate conduct,it is called morality (śīla).[43] [p.227; 127b2] Because the wise praise it, it is called good conduct (Legs sPyad; sucarita).[44] Because it's nature is action (kriyā) it is called karma. Because it restrains (saṁvaraṇāt) what is not to be performed by body and speech, it is called restraint (saṁvara).

Among these, the initial revealing karma and non-revealing karma initially free one from sin so they are called prātimokṣa. Because they are the basis of engaging in intentional karma, they are actions. Because they are the path of those actions, they are called paths.

Therefore, if it is prātimokṣa restraint it does not pervade that it is prātimokṣa.[45] {16}

iv) The individual who

possesses them.

There are eight types of individuals who possess the prātimokṣa restraint: the two, bhikṣu and bhikṣuṇī; the śikṣamānā; the two, śrāmaṇera and śrāmaṇerikā; the two, upāsaka and upāsikā; and the upavāsastha.

Then if one asks: Isn't that a repetition from where it says {iv.14}, "The prātimokṣa is of eight types."

It is not. There the divisions of the prātimokṣa restraint are explained, whereas here the classes of individuals who abide in that state are explained. {17a}

b) Concentration and uncontaminated restraints.

One who possesses the meditative stabilization that arises from a concentration is the one who possesses that restraint [arisen from] concentration (bSam gTan Gyi sDom Pa; dhyāna-saṁvara). The uncontaminated restraint (Zag Pa Med Pa'i sDom Pa; anāsrava-saṁvara) is possessed by Āryan sentient beings. {17b-c}

c) Incidental points.

If one asks: Then which are the two restraints that are explained as attendants of mind (Sems Kyi rJes 'Brang; citta-anuvartin)?[46]

These latter two restraints, [concentration and uncontaminated] are attendants of mind. Because they come and go in accordance with the arisal or not of a mind. The prātimokṣa restraint is not an attendant of mind, because it exists even when the mind is directed elsewhere (gYengs Pa) and in non-mental states.

The latter two restraints have also gotten the name abandoning restraints (sPong Ba'i sDom Pa; prahāṇa-samvara). If one asks: Based on what occasions do they get this [name?]

When they arise on the last uninterrupted paths based on the anāgamya (Mi lCogs Med) preparatory level of the first concentration they get [that name.][47] [p.228; 128a2] Because they abandon degenerate conduct and the afflictions that are its source.

Then, as it says in sūtra: "Restraint of the body is good; restraint of the speech is good; restraint of the mind is good; in all things restraint is good."[48] And also: "He abides with his eye faculty controlled by restraint."[49] If one asks: What are the restraints of mind (Yid; manas) and of faculty?

Both introspective alertness (Shes bZhin; saṁprajāna) and mindfulness (Dran Pa; smṛti) are the restraints of mind which arise in the retinue of mental consciousness, and the restraints of faculty which arise in the retinue of faculty consciousnesses. If one says: Then it is sufficient to say

{18c}, "The two, introspective alertness and mindfulness..." [without the pluralizer "Dag".]

It is stated that way because it might be understood that introspective alertness is [the restraint of] mind, and mindfulness is [the restraint of] faculty; but this is clarified by using the pluralizer which indicates "both" [are involved in both restraints.] {17d-18}

(b) The manner of possessing.

There are three topics:

1) The manner of possessing non-revealing karma.

2) The manner of possessing revealing karma.

3) Explaining the four possibilities of possessing.

1) The manner of possessing non-revealing karma.

From the first moment of abiding in the restraint of prātimokṣa for as long as one does not give it up, one possesses non-revealing karma of the present. After the first moment one possesses non-revealing karma of the

past.

Similarly, one who abides in unrestraint[50] also possesses non-revealing karma of the present from the first moment for as long as it is not given up; and possesses non-revealing karma of the past after the first moment.

One who possesses the restraint of concentration always possesses the [non-revealing karma] of the past and future [as long as it is not given up.][51]

The Āryan, who possesses the uncontaminated restraint, does not possess [the non-revealing karma] of the past at the first moment, because he has not previously generated the uncontaminated path. [p.229; 128b2]

One who abides in a mundane meditative equipoise possesses a restraint of concentration of the present. One who abides on the Āryan path possesses an uncontaminated restraint of the present.

One who abides in the state between restraint and unrestraint (Bar gNas; madhyastha) does not definitely have non-revealing karma. If he has it he possesses non-revealing karma of the present from the first moment until he gives it up. In the period following the first moment he possesses both non-revealing karma of the past and of the present.

If one asks: Can one who abides in unrestraint have a virtuous non-revealing karma; and can one who abides in restraint possess a non-virtuous

one?

They can. When, [for example,] one who abides in unrestraint performs prostrations, he possesses a virtuous non-revealing karma; and when one who abides in restraint does something like taking a life, he possesses a non-virtuous non-revealing karma.

For how long do they possess them? They are possessed for as long as one does not give up the forceful impetus of faith (Rab Tu Dang Ba; prasāda) or afflictions. {19-22}

2) The manner of possessing revealing karma.

There are two topics:

a) The actual topic.

b) Incidental points.

a) The actual topic.

In the case of revealing karma, for all [three,] those who abide in restraint, unrestraint or in-between, those who perform action of body or speech possess [revealing karma] of the present for as long as that first moment [of action] is not finished.[52] After the first moment they possess revealing karma of the past. They do not possess revealing karma of the

future, because it is not an attendant of mind.

One also does not possess the obscuring [neutral] and non-obscuring [neutral] revealing karma of the past; because, by being weak, the past obtainment does not have the force to generate lasting consequences (rJe Su 'Brel Ba; anubandhin). {23-24b}

b) Incidental points.

As it says {iv.22}, "Those who abide in unrestraint [can possess] virtuous [non-revealing karma]..." If one asks, why is it called unrestraint (sDom Pa Ma Yin Pa; asaṁvara)? [p.230; 129a4]

Because bad conduct (Nyes sPyod; duścarita) is absence of restraint it is called unrestraint; because it is scorned by the wise it is called bad conduct; because it is the opposite of morality (Tsul Khrims; śīla) it is called degenerate conduct ('Chal Ba'i Tsul Khrims; dauḥśīlya); because it is in the nature of action it is called karma; and because it is the path of that action it is called [karmic] path.[53] {24c-d}

3) Explaining the four possibilities of possessing.

If one asks: Can one who possesses revealing karma not possess non-revealing karma and so forth?

One who abides in the state in-between [restraint and unrestraint], who is without previous non-revealing karma, if now, by another [weak] mind performs a karma of body or speech, he possesses the revealing karma itself but does not possess the non-revealing karma; because he did not possess any previous non-revealing karma, and the current [action] is not strong enough to produce a non-revealing karma.

In the case of an Āryan individual who has given up the revealing karma of a previous life and has not generated revealing karma in the subsequent life;[54] he possesses non-revealing karma but does not possess revealing karma. Because he has given up the revealing karma of previous lives and has not generated revealing karma in the subsequent life.

Those who possess both are ourselves and so forth. Those who possess neither are those who are other than these cases.[55] {25}

(c) Obtainment and giving up.

There are two topics:

1) The manner of obtaining.

2) The manner of giving up.

1) The manner of obtaining.

There are three topics:

a) The manner of obtaining restraint.

b) The manner of obtaining unrestraint.

c) The manner of obtaining the in-between state.

a) The manner of obtaining restraint.

There are two topics:

i) How they are obtained.

ii) Relative to what are they obtained.

i) How they are obtained.

There are two topics:

(A) The manner of obtaining the uncontaminated restraint and restraint of concentration.

(B) The manner of obtaining the prātimokṣa restraint.

(A) The manner of obtaining the uncontaminated restraint and restraint of concentration.

If one asks: How is the uncontaminated restraint and the restraint of concentration obtained?

The restraint that arises from a concentration is obtained with the [attainment of the] levels themselves--the preparatory levels and actual absorptions of the concentrations.

The uncontaminated restraint is obtained with the uncontaminated path of the Āryan. {26a-c}

(B) The manner of obtaining the pratimokṣa restraint.

There are two topics:

(i) The actual topic.

(ii) Incidental points. [p.231; 129b3]

(i) The actual topic.

Then if one asks: How is the pratimokṣa restraint obtained?

The seven types of prātimokṣa restraints are obtained from the revealing karma of another (gZhan Gyi rNam Par Rig Byed; para-vijñapana), a preceptor and so forth.[56]]

The term "and so forth" (Sogs; ādi) {iv.26d} means, according to the Masters of the Vinaya of the Vaibhāṣkas, it includes what they say are ten types of ordination (bsNyen Par rDzogs Pa; upasaṁpad). If one asks, what are the ten?

Ordination by oneself, in the case of a Buddha and Pratyekabuddha, because by merely attaining wisdom by themselves they generate the restraint of a bhikṣu.

Ordination by entering the path (Nges Pa La 'Jug Pa; niyāmā-vakrānti)[57] in the case of the Five [first disciples.] Because they attained ordination by merely generating the Path of Seeing.

Ordination by [the summons,] "Come forth [Oh Bhikṣu!]," in the case of Ājñata (Grags Pa) and so forth. Because it says [in sūtra:]

> When the Tathāgata commanded, "Come here!", instantaneously [Ajñata's] head was shaved and his body was clothed in a yellow monk's mantle, his faculties became peaceful; the form of his body was overspread by the thought of the Buddha.[58]

Ordination by accepting the Buddha as master, in the case of Mahākāśyapa ('Od Srung Chen Po). As it says [in sūtra:]

> By his extraordinary power, when he made obeisance to any image of a deity the result was that its head burst into pieces. Then he saw the Tathāgata sitting among Bu Mangs[59] stupas and faith arose

in him. However, believing that if he prostrated he would harm Him, he did not prostrate.

The Tathāgata, knowing this thought, said, "Kāśyapa, prostrate to the Tathāgata!"

He prostrated, and seeing that no harm at all was done, devotion arose in him and he said, "The Tathāgata is my master. I am the Tathāgata's disciple (Nyan Thos; śrāvaka)." And by the Master merely accepting this, saying, "Kāśyapa, thus you are my disciple. I am your master," he received ordination. p.232; 130a4]

Ordination by [the Buddha] being pleased with [answers to] his questions, as in the case of Sodāyin (Legs Byin). The Tathāgata asked, "Sodāyin, what is the dharma which alone is necessary?"

"Liberation," he answered.

"What is necessary for that?"

"Faith," he answered.

Receiving such answers to his questions the Tathāgata was pleased, and by that [Sodāyin] was ordained.

Ordination by showing the special obligations (lCi Ba'i Chos; gurudharma) [of monks and nuns,] as in the case of Mahāprajāpati and so forth.[60]

Ordination by messenger ('Phrin Chog; dūta), as in the case of the Bikṣuṇī Dharmadinnā, who took ordination by means of a messenger and became a bhikkuṇī.[61]

Ordination by a group of five holders of the vināya [i.e. bhikṣus,] as in

the case of a frontier region.

Ordination by a group of ten, as in the case of a central land.

Ordination by simply repeating refuge three times, as in the case of the group of sixty Bhadravargas and so forth.[62]

However, among these, ordination by oneself and ordination by entering the path do not depend on revealing karma; but because they are included [in the list,] the term "and so forth" is used. {26c-d}

(ii) Incidental points.

There are three topics:

(I) The certainty of the length of time of restraint and unrestraint.

(II) The distinctions of the restraint of upavāsa.

III) The distinctions of the restraint of upāsaka.

(I) The certainty of the length of time of restraint and unrestraint.

Seven types of prātimokṣa restraints are to be accepted for as long as

one lives. The upavāsa restraint is to be accepted for one full day.

Then if one asks: Is the length of time of unrestraint definite? There is no unrestraint for one day, because, it is believed (Grags; kila), unrestraint is not taken up in the manner of the restraint of upavāsa.[63] {27} [p.233; 130b4]

(II) The distinctions of the restraint of upavāsa.

There are three topics:

A) The method of taking it.

B) The certainty of the branches.

C) The certainty of the basis.

A) The method of taking it.

The "taking of the [vow"] {iv.28} is the basis of the [following] explanation.

What is the method?

Sitting in a posture of [the mind of] behavior (sPyod Lam; airyapathika)

on a seat that is lower than the person giving the vows ('Bog Pa Po; dātṛ), with the palms together in devotion (Thal Mo sByar; añjali), following [the preceptor] one repeats what he says three times.

If one asks: What kind of clothing (Cha Lugs) should be worn? One should not be adorned with new ornaments.

For how long is it taken? "Until the next day," {iv.28} means until the sun rises the following day.

What [is to be taken?] The upavāsa is to be taken with its eight limbs in their entirety.

From whom? It is to be taken from another, a bhikṣu and so forth.

For what period of time? Until the following morning before one has eaten the morning meal.[64] {28}

B) <u>The certainty of the branches</u>.

As it says {iv.28}, "The upavāsa [should be taken] with its branches in their entirety." If one asks, what is the reason that the number of branches is definitely eight?

The four root precepts are the limb of morality, because by means of them attentiveness to improper conduct (Tsul Min) is abandoned.[65]

One, abandoning intoxicants, is the limb of conscientiousness (Bag

Yod Pa; apramāda), because by intoxicants one becomes heedless.

In the same way, the last three precepts are the limb of asceticism (brTul Zhugs; vrata), because they are conducive to a state of disgust (sKyo Ba; saṁvega) [towards the pleasures of cyclic existence.][66]

If intoxicants are not abandoned one becomes heedless, because by those intoxicants one's mindfulness of what should be done and what should not be done deteriorates.

If the last three [precepts] are not abandoned, one becomes arrogant: By abandoning food after noon one conceives of oneself as abiding in upavāsa, and it is conducive to a state of aversion towards [the ways of] other lay-people.

If the other two [limbs of conscientiousness and asceticism] are not abandoned one becomes arrogant, and then degenerate conduct is not far away. {29} [p.234; 131a4]

C) The certainty of the basis.

If one asks: Is the upavāsa restraint only for upāsakas? Others, besides upāsakas, can also take the restraint of upavāsa; however, not those who have not taken refuge. {30a-b}

(III) <u>The distinctions of the restraint of upāsaka</u>.[67]

There are three topics:

A) The actual topic.

B) Explaining in detail the object of refuge.

C) The certainty of the branches.

A) <u>The actual topic</u>.

As it says in sūtra:

A lay-person who wears white clothing; a man who possesses the male faculty, who, having gone for refuge to the Buddha, dharma and sañgha states that, "I request to take the upāsaka restraint," by that statement he becomes an upāsaka."[68]

If one asks: By merely [taking refuge] does the upāsaka restraint arise or not arise?

The Sautrāntikas say, "It does not arise."

The Kāśmīrans say that the restraint arises by specifically accepting upāsaka, having previously taken refuge.

If one says: Then there would be no purpose in the presentation of the

rules to be followed (bsLab Bya).

There is no fault. The [presentation] of the rules to be followed is in order to inform those who do not know. The purpose is the same, for example, as presenting the rules to be followed to a new bhikku.

If one asks: If all upāsakas remain bound by the restraint as all five [precepts together[69],] how can there be the ekadeśakārin (sNa gCig sPyod Pa) and the other [three] upāsakas?[70]

It is maintained (Grag; kila) that the ekadeśakārin and the others are taught according to whether they observe (Srung; pāla) one or more [precepts;] having agreed to observe all the rules (bSlab Pa; śikkāpada) at first, they degenerate.

If one asks: How can the restraints be weak etc., [medium and great?]

According to the motivating mind: A restraint is weak and so forth depending on whether the motivation is weak and so forth. {30c-31}

B) Explaining in detail the object of refuge.

As it says {iv.30}, "Those who have not taken refuge can not [take upavāsa."] If one asks, in what does one take refuge?

One who takes refuge in the three jewels takes refuge in the dharmas

of No More Learning which produce the Buddha;[71] but does not go for refuge to the form body, because that is not any different from the time when he was an ordinary individual. [p.235; 131b5]

If one says: In that case there is the consequence that there could not be the karma of automatic transgression for drawing the blood of the body of a Tathāgata with malicious intent; because the form body is not the Buddha.

There is no fault. Because if one does harm to the Buddha's body (rTen; āśraya), the body will harm the Buddha.

Then if one asks: Does one take refuge in only one Buddha, or does one take refuge in all the Buddhas?

One takes refuge in all the Buddhas, because their paths are the same by definition.

By that [explanation, refuge in] the sañgha is also shown. In the case of the sañgha, the qualities of both learning and of No More Learning which produce the sañgha [are the refuge.]

As for refuge in the dharma: One takes refuge only in the dharma of Nirvāṇa, the Truth of Cessation. {32}

C) The certainty of the branches.

If one asks: What is the reason that in the other [restraints] the limb is

established as abandoning all sexual activity (Mi Tsangs Par sPyod Pa; abrahmacarya), but in the upāsaka [precepts] the limb is not established as abandoning all sexual activity but rather the limb is posited as abandoning sexual misconduct (Log gYems; kāma-mithyācāra)?

There is a reason for this. Sexual misconduct is much condemned, as it is the violation (Sun 'Byin Pa; upaghāta) of another's spouse, and because it is the cause of rebirths in bad migrations; but that is not the case for sexual activity. Also, the Āryans obtain the [restraint] of not performing sexual misconduct in future lives, but that does not apply to sexual activity. Also, for those with a householder's body (rTen; āśraya), abandoning sexual misconduct is simple, but that is not the case for sexual activity.

If one asks: Then, if one takes a wife after he becomes an upāsaka, would that be sexual misconduct?

It would not be. Because the way that the restraint is obtained is by accepting it with the statement, "I will not commit sexual misconduct." It is not with the statement, "I will not have sexual activity with certain other individuals (rGyud; santāna)," so one does not agree to abandon all sexual activity. [p.236; 132a6]

If one asks: What is the reason that among the four [transgressions] of speech, for the upāsaka the limb is stated as abandoning lying?

There is a reason for that. If one had transgressed all the rules, when

asked by another, "Have you done that?", you would lie and say, "I have not done that." So it was in order to prevent this consequence [that the rule was stated this way.]

If one asks: What is the reason that, for the upāsaka, among the misdeeds of disobedience (bCas Pa'i Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya),[72] only abandoning intoxicants is given as the limb?

There is a reason for that. By abandoning the misdeed of disobedience of drinking intoxicants the others are also safeguarded, so that is the purpose.

Here some Vaibhāṣika Masters of the Vināya say: Drinking intoxicants is a misdeed by nature (Rang bZhin Gyi Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; prakṛti-sāvadya), because it says, [when Upāli asked him,] "Reverend Sir. How does one nurse illness?" He answered, "[With anything] except what is a misdeed by nature." [But on the other hand in cases of illness] he permitted other things [which were misdeeds of disobedience.][73]

And after that, he forbad intoxicants to the sick Śākyas, saying, "Those who profess me as their teacher should not drink even the amount of liquor on the tip of a blade of grass." And He said, "Having regarded me as your teacher, do not drink or pour liquor. For those who drink liquor, I am not their teacher, and they are not my disciples." Thus He made a firm proclamation.

And the Āryans obtain [the restraint of] not drinking in future lives. And the four negative actions of body are: killing, taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and drinking liquor--so He taught drinking liquor as one of the four negative actions of body.

And He taught that by completely indulging (Kun Tu bsTen) in or habitually [drinking such drinks as] surā ('Bru'i Chang), maireya (sByar Ba'i Chang), and bCos Pa'i Chang, [one falls into] a state of intoxication (Myos Par 'Gyur Ba) characterized by heedlessness (Bag Med Pa; pramāda). If one does it frequently, after one dies, the body having been destroyed, one is born in hell.

If one says these things [are taught by the Buddha and therefore drinking intoxicants is a misdeed by nature:][74] [p.237; 132b6]

There is no fault: Having permitted for sick people [misdeeds of disobedience--those prohibited things] other than the misdeeds by nature; after that he made a general and special prohibition against drinking. And it was because liquor is as uncertain [in its potency] as poison that he made it certain that one should not drink even the amount on the tip of a blade of grass.

And the thought was that Āryans do not perform actions that are reviled in the world, and drinking liquor is an action reviled in the world.

And it was because liquor is the cause of a state of intoxication and

the loss of mindfulness that he taught it as a negative action of body.

And it was because due to liquor one commits new non-virtuous karma, and because the retribution of that karma is definite, that he taught that after death one will be reborn in hell.

Moreover, drinking liquor is not a misdeed by nature because it does not fulfill the definition of a misdeed by nature; because a misdeed by nature is done under the power of affliction, but there can also be liquor that does not intoxicate, and there is also drinking with the thought that it is a remedy. {33-34}

ii) Relative to what are they obtained.

If one asks: What are [the objects] through which one acquires the restraints?

The prātimokṣa restraint which is included in the Desire Realm is acquired through all three [stages of an action,] the preparation (sByor; maula), the actual action (dNgos; prayoga) and the subsequent stage (rJes; pṛṣṭha); or the abandonment of the preparation, actual action and subsequent stage of a non-virtuous action.

It is acquired relative to abandonment of both misdeeds by nature and those of disobedience. It is acquired relative to both types of basis, sentient

beings and non-sentient things. A misdeed by nature which is based on sentient beings is, for example, killing. A misdeed by nature which is based on non-sentient things is, for example, stealing gold. A misdeed of disobedience based on sentient beings is, for example, [for a bhikṣu] to touch a woman. That based on non-sentient things is, for example, [for a bhikṣu] to cut grass. [p.238; 133b1]

In relation to what kind of sentient beings is it acquired? It is acquired in relation to sentient beings of the present; but it is not acquired in relation to sentient beings of the past or future. Because they are not capable of being the sentient beings who are the basis of [the action of] killing in the present.

As for the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint: They are acquired relative to the abandonment of the actual action of non-virtue, but not acquired relative to the abandonment of the preparation or subsequent stage; because they are not based on the preparation or subsequent stage.

These are also acquired in relation to abandonment of misdeeds by nature, but not in relation to abandonment of misdeeds of disobedience; because one does not promise to abandon these.

As for the times [in relation to which these two are acquired:] They are

acquired in relation to all three times, because they are acquired in relation to sentient beings of the past and future in the same way that they are acquired in relation to sentient beings of the present.

The restraints are acquired in relation to all sentient beings.

There are distinctions as regards the limbs and the causes: The others are acquired with respect to four limbs, while the restraint of bhikṣu is acquired with respect to all seven.[75] If the three root virtues[76] are considered the causes, [the restraints] are acquired through all [three of these] causes; if the [immediate] motivation [for taking the restraint] which is either weak, medium or strong, are considered the causes, [the restraint] is acquired through [one cause]--whichever is appropriate.

If one asks: Then is unrestraint also acquired in relation to all sentient beings?

Unrestraint is acquired in relation to all sentient beings and also all limbs. It is not acquired through all causes, because the three root non-virtues do not arise at one time, and the three types of motivation also do not arise at the same time. The Sautrāntikas say: Unrestraint is not acquired in relation to all sentient beings: because a butcher, for example, does not do harm to his children or mother or father. [p.239; 134a1] It is also not acquired in relation to all the limbs: because there are butchers, for

example, who do not take what is not given, do not commit adultery with women other than their own, who are mute and do not speak [so they can not lie.] {35-36}

b) The manner of obtaining unrestraint.

If one wonders, in relation to what is unrestraint acquired? Taking a butcher for example: one who is born into that class from the beginning, acquires the unrestraint by engaging in those activities. One who is not initially born into such a class can acquire the unrestraint by going before a regional chieftain, for example, and pledging, "I will do this for my livelihood," and having generated a misguided mind he actually undertakes those activities. {37a-b}

c) The manner of obtaining the in-between states.

The in-between non-revealing karma which is other than restraint or unrestraint is acquired through a field, such as the seven merits that arise from substances; and it is acquired through pledging, for example saying, "I will not eat before paying homage to the Buddha." And it is acquired through actions done with sincerity, for example with a fierce motivation. {37c-d}

2) The manner of giving up.

There are three topics:

a) The manner of giving up restraint.

b) The manner of giving up unrestraint.

c) The manner of giving up the in-between state.

a) The manner of giving up restraint.

There are two topics:

i) The manner of giving up the prātimokka restraint.

ii) The manner of giving up the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint.

i) The manner of giving up the prātimokṣa restraint.

When one goes before a person who understands speech, and having made up one's mind, casts off (Phul Ba; nikṣepaṇa) the rules, the prātimokṣa

discipline ('Dul Ba; dama) is given up; because one generates a revealing karma that is contrary to one's solemn vow [to observe] the rules.

Also, at the time of death one gives it up, because the basis of that [restraint] has disappeared.

It is also given up when both sex organs (mTsan; vyañjana) occur at the same time, because the basis is damaged (Nyams Pa; vikopana).

The prātimokṣa discipline is also given up by the cutting of the roots of virtue, because the roots of the restraint are cut. [p.240; 134b1]

On top of these, the upavāsa restraint is given up with the passing of the night, because that fulfills its obligations ('Phen Pa) in accordance with the way it was projected.

Some Bahirdeśakas say: From the occurrence of any one of the four root downfalls (lTung Bar 'Gyur; patanīya)[77] all the restraints [of a bhikṣu or a śrāmaṇera] are given up.

Others, the Tāmraśāṭīyas (Gos dMar Ba'i sDe Pa)--so-called because they write the Tripiṭaka on copper plates--say that when the holy Dharma disappears the prātimokṣa restraint is given up, because at that time there will be no limitations made by the rules and no ritual actions.[78]

The Ācarya [Vasubandhu] says: When the holy Dharma disappears, because there will be no activities of the discipline ('Dul Ba; vinaya), those who did not previously have restraints will not be able to newly acquire

them; but those who have them from previous acquisition will not newly lose them.

The Kāśmīrans believe that one who commits a root downfall has both morality that has degenerated and morality; because, they believe, it is like one person who has both debts and riches. They hold that one who attains Arhatship having confessed a downfall possesses only morality: It is like, for example, if one who has debts pays back the debts, he becomes someone who only has riches.

If one asks: But how can there be someone who has committed a root downfall but possesses morality?

[The Kāśmīrans say:] There can be. As it says [in sūtra,] "If a bhikṣu with degenerate morality teaches Dharma to a bhikṣunī he commits a downfall."[79] And the five types of downfalls are made in terms of those who possess morality, because it is [based on] the rules (bCas Pa) [of ordination.] And it says: "There are four type of bhikṣu and not five. The one who triumphs by the path (Lam Gyis rGyal; mārga-jina); the one who teaches the path (Lam sTon Pa; mārga-daiśika); one who lives by the path (Lam Phyir 'Tso; mārga-jīvin); and the one who defiles the path (Lam Sun 'Byin; mārga-dūṣin)." And by saying that, it teaches that the bhikṣu who defiles the path has both degenerate morality and morality. [p.241; 135a1] And it is taught that, although one [violates the rule of] no sexual activity, if a concealing

mind does not arise for even one moment, having done penance (bsLab Pa Byin; śikṣā-dattaka) by means of atonement (Chad Pa'i Las; daṇḍa-karma), he remains at the level of a bhikṣu.[80] And the one who has committed a root downfall does not [once again] take ordination. Also, by the occurrence of one [downfall] like [transgressing] no sexual activity, all the restraints are not given up; because a revealing karma that is completely contradictory to all of the restraints is not generated on the continuum. If this were not the case, and by one root downfall all of the restraints were given up, then by accepting one restraint all of them would also be accepted. So they say.

To this the Sautrāntikas say: This is not correct. Because there is no proof and there is a refutation:

There is no proof because: The teaching that, "If a bhikṣu with degenerate morality teaches Dharma to a bhikṣuṇī he commits a downfall," merely means that he falls into a bad migration.

The statement that there is a bhikṣu "who defiles the path" merely means one who maintains the outward appearance (Sha Tsugs Tzam; ākṛti-mātra) of a bhikṣu.

And we also do not believe that, even if one has [transgressed the rule of] no sexual activity, if one doesn't harbor the mind of concealment for even one moment, a grave transgression (Phas Pham; pārājika) occurs.[81]

And the teaching that those who have committed root downfalls do

not take ordination, means that because their mental continuums having degenerated due to their great shamelessness and immodesty, by that time they are not in a position (sKal Ba Med Pa; abhavya) to take the restraints.

There is a refutation because it is taught, among other things that, "If a bhikṣu does something like that, as soon as he does it he is no longer suitable to be a bhikṣu."

[The Kāśmīrans reply:] There is no fault. The intention there is [that one is no longer suitable to be an] ultimate bhikṣu (Don Dam Pa'i dGe sLong; paramārtha-bhikṣu).[82] If they say this:

[The Sautrāntikas reply:] That is still incorrect. It says in sūtra:

> There are four types of bhikṣu: nominal bhikṣu (Ming Gi dGe sLong; samjñā-bhikṣu); a purported bhikṣu (Khas 'Che Ba'i dGe sLong; pratijñā-bhikṣu); a bhikṣu by virtue of begging (sLong Bas Na dGe sLong; bhikṣata iti bhikṣu); and a bhikṣu by virtue of Arhatship (dGra bCom Pas Na-- or Nyon Mongs Pa bCom Pas Na dGe sLong; bhinna-kleśatvāt bhikṣu). And the meaning here is that a bhikṣu is one who receives ordination by [the ordinary procedure of] request and the four acts.[83] [p.242; 135b2]

Moreover, it is taught that one who has degenerated morality should be separated from the activities and material possessions of a bhikku. And it is taught that one with degenerated morality should be expelled from the abode [of proper bhikṣus.]

How? "He who is not a bhikṣu but claims to be a bhikṣu, throw out that worthless chaff. Expel that rotten wood. Drive out the one who is without substance."[84] So it is taught [the Sautrāntikas] say. {38-39}

ii) The manner of giving up the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint.

The virtue that is included in the concentrations is given up when one moves to a higher or lower level, or when one deteriorates from an absorption.

It is the same for virtue that is included in the Formless Realm; it is given up by changing levels or deteriorating.[85]

As for the uncontaminated restraint of the Āryans: When a fruit[86] is attained, the restraint that was included on the [preceding path of the] candidate (Zhugs Pa; pratipannaka)[87] is given up. When the faculties are purified (sByangs; uttāpana) {vi.29} the restraint included [on the path of] dull faculties is given up. When one deteriorates from a fruit [the restraint that is] included on the superior [path or fruit] is given up. {40}

b) The manner of giving up unrestraint.

If one asks, what is the manner of giving up unrestraint?

Unrestraint is given up when a restraint is obtained, because at that time a powerful antidote counteracting that [unrestraint] is generated.

It is given up at the time of death, because at that time the basis (rTen; āśraya) [of the unrestraint] is destroyed.

It is also given up by the occurrence of the two sex organs at the same time, because at that time the basis is damaged (Nyams Pa; vikopana). {41a-b}

c) The manner of giving up the in-between state.

As for the [non-revealing karma which is] in-between restraint and unrestraint, it is given up [from six causes:] by the termination of the force of purity or of affliction [that projected the non-revealing karma;[88]] by the termination of the pledge that, "I shall do this for such and such length of time";[89] termination of the activity--not doing what was pledged, although the pledge [itself] is not terminated; termination of the object (Don; artha) [with which one was engaged, where one's actions were] based on [such objects as] a stūpa or a trapper's net (rGya; jāla); the termination of life; and by the cutting of the roots of virtue. [p.243; 136a2]

As for the virtue included in the Desire Realm which is not physical, it is [given up] by the cutting of the roots of virtue and by birth on a higher level.

Afflicted and non-physical [phenomena] of [any of] the three realms is lost (Nyams Pa; vihīyate) by the generation of each one's antidote--the

uninterrupted paths. {41c-42}

(d) Explanation of the individual who possesses.

If one asks: Which individuals possess these unrestraints?

Humans have unrestraint, except for natural-born eunuchs (Za Ma; ṣaṇḍha) who have neither sex organ from birth, those of confused gender (Ma Ning; paṇḍaka) whose [organs] have been damaged by weapons and so forth; the Uttarakurus, and hermaphrodites (mTsan gNyis Pa; ubhaya-vyañjana). Natural-born eunuchs and so forth do not have it because they do not have a disposition of mind that is firm (bSam Pa Mi brTan Pa; sthira-āśaya) in virtue or sin.[90]

Likewise, for restraint: humans have it, other than the natural-born eunuchs, those of confused gender, Kurus and hermaphrodites; but the natural-born eunuchs and so forth do not have it.

In the case of restraint, the Desire Realm gods also have it.

Then if one asks: Which individuals have how many restraints?

Humans have all three restraints.[91]

Gods born in the Desire and Form Realms have the restraint arisen from concentration: The Desire Realm gods are capable of having the restraint of concentration and the gods born in the Form Realm universally

have the restraint of concentration.

In the case of the uncontaminated restraint, except for [beings in] the special first concentration and beings [in states of] non-discrimination, gods of the Form Realm as well as gods of the Formless Realm have it.[92] {43-44}

B. The list of synonyms that appear in the sūtras.[93]

In the list of synonyms that appear in the sūtras there are 15 topics. The first is:

1. The introduction: the divisions by means of definitions.

If one asks, what are virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral karma?

Karma that yields comfort (bDe Ba; kṣema) is virtuous karma. Karma that yields the discomfort (Mi bDe Ba; akṣema) of suffering is non-virtuous karma. The other karma, which creates a neutral feeling, is the other, neutral (Lung Ma bsTan Pa; avyākṛta) karma. [p.244; 136b3]

2. The divisions by way of fruit.

There are two topics:

a. The presentation.

b. The explanation.

a. The presentation.

Within karma there are three [types:] Meritorious karma (bSod Nams; puṇya). Demeritorious (bSod Nams Ma Yin Pa; apuṇya) karma. Immoveable karma (Mi gYo Ba; aniñjya).

And karma is also three-fold because there is: karma that is to be experienced as pleasure (bDe Ba Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; sukha-vedanīya) and so forth: [karma to be experienced as suffering (sDug bsNgal Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; duḥkha-vedanīya), and karma to be experienced as neither pleasure nor suffering (bDe Ba Yang Ma Yin sDug bsNgal Yang Ma Yin Pa Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; aduḥkha-asukha-vedanīya).]

b. The explanation.

There are two topics:

(1) Explaining meritorious karma etc.

(2) Explaining [karma to be experienced as] pleasure etc.

(1) Explaining meritorious karma etc.

If one asks: What is meritorious karma etc.?

Meritorious karma is virtuous karma of the Desire Realm. Immoveable karma is [virtuous] karma that is generated in the upper, Form and Formless

Realms.

If one says: If that karma of the upper levels is immoveable, it is contradictory with the teaching that the third concentration on down are moveable (gYo Ba; injya).[94]

There is no contradiction. The idea of the teaching that it is moveable from the third concentration on down was that, because of flaws in the meditative stabilization it is moveable.[95] The intention here is that the fruition of karma on the higher levels is immoveable. The fruition is immoveable for the reason that on the levels of the Form and Formless Realms, the fruition of karma that is to ripen on those levels will never ripen on another level. Therefore it is fruition that does not move to another [level.]

Karma of the Desire Realm is moveable, because [the karma] to be born as a god, by the force of conditions [can ripen] in another rebirth. For example: A Brahmin is to be born as a god because of giving alms; but seeing a handsome elephant he thinks, "If only I too could become like him." And because of that he is born as [Indra's] elephant Airāvaṇa (Sa Srung Gi Bu). {45-46} [p.245; 137a3]

(2) Explaining [karma to be experienced as] pleasure etc.

There are three topics:

(a) Individual examples of the three ways to be experienced.

(b) The divisions of the ways to be experienced.

(c) Which feelings are the fruit of which karmas.

(a) Individual examples of the three ways to be experienced.

There are two topics:

1) Our own system.

2) Others' systems.

1) Our own [Vaibhakika] system.

As it says {iv.45}, "...the three to be experienced as pleasure and so forth." If one asks, what are these?

Virtuous karma from the Desire Realm up through the third concentration is karma to be experienced as pleasure.[96] Virtuous karma from the third concentration up to the Peak of Existence is karma to be experienced as neutral, being neither suffering nor pleasure. Karma to be experienced as suffering is non-virtue of this Desire Realm. {47}

2) Others' systems.

Some say: There is also karma to be experienced as in-between [or neutral] on the three levels below the fourth concentration.

Why? Because there is karma that comes to fruition in the special [first] concentration;[97] and because one must admit that the three [types of karma] can yield fruit all at the same time.[98] {48}

(b) The divisions of the ways to be experienced.

There are two topics:

1) The five divisions.

2) The detailed explanation of [karma] which is to be experienced as fruition.

1) The five divisions.

There are five ways in which karma is to be experienced: to be experienced in the very nature [of experience] (Ngo Bo Nyid Kyis Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba; svabhāva-vedanīya), such as feeling (Tsor Ba; vedanā); to be experienced as concomitants (mTsungs lDan Gyis; samprayoga), such as contact (Reg Pa; sparśa);[99] to be experienced with respect to a referent object (dMigs Pas; ālambana), such as forms; to be experienced as fruition

(rNam sMin Gyis; vipāka), such as virtuous and non-virtuous karma; to be experienced in its manifest presence (mNgon Sum Du Gyur Ba Las; sammukhī-bhāva), such as feeling. {49}

2) The detailed explanation of [karma] which is to be experienced as fruition.

There are two topics:

a) The general presentation.

b) The specific explanation of karma that is certain to be experienced.

a) The general presentation.

There are two topics:

i) The divisions of karma.

ii) How many projections of karma there are in which realms and rebirths.

i) The divisions of karma.

There are four [types of] karma to be experienced through fruition:

There are the two types, certain (Nges Pa; niyata) and uncertain karma (Ma Nges Pa; anyiyata). [p.246; 137b3]

And from these two, the first, certain karma, has three types: karma to be experienced in the current life [in which the karma was performed] (mThong Chos La Myong 'Gyur Gyi Las; dṛṣṭa-dharma-karma), which will be experienced in this life; karma to be experienced after rebirth (sKyes Nas; upapadya), which will be experienced in the next life; and karma to be experienced in subsequent existences (Lan Grangs gZhan La; aparaparyāya), which will be experienced in the life after next and those following.

Some say that there are five aspects of karma. This is by dividing uncertain karma into karma that is certain in fruition but uncertain in the occasion [of fruition;] and karma that is uncertain in both.

Other Dārṣṭāntika Sautrāntikas say that the possibilities are fourfold: [Karma for which] fruition is certain but the occasion is uncertain. The occasion is certain but fruition is uncertain. Both are certain. Both are uncertain.

Then if one asks: Which karmas project homogeneity (Ris mThun Pa; nikāya-sabhāga)?

Homogeneity is projected by three [types of karma.] But karma to be experienced in the present life does not project homogeneity, because [such karma] ripens in the very continuum of aggregates that committed the action.[100] {50-51b}

ii) How many projections of karma there are in which realms and rebirths.

If one asks: How many projections[101] of karma are there in which realms and rebirths?

For all five of the rebirths there are [all] four projections of karma.

However, in the hells there are [only] three [types of] projections of virtuous karma, but there is no projection of virtuous karma to be experienced in the present life; because there is no agreeable fruition there.

Immature beings [ordinary individuals] who are firm--[in that they will not degenerate]--in being free of attachment to any of the eight levels,[102] will not commit karma to be experienced in the next life on the level from which they are free of attachment; because they can not be born in the future on that level from which they are free of attachment.

An Āryan who is firm in being free of attachment to the seven middle levels will not commit karma to be experienced in the next life on such a level; and not only that, he will also not commit karma to be experienced in subsequent lives, because he definitely will never be born on a level from which he is free of attachment. [p.247; 138a3]

Also the Āryan who is not firm but is free of attachment to the Desire Realm or the Peak of Existence will not commit karma to be experienced in

the next life or in subsequent lives in the Desire Realm or the Peak of Existence; because for the Āryan who has deteriorated from being free of attachment to the Desire Realm or the Peak of Existence, although he deteriorates from the fruit, he can not die before he is restored to that state from which he has declined.[103]

If one asks: Are there projections of karma in the intermediate state as well?

There are 22 [projections:] The intermediate existence--the intermediate state in the Desire Realm--is itself one; the five stages in the womb;[104] the five stages of life;[105] which makes 11. Taking each of these as both certain and uncertain of being experienced, there are 22 types of projection.

And the eleven that are certain are karmic actions that have fruit in the present life, because both the aggregates at the stage of accumulating the karma, and the aggregates at the stage of experiencing the fruition, are just one homogeneous existence (Ris mThun Pa; nikāya-sabhāga) projected by one projecting karma.[106] {51c-53}

b) The specific explanation of karma that is certain to be experienced.

If one asks: What is karma that is certain to be experienced as

fruition?

[Karma which is performed under the influence of] intense afflictions or intense purity; or based on a field of virtuous qualities [like the three] precious jewels; or those things that are done continually; or the karma of killing father or mother regardless of any meritorious thought; these are certain to be experienced as fruition.

As it says {iv.53}, "Those are [karmas whose] fruits [will be experienced] in the present life." If one asks what are these?

Karma that has its fruit in the present life becomes that through special qualities of the field or the intention (Sams Pa; āśaya):

A case of it becoming karma that has its fruit in the present life due to a special quality of the field is, for example: Previously, when our Teacher was a Bhikṣu [named] Tripiṭika, he spread arguments among the sañgha; so one Master of the Tripiṭika tried to mediate. But the Bhikṣu Tripiṭika got mad and blasphemed, saying, "A woman should pacify a woman's quarrel." [p.248; 138b5] And due to that he became a woman in that very life and was a woman for the next 500 lives.[107]

A case of it becoming karma that has its fruit in the present life due to a special quality of the intention is, for example: King Kanaka's eunuch, called Andhala (Long Ba), asked a man who was herding 500 bulls, "What

are you doing?" "I am going to castrate them," the man replied. Out of his compassion the eunuch freed the bulls, and because of that in that very life he recovered his sex organs.

Besides these cases, when one is absolutely free of attachment to a particular level, any karma that is certain to have fruition on that level also becomes karma that has its fruit in the present life.[108]

If one asks: What are examples of special fields?

By doing benefit or harm to those who have just arisen from [the absorption of] cessation, the fruit is experienced immediately, because it is as if they have returned from Nirvāṇa.[109]

By doing benefit or harm to those who have just arisen from the meditative stabilizations [called] Measureless Love (Byams Pa; maitri) and Free of Afflictions (Nyon Mongs Med Pa; araṇa),[110] the fruit is experienced immediately; because they are endowed with the superior intention [respectively] to benefit all sentient beings, and [that all beings should be] free of afflictions; and they are permeated by measureless sharp and clear merits.

By doing benefit or harm to those who have just arisen from the Path of Seeing the fruit is experienced immediately; because they attain the stainless (Dri Ma Med Pa; nirmala) newly transformed state (gNas Yongs Su Gyur Ba gSar Pa; pratyagra-āśraya-parivṛtti) where all objects to be

abandoned by Seeing without exception have been eliminated.

By doing benefit or harm to those who have just arisen from the fruit of Arhatship the fruit is experienced immediately; because they attain the stainless newly transformed state where all objects to be abandoned by Meditation without exception have been eliminated. [p.249; 139a4]

By doing benefit or harm to those who have just arisen from Once-returner and Non-returner, the fruit is not experienced immediately; because the stainless newly transformed state where the objects to be abandoned by Seeing are eliminated is in the past; and they have not yet attained the stainless newly transformed state where the objects to be abandoned by Meditation without exception are eliminated. {54-56}

(c) <u>Which feelings are the fruit of which karmas</u>.

There are two topics:

1) The actual explanation.

2) The detailed explanation of deranged mind (gYengs Pa'i Sems; citta-kṣepa).

1) <u>The actual explanation</u>.

If one asks: If the principal aspect of fruition is feeling, is it feeling of

the body or mental feeling?

The fruition of virtuous karma from the special [first] concentration upward, which are [levels] without investigation (rNam Par rTog Pa; vitarka), is held to be exclusively mental feeling. Because from that point upward there is no feeling of body, because feeling of body is exclusively with investigation.[111]

By that, the fruition of virtuous karma that is with investigation is shown, implicitly, to be both bodily feeling and mental feeling.

The fruition of non-virtuous karma is held to be exclusively feeling of body. Because suffering mental feeling is mental unhappiness (Yid Mi bDe; daurmanasya), and that can not be fruition.[112] {57}

2) The detailed explanation of deranged mind.

If one asks: Is deranged mind (gYengs Pa'i Sems; citta-kṣepa) in the mental consciousness or in the faculty consciousnesses?

Deranged mind is in the mental consciousness but not in the faculty consciousnesses; because the faculty consciousnesses do not conceptualize (rNam Par Mi rTog Pa; avikalpa) by means of [two of the three types of conceptuality:] examining conceptuality (Nges Par rTog Pa; abhinirūpaṇa); and conceptuality of memory (rJes Su Dran Pa'i; anusmaraṇa).[113]

If one asks: From what causes does deranged mind occur?

It arises through the fruition of the karma of causing others' minds to become deranged; being frightened by seeing the terrible form of a demon (Mi Ma Yin; amanuṣya), or by a demon doing one harm; when the elements of one's body, [wind, bile and phlegm] become imbalanced; and it can be produced by sorrow and so forth.

If one says: In that case there is the consequence that it is a mental feeling that is a fruition of non-virtuous karma; because that deranged mind arises from the fruition of non-virtuous karma.[114] [p.250; 139b5]

There is no fault. Although it is produced from the fruition, it is not [itself] the fruition. Because from an obscured mind the disturbance of the elements arises, and it is from that that the deranged mind arises. That disturbance of body is the fruition; the deranged mind is a sovereign result.

Then if one asks: Which individuals have this deranged mind?

Those of the Desire Realm other than the Kurus have it. If there is madness and so forth even among the gods, what need is there to mention that the others have it as well.

The Āryans, other than the Buddhas, can have deranged minds which arise from a disturbance in the elements of the body; but they do not have deranged mind arisen from fruition; because their certain karma has already ripened; and their uncertain karma will not come to fruition. They do not

have deranged mind from the fear of the form of demons, because they do not engage in any unpleasant actions that would cause [the demons] harm. They do not have deranged mind produced by sorrow, because they have directly seen the nature of reality (Chos Nyid; dharmatā).[115] {58}

3. <u>The divisions by way of causes</u>.

As it says in sūtra, "The three karmas of crookedness (Yon Po; vañka) and so forth--[defect and stain...]" If one asks what are these?

Dissimulation (gYo; śāṭhya), by being deceitful (Gya Gyu; kuṭila) is crookedness. And the three karmas of body, speech and mind that are motivated by that are the three karmas of crookedness.

Hatred (Zhe sDang; dveṣa), is a fault by being a great defect (Nyes Pa; doṣa). The three karmas of body, speech and mind that are motivated by that are the karmas of fault.[116]

Attachment ('Dod Chags; rāga), just like the stain of a color, is a stain (sNyig Ma; kaṣāya) by being difficult to get out of the mental continuum. And the three karmas of body speech and mind that are motivated by that are the three karmas of stain. {59a-b} [p.251; 140a6]

4. <u>Divisions by way of both cause and fruit</u>.

There are two topics:

a. The presentation.

b. The explanation.

a. The presentation.

Karma has four aspects because it is taught [in sūtra] that way, by distinguishing black, white and so forth. {59c-d}

b. The explanation.

Then if one asks: What is the nature of these types of karmas?

Non-virtue is black karma with a black fruition. It is black because its nature is afflicted; and because it yields a disagreeable fruition, its fruition is also black.

Virtue included in the Form Realm is white karma with a white fruition: because its nature is that it is unmixed with [non-virtue] in a particular continuum, and it yields agreeable fruition which is unmixed with suffering within a particular continuum.[117]

Virtue included in the Desire Realm is black-white fruition and black-white karma: It is white because its own nature is non-afflicted; and it is black because it is mixed with affliction within a single continuum. Because it yields agreeable fruit the fruition is white; because it is mixed with suffering within a single continuum the fruition is black.

Uncontaminated karma is not white, not black, and does not have fruition; but [rather] it is what terminates (Zad Par Byed Pa; kṣaya) the black [karma.][118]

The manner of terminating is: those 12 aspects which are the intentions (Sems Pa; cetanā) of the four dharma patiences (Chos bZod; dharma-kṣanti) [of the Path of Seeing] and the eight uninterrupted paths which are freedom from attachment [to the Desire Realm on the Path of Meditation] are the karmas that terminate the black [karmas.] Because they eliminate attachment and affliction.

The intention of the ninth uninterrupted path [on the Path of Meditation] is the karma that terminates the black-white [karma;] because it eliminates interest in ('Dun Pa) the virtues of the Desire Realm by means of being free of attachment; and it eliminates the afflictions of the Desire Realm by means of cutting the obtainments. [p.252; 140b6]

The uninterrupted path that arises last and frees from attachment to the four concentrations, terminates the white [karma.][119] Because it eliminates the craving for the virtues of the Form Realm by means of being free of attachment.

Other schools say that black karma is karma that will be experienced in the hells [because it is exclusively disagreeable.] Karma that is to be experienced in other rebirths within the Desire Realm is known as black-white

karma [because it is mixed.]

Still other schools hold that karmas that are to be abandoned by Seeing are black, and other [karmas] arisen in the Desire Realm [which are to be abandoned by Meditation] are karmas that are both black and white. {60-63}

5. Divisions by way of basis.

As it says in sūtra: "Sagehood (Thub Pa; mauneya) is three-fold: the sagehood of body; the sagehood of speech and the sagehood of mind."[120] If one asks, what are these?

The state of No-more-learning is sagehood (Thub Pa; mauneya), because the afflictions are permanently quiescent (Thub Pa; mauna).[121] The karma of body, speech and mind of such a one are the three sagehoods, and they should be applied respectively.[122] {64a-b}

6. Divisions by way of the agents [of purification].

As it says in sūtra: "The three purifiers (gTzang Byed; śauca) are the purifier of body, the purifier of speech and the purifier of mind."[123] If one asks, what are these?

All the three good conducts (Legs sPyad; sucarita) [of body, speech and mind] are the three types of purifier. Because the contaminated [good

conduct] cleanses temporarily, and the uncontaminated cleanses permanently. {64c-d}

7. The explanation of good conduct and bad conduct.

There are three topics:

a. Establishing the karmic paths.

b. The reason for teaching wrong livelihood separately.

c. Which karmas have how many results.

a. Establishing the karmic paths.

There are two topics:

(1) The presentation.

(2) The explanation.

(1) The presentation.

As it says in sūtra: "The three bad conducts and the three good conducts..."[124] If one asks, what are these?

The non-virtuous karmas of the body and so forth, criticized by the holy ones, are held to be the three types of bad conduct because they yield disagreeable fruition. [253; 141a6]

Their opposites, virtuous karmas of the body and so forth, praised by

the holy ones, are good conduct.

Although covetousness (brNab Sems; abhidya) and so forth are not karma, because they are afflicted, they are the three types of mental bad conduct.[125]

By putting together the most prominent from among the good conducts and the bad conducts, ten karmic paths (Las Kyi Lam; karma-patha) were taught [in the sūtras,] virtuous and non-virtuous respectively.

If one asks: In that case, which were not included?

[From the non-virtuous actions:] the preparation (sByor; prayoga) and subsequent actions (mJug; pṛṣṭhabhūta) for things like killing are not included. The lesser [actions] of speech, those other than the most serious, are not included. Intention (Sems Pa; cetanā) of mind is not included.

From among the virtuous actions: preparation and subsequent actions of the body are not included. Speech such as affectionate words is not included. Intention of mind is not included. {65-66}

(2) The explanation.

There are seven topics:

(a) The certainty [of having] revealing and non-revealing karma.

(b) Divisions of the three karmic paths by

three.

(c) The specific explanations of the non-virtuous karmic paths.

(d) The manner of cutting the roots of virtue, and regeneration.

(e) How many karmic paths arise simultaneously with intentions.

(f) How many karmic paths are there in which realms and rebirths?

(g) The results of the karmic paths.

(a) The certainty [of having] revealing and non-revealing karma.

If one asks: Which virtuous and non-virtuous [karmic paths] of body and speech have revealing and non-revealing karmas?

Six non-virtuous [karmic paths] definitely have non-revealing karma but do not definitely have revealing karma; because they can also be accomplished by having another person perform them.[126]

One, sexual misconduct, is [always] of both types, revealing and non-revealing. Because it definitely has to be done by oneself without depending on another.[127]

And those six, when they are done by oneself, are both types, revealing and non-revealing.

The seven virtues of prātimokṣa have both aspects, revealing and non-revealing. [p.254; 142a1]

The virtues of the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint, which arise from meditative stabilization, are non-revealing karma, because they arise by the power of meditative equipoise.[128]

The preparatory stages (Nyer bsDogs; sāmantaka), which are preparations for virtuous and non-virtuous [karmic paths,] are revealing karma, because they depend on actions of the body and speech. If the motivation is very strong they will [also] have non-revealing karma; or, if the motivation is weak, it will not come to have non-revealing karma.

For the subsequent action it is the opposite of this: it definitely will have non-revealing karma, but it will not definitely have revealing karma. Because if one performs [subsequent] action that is consistent with the actual action it will have revealing karma; but if one does not perform [such subsequent action] it will not have revealing karma. {67-68c}

(b) Divisions of the three karmic paths by three.

As it says in sūtra: "There are three types of killing: arisen from

attachment; arisen from hatred; and arisen from ignorance." If one asks: Are or are not all karmic paths actualized by (mThar Phyin Par Byed Pa; niṣṭhā) [all of] the three roots?

They are not. The intention of the statement in the sūtra is that the preparations for something like killing arise from the three roots.[129]

Then if one asks: How do the preparations of the ten non-virtues arise from the three roots?

The case of the preparation for killing arising from attachment is, for example, killing for the sake of meat. The case of it arising from hatred is, for example, killing an enemy. The case of it arising from ignorance is, for example, killing ones father, mother and so forth with the idea that it is meritorious.

The preparation for stealing (Ma Byin Par Len Pa; adattā-dāna) arising from attachment is, for example, stealing out of desire for the wealth. The case of it arising from hatred is, for example, stealing an enemy's treasure. The case of it arising out of ignorance is, for example, doing it in accordance with the interpretation of Brahmans that it is a religious act. [p.255; 142b1]

Sexual misconduct arisen from attachment is, for example, to engage in misconduct out of desire. The case of it arising out of hatred is, for example, copulating in order to humiliate (sMa dBab) another. The case of it arising from ignorance is, for example, those who say that, "[Women are] like

flowers, fruit, well-made food, the ford of a river (Chu Ngogs; tīrtha), or a road, they are there to serve everyone."

The three [karmic paths] of mind, covetousness and so forth arise from the three roots, because they arise immediately following those three roots.

The ten virtuous [karmic paths] with their preparations, subsequent actions and actual actions arise from the absence of attachment, hatred and ignorance. {68d-69}

(c) <u>The specific explanations of the non-virtuous karmic paths</u>.

There are three topics:

1) The causes of the non-virtuous karmic paths.

2) The individual definitions.

3) The meaning of the term karmic path.

1) <u>The causes of the non-virtuous karmic paths</u>.

Then if one asks: Which of the non-virtuous [karmic paths] are actualized by which [of the three root afflictions?]

The three, killing, harmful thoughts and harsh words are actualized by hatred.

The three, sexual misconduct, covetousness and stealing are accomplished (rDzog Par Byed; samāpana) by attachment.

Wrong view is accomplished by ignorance, because wrong view arises from extreme ignorance.

The remaining three, lying, slander and idle chatter are held to be accomplished by [any of] the three poisons: For example, those that are motivated by attachment are accomplished by attachment.

Then if one asks: What are the bases (gZhi; adhiṣṭhāna) of these four parts [of karmic paths that have just been described in four groups of three, three, one and three?]

The basis of the first part is sentient beings, because killing is the termination of the life of sentient beings; harmful thought is hatred towards sentient beings; and for harsh words a person must hear it; so this is the way they arise. [p.256; 143a1]

The basis of the second part is an object of enjoyment [Longs sPyod; bhoga], because it arises from enjoying tangible objects which are inside of sentient beings; and they arise based on holding those [objects of enjoyment] as one's own [although they belong to another.]

The basis of the third part is [the five aggregates of] name and form,

because it arises from the view that there is no virtue or non-virtue included in name and form.

The basis of the fourth part is [the collection of] words (Ming Gi Tsogs; nāma-kāya),[130] because lying words and so forth arise based on [the collection of] words.

If one asks: If one stabs another with a sword, having determined to kill him, but the killer dies before the victim, or dies at the same time, does an actual action (dNgos gZhi; maula) of a karmic path arise or not?

In that case it does not arise. It does not arise until the victim dies. If one dies at the same time as the victim one is born in another body, and that [other body] has not engaged in the preparations for killing another person.

If one asks: In the course of a war etc., if one person kills another, does the karmic path arise only for that single person?

No. In a war and so forth, since they are all there with the same purpose of killing, they all have the karmic path in the same way as the killer. {70-72}

2) The individual definitions.

There are three topics:

a) The four roots.

b) The four expressions.

c) The explanation of the six branches.

a) The four roots.

If one asks: What is the individual nature of the ten non-virtues?

Killing (Srog gCod Pa; prāṇātipāta) is killing another unmistakenly in accordance with one's intention.

By saying "in accordance with one's intention," it shows that if [the other] dies without one's intending it, the fault (Nyes Pa) does not occur.

By saying "unmistakenly" it shows that, for example, having made preparations to kill Devadatta (lHas Byin), but mistaking another--called Yajñadatta (mChod sByin)--for him, one kills Yajñadatta, the actual action of the karmic path does not arise.

By saying "another" it shows that for one who kills himself the actual action of the karmic path does not arise. [p.257; 143b1]

As for stealing (Ma Byin Par Len Pa; adattādāna): It is, in accordance with one's intention and unmistakenly, to take possession of another's wealth by power,[131] superior authority, stealth or secrecy.

There are four types of sexual misconduct ('Dod Pas Log Par gYem Pa; kāma-mithyā-cāra) by way of unmistakenly and intentionally having sexual intercourse with an unsuitable object [and so forth:] 1) with a wife who

belongs to another; other than that, with ones own female relatives, mother or sister or those related to ones father and mother out to the seventh line [of cousins;] 2) even though it is one's wife, [having sex] by an unsuitable limb, through the avenue of the mouth or the anus; 3) in an unsuitable place, in an open area or in the presence of a stupa or a temple; 4) at an unsuitable time, with a woman who is nursing, who is pregnant, or if one does it while she is in [the restraint of] upavāsa; these become sexual misconduct.

As for lying (rDzun Tsig; mṛṣā-vaca), it is when one intentionally and unmistakenly alters a discrimination to something else, and another person understands the meaning of the words you speak. {73-74}

b) The four expressions.[132]

As it says in sūtra[133] [that there are sixteen expressions (Tha sNyad; vyavahāra) that describe lying:] Saying that one has not seen etc. the four: the seen, the heard, the understood (rNam Par Shes Pa; vijñāta) and the cognized (rTogs Pa; mata); or saying that one has seen etc. the four when one has not seen them etc.; these are the eight expressions (Tha sNyad; vyavahāra) of an immature being. And the four, saying that one has seen the seen etc.; and the four, saying that one has not seen the unseen etc.; these are the eight expressions of an Āryan. As the sūtra teaches this, if one asks: What are these four, the seen, the heard and so forth?

What is experienced by the eye consciousness, the ear consciousness, the mental consciousness, and by the nose, tongue and body--these are, respectively, explained as the seen, the heard, the understood and the cognized. {75}

c) The explanation of the six branches.

Slander (Phra Ma; paiśunya) is to intentionally and unmistakenly say words, with an afflicted mind, intended to alienate others with friendly relations, when those words are understood by the others. [p.258; 144a2]

Harsh words (Tsig rTzub; pāruṣya) is to intentionally and unmistakenly say unfriendly words, when the meaning is understood by the other person.

All afflicted words are idle chatter (Ngag Kyal Pa; saṁbhinna-pralāpa).

Other schools say: Only afflicted speech that is other than the three [categories above] is idle chatter. For example: a bhikṣu who boasts [of his attainments][134] (Kha gSag; lapanā) as an improper means of gaining a living (Log Pas 'Tso Ba; mithyā-jīva), or who sings out of passion; or actors who, in order to entertain others during a performance, tell a story (gTam rGyud); or to recite inferior scriptures of outsiders having been excited by them.

Covetousness (brNab Sems; abhidhyā) is, having wrongly and

inappropriately craved another's wealth, to desire to make it one's own.

Harmful thoughts (gNod Sems; vyāpada) are desiring to do harm by dwelling in a state of hatred toward sentient beings.

The view that there is no virtue nor non-virtue is wrong view (Log Par lTa Ba; mithyā-dṛṣṭi).[135] {76-78c}

3) The meaning of the term karmic path.

If one asks: Why are these ten called karmic paths?

From the three of mind the intention embarks ('Jug Pa) on its path, so they are paths. The seven of body and speech are also karma, and because they are the paths upon which the intention embarks, they are called karmic paths. {78d}

(d) The manner of cutting the roots of virtue, and regeneration (mTsams sByor; saṁdhi).

If one asks: By which non-virtues are the roots of virtue cut? The roots of virtue are cut by the view of non-existence (Med Par lTa Ba; asad-dṛṣṭi).[136]

If one asks, how [are they cut?] The roots of virtue included in the Desire Realm are cut, but the roots of virtue of the Form and Formless

Realms are not cut; because these [latter] are not in the continuum [of one who cuts the roots of virtue.]

And it is the innate (sKyes Nas Thob Pa; utpatti-lābhin) [roots of virtue] included in the Desire Realm that are cut, but the acquired (sByor Byung; prayogika) [roots] are not cut; because, having [already] cut them at the time of the weak-weak wrong view, they are already extinguished.[137]

And the wrong view that denies cause and result cuts [the roots, but the view] that denies the Āryan does not cut. [p.259; 144b2]

Although some say that [the roots] are not cut by [wrong view that denies the existence of] the uncontaminated [such as the Truth of Cessation or Truth of the Path,] or by [wrong view that takes as its object phenomena of higher realms which are] not of the same type (sKal Mi mNyam Pa; asabhaga); [although some say this, the Vaibhāṣikas say: wrong view] which takes as its object [of negation] phenomena of the same or different [realm,] or the contaminated [first two Truths] or the uncontaminated [last two Truths,] by all of these [types of wrong view the roots of virtue] are cut.

How [are they cut?] Although some say that they are cut in the same manner as the Path of Seeing, which simultaneously eliminates the objects to be abandoned by Seeing; [we, the Vaibhāṣikas, say the roots] are cut in the same manner that the objects to be abandoned by Meditation are eliminated, that is, gradually.[138]

If one asks: On what bases (rTen; āśraya) are they cut?

They are cut among humans of the three continents, but they are not cut among others. Because for beings of the bad migrations their afflicted wisdom is not firm. For the beings of Uttarakuru their sinful attitudes are not firm. As for the gods of the Desire and Form Realms, since the three states [of past, present and future] are evident to them, as soon as they are born, karma and its results are apparent.

And among humans, men and women cut [the roots of virtue.] But natural-born eunuchs and those of confused gender[139] do not cut, because their sinful attitude is not firm.

Among the two types of humans, those who indulge in views (lTa Ba sPyad Pa; dṛṣṭi-carita)[140] and those who indulge in desire (Sred Pa sPyad Pa; tṛṣṇa-carita), it is cut among the former because their afflicted wisdom is firm.

The nature of this cutting of the roots of virtue is a non-possession of the roots of virtue.

Then if one asks: What can make roots of virtue that have been cut regenerate (mTsams sByor; saṁdhi)?

As for regeneration, it is caused by doubt which wonders whether karma exists; or [the roots of virtue] are regenerated by the right view that

[karma] definitely does exist.

If one asks: Is it definite that those who cut the roots of virtue can regenerate in this same life?

When one has committed the automatic transgressions [the roots of virtue] will not regenerate in this same life.

If one asks: At what stage of life is there regeneration?

When the roots of virtue are cut by the power of a previous cause, they are regenerated at the time of dying from hell. When the roots of virtue are cut by the power of conditions, they are regenerated at the time of being reborn in hell.[141] {79-80}

(e) How many karmic paths arise simultaneously with intentions.

If one asks: How many karmic paths arise together with [a particular] intention? [p.260; 145a2]

From one up to eight non-virtues can arise together with one intention; but nine or ten can not arise together, because the three [non-virtues] of mind do not arise simultaneously.

The case of one non-virtue arising together with an intention is the state of having any of the three [non-virtues] of mind.

The case of two arising together is, for example, stealing while in a

state of covetousness.

The case of three arising together is, for example, when one with a harmful thought kills a living creature and then steals it.

The case of four arising together is, for example, when one with a harmful thought tells lies in order to make divisions among others.[142]

The cases of five, six or seven arising together are, for example, when one is in the state of any of the three [non-virtues] of mind, while others accomplish four, five or six according to one's direction.

The case of eight arising together is, for example, when one has covetousness and is in a state of sexual misconduct while [at the same time] others accomplish six according to one's direction.

For virtues, from one up to ten can arise together with an intention. However, there is no arisal of one, eight or five together with [one intention.]

There is no arisal together with one because [a virtuous mind] can not arise without non-covetousness and non-harmful thought.

The case of two arising together is, for example, the state of being in any of the three [virtues] of mind.

The case of three arising together is, for example, being in a state of virtuous mental consciousness [which includes Right View.]

The case of four arising together is, for example, taking the śrāmaṇera

restraint [which includes four virtuous karmic paths] while in a state of neutral [or non-virtuous] motivation at the time.

The case of six arising together is, for example, taking the śrāmaṇera restraint while in a state of virtuous faculty consciousnesses as the motivation at the time.

Because of the reason for these two, there is no arising together of five.[143] [p.261; 145b3]

The case of seven arising together is, for example, taking the restraint of a bhikṣu wile in a neutral [or non-virtuous] state as the motivation at the time.

The case of nine arising together is, for example, taking the restraint of a bhikṣu while in a state of virtuous faculty consciousnesses as the motivation at the time.

Because of the reason for these two, there is no arising together of eight.[144]

The case of ten arising together is, for example, taking the restraint of a bhikṣu while in a state of virtuous mental consciousness.

But the [above cases are only those] based on [the taking of] restraints; [if one takes the cases] included in [the category of actions that are] in-between [restraint and unrestraint] there are also the arising together of one, five and eight.[145] {80-81}

(f) How many karmic paths are there in which realms and rebirths?

If one asks: How many karmic paths are there in which realms and rebirths?

In the hells there is idle chatter, harsh words and harmful thoughts; both in the sense of being actually present and in the sense of being possessed: [idle chatter] because they wail lamentations; [harsh words] because they reproach [each other; harmful thoughts] because they have hatred for each other.

There is covetousness and wrong view [in the hells] by way of being possessed, but they are not actually present; because there is no substance to be desired, and karma and its fruit are directly evident. There is no killing, because even if you kill someone, if their karma is not exhausted, they will not die. There is no stealing nor sexual misconduct, because there is no sense of ownership of material things or of women. There is no lying, because there is no purpose to it. There is no slander, because [the hell beings] are [always] separate from each other.

In Uttarakuru the three [karmic paths] of mind exist in the sense of being possessed, but they are not actually present: because there is no sense of ownership of material things or of women; there is no object of hostility and they have gentle dispositions (rGyud; saṁtāna). There is no killing,

because it is definite that they will reach the age of 1000. There is no stealing nor sexual misconduct, for the reasons given previously. There is no lying, because there is no purpose to it. There is no slander nor harsh words, because they have gentle dispositions. [p.262; 146a3] However the seventh, idle chatter is actually present there, because they sing songs motivated by desire.

In the rest of the Desire Realm there are all ten non-virtues, [both possessed and actually present.]

If one asks: How can there be killing among the gods?

There is. Although they do not kill among themselves, they do kill other types of beings. Also, it is said that if you sever the head or waist of a god it will die.

As for the three virtues of mind, all types of beings have them by acquisition (rNyed Pa; lābha) [i.e. by possession] and by their being actually present.

The Āryans born in the Formless Realm have [the seven virtuous karmic paths of body and speech] by acquisition of the seven precepts included in the uncontaminated restraint, but they are not actually present. And beings of [the absorption of] non-discrimination have them by acquisition of the seven precepts included in the restraint of concentration, but they are

not actually present.

Among the remaining rebirths the seven [virtuous karmic paths] of body and speech are actually present as well.

Among the gods and humans they [can be] included in the restraints [or they can be in-between actions;] for the animals and hungry ghosts they are [only] included in the in-between actions. However, there is the exception of the hell beings and those of Uttarakuru, because [in those places] there is no proper taking of restraints nor meditative stabilization. {82-84}

(g) <u>The results of the karmic paths</u>.

It is held that all non-virtuous karmic paths yield the three, sovereign result, naturally flowing result and fruitional result.[146]

The fruitional [result] of the great non-virtues is rebirth in hell;[147] for the medium-strong [non-virtues] it is rebirth as an animal; for the weak [non-virtues] it is rebirth as a hungry ghost.[148]

The naturally flowing result is: By taking life, one's life will be short. By stealing, one will be devoid of material enjoyments. By [wrongful] sexual activity, one will have a wife who is an enemy. By harsh words, one will be greatly insulted [by others], and so forth.[149] [p.263; 146b3]

The sovereign result is: By killing, external objects have little vitality.[150] By stealing, one is born in an environment that has many

dangers [such as hail and rain etc.][151]

If one asks: What is the reason that all the karmas yield the three?

In the case of killing, for example: by the preparation one causes another to suffer [which yields the fruitional result;] in the actual act one kills [which yields the naturally flowing result;] and subsequently one has extinguished [the victim's] vitality [which yields the sovereign result;] therefore [each action] yields three types of fruit.[152] {85}

b. The reason for teaching wrong livelihood separately .

As sūtra teaches, "wrong action (Log Pa'i Las Kyi mTha; mithyā-karmānta), wrong speech (Log Pa'i Ngag; mithyā-vāc), and wrong livelihood (Log Pa'i 'Tso Ba; mithyā-jīva)," if one asks: is wrong livelihood something other than those two?

It is not. Karma of body and speech that arises from attachment is the three, wrong livelihood and so forth.

If one asks: In that case, does wrong livelihood pervade the other two?

It does not. Karma of body and speech that arises from hatred or ignorance is only wrong action or wrong speech. It is not wrong livelihood.

If one asks: In that case, if wrong livelihood is not different from them, what is the reason that it was taught separately?

There is a reason. It was in order to make it understood that it is

difficult to correct (sByang dKa'; duḥśoda) that; because it is difficult to disentangle (dBral Ba) the mental continuum from things that carry a pleasurable aspect (dGa' Ba'i rNam Pas 'Jug Pa; harṣākāra-vartitva); and because the sangha's livelihood depends on others.

If one says: If wrong livelihood is karma of body and speech that is motivated by desire for the material necessities of life (Yo Byad; pariṣkāra); then karma of body and speech that is motivated by desire [for mere enjoyment,] such as singing and so forth because one enjoys it, is not wrong livelihood.

That is incorrect. Because it is in contradiction to the *Śīlaskandhikā Sūtra* (Tsul Khrims Kyi Phung Po'i mDo) which says: "Bhikṣus who have enjoyed donations out of faith, if [they use those donations for idle pleasures such as] watching elephant fights and so forth, it is wrong livelihood."[153] {86} [p.264; 147a4]

c. Which karmas have how many results.

Then if one asks: Which karmas have how many results?

Karma on the impure path of abandoning[154] has five results: As contaminated virtue it has fruitional result. What arises concurrently by the force of that [action,] and what arises immediately following, is result of human effort.[155] Those saṁskṛta [dharmas] that did not arise previous [to

the action] are sovereign result.[156] Those that are subsequent and similar are naturally flowing result. As it is the uninterrupted path it has the result of separation.[157]

As for the results of karma on the stainless path of abandoning: It has four results, by not including fruitional result.

Either virtuous or non-virtuous karma that is other than on the contaminated path of abandoning also has four results: all except the result of separation.

The remaining uncontaminated karma other than on the path of abandoning, and what is neutral, has three: by not including fruitional result and result of separation.

The [manner in which the] results of virtuous karma are [themselves] virtuous etc.--neutral and non-virtuous, is, respectively: four [results of virtuous karma can be virtuous,] by excluding fruitional result [which is neutral;] two [results of virtuous karma,] result of human effort and sovereign result [can be non-virtuous;] and three [results of virtuous karma,] the same as the preceding and on top of [those two] fruitional results, [can be neutral.]

The [manner in which the] results of non-virtuous karma are [themselves] virtuous etc.--non-virtuous and neutral is respectively: two,

result of human effort and sovereign result at the time [the result] is produced, [can be virtuous;] three, [by counting] on top of [the preceding] naturally flowing result, [can be non-virtuous;] and four, by excluding result of separation [can be neutral.]

The [manner in which the] results of neutral karma are [themselves] virtuous etc.--non-virtuous and neutral is respectively: two, the result of human effort and sovereign result at the time [the result] is produced, [can be virtuous;] three [by counting] on top of [the preceding,] naturally flowing result [can be both non-virtuous and neutral.] [p.265; 147b4]

The results of karma of the past which are of all the times--past, future and present, are four: by excluding result of separation.[158]

The results of "middle" {iv.90} or present karma which are [dharmas] of the future are four: by excluding result of separation.

The results of middle or present karma which are [dharmas] of the present are two: result of human effort and sovereign result.

The results of unarisen karma which are [dharmas] of the future are three: by excluding naturally flowing result and result of separation. Naturally flowing result is excluded because there is no consecutive order to the future; [and result of separation is outside of time.]

The results of [karma] which are of the same level, are four: by excluding result of separation. That is not included because it is not included on a [particular] level.

The results of karma which are of different level [than the karma,] if they are uncontaminated, are three: result of human effort and sovereign result, as well as naturally flowing result. If they are contaminated, two: result of human effort and sovereign result.

As for the results of the karma of a Learner (sLob Pa; śaikṣa), which are of a Learner etc.--of a Non-Learner, or of neither Learner nor Non-Learner, they are respectively: three, result of human effort and sovereign result, as well as naturally flowing result [is of a Learner; those which are of the Non-Learner are] the same three; and three, result of human effort and sovereign result, as well as result of separation [are of neither.]

The results of the karma of a Non-Learner, which are the dharmas of a Learner etc.--of a Non-Learner or neither of these, are respectively: one, sovereign result [are of a Learner;] three, result of human effort and naturally flowing result [are of a Non-Learner;] and two, result of human effort and sovereign result [are of neither.]

The results of karma that is other than [Learner etc.,] which are [themselves] Learner etc.--Non-Learner or neither of these, are respectively:

two, result of human effort and sovereign result [are Learner;] the same two [are Non-Learner;] all five [are neither of these.]

The results of karma that is to be abandoned by Seeing, which are [themselves] to be abandoned by Seeing etc.--to be abandoned by Meditation or not to be abandoned, are respectively: three, result of human effort and sovereign result, as well as fruitional result [are to be abandoned by Seeing;] four, by excluding result of separation [are to be abandoned by Meditation;] and one, sovereign result [is not to be abandoned.] [p.266; 148a5]

The results of karma that is to be abandoned by Meditation, which are [themselves] objects to be abandoned by Seeing, objects to be abandoned by Meditation, or objects which are not to be abandoned, are respectively: two, result of human effort and sovereign result; four, by excluding result of separation; and three, result of human effort and sovereign result as well as result of separation.

The results of karma that is not to be abandoned, which are [themselves] objects to be abandoned by Seeing, objects to be abandoned by Meditation, or objects not to be abandoned, are respectively: one, sovereign result; two, result of human effort and sovereign result; and four, by not including fruitional result. {87-94b}

8. <u>The divisions of karma as prescribed behavior and improper</u>

behavior.

The *[Jñānaprastāna] Śāstra* mentions three, karma that is improper behavior (Rigs Pa Min Pas bsKyed Pa; ayoga-vihita), prescribed behavior (Rigs Pas bsKyed Pa; yoga-vihita), and neither improper nor prescribed behavior. From these: Improper behavior is afflicted karma which is a non-virtuous natural misdeed (Rang bZhin Gyi Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; prakṛti-sāvadya), or an obscuring neutral; because it is produced by a misguided thought (Tsul bZhin Min Pa'i Yid La Byed Pa; ayoniśo-manaskāra).[159]

Some previous Ācāryas say it is not only afflicted karma, but it is also misdeeds of disobedience (bCad Pa'i Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya)--walking, sitting, eating, dressing, etc., which has degenerated from the norms of behavior which are renowned in the world; and not being in accordance with these [norms of behavior] this is also improper behavior.

Prescribed behavior is virtuous karma. Others say that it is not only that, but also [actions that] have not degenerated from the norms of behavior.

What is other than the [above] two, is neither [prescribed nor improper behavior.] {94c-d}

9. The divisions of projecting and completing.

If one asks: Does one karma project only one birth or does it project

many? And similarly, do many karmas project only many births, or can they also project one? [p.267; 148b5]

One karma projects one birth and does not project many births. And because an homogenous existence (Ris mThun Pa; nikāya-sabhāga) {ii.41} would come to be projected in parts, many karmas also can not project one birth. This is according to the system of the Vaibhāṣikas.

If one says: In that case, it says in the *rGyal Po'i mDo* and *Yang Dag Par lDan Pa'i mDo*:[160]

> The Sthavira Aniruddha (Ma 'Gags Pa) said to the bhikṣus, "Oh Venerables. When I was born in Varanasi as a poor man who lived by collecting grass, I offered alms to the Pratyekabuddha Āsādya (sTeng Nas Sam) or to the Pratyekabuddha Tagaraśikhin (sPyi gTzug Me Tog Ta Kar lTa Bu). By the fruition of that single offering of alms that I made, I was born seven times among the gods of the Thirty-three, and seven times I became a Cakravartin King, and now I am born into the lineage of the wealthy Śākyas."

So [the Vaibhāṣika position] is in contradiction to that. If one says this:

There is no contradiction. By that merit he obtained the good fortune of a happy rebirth, and remembering his [previous] rebirths he performed further acts of merit. So his statement that he was born in all of those rebirths due to that single offering of alms, is intended to mean that [those rebirths] were based on that single [offering of alms.] It is like, for example, when one becomes rich by multiplying a single coin many times and says, "I became rich with one penny."

Furthermore, based on that single offering of alms there are many

intentional karmas--joy and rejoicing and so forth, and so there are [also] the results of these.

[Although one existence is projected by a single karma:] The karmas that complete the particular dharmas of an existence as same type which is projected by a single karma, are many.

For example, an expert painter draws the outline with one brush and then completes the [picture] with various colors using other [brushes.] [p.268; 149a5] In the same way, although they are the same in that they are human, some, because of virtuous completing [karma] have excellent forms, complete faculties, great wealth, are without illness, and have complete power and so forth; while some, because of non-virtuous completing [karma] have poor forms and so forth.

Therefore, from the four possibilities, 1) virtuous projecting but non-virtuous completing karma; 2) the opposite of that, [non-virtuous projecting but virtuous completing karma]; 3) both virtuous; 4) both non-virtuous:

The first is, for instance, gods and humans of the Desire Realm who have suffering.

The second is, [for example, beings born in bad migrations but with good conditions, such as ] Dharmarāja Yama (Chos Kyi rGyal Po gShin rJe), Vāsukir Nāgarāja (Klu'i rGyal Po Nor rGyas Kyi Bu), and so forth.

The third is Śakra (brGya Byin)[161] and so forth.

The fourth is, for instance, the sentient beings of Avīci.

The Sautrāntikas and so forth hold that there can be many births from one karma and also there can be one [birth] projected by many [karmas;] because of the explanation of the [above-cited] Sūtra [that says] one karma projects many births, and besides that there are many other instances of such teachings.

If one asks: Don't all karmas project a birth?

Although they are associated with fruition (rNam sMin Dang bCas Pa; savipāka), the two non-conscious absorptions do not project [a birth,] because it is already projected by the fourth concentration and the Peak of Existence; and because the karma of these states is too weak, because due to the absence of consciousness karma does not arise together with an intention.[162] Therefore, although it is said that the fruition of the two absorptions is [respectively,] the long life of a god or the Peak of Existence, this is based on the [absorptions being] completing karma; but the projecting karma is the fourth concentration and the absorption of the Peak of Existence.

Also, virtuous and non-virtuous obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti), although it is simultaneous with karma, it does not project, because the karma and the obtainment do not have the same result; and the obtainment, being non-intentional and arising incidentally, is too weak; and obtainment is separate

from the karma like the bark of a tree. [p.269; 149b6]

However, contaminated virtuous and non-virtuous obtainment do [act as] completing [karma.] Similarly, the contaminated karma that exists in the continuum of an Āryan, and also the four states conducing to insight (Nges 'Byed Cha mThun; nirvedabhāgīya) of the Path of Preparation, are exclusively completing [karma.][163] {95}

10. The explanation of the three obstructions.

The karmas of the five automatic transgressions[164] are the karma obstruction (Las sGrib; karma-āvaraṇa).

[As for the affliction obstruction (Nyon Mongs Pa'i sGrib Pa; kleśa-āvaraṇa):]

From the two types of afflictions--excessive (Shas Che Ba; tīvra) and sharp (rNo Ba; tīkṣṇa): excessive means it occurs continually. In this case, from weak occurrences moderate occurrences develop, and from the moderate, strong occurrences develop, and because it occurs continually one does not find the occasion to abandon it by means of the antidote, and so it is an affliction [that is an] obstruction.

The second, [sharp afflictions,] are those that occur forcefully [but are not chronic.] Because these are easier to abandon they are not affliction obstructions.

The three types of bad migrations, sentient beings in the states of non-discrimination, and those born in Uttarakuru, are the fruition obstruction (rNam sMin Gyi sGrib Pa; vipāka-āvaraṇa); because it is by previous karma that the continuum is projected to a bad state.

In this way, obstruction is held to be of three types, because they [are the things that] impede and obstruct the [attainment of the ] Āryan path, and the virtues which prepare one for the Āryan path--the attainment of Heat (Dro Bar Byed Pa; ūṣmagata)[165] and so forth.

If one says: In that case, Śūḍa (Lam Phran Pa), Angulimāla (Sor Phreng Can), and Nanda (dGa' Bo), since they possessed excessive afflictions, they should not have been able to generate the Āryan path.

There is no fault. For them as well, as long as they had not eliminated the obstructions, for that long they could not generate the path; and when they did generate the path, they did not have these excessive afflictions.

Concerning the five automatic transgressions, from among these three obstructions: They exist in the three continents but not in Uttarakuru nor among the other rebirths.

Although there is killing of father and mother etc. in the bad migrations, it does not become an automatic transgression, because the sinful attitude is not firm, and karma and its result are evident to them. [p.270; 150b1]

For the gods there is no killing of father and mother etc., because they do not have the sinful attitude and karma and result are evident to them.

It also does not exist among the Kurus, because they naturally have morality or they are good by nature, because there is no teaching [of the dharma] there [to make them good.]

And even in those [other] three continents, those taught by the names natural-born eunuch (Za Ma; ṣaṇḍha) and so forth, those of confused gender (Ma Ning; na-puṁsaka) and hermaphrodite (mTsan gNyis Pa; ubhaya-vyañjana)--it is believed that they also do not have the automatic transgressions. If one asks, why?

It is because: From the side of their parents, [they feel that] they did not produce a complete body faculty, and so they gave less love and benefit. And from the side of the son, he possesses much less shame and embarrassment with regard to the parents [which, when contravened, constitute an automatic transgression.]

As for the remainder, the two besides the karma obstruction--the affliction and fruition obstructions--the beings of non-discrimination, the Kurus, and those in bad migrations, are all fruition obstruction; and because they all also have excessive affliction, there is [affliction obstruction] among [all] the five types of rebirth. {96-97}

11. <u>The explanation of the automatic transgressions</u>.

From the five automatic transgressions: The first three, [killing mother, father or an Arhat] are karma of body, because they are killing; and the fifth, [wounding a Tathāgata,] is karma of body because it is preparation for killing. The fourth, [causing a schism in the sañgha] is lying, so it is karma of speech.

As for schism in the circle of the sañgha, in the Vaibhāṣika system they say: It is established as a substance which is a non-associated saṁskṛta phenomenon that is of the nature of discord between two sects of the sañgha. And since [it is possible that the monk who causes the schism] has abandoned affliction and also cut the roots of virtue, its nature is neither afflicted nor determined (Lung Du bsTan Pa; vyākṛta) as virtuous; therefore its nature is non-obscuring neutral.[166] [p.271; 151a1]

This type of schism is [a substance which is] possessed by the two sides of the sañgha, and is not karma of an automatic transgression. The disgraceful karma (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba'i Las) that is the cause of the schism in the sañgha, is a lie which causes the division in the sañgha, and it is that which is the automatic transgression; and it is that which is possessed by those who cause division in the sañgha, such as Devadatta (lHas Byin) and so forth.

The fruition of the karma of causing a schism in the sañgha is that for

an intermediate kalpa the one who caused it will experience the fruition in the sufferings of Avīci hell.

If one asks: Then what is [the fruition] for committing the remaining automatic transgressions? For the other automatic transgressions, although one will definitely be born in the hells in general, it is not definite that one will be born only in Avīci.

Then if one says: If, by committing two or more automatic transgressions one is not born for more than just one life in hell, there would be no difference in the size of the karmas; but if one is born there again for two or more lives, it would not [conform to the rule that] automatic transgressions are exclusively karma to be experienced in the next life.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: Although one is not born for more than one life in hell due to committing two or three or more additional automatic transgressions; according to the number of karmas, the body there in Avīci grows greater by doubling and so forth in size and it becomes very sensitive, and the suffering of the injury becomes twice as bad and so forth; so one comes to experience the additional [karma]. Therefore [our view] is free of both faults [mentioned above.] And the first of those [automatic transgressions] acts as projecting karma, while the later ones [ripen] as completing karma. So [the Vaibhāṣikas] say.

According to the Sautrāntikas and so forth: By committing many

automatic transgressions one is born in Avīci again and again. And because there is no other birth that intervenes (mTsams Med Pa) between the body that performs the karma and [rebirth in] hell, it is also not [a reason] that can eliminate the belief that [subsequent births in hell] would be [fruition of karma] to be experienced in the next life. [p.272; 151b1]

As for the [type of] individual [who creates the schism,] it is a bhikṣu, it is one who indulges in views (lTa Ba sPyad Pa; dṛṣṭi-carita) and who possesses morality, who causes a division. It cannot be a layperson, nor a bhikṣu who indulges in desire (Sred Pa sPyad Pa; tṛṣṇa-carita), nor one with degenerate morality; because the saṅgha would not have confidence in him so that he could [succeed in] establishing [himself] as one with sharp faculties and as rival to the Buddha.

If one asks, where does it happen? In a place other than the place where the Buddha is residing; when the Teacher is actually present it does not occur, because his majesty is irresistible.

Who is divided? Saṅgha who are immature (Byis Pa; bāliśa) ordinary individuals are divided, but not Āryans; because knowing the Buddha from a direct experience of the nature of reality (Chos Nyid; dharmatā), they have obtained faith. Some say that individuals who have attained the stage of Patience (bZod Pa; kṣānti) {vi.18} [on the Path of Preparation] also cannot be divided.

As for the measure of [what constitutes] division: At such time as [the saṅgha] tolerates (bZod; kṣamate) and willingly accepts Devadatta as the Teacher instead of the Buddha as the Teacher, and instead of the path that was enjoined by the Buddha [they accept] what Devadatta says is to be renounced: the so called "five special rules" (bsLab Pa'i Tsigs lNga bCas Pa) and so forth--not using any milk products; giving up meat; not to use salt; wearing clothes that are not cut and resown; staying in temples within a town; [at such time as these are accepted,] at that time the saṅgha is divided.

If one asks, for how long do they remain divided? That schism, by its very nature (Chos Nyid; dharmatā), will not remain longer than the one night.[167]

Such a schism in the saṅgha is held to be a schism of the wheel of the dharma (Chos Kyi 'Khor Lo'i dByen; dharma-cakra-bheda). Because for as long as the saṅgha is divided and not reconciled the path cannot arise in anyone's mental continuum. Such a [schism] is an automatic transgression, but other schisms are not automatic transgressions.

And such a schism of the wheel can occur in Jumbudvipa where the Buddha abides, but not in other continents. [p.273; 152a2]

The individuals who accomplish it are at least nine bhikṣus, because a saṅgha is four or more bhikṣus, and there must be the two dividing groups of

bhikṣus as well as the one causing the schism. That determines the minimum number, but there is no definite maximum. {98-101b}

A ritual schism (Las Kyi dByen; karma-bheda)[168] can occur in the three continents other than Kuru, where the Teaching is present. That occurs when, within one religious community (mTsams; sīmā), they perform ritual actions (Las; karma) such as the bimonthly confession (gSo sByong; poṣadha) [separately or] with disharmony.[169] If one asks, how many individuals [are necessary for a ritual schism?] It can be accomplished by eight or more bhikṣus, because a ritual schism does not require a separate individual to instigate it.

The schism of the wheel does not arise during the period when not much time has elapsed after the Buddha's turning of the wheel of the dharma, because everybody is united in the harmony of great joy. It also does not happen at the end of the life of the Buddha, at the time of his Parinirvāṇa; because the Buddha is held to be a rare jewel; and because of awareness of impermanence [at that time, everyone's] mind is well-disposed (bLo mThun Pa) to strong aversion [for saṁsara.]

From the *Stanzas of the Vinaya* ('Dul Ba Tsig Le'ur Byas Pa):

Pure like the autumn streams,
the Teachers doctrine for twelve years
remained fine and free of downfalls,
and was the cause of eliminating afflictions.

So, as it says, as long as no faults of view or of morality arose in the dispensation (bsTan Pa; śāsana), [a schism of the wheel] could not occur, because the dispensation remained free of faults.

It also does not arise prior to the Supreme Pair [of disciples,] because the division does not remain for a long time, and these [disciples] are the necessary conciliators and without them there is no reconciliation.[170]

It also does not occur after the Sage has passed away and attained Nirvāṇa, because the Buddha is not there to serve as an opponent.

It also does not occur when the extent of [the boundaries of] the religious community have not been defined, because a schism is the division of the saṅgha within one religious community, and that is not the case [when the borders are not defined.] [p.274; 152b2]

So, for these reasons, a schism of the wheel does not occur during these six periods.[171]

Also, because such a schism depends on the previous karma of the disciples, it does not occur for all Buddhas. The Teacher Śakyamuni, previously, when he was a Bodhisattva, divided the followers of a ṛṣi who possessed the five clairvoyances (mNgon Shes; abhijñā), and the subsequent fruition of that is [the schism of the wheel.] So [the Vaibhāṣikas] explain it.[172]

As for this, the higher vehicles [disagree and] explain the intended

meaning [of the sūtra.] {101c-102}

If one asks: Why is it that only killing one's father, mother and so forth are automatic transgressions, but the killing of others and so forth is not?

The killing of father or mother is an automatic transgression because, by creating one's own body which is suitable for liberation, they are a special field of benefit, [and by killing them] one abandons them by one's attitude and destroys them by the act.

Similarly, the Arhat, sañgha, and Buddha are special fields of virtue, [and by killing or harming them] one abandons them by one's attitude and by the preparation one does actions that are contrary to them remaining alive. And even though one can not kill the Tathāgata one abandons him by one's attitude.

Because other karmas do not constitute such grave offenses, they do not become automatic transgressions.

Then if one asks: If one kills a parent whose sex has changed, does it or does it not become an automatic transgression?

In the case of the two parents, if one kills one's parent who has changed sex, [like a father] who has become a woman, it still becomes the automatic transgression of killing one's parent; because one has killed someone who performed the action of a parent in creating one's own special

body.

If one asks: If the embryo (Nur Nur Po; kalala) of one woman is inserted into the womb of another and is born from that womb, killing which of these two women would constitute an automatic transgression?

Between these two, the first, from whose egg (Zla mTsan; śoṇita) one arises, she is one's mother; and therefore if one kills the first woman it becomes [an automatic transgression;] because she was principle in creating this body that is conducive to liberation. The second woman, who holds one in her womb, is not [one's mother,] because doing just what she does is not the principle [basis for motherhood.][173]

Moreover, if, having prepared to kill one's parent one kills someone else, or having prepared to kill someone else one kills one's parent, it does not become an automatic transgression. Because, for an automatic transgression one must complete the actual action upon that [same object] in regard to which one made the preparations; and these cases are not like that. For example: If one kills one's mother who happens to be under the bed; or the son of the washerman who, wanting to kill a fly, smashed his father over the head with a hammer.[174]

If, with one blow of a weapon, one kills one's mother along with another being, there are two non-revealing karmas, one of automatic transgression and one of mere killing; but the revealing karma is only an

automatic transgression, because that karma of automatic transgression is of much greater strength.

If one kills one's father who is also an Arhat, or one's mother who is also an Arhat, there is the karma of just the one automatic transgression of killing an Arhat, because there is only the one basis (rTen; āśraya).

Then if one says: It says in the Avadāna (Lung rNam 'Byed):

> In previous times, when the King of the city of Rauruka (sGra sGrog), King Udrayāṇa, who was both a father and a king, was slain by his own son, King Śikhaṇḍin (sKra Can), [the Buddha] said: "Go tell Śikhaṇḍin, 'You have committed two automatic transgressions--that of killing your father and that of killing an Arhat.'"

So what was [the meaning] of that message? [p.276; 153b3]

[The sense of] that was to say, "Because of two causes you have committed an automatic transgression." Or, it is to rebuke him in two ways. But there is no automatic transgression other than that one.

And [in the case of] drawing the blood of a Tathāgata with malice, if one wounds him with a desire to kill it becomes [an automatic transgression.] But if one wounds him with only the intention to strike the Buddha, it is not [an automatic transgression,] because there is no thought of killing.

Similarly, if one wounds someone who has not yet attained Arhatship and after the attack he does attain Arhatship, even if the Arhat died from the wound, it does not become an automatic transgression, because the [offender] did not make his preparations with regard to that basis [of an

Arhat.]

And if one asks: Can one who has made the preparations for an automatic transgression, without eliminating that, obtain the fruit or become free from attachment?

For one who makes preparation for an automatic transgression, because his thought is so utterly contradictory [to the fruit,] it is not possible to obtain the fruit or become free from attachment.

Then if one asks: Which is the gravest of the automatic transgressions?

Telling a lie in order to divide the saṅgha in two is held to be the very greatest disgrace among the automatic transgressions. Because: It injures the Dharma-body (Chos Kyi sKu; dharma-śarīra) of the Tathāgatas; and until the divided saṅgha is once again reconciled, in the world there will be an obstacle to entry into the path (Nges Pa; niyāma), to the obtainment of fruits, to being freed from attachment, and to the extinction of contamination.[175] And also [people] will not engage in the concentrations, in reading, reciting prayers, or [virtuous] mental karma; and so it obstructs [the attainment] of higher states and emancipation (Byang Grol; apavarga). And the world of the gods becomes disturbed, is mentally unhappy, without freedom, and their memories deteriorate. Therefore, the fruition [for causing a schism] is to be born in Avīci for one intermediate kalpa. [p.277; 154a4]

After that the gravest [automatic transgression] is the fifth, [causing the blood to flow from a Tathāgata;] and after that the third, [killing an Arhat;] and after that the first, [killing one's mother;] and after that the second, [killing one's father.] So among these five, killing one's father is explained as the lightest.

If one says: In that case it would be contradictory with the teachings in sūtra that, "Among the three offences (Nyes Pa; daṇḍa), the three karmas of the mind are the gravest. And among those, wrong view is the gravest."[176]

There is no contradiction. Because its fruition is an intermediate kalpa in Avīci, causing a schism in the saṅgha is the gravest in the sense of having the greatest fruitional result among the automatic transgressions.

But in terms of its sovereign result of [causing] the death of the most people, among the three karmas of the three doors, mental karma is the gravest. Because, [for example,] the ṛṣis, by their anger, were the cause of the death of many of the people of the Daṇḍaka forest etc.[177]

And in terms of its result of human effort of cutting all the roots of virtue, among the mental karmas wrong view is the gravest, because [all the roots of virtue] are not cut by any of the others.

Or again, [it is not contradictory] because, taking as the bases: the five automatic transgressions, the karma of the three doors, and the five

views;[178] the gravest are taught to be, respectively, causing a schism in the saṅgha, mental karma, and wrong view.

Then if one asks: Which fruits of virtuous karma are the greatest?

For the mundane virtues, the virtue of the intention for the Peak of Existence is held to have the greatest fruit, because the fruition of that is the complete pacification of all suffering for 80,000 great kalpas.

But that is based on the fruitional result of contaminated virtue. If it is based on the result of human effort or the result of separation: for contaminated karma [the greatest fruit] is the Supreme Worldly Dharma; and for uncontaminated karma the greatest fruit is the Meditative Stabilization of Vajropama-samādhi (rDo rJe lTa Bu'i Ting Nge 'Dzin); because without being homogenous cause they, [respectively,] lead to the Path of Seeing, and attain the abandonment which eliminates the afflictions of the three realms.[179] {103-105} [p.278; 154b4]

12. The explanation of the five near transgressions (Nye Ba lNga).

If one asks: Is it only by the automatic transgressions that one will definitely be born in hell? One will also definitely be born there by the transgressions similar to the automatic transgressions (mTsams Med Pa Dang Cha 'Dra Ba; ānantarya-sabhāga).

And if one asks, what are these?

To sexually violate one's mother who is also an Arhat; to kill a Bodhisattva who has reached the predestined stage (Nges Par rTogs Pa; niyati-patita);[180] to kill any of the seven types of individuals who are Āryan Learners; to steal the property ('Du Ba'i sGo; sukhāya-dvārika)[181] of the saṅgha. These four are offenses that are, respectively, similar to the automatic transgressions of: killing a mother, father, and Arhat, and causing a schism in the saṅgha; so they are called "transgressions that are near to those [automatic transgressions,"] and due to these, one can only be born in hell.

Similarly, the near transgression [that is similar to] the fifth [automatic transgression] of drawing the blood of a Tathāgata with malice, is to destroy, with the motivation of hatred etc., a stūpa or an image of the body, speech and mind [of the Buddha.]

Here, concerning the stealing of the property of the saṅgha, Ācarya Vasubandhu[182] says it is to repeatedly steal the income ('Du Ba; āya). Yaśomitra (rGyal Po'i Sras) and Pūrṇavardhana (Gang sPel) believe that it is to steal what is used for their livelihood (Tso Bar Byed Pa; jīvikā kalpayati), what their food (Zhal Du gSol; mukhopabhogika). {106-107b}

On the other hand, three karmas are explained as having a fruition that

impedes. For example, just as creditors will rise up if a borrower [plans] to leave the area: the [three] attainments of Patience on the Path of Preparation, the Āryan Non-returner, and Arhatship, thoroughly impede, respectively, the three types of karma definitely to be born--in bad migrations, in the Desire Realm (except for karma to be experienced in the present life), and in [any of] the three realms. [p.279; 155a4] As it says {vi.23}, "Having attained Patience one does not go to the bad migrations." So, respectively, having attained Patience one is not born as a being in the bad migrations; having attained Non-returner one is not born in the Desire Realm; and having attained Arhatship one is not born in the three realms. {107c-d}

If one asks: If it is said that killing a Bodhisattva who has reached the predestined stage is the near transgression [similar to] killing one's father, from what point is one a Bodhisattva who has reached the predestined stage?

From the point at which one [begins to] accumulate the karma whose fruition is the 32 marks, from then on one is a Bodhisattva on the predestined stage. Which means one is predestined to attain Buddhahood after 100 kalpas.[183]

And if one asks, how does that work? Such a Bodhisattva possesses six special qualities: from then on he is born in happy migrations; and even

among these he is born into high castes, such as the royal caste like a great Śāla tree and so forth.[184] His faculties, eyes and so forth, are complete; he is male; he remembers his past lives in all of his births; he will attain Buddhahood in 100 kalpas without being deterred.

As for the cause of acquiring virtues such as these: The Great Souls (bDag Nyid Chen Po; mahātma), being motivated by great compassion (Thugs rJe Chen Po'i gZhan dBang Du Gyur Pa; karuṇā-pāratantrya), not disheartened by any type of suffering or opposition [in their pursuit of] the purpose of others, for all sentient beings, without pride, they take responsibility for the welfare of others.

Because that which was explained as the karma which has its fruition in the [32] marks [requires] the sharpest faculties, [that karma] is accumulated only by those born in Jambudvipa with male faculties, but other rebirths, other continents and other individuals do not [accumulate this karma.] And this is the special quality of the accumulation of the karma. [p.280; 155b5]

And he also accumulates this karma while he is in the presence of the Teacher, so this is the special quality of place.

He also has the virtuous intention directed towards Buddhahood,[185] and is not directed towards higher rebirths, liberation or other levels. And that [karma to have the 32 marks] is virtue that arises from thinking and not

what arises from hearing, because [the latter] is inferior; and it is not what arises from meditation, because the uncontaminated is not [yet] attained; and as for that contaminated [karma,] if it is the cause of being born in higher realms, the Bodhisattva will be born in the higher rebirth of a high caste in the Desire Realm.[186]

[The Bodhisattva] projects and accumulates that karma when there are 100 great kalpas remaining before his enlightenment, and this is the special quality of time. If there are more than these 100 kalpas remaining it is not possible to project the karma, but it is possible if there are fewer remaining; because, it is taught that the Buddha Śākyamuni projected that karma when there were 91 kalpas remaining.[187]

And each one of these 32 marks arises from 100 merits,[188] and that is the measure. And some believe that the measure of each [unit of 100 merits] is equal to the collection all together of the merit having its result in the enjoyment of all sentient beings other than Bodhisattvas on the predestined stage.

Others say: It is equal to the amount of general karma of sentient beings that causes the formation of a trichiliocosm [universe.] By 100 of such [accumulations of karma] one mark of a great individual is achieved, and so it is the same for [each mark] up to 32.

Others say: The measure of that merit is difficult to comprehend [for

anyone] other than a Buddha. [p.281; 156a5]

And on the certainty of the number 100, some believe that there are 50 intentions directed toward the 50 [qualities]--the 32 marks of the body in which the Buddha arises, and the 18 unmatched qualities (Ma 'Dres Pa; āveṇika) of the Dharma-body;[189] and there are another 50 intentions when he thinks, "May I too obtain 50 [qualities] like these." {108-110a}

Then if one asks: When the Teacher Śākyamuni was a Bodhisattva, how many Buddhas did he venerate, and then become enlightened?

In previous times the Buddha known as the Great Śākyamuni, like this [current] Teacher, arose during a period of strife. His life span, the size of his following and so forth were also the same as this [current Buddha,] and his teaching lasted 1000 years. The current Teacher was the son of a potter with the name Prabhāsa (sNang Byed). Having offered a cup full of rice, shoes and fragments of cloth (Ras Kyi Kha Tsar), he made the prayer, "Oh Tathāgata, may I have a body just like yours..." and so forth, [praying for the same size of following, lifespan, etc.]

And from that point on: In the first countless kalpa he venerated 75,000 Buddhas. The last [Buddha of each countless kalpa is given here] in the reverse order of the [way they are listed in the root] text {iv.110}: The Buddha known as Ratnaśikhin (Ring Chen gTzug Tor Can) appeared, and at

that time the first countless kalpa [in which he venerated 75,000 Buddhas] finished. Then in the second countless kalpa he venerated 76,000 Buddhas, of which the last was Buddha Dīpaṁkara (Mar Me mDzad), and at that time the second countless kalpa came to an end. And from that point, during the third countless kalpa, he venerated 77,000 Buddhas, of which the last was Buddha Vipaśyin (rNam gZigs), and at that time the third countless kalpa came to an end.[190]

In this way these final Buddhas of the three countless kalpas appeared, and the first of all of them was the previous Buddha Śākyamuni himself.

[p.282; 156b6]

The explanation from the *Bhaiṣajya-vastu-āgama* (*Lung sMan Gyi gZhi*)[191] is a little different:

> From Buddha Śākyamuni,
> up to the Leader, Rāṣṭrapāla,[192]
> I worshiped seventy-five thousand Buddhas.
>
> From Buddha Legs mDzad, to the great Muni rGyal mTsan, I worshiped seventy-six thousand Buddhas.
>
> From Buddha Dipaṁkara up to Buddha Kāśyapa ('Od Srung),
> I worshipped seventy-seven thousand.
> In those three countless kalpas,
> When I, the Conqueror, performed those acts of worship in order to attain enlightenment,
> At that time I had a mind undettered [by saṁsara.]

Also, according to the Mahāyāna it is taught that in each countless kalpa he worshipped innumerable Buddhas. {110b-d}

If one asks: When he was a Bodhisattva, how were each of the six Perfections (Phar Phyin; pāramitā) fulfilled?

When he gave to all sentient beings all of his property (dNgos Po), his body (Lus), and his objects of enjoyment (Longs sPyod), not motivated by a wish for a particularly good result [for himself,] but with compassion--at that time he fulfilled the Perfection of Giving (sByin Pa'i Phar Phyin; dāna-pāramitā). This is demonstrated in the Jātakas.[193]

When he was not yet free of attachment of the Desire Realm, and still possessed desire, but his mind was undisturbed even though his limbs were being cut, at that time he progressively fulfilled the Perfections of Patience (bZod Pa; kṣānti) and Morality (Tsul Khrims; śīla). This is like the Jātaka of the Ṛṣi Kṣānti.[194]

When the Teacher was Māṇavaka (Bram Ze Khye'u),[195] seeing Buddha Puṣya (sKar rGyal) in a mountain cave engaged in the Absorption of the Exaustion of the Element of Fire; with faith, he raised one leg and for seven days he praised him with the verse:[196]

> Oh foremost of beings! There is no other great ascetic equal to you in the realms of the gods.
> In this world there is none, nor in the abode of Vaiśravaṇa (rNam Thos Bu). [p.283; 157b1]
> There is none even in the palace of the supreme abode of the gods, nor in the [four] directions and the intermediate directions.
> How could there be such a one in the regions of all this vast land with its mountains and forests?

With this praise he fulfilled the Perfection of Persevering Effort (brTzon 'Gros;

vīrya); and also bypassed ('Dum; pratyudāvartita ) nine kalpas. Because it says [in sūtra:] "While he was that holy Brahman, by his persevering effort and the power of his excellent praise of the Tathāgata, nine kalpas were bypassed."

Immediately before his enlightenment, when he was in the Vajropama meditative stabilization,[197] his meditative stabilization fulfilled the Perfection of Concentration (bSam gTan; dhyāna) and his cognition (bLo; dhī) fulfilled the Perfection of Wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā).

They are called perfections (Pha Rol Tu Phyin Pa; pāramitā) because for each of them one has gone to (Phyin Pa; gamana) the father shore (Pha Rol; pāram) of its fulfillment (Phun Sum Togs Pa; sampad). {111-112b}

13. The explanation of the three occasions of meritorious action.

If one asks: It says in sūtra that there are three occasions of meritorious action (bSod Nams Bya Ba'i gZhi; puṇya-kriyā-vastu)--arising from giving, morality and meditation. Why is that?

From these three, in accordance with each, desirable results arise, so they are meritorious; because they are of the nature of karma, they are actions; because they are the occasions of engaging in the intention which is the source of these three, they are the occasions of meritorious action. For

example: Just as the seven [karmas] of body and speech are both karmas and karmic paths, but the three of mind are only karmic paths, so they are all called karmic paths. {112c-d}

So from these three [occasions of meritorious action, concerning giving:] the person who, with a virtuous attitude gives articles he possesses to another, that is the [occasion of] giving. Because it says in the *Vyāsa-paripṛcchā* (*Drang Srong rGyas Pas Zhus Pa*):[198] "The great ṛṣis who gave a little bit with faith, all of them are called [occasions of] giving." [p.284; 158a2]

To transfer [something] when the motivation is the desire to worship (mChod Pa; pūjā) an excellent object or to benefit a poor one, is giving; but it is not [giving when motivated by] fear or the desire for a return and so forth. And that karma [of giving] is karma of body or speech together with the concomitant [mind and mental states which act as the] motivation.

The fruit of such giving is to have a great temporal material enjoyments (Longs sPyod; bhogya).

To classify:

Giving for the sake of one's own purpose is: giving towards a stupa by one who is not free of attachment to the Desire Realm, or an ordinary individual who has abandoned that attachment by means of the mundane

path.

Giving for the sake of others' purposes is: giving to another sentient being who is not free of attachment, by an Āryan who is free of attachment, with the exception of the case where [the karma of giving] is to be experienced in the present life.[199]

Giving for the sake of both [self and others] is: giving to another sentient being who is not free of attachment by an Āryan who is not free of attachment or an ordinary individual who is not free of attachment.

Giving for the sake of neither is: offering for a stūpa by an Āryan who is free of attachment of the Desire Realm, other than [giving] that is to be experienced in the present life. Because [such an offering] is offered only out of veneration (bKur sTi; gaurava) and gratitude (Byas Pa gZo Ba; kṛta-jñā).

Of these [types of] giving, the particularly superior is distinguished in three ways: by the donor, the object given and the field [to which it is given.] The particularly superior donor is one who is controlled by (bZung Ba) an attitude of faith and so forth--morality, relinquishment (gTong Ba; tyāga), learning (Thos Pa; śruta), shame, embarrassment, and wisdom, which are known as the seven jewels of a superior ('Phags Pa'i Nor bDun); and who has little desirous grasping ('Dod Zhen). [p.285; 158b3]

The action combines [the four distinctions of giving: it is given] with respect and so forth; one gives it with one's own hand; at the very time it is

needed (Nye Bar mKho Ba'i Dus); and it does not harm others, either by the basis [i.e. the thing given]--like giving what has been stolen from others, or giving a sheep to a butcher; or the thing to be given does not harm the field--like giving poison or unhealthy food.

By virtue of giving with [these four distinctions of] respect and so forth, the results are, respectively: in future births one will be venerated by one's own followers; [due to giving from one's own hand] one becomes independently rich with the pleasure of vast material enjoyments; [by giving at the right time] one obtains what one needs in a timely manner; [by giving what is not harmful] one does not meet obstacles to material enjoyments, such as enemies, fire and so forth.

What displays its excellence by its color and so forth, its fragrance, taste or texture, is a particularly superior object. By giving something with excellent color one acquires temporarily a beautiful form; [by giving something of excellent fragrance] one is renowned;[200] [by giving something of excellent taste] one's mind has joy; [by giving something of excellent texture] one has a very youthful body, and like the precious wife [of a Cakravartin King, the body] feels warm in cold times and feels cool when it is hot; and if one is an ordinary person (Tha Mal Pa; [udāsīna]), one has a body that is pleasurable whenever it is touched. And so [the fruits of giving the various excellent objects] should be applied respectively.

As for the particularly superior field:

From the *Gautamī Sūtra* (*Go'u Ta Mi'i mDo*):[201] "Ānanda! If one gives to a being who has gone to the state of rebirth as an animal one can expect a fruition that is one hundred-fold. If one gives to a human of degenerate conduct one can expect a fruition one thousand-fold."[202] So in accordance with this statement, [a field can be superior by way of] rebirth.

And from among the [seven] occasions of meritorious action that arise from substances (rDzas Las Byung Ba'i bSod Nams Bya Ba'i dNgos Po; aupadhika-puṇya-kriyā-vastu),[203] giving to the sick, or to those who nurse the sick, or giving in times of cold and so forth, [the fruition will be] measureless; so in accordance with this statement, [a field can be superior by way of] suffering. [p.286; 159a4]

[By giving to] one's father or mother or other benefactors, as in the Jātaka story of the bear and the antelope, [a field can be superior by way of being] those who have benefitted oneself.

As it says in the *Gautamī Sūtra*: "If one gives to one who is endowed with morality, one can expect a fruition 100,000 times over. If one gives to one who has entered the fruit ('Bras Bu La Zhugs Pa; phala-pratipannaka) of Stream Enterer the fruition is measureless. And if one gives to a Stream Enterer it is even more immeasurable than that."[204] So in accordance with this statement [a field can be superior by way of] possessing virtuous

qualities. So by way of these four, [type of rebirth, suffering, being a benefactor, and having virtuous qualities,] a field can be particularly superior.

Among all the types of giving the supreme is the giving by one who is liberated from the three realms to another who is liberated, because both are supreme. It says in the *Gautamī Sūtra*:

> Among the actions of giving alms to beggars
> Who are those with constrained body and speech,
> When one who is free of desire gives to one who is free of attachment,
> That is the supreme giving of material objects.

But in the case of a donor who is a Bodhisattva giving anything at all in order to benefit all sentient beings, even though it is giving by a non-liberated being to a non-liberated being, since it is giving for the purpose of complete enlightenment and for all sentient beings, it is supreme; because it is giving that will become a protection for all sentient beings.

And in sūtra eight types of giving are taught: 1) Giving to those who are near (Nye Ba La sByin Pa; āsadya); 2) giving through fear; 3) giving because the receiver "gave to me"; 4) giving because the receiver "will give to me"; 5) giving because "previously my parents and ancestors gave, so [I too] will give"; 6) giving for the sake of high rebirths; 7) giving for the sake of fame; 8) giving for the sake of the ornaments of the mind,[205] giving for the sake of the equipment (Yo Byad; pariṣkāra) of the mind,[206] for the sake of assembling the necessities for yoga,[207] in order to attain the supreme

goal. Among these eight, the eighth, giving for the sake of ornaments of the mind etc. is supreme. [p.287; 159b3]

Here, giving to those who are near means, according to some previous Ācāryas, giving to those who are nearby or who approach one. Giving through fear is a case of giving in which, seeing that someone is about to perish, one thinks, "It is best to give," so one gives. Giving because he gave to me is when one thinks, "Previously he gave to me," and so one gives. The others are easy to understand.

Ornaments of the mind refers to supernatural powers (rDzu 'Phrul; ṛddhi). Equipment of the mind refers to the eight limbs of the Āryan path. Assembling the necessities for yoga refers to single-pointed concentration (Zhi gNas; śamatha) and special insight (lHag mThong; vipaśyanā). The supreme goal is the attainment of Arhatship or Nirvāṇa. This is according to Yaśomitra's (rGyal Sras) explanation.

According to Pūrṇavardhana, the meanings of the four [types of giving] for the ornaments of mind and so forth are respectively: To elicit the riches of faith and so forth [is giving for the ornaments of mind.] To counteract the odor of miserliness [is giving for the equipment of mind.] Generating the pleasure of the absorptions [is assembling the necessities for yoga.] Leading to Nirvāṇa [is giving for the supreme goal.]

Or again, they are believed to be, respectively, the four fruits of

monkhood (dGe sByong Gi Tsul Gyi 'Bras Bu; śrāmanya-phala).[208] Or they are believed to be, respectively, the Paths of Accumulation and Preparation; the Path of Seeing; the Path of Meditation; and Nirvāṇa. Or yet again, respectively, the Paths of Accumulation and Preparation, the seven impure levels, the three pure levels, and the level of the Buddha.[209]

That is not all [with regards to special fields of giving:] Even though they are not Āryans, the merit of giving offerings (Yon; dakṣiṇā) to fields of benefit such as father and mother, to fields of suffering such as the ill, to preachers of the dharma, to Bodhisattvas in their last rebirths, is without measure [even compared to those acts of giving whose fruition was] multiplied 100,000 times.

As it says in the *Legs Nyes Kyi rGyu Dang 'Bras Bu bsTan Pa'i mDo*:[210] "Moreover, if one performs giving to these three types of individuals, there will be no limit (Yongs Su gTugs Pa) to the fruitional result: they are the Tathāgata, one's parents, and the sick." Because, it teaches, [giving to them] is equal to [giving to] the Buddha. [p.288; 160a4] {113-118}

Tangentially, an explanation of gravity and lightness:

The greatest of the subsequent actions (mJug; pṛṣṭha) is continuing to do it after the actual action of the karmic path.

The greatest of the fields (Zhing; kṣetra) is one who has done benefit.

The greatest of the bases (gZhi; adhiṣṭhāna) is: for karma of the body, killing; for karma of speech, lying; for karma of mind, wrong view; and so forth, these are the greatest. And even within killing, killing an Arhat and so forth is great [killing] because one goes to Avīci. Medium [killing] is killing one who abides on the path. Least [killing] is killing an animal and one with degenerate conduct. So it appears in the *Smṛti-upasthāna* (*Dran Pa Nyer gZhag*).[211]

The greatest of preparations (sByor Ba; prayoga) are the preparations of the body and speech for the actual action.

What is greater by way of intention (Sems Pa; cetanā) is the greater intention that causes [the action] to be completed.

What is greater by way of attitude (bSam Pa; āśaya) is the greater motivating attitude.[212]

So in this way, from the weakness or greatness of these six [factors]--the subsequent action and so forth--a karma also becomes weaker or greater. If all the six factors are complete it is known as a very grave karma. {119}

And as it says in sūtra, "Karma that is committed (Byas; kṛta) and accumulated (bSags; upacita) and karma that is committed but not accumulated" etc. If one asks, what are these?

Karma with these six [aspects] is called karma that is committed and accumulated: action done deliberately (bSams bZhin Pa; sañcetana) with the thought, "I will definitely do this," and not done without forethought or done impetuously (Bab Col Du; sahasā);[213] action that completes the limbs of karma;[214] after the action one does not regret it; there is no antidote that counteracts that karma; it has a retinue;[215] the fruition will definitely be experienced.

Other karma is called karma that is committed but not accumulated.[216] [p.289; 160b4]

Karma that is accumulated but not committed or neither [accumulated nor committed] should be understood in the same way.[217]

Here, [karma that is] "completed" (rDzogs Pa; samāpta) means: For some karmas, one goes to bad migrations or happy migrations because of one act of misconduct or one good act; in other cases one goes to bad or happy migrations because of ten karmas of the three doors all together; those [karmas due to which one goes to a good or bad migration] are the karmas that are completed.

"There is no antidote" means there is no regret for the wrong view and so forth, and no confession or vow of restraint etc.

"Retinue" means that virtuous and non-virtuous actions have retinues of further virtuous and non-virtuous [actions.] Although the explanation in the

Tika [of Yaśomitra] is correct, that [the retinue] is, "having committed [the action] one rejoices." Here, the retinue is both the preparation and the subsequent action. {120}

The Pūrvaśaila (Shar Kyi Ri Bo sDe Pa) and the Aparaśaila (Nub Kyi Ri Bo sDe Pa)[218] subsects (Bye Brag) of the Mahāsaṁghika school and so forth say: "If one offers to a stūpa with attachment, merit does not arise. Because there is no receiver and no enjoyment [of the gift by a receiver."]

But this statement is not correct. Although in these cases there is no merit that arises from receiving or enjoyment, merit that derives from relinquishing [the gift] (bTang Ba'i rGyu Las Byung Ba; tyāgānvaya) to the stūpa does arise. It is like, for example: The [four] immeasurables of thinking, "May all sentient beings be happy," and so forth; or, meditating on the right view; although these [activities] have no receiver and do not directly benefit someone else, by the force of one's own mind immeasurable merits arise.

If one asks: If it is true that the fruit of giving to a good field that has done benefit etc. is a desirable fruition, by giving to an inferior field like animals and so forth will there not be a desirable fruition?

The arisal of a result that is a desirable fruition from a cause that is contaminated virtue is never inconsistent (Mi 'Khrul Ba; aviparyaya). [p.290;

161a4] And the fruit of giving to an inferior field is exclusively desirable fruition. However, by the influence of the inferior field the fruitional result will be smaller or there will be none at all. It is just like planting in an inferior field, the fruit will not ripen in season or it will be smaller and so forth.

That [concludes] the explanation of the occasions of meritorious action arisen from giving. {121}

Now for the explanation of the occasions of meritorious action arisen from morality.

Degenerate morality which is to be abandoned is unrestraint, being non-virtuous revealing and non-revealing form. Morality, which is the antidote that eliminates that degenerate morality, is the virtue that arises from morality. And that morality is of two types--revealing and non-revealing, because it is the antidote of both the revealing and non-revealing [degenerate morality] to be abandoned.

Although they are not by nature sins, the abandonment of [those actions that are] prohibited because they were enjoined by the Buddha--eating food at improper times and so forth--is a revealing or non-revealing abandonment which is also morality.

And that morality has four pure qualities. If one asks, what are the four?

It is untainted ('Phan Ma Byung; ahata) by the faults of degenerate morality. It is untainted by the root causes, [the afflictions,] and the subsidiary afflictions. It is based upon the Applications of Mindfulness (Dran Pa Nye Bar bZhag Pa; smṛty-upasthāna) {vi.14} which act as the antidotes of degenerate conduct. It is based on peace because it is directed to liberation. {122-123b}

Now for the explanation of the occasions of meritorious action arisen from meditation.

The virtue of meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi) together with its concomitants, which arises from a mind that is in meditative equipoise (mNyam Par bZhag Pa; samāhita) upon its object, and does not arise from the absence of meditative equipoise or from the habits of the afflictions--that is [the occasion of meritorious action] arisen from meditation.[219] [p.291; 161b5]

If one asks, why is it called meditation (sGom Pa; bhāvanā)? It is based on [the way] the virtuous subtle propensities (Bag Chags; vāsanā) pervade (bsGo; vāsana) and accustom (Goms) the mind like sesame seeds are pervaded by the fragrance of flowers. {123c-d}

Then if one asks: What is the primary [result] of the [occasions of

meritorious action] arisen from morality and meditation?

As it says in *The Four Hundred*:[220] "By morality one goes to a high rebirth; by the view one goes to the supreme state." So, for the purpose of obtaining higher rebirths morality is foremost; and in order to actually eliminate the objects of abandonment by uninterrupted paths for the purpose of being separated from afflictions, meditation is foremost.[221] So those who desire those goals should obtain them in accordance with that [explanation.]

Then if one says: Since it says in sūtra: "Four types of individuals generate the merit of Brahma (Tsangs Pa'i bSod Nams; brāhma-puṇya): One who builds a stūpa for the relics of the Tathāgata in a region where previously there was none, this is the first type of individual who generates the merit of Brahma." And similarly, it adds [the other three:] offering a pleasure grove (Kun dGa' Rwa Ba; ārāma)[222] to the saṅgha of the four directions; building a temple for them; reconciling ('Dum; pratisaṁdadhāti) divisions among the disciples (Nyan Thos; śrāvaka); meditating on the immeasurable of compassion.[223] If one asks, what are these merits of Brahma?

Such merits of Brāhma [are called that] because [by these merits] one abides joyfully in a high rebirth for [one] kalpa, equal to the lifespan of the

Brahmapurohitas. The above mentioned four types of individuals, who build a stūpa for relics in a place where there was none before etc., are the ones who generate the merits of Brahma. Such is [the meaning of the sūtra.]

Here, Brahma means the Brahmapurohitas. The merits [sufficient] to be born there, [called] the merits of Brahma, extend ('Thud) the lifespan in a high rebirth of the Desire Realm so that one experiences pleasure for 40 intermediate kalpas.[224] {124}

Now, tangentially, an explanation of giving the dharma: [p.292; 162a6]

The giving of dharma is: With an attitude that is not afflicted with the motivations of profit or honor and so forth,[225] to teach without error and in accordance with the truth what should be taught--the 12 branches of the Buddha's teachings[226] [consisting of] the Sūtra Piṭaka and so forth, or the Three Piṭakas. {125a-b}

14. <u>The explanation of the three that coincide with [virtue.]</u>

The sūtra teaches three types of virtue: those that are conducive to merit, to liberation, and to insight:

[Virtue] conducive to merit (bSod Nams Cha mThun Pa; puṇya-bhāgīya) is that [karma] which has a desirable fruition within cyclic existence.

The virtuous [karma] that is directed to Nirvāṇa on the Path of Accumulation is [virtue] that is conducive to liberation (Thar Pa'i Cha mThun Pa; mokṣa-bhāgīya) which, when it arises, definitely becomes a dharma of Parinirvāṇa.[227] When this virtue is present it can be determined, because when the faults of cyclic existence and the good qualities of Nirvāṇa are explained, from powerful faith there are signs such as the hair standing on end and so forth.

The virtue of the states conducing to insight (Nges 'Byed Cha mThun Pa; nirvedha-bhāgīya) is the four stages of Heat (Dro Ba; uṣmagatas) and so forth.[228] {125c-d}

15. Karma that is accomplished through a discipline (Rigs Pas Rab Tu bCug Pa; yoga-pravārtita).

The three types of karma of the three doors that is accomplished by skills due to the disciplines of training, together with their concomitant motivations, are of the nature of the five aggregates.

Here, in order: Writing the forms of the alphabet (Yig 'Bru'; lipi)--[the letter] "Ka" etc.; and carving reliefs (rGya; mudra) of deities and so forth, are karmas of body.

Poetry (sNyan Ngag; kāvya) together with counting (bGrang; gaṇanā) things--one, [two, three,] and so forth--are karmas of speech.

Grasping the sum having calculated the numbers (Grangs; saṁkhyā), such as "ten times ten is 100," is mental karma. {126}

Furthermore, because it arises tangentially to the teaching concerning writing and so forth; and also because this [text] is collecting the [whole] Abhidharma, now some of the synonyms that occurred [earlier] in the explanation of the dharma aggregate will be explained. [p.293; 163a1]

Here is a list of the synonyms of afflicted dharmas:

Because it is covered by affliction it is called an obscuration (bsGrib Pa; nivṛta). Because it is associated with afflictions it is black. Because it is discarded (Bor Ba) by the Āryans it is called bad [or inferior] (Ngan Pa; hīnā). Because it exists simultaneously with affliction it is called disgraceful conduct (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba Dang bCas Pa; sāvadya).

Now for [synonyms] of stainless virtue:

Because it goes to the best of virtues, deliverance, it is good (Gya Nom Pa; praṇīta); therefore this "good" is a synonym for uncontaminated virtue.

Because affliction is only bad, and uncontaminated virtue is only good, what is other than these two is called intermediate (Bar Ma; madhya).

In terms of generating them on the mental continuum, they are to be practiced (bsTen Par Bya Ba; sevya) sincerely. This is the synonym of all

saṁskṛta dharmas that are contaminated or uncontaminated virtues.

What are other than these: the asaṁskṛta, the non-virtues, and the obscuring neutral are not to be practiced. The asaṁskṛtas are not susceptible to being generated and meditated on in the mental continuum again and again. And if practicing is for the purpose of yielding a result, [the asaṁskṛta] also do not have any result. The non-virtues and the obscuring neutrals are afflicted, and their fruition is not desirable, [so they are not to be practiced.]

For non-virtues and obscuring neutrals; saṁskṛta non-obscuring neutrals; contaminated virtue; uncontaminated saṁskṛtas; uncontaminated neutral asaṁskṛtas such as space and non-analytical [cessations;] analytical cessations such as liberation; each previous one has the subsequent one as its superior (Bla Ma Dang bCas Pa; sa-uttara). Because, they are respectively: without a desirable fruition; not afflicted; having a desirable fruitional result; uncontaminated; permanent; permanent and virtuous. [p.294; 163b1]

Therefore, all the other dharmas have a superior. But for liberation, the analytical cessation of Nirvāṇa, there is no other dharma that reaches a higher point or is more exalted, so it is without superior (Bla Na Med Pa; anuttara).

As it says in sūtra: "Oh Bhikṣus! Among any amount of saṁskṛta dharmas or asaṁskṛtas, the supreme is proclaimed as that which is free of attachment."[229]

If one desires to understand well what creates ('Grub Byed) the world--intentional karma and karma-having-intended, the various categories of karma and its results, revealing and non-revealing, restraints, non-restraints and in between [karma] and so forth; attend to this chapter.

This is the explanation of the fourth chapter entitled, "The Presentation of Karma from the verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*."

## NOTES--CHAPTER 4

1. i.e. If it arose naturally without a cause, or from arbitrary causes, it would always arise. It is not created by a god, because then it would be created all at once, whereas it evolves gradually.

2. It is the mental factor that moves the mind to its object. See {ii.24}.

3. The Vātsīputrīyās do not hold to the momentariness without cause of all saṁskṛtas, but rather that a phenomenon arises, then by cause begins to decay.

The Vaibhāṣikas argue that saṁskṛtas do not exist past the moment of their arisal, because, due to their momentariness, decay begins immediately. Therefore there is nothing that can move from one position to another. So revealing karma can not be a movement of the body.

4. The position of the Vātsīputrīyas.

5. *ADKB* p.572; *bShad Pa* p.353 explains that the very same cause--the cooking by fire--that created the pot, would also be the destroyer of the pot if it was cooked to a greater degree.

6. First argument: The shape of something is cognizable by two faculties, by the eye and by touch. If it were substantially existent, a thing in and of itself, then it would violate the entire dhātu structure which maintains that form (rūpāyatana) is only knowable by the eye, and the body faculty (touch) only cognizes tangible objects.

Second argument: The point here is that Vaibhāṣikas hold that subtle atoms are partless and directionless. If there were a substantially existent shape, this would not stand up.

For the Sautrāntikas shape is merely a nominal designation given to various configurations of color. A large amount of color in a single direction is designated as long; color spread equally in all directions is designated as a circle, and so forth.

7. See Pruden fn#21 for citations.

8. *Ekottrāgama*, Taisho 2, p.13b-c.

9. *SAKV* p.579; *'Grel bShad* p.9a5:

> Other than non-revealing form there is no form which is invisible and non-obstructive; so says the *Rūpa-saṁgraha Sūtra*. Where the *ADKB* (p.579) says: "Other than non-revealing form there is no form that is invisible and non-obstructive; nor any uncontaminated [form."] It should continue, "...nor any uncontaminated form, <u>with the exception of non-revealing form</u>." Because for those who are engaged in absorption on the Truth of the Path, [to say] there are revealing forms of body and speech is not correct.

10. See {iv.113} and Pruden fn#22 for the seven acts of merit. See that footnote also for citations of the sūtra quote.

11. *ADKB* p.580; *bShad Pa* p.358:

> Other than by non-revealing form, it would not be suitable for merit to increase even when one was in another state of mind.

12. The *ADKB* p.582 mentions right livelihood as a third.

13. *ADKB* p.583; *bShad Pa* p.359:

> As it also says in sūtra that the vows are a dam because they block degenerate conduct ('Chal Ba'i Tsul Khrims; dauḥśīlya); since it would not be suitable to call something that does not exist a dam, non-revealing form must actually exist.

14. *ADKB* p.580; *bShad Pa* p.358:

> And it was said: "For any man or woman of good family who has faith and possesses these seven acts of merit derived from substances, their merit will increase and add to itself (Nye Bar sKye Ba; upa-√jan) unceasingly, whether they are walking, sitting, lying down, or not lying down. And it is the same for those who possess the seven acts of merit not derived from substances," it will also increase for them. Except for non-revealing form, it would not be possible that merit would increase when one was in some other state of mind.

15. This is according to Geshe Donyo and *mChims* p.188b2. See Pruden fn#22 for citations of sources and quotation from *SAKV* p.580.

16. The *ADKB* p.583; *bShad Pa* p.359 cites these as the responses of the Sautrāntikas.

17. Such forms arise in meditative stabilization "according to the Yogācāras (rNal 'Byor sPyod Pa)" (*ADKB* p.583; *bShad Pa* p.359). The following point is also according to the Yogācāras.

18. Earth, water, fire and wind.

19. Geshe Sopa comments: What is it that distinguishes the realms or levels? Dharmas that are suitable to increase affliction on a particular level are of that level. So contaminated karma, which by definition increases affliction, can only be based on elements of its own level.

20. See {i.34} for discussion of the meaning of upātta. *GDD* (p.62; 36a6) summarizes it this way:

> Here, the meaning of "appropriated" is: That which is grasped by the mind and mental factors in its function of support, because it generates a feeling of pleasure or pain by means of benefiting or harming the physical faculties; i.e. what is called by the world "with mind" (Sems Dang bCas Pa; sacetanā).

21. The three types of origination are: arisen from fruition (rNam sMin Las Byung Ba; vipāka-ja); arisen from development (rGyas Pa Las Byung Ba; aupacayika); and naturally flowing result (rGyu mThun Las Byung Ba; naiṣyandika). See {i.37}.

22. i.e. The seven basic vows to abandon the seven non-virtues of body and speech: taking life; taking what is not given; sexual misconduct; lying; divisive talk; harsh speech; idle gossip.

23. *ADKB* p.501; *bShad Pa* p.366 explains that non-revealing form that arises from meditative stabilization includes both the restraint of concentration and the uncontaminated restraint. They are both arisen from elements that are not appropriated and are arisen from development. Furthermore, they are "not separate," which is to say that the same group of four elements produces all seven abandonments:

> Why is that? Because just like the mind [in that state of absorption] there is no distinction between the elements [with respect to the abandonments.] In the case of the prātimokṣa restraints [which are in the Desire Realm,] on the other hand, the seven non-revealing forms

[of the abandonments] arise based on all different great elements.

24. i.e. Attachment, anger and ignorance. See {v.20}.

25. *ADKB* p.594; *bShad Pa* p.368:

> By the restriction [of not mentioning] virtuous and neutral karma [it is understood that] they are in all [three realms.]

26. *ADKB* p.594; *bShad Pa* p.368:

> In the Formless Realms it does not exist because there are no elements [upon which it is based.] Wherever there is engaging in [the actions of] body and speech, there are the restraints (sDom Pa; saṁvara) of body and speech.

27. Geshe Sopa comments: For all beings above the first concentration there is no revealing karma. These beings do act, but there is no strong motivation driving the action, as in the lower levels.

On these lower levels we have investigation and analysis, grosser, discriminating minds, conceptualizing minds, judgmental minds. These discriminations create attachment or aversion which motivates and gives force to our actions, producing revealing and non-revealing karma.

On the higher levels, lacking such discriminating minds, actions are more spontaneous, more natural and more subtle; not driven by such strong motivating forces.

> See {i.32} and {ii.33} where sūtra is quoted:
>
> It is after having investigated, after having analyzed, that one speaks.

(See Pruden Ch.2 fn#169 for citations.)

28. In the Desire Realm all contaminated revealing karma is non-virtuous, never neutral. Obscuring neutral revealing karma exists only in the world of Brahma in the Form Realm, because great Brahma possesses the karma of speech that is motivated by dissimulation (gYo; śāṭhya). This is known from the time he boasted falsely in order to avoid the inquiries of Aśvajit. See {v.51} for this story and Pruden fn#42 for citations.

For discussion of why an object to be abandoned by Seeing does not have the power to give rise to revealing karma, see below, (b) Explaining the origins.

29. 1. Don Dam Pa; paramārthatas. 2. Ngo Bo Nyid; svabhāvatas. 3. mTsungs Par lDan Pa; saṁprayogatas. 4. Kun Nas sLong Ba; samutthānatas.

30. The three roots of virtue are non-attachment, non-anger, and non-ignorance or wisdom. See {ii.25} and {iv.8}.

31. *ADKB* p.600; *bShad Pa* p.372:

> Because causal origin projects [the action] it is what gives the initiating force ('Jug Par Byed Pa; pravartaka). Because the timely origin proceeds in accordance [with that] at the time of the action (Bya Ba'i Dus Su mThun Par 'Jug Pa; kriyā-kālā-anuvartana) it is the proceeding force (rJes Su 'Jug Byed; anuvartaka).
>
> What is the efficacy of [the proceeding force] in regards to that [action?] Even if [the action] is already projected [by the initiating force,] if [the proceeding force] is absent, [the action] will not come about; as in the case of someone who dies [before completing an action.]

i.e. There is the initial motivation, which sets in motion, and the timely motivation, which proceeds with the action at the moment of acting.

32. *ADKB* p.601; *bShad Pa* p.372:

> The mind which is to be abandoned by Seeing is the initiating force of the revealing karma, because it is the basis of investigation and analysis which give rise to that [revealing karma.]
>
> But the proceeding force [is not to be abandoned by Seeing,] because it no longer exists at the time of the action, when the mind is turned outward. [Also:] The form [i.e. the revealing karma] that it gives rise to would also become an object to be abandoned by Seeing.
>
> So what?
>
> This would disagree with the Abhidharma. Form is not in opposition to either knowledge (Rig Pa; vidyā) or ignorance (Ma Rig Pa; avidyā), so it is not to be abandoned by Seeing.

33. So there are four categories:
1. The mind to be abandoned by Seeing is exclusively initiating force.
2. The five faculty consciousnesses are exclusively proceeding force.
3. The mental consciousness that is to be abandoned by Meditation can be both.

4. The uncontaminated, which is neither.

34. Poussin (Pruden fn#60) quotes the Japanese editor Saeki, that this is the Mahāsāṁghikas. The *Vibhāṣā* Taisho 27, p.410b26 says: The Vibhajyavādins praise the Blessed One, saying that his mind is always absorbed...

35. *Aṅguttara*, iii.346; *Theragāthā*, 696-697.

36. There are the four types of non-obscuring neutral minds of the Desire Realm--see {ii.72}. The second, the mind of behavior includes four behaviors: walking, standing, sitting, lying down.

37. *ADKB* p.604; *bShad Pa* p.374:

> It does not mean that the Buddha does not have neutral dharmas such as: those arisen from fruition, a mind of behavior, or an emanation mind (sPrul Pa'i Sems; nirmāṇa-citta); so say the Vaibhāṣikas.

38. *SAKV* p.604; *'Grel bShad* p.23b6 explains that saṁskāra = prayatna ('Bad Pa) = effort or exertion. So the mind that arises from fruition is neither initiating nor proceeding force because it does not arise from any kind of intentional effort.

39. Geshe Sopa comments: Traditionally there are three types of motivation which can move one to take vows or enter a spiritual practice: 1. There is the motivation for a higher rebirth. 2. The motivation of seeking protection from worldly fears. 3. The motivation of renunciation for the sake of liberation. This last is the proper motivation for taking the restraints of prātimokṣa, because these restraints are for the purpose of liberation (mokṣa) of the individual (prāti-).

40. i.e. The restraint of a bhikṣuṇi is not different from the restraint of a bhikṣu and so forth. This is demonstrated by the fact that when one changes sex only the name changes, from bhikṣuṇī to bhikṣu etc., but the restraint does not change.

41. i.e. Does each set of restraints just pile up more of the same precepts; or is the precept of killing for a śrāmaṇera a different thing altogether--a different substance--from the precept of killing for a bhikṣu?

42. Their traditional role is to serve the bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇis in the kitchen, and to perform tasks that fully-ordained monks and nuns can not do.

43. *ADKB* p.609; *bShad Pa* p.378:

> Because it rectifies (Yang Dag Par 'Jog Par Byed Pa; samādāna) the restraint of those who commit incorrect actions, it is called morality (śīla). Etymologically, it is because it has the nature of cooling (śītalatvāt).

44. 'Bras sPung Edition has two corrections on 127b2:
Legs sPang is corrected to Legs sPyad //
Lus Dag is corrected to Lus Ngag //

45. *ADKB* p.610; *bShad Pa* p.379:

> THE INITIAL REVEALING AND NON-REVEALING [KARMAS] ARE CALLED PRĀTIMOKṢA AND KARMIC PATHS.
>
> The revealing [karma] of having accepted a restraint correctly, and the initial non-revealing [karma] are called prātimokṣa, because by that one is released from sins (So So Thar Pa'i Phyir; pratimokṣaṇāt). Which means they are abandoned.
>
> They are also called prātimokṣa restraint because they restrain the body and speech.
>
> They are also called karmic paths because they include the fundamental [actions.]
>
> The second instant onward are only prātimokṣa restraint, not prātimokṣa, because they are the aftermath, not the actual karmic paths.

46. See {ii.51}.

47. Anāgamya {viii.22} is the preparatory level prior to the first concentration. It is on this level that one attains the abandonment of the afflictions of the Desire Realm and thus advances to the first concentration. So these two types of restraint are called the abandoning restraints based on the fact that they arise on the occasion of the last uninterrupted path (Bar Chad Med Lam; ānantarya-mārga) which is the moment of abandonment of the last afflictions of the Desire Realm.

48. See Pruden fn#77 for citations.

49. *Añguttara* iii.387.

50. See below, {iv.24}.

51. One who possesses the restraint of concentration takes possession, from the first moment, of previous restraints of concentration from this or previous lives. So he possesses the non-revealing karma of the past and future from the first moment until it is given up.

52. i.e. They possess the revealing karma of the present for as long as the act is being performed.

53. *ADKB* p.617; *bShad Pa* p.617:

> Because it is included in the fundamental [actions] it is called karmic path.

54. For example, when he is in an embryonic state or born in the Formless Realm; or when his revealing karma has deteriorated because it was created with a neutral intention, which is weak.

He can still possess non-revealing karma from a previous life.

55. *SAKV* p.618; *'Grel bShad* p.31a6 explains that this case is an ordinary individual who has proceeded to another rebirth but has not yet performed any revealing karma, or whose revealing karma has deteriorated.

56. *ADKB* p.619; *bShad Pa* p.386:

> The pratimokṣa restraint is acquired when another performs revealing action to the [acquirer,] and the [acquirer] in turn performs revealing action to the other. And it is [acquired] from either the saṅgha or an individual. The restraints of bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī and śikṣamāṇā [are acquired] from the saṅgha; the others [are acquired from] an individual.

In this context "saṅgha" refers to a quorum of at least four bhikṣus. An "individual" means fewer than four. This would include at least a preceptor (mKhan Po; upādhyāya) or a master (sLob dPon; ācārya).

57. This is the name given to the moment when one attains the Path of Seeing, at which point one becomes an Āryan. See {vi.26a}.

58. See Pruden fn#91 for citations.

59. This is an obscure term, not found in any standard reference nor familiar to any Geshe I consulted.

60. *SAKV* p.619; *'Grel bShad* p.31b7 lists the eight special obligations (bLa Ma'i Chos; guru-dharma), which, when accepted, constitute this ordination. See also Pruden fn#94 for other citations.

GDD calls them lCi Ba'i Chos, so we read guru as heavy or special, not as teacher.

61. She was locked in a harem and sent a messenger in order to obtain ordination. See Pruden fn#95 for variations on the story.

62. Sources for these ten types of ordination are found at Pruden footnote numbers 89-98.

63. *ADKB* p.621; *bShad Pa* p.388:

> No one takes up unrestraint in the manner of upavāsa, saying, "I will abide in a state of unrestraint for one full day." Because it is shameful action. So it is believed (Grags; kila) [by the Vaibhāṣikas.]

The Vaibhāṣikas agree that unrestraint is not acquired for a fixed period of time--that simply is not the way people commit sins, although such a thing is theoretically possible. However:

> The Sautrāntikas say: Unrestraint, like non-revealing [karma,] does not exist as a separate substance. Unrestraint is just the intention to commit a sin along with the factors associated [with the intention.] So, as long as that [intention] is not eliminated, even when a virtuous mind arises, one still possesses [the unrestraint.]

64. Except that one who has taken a commitment to take the upavāsa restraint on the eighth day of every month can take the restraint after having eaten.

For a bibliography on the subject see Pruden fn#102.

65. These four are killing, stealing, sexual misconduct and lying. *ADKB* p.623; *bShad Pa* p.390 calls these "improper conduct by nature" (Rang bZhin Gyi Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; prakṛti-sāvadya).

66. These three are renouncing high beds, music etc., and meals at forbidden times.

67. For extensive notes and bibliography on the place of upāsaka in Buddhism see Pruden fn#115.

68. *Mahānāma-sūtra*. This text, Poussin points out, is the main source for Vasubandhu as well as Buddhaghosa on the subject of upāsaka. See Pruden fn#116 for discussion of various places where this text appears.

69. i.e. The four roots plus intoxicants.

70. Upāsaka who observes one precept: ekadeśakārin; sNa gCig sPyod Pa.
One who observes two precepts: pradeśakārin; Phyogs gCig sPyod Pa.
One who observes three or four precepts: yadbhūyaskārin; Phal Cher sPyod Pa.
One who observes all five precepts: paripūrṇakārin; Yongs Su rDzogs Par sPyod Pa.

71. *SAKV* p.628; *'Grel bShad* p.35a5 informs us that these dharmas are: knowledge of extinction (kṣayajñāna); knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna); Right View (samyagdṛṣṭi); along with their retinue, the five uncontaminated aggregates.

72. Both editions of *GDD* show bCas Pa; Peking Edition of *bShad Pa* shows bCad Pa as does Dharamsala Edition.
Pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya are transgressions by virtue of contravening the rules laid down by the Buddha; in contrast to prakṛti-sāvadya--transgressions by nature. See {iv.122}.

73. In cases of illness monks were permitted to eat after noon, wear other than monk's clothes etc.

74. See Pruden footnote numbers 143 to 154 for sources and identification of these various substances.

75. i.e. The restraints other than the bhikṣu restraint include four of the seven precepts, killing, stealing, lying and sexual misconduct. The bhikṣu restraint includes all seven non-virtues of body and speech.

76. Non-desire; non-hatred; non-ignorance.

77. *SAKV* p.643; *'Grel bShad* p.44a3, lists the four root downfalls: non-celibacy (abrahmacaryam); stealing of a certain consequence (yathokta-pramāṇam adattādānam); killing a human being (manuṣya-vadha); lying about

one's supernatural powers (uttari-manuṣya-dharma-mṛṣāvāda).
See also Pruden fn#165 for other sources on the subject.

78. Poussin (Pruden p.614) attributes this to the Dharmaguptakas.

79. i.e. Although the bhikṣu has degenerate morality the Buddha still speaks of him as a bhikṣu and he can still commit a downfall.

80. *SAKV* p.646; *'Grel bShad* p.45b2:

> "Penitent" (bsLab Pa Byin; śikṣā-dattaka) means: If a bhikṣu has sexual relations with a woman due to powerful desire, but immediately thereupon he feels regret with the thought, "I have done a terrible thing." And without a single thought of concealing his action having arisen, he goes before the bhikṣu-saṅgha and confesses saying, "I have performed this sin." Then, based on the ruling of the ārya-saṅgha he carries out his penance of abstaining from contact with the bhikṣus and so forth--such a one is known as a penitent (śikṣā-dattaka). If, due to his degenerate conduct he is no longer a bhikṣu, then he is no longer [a bhikṣu.] And for such a one there is not to be another ordination; and he is not once again to be a bhikṣu. Therefore, due to degenerate conduct one does not [necessarily] lose [the restraint] of bhikṣu.

81. i.e. The Sautrāntikas are agreeing with the Kāśmīran's statement at *ADKB* p.646; *bShad Pa* p.409:

> If one were no longer a bhikṣu due to degenerate morality, there would be no such thing as penance (bsLab Pa sByin Pa; śikṣadattaka). We do not say that all those who commit a downfall [of sexual misconduct] (lTung Ba Byung Ba; sahādhyāpatti) are guilty of grave transgressions (Phas Pham; pārājika); rather that whoever commits a grave transgression is unquestionably no longer a bhikṣu. In some instances, due to the special qualities of the continuum, it does not become a grave transgression. It is those whose minds do not conceal [their downfalls] that are established by the Lord of the Dharma [as penitents.]

82. *SAKV* p.644; *'Grel bShad* p.44b2:

> Because they are no longer capable of seeing the Truths, there is no attainment of the state of ultimate bhikṣu for those who have committed a sin (lTung Bar 'Gyur Ba; āpanna).

83. *ADKB* p.645; *bShad Pa* p.408:

> And this does not mean that one was previously an ultimate bhikṣu and subsequently lost the status of a bhikṣu.

"Request and the four acts" is a descriptive name of the standard ritual of ordination.

84. For various sources on this quote and these terms see Pruden fn#173.

85. Note that there are no restraints in the Formless Realm. Because there is no body to act as a basis.

86. i.e. Fruits of Stream-winner, Once-returner, Non-returner, Arhat.

87. The path of the candidate consists of the three paths: The Path of Preparation (sByor Lam; prayoga-mārga); the uninterrupted path (Bar Ched Med Lam; ānantarya-mārga); and the path of liberation (rNam 'Grol Lam; vimukti-mārga). See {vi.65}.

88. For example, when the force that impelled a potters wheel or a flying arrow terminates, the wheel stops and the arrow falls.

89. By considering that one has done it long enough.

90. 'Bras sPung Edition is corrected from Tha Ma to Za Ma three times, p.136a4-5.

For a discussion of these terms and my translation of them see Chapter 2, fn#2.

91. Prātimokṣa restraint; restraint of concentration; uncontaminated restraint.

92. Only Āryans have uncontaminated restraint and the special concentration and the states of non-discrimination are not levels on which Āryans arise.

For the gods of the Formless Realm, they can possess the restraint, but it is never manifest (mNgon Sum Gyur Pa; sammukhī-bhāva), because the restraint is form. (*ADKB* p.651; *bShad Pa* p.414).

93. *ADKB* p.652; *bShad Pa* p.414:

> Since [this chapter] is concerned with the presentation of karma, from here on, a presentation of karma as it is taught in the sutras is to be undertaken.

94. *Madhyama*, Taisho 1, p.743. Compare *Majjhima*, i.454.

95. Geshe Donyo explains that there are eight flaws in the meditative stabilization from the third concentration on down. The fourth concentration is said to be immoveable because these flaws are not there. See {viii.11}.
But here the meaning of "immoveable" is different.

96. Pleasure (bDe Ba; sukha) here means the feeling of pleasure and the feeling of mental happiness in the Desire Realm and the first two concentrations; and the feeling of mental happiness in the third concentration.

97. The special first concentration (dhyānāntara) is between the first and second concentration. It is a kind of annex of the first concentration, higher because there is no investigation (rTog Pa; vitarka). In the special first concentration there is only neutral feeling, no pleasure or suffering. So there must be karma to be experienced there in levels other than the fourth concentration.

98. *ADKB* p.655; *bShad Pa* p.417:

> Because it says in sūtra: "Can there be the ripening of three types of karma at the same time? There can be: that to be experienced as pleasure [can ripen as] form; that to be experienced as suffering [can ripen as] the dharmas of the minds and mental factors; that to be experienced as neither suffering nor pleasure [can ripen as] the formative forces not associated with mind." Therefore, there is also karma to be experienced as neither pleasure nor suffering in the lower [levels;] because other than in the Desire Realm there is no other [level] where the ripening of three types of karma could be possessed simultaneously.

99. We see at *ADKB* {ii.10c} that the sūtra speaks of sukha-vedanīya-sparśa. This is taken to mean contact with which the feeling of pleasure is concomitant or suitable to arise. See *SAKV* p.656; *'Grel bShad* p.50a5.

100. The three types of karma are uncertain karma and two of the three types of certain karma.
The point here is that there is no sense in talking about homogeneity within one lifetime. Its function is to transmit sameness from generator to generated.
See {ii.41} for homogeneity (nikāya-sabhāga).

101. Here the four "projections of karma" (Las bZhi'i 'Phen Pa; caturṇām karmaṇām-ākṣepa) merely means the four types of karma listed above in both their virtuous and non-virtuous aspects. The limitations to this rule follow.

102. The eight levels are from the Desire Realm up through the third formless absorption. One can only be free of attachment to the ninth level, the Peak of Existence, by means of the super-mundane path because there is no higher level with which to compare it, as is done on the mundane path. Therefore ordinary individuals can only be free of attachment to eight levels. Āryans who become free of attachment to the Peak of Existence become Arhats. See {vi.45}.

Those who are firm (akopyadharman) are discussed at {vi.56}, primarily with reference to Arhats.

103. See {vi.60} for explanation.

The Āryan who is free of attachment to the Desire Realm is a Non-returner. {vi.36}

The Āryan who is free of attachment to the Peak of Existence is an Arhat. {vi.45}

104. See {iii.19}: kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana, praśākhā.

105. See {iii.19}: bāla, kumāra, yuva, madhya, vṛddha = baby, youth, prime of life, middle age, old age.

106. *ADKB* p.660; *bShad Pa* p.422:

> THOSE ARE FRUITS TO BE EXPERIENCED IN THE PRESENT LIFE. What was explained as the eleven types of certain karma in the intermediate existence should be understood to be karma to be experienced in the present life.
>
> What is the reason? THEY ARE ONE HOMOGENOUS EXISTENCE (Ris gCig; nikāyo hi eka). They are just one homogenous existence. What is the intermediate existence and what are the ten stages that follow from it, they are [all] projected by a single karma. For that reason a separate karma to be experienced in the intermediate existence is not mentioned. Because that [intermediate existence] is projected only by karma to be experienced in the next life.

To clarify this: The intermediate existence and the rebirth that follows from it are projected by a single karma, which is a karma to be experienced in the next life. Actions taken while in the intermediate existence will ripen there or in the following rebirth, so they are karma to be experienced in the present

life.

107. This and the next story are summarized by *SAKV* p.662; *'Grel bShad* p.52a3.

108. Because one can not be born on that level in the future.

109. For nirodha-samāpatti see {ii.41} and {viii.33}. It is like Nirvāṇa in its pacification of feeling and discrimination. It is cultivated by Āryans because it appears to be liberation.

110. See viii.29 and 35 respectively.

111. We see in {i.32} that the five faculty consciousnesses are always with both investigation and analysis. So bodily feeling, which depends on these faculties, must also have investigation and analysis. Since actions taken on the levels from the special first concentration upwards are without investigation, they can not ripen in bodily feeling, but only mental feeling.

112. See {ii.10} where we see that mental unhappiness is never a fruition but itself has fruition.

113. We quote from {i.33}, *GDD p.60*:

> If someone says: If the five dhātus of consciousness have investigation, it is contradictory to the sūtra that explains them as being without conceptuality (rNam Par rTog Pa; vikalpa): "Oh Bhikṣus, the eye consciousness cognizes blue, but not by thinking, 'This is blue.'" If one says this:
>
> There is no contradiction, because, in general, there are three conceptualities: natural conceptuality (Ngo Bo Nyid; svabhāva); examining conceptuality (Nges Par rTog Pa; abhinirūpaṇa); and conceptuality of memory (rJes Su Dran Pa'i; anusmaraṇa). From among these the consciousnesses of the five doors are explained as non-conceptuality because of [being without] examining conceptuality and conceptuality of memory; but not because they are without natural conceptuality.
>
> Then if one asks, what are these conceptualities? The first [natural conceptuality] will be explained among the mental factors {ii.33}. Examining conceptuality and the conceptuality of memory should be understood respectively as: A wisdom (Shes Rab; prajñā) concomitant with mental consciousness which is wavering (gYeng Ba; vyagra) towards its object. [And conceptuality of memory is:] A

memory concomitant with a mental consciousness which remembers its object without depending on a name; and this includes all [such memory] whether in meditative equipoise or not in equipoise (mNyam Par bZhag Pa; samāhitā).

Here, wavering mental wisdom is [a wisdom] concomitant with that [mental consciousness] that is arisen from hearing or thinking or is inborn.

114. Thus contradicting {iv.57} above: "The fruition of non-virtuous karma is held to be exclusively feeling of body."

115. *SAKV* p.668; *'Grel bShad* p.:

> They realize the nature of reality (Chos Nyid mNgon Par Shes Pa; dharmatā abhijñatva) means: All contaminated things are suffering. All conditioned things are impermanent. All phenomena are without self. So they realize the nature (Ngo Bo Nyid; svabhāva) of phenomena.

116. Here GDD has chosen the synonym sKyon (fault), rather than Nyes Pa (defect) which appears in the *bShad Pa* p.427.

117. Sarnath Edition p.251 and 'Bras sPung Edition p.140b3 are both corrected from "Nyon Mongs Pa Dang Ma 'Dres" to: Mi dGes Ba Dang Ma 'Dres //

*ADKB* p.669; *bShad Pa* p.428:

> Virtue that is included in the Form Realm is exclusively white because it is unmixed with non-virtue; and because its fruition is agreeable its fruition is also white....
>
> Virtue that is included in the Desire Realm is black-white because it is mixed with non-virtue; and because its fruition is mixed the fruition is also black-white. This is established in terms of a continuum, not in terms of the nature [of the individual karma.] There is no such thing as a single karma or fruition that is black and also white, because these are mutually exclusive.
>
> In that case wouldn't non-virtue also become black-white since it is mixed with virtuous karma? In the Desire Realm non-virtue is not necessarily mixed with virtue, because it has force. Virtue, because it is of lesser force, is mixed.

118. *ADKB* p.670; *bShad Pa* p.429:

> Uncontaminated karma causes the termination and the elimination of those three [types of] karma....Since it is contrary to entering into [the process of existence, uncontaminated karma] is not included within the realms; therefore it has no fruition.

See {ii.6}.

119. Because there is no non-virtue in the four concentrations.

120. See Pruden fn#260 for citations.

121. In Tibetan this sentence can be read as: "No More Learning is sagehood (Thub Pa) because one has permanently overcome (Thub Pa) the afflictions."

However the pun in Sanskrit is that Sagehood (mauneya) is the state of silence or quiescence (mauna) of the body, speech and mind of one in the state of No More Learning.

In fact, Poussin (Pruden p.638) even translates mauneya as silence: "The Sūtra says, 'There are three silences, silence of the body, voice and of the mind.'"

122. *ADKB* p.672; *bShad Pa* p.431:

> Just the mind itself of an individual of No More Learning is sagehood (Thub Pa; mauna) of mind; that is, it is not the karma of mind. Why is that? Mind is the ultimate Sage (Thub Pa; muni). That [mind of No More Learning] can be inferred from the karma of body and speech; so it is believed (Grag; kila) [by the Vaibhāṣikas.]

123. See Pruden fn#264 for citations.

124. See Pruden fn#266 for citations.

125. *ADKB* p.674; *bShad Pa* p.432:

> Although they are not of the nature of karma, there are three types of mental bad conduct, which are not of the nature of intention: covetousness (brNab Sems; abhidyā); malice (gNod Sems; vyapada); and wrong view (Log lTa; mithya-dṛṣṭi).

These states of mind are not intentional karma because they are affliction itself, however they set in motion intentions. Activities of body, speech and

mind that are condemned are considered "bad conduct" simply because they have a disagreeable result.

126. The six are: killing, stealing, lying, slander, harmful speech and idle chatter, when one person has another person commit them. They can be only avijñapti because the one who orders another to do them commits no vijñapti karma.

127. *ADKB* p.676; *bShad Pa* p.434:

> If one induces another to perform it one does not get the same pleasure.

128. i.e. They depend only upon the mind so there is no vijñapti karma of body or speech.

129. i.e. In the sense that all three roots--attachment, anger and ignorance--can initially give rise to the action by being the initial motivation.

The full analysis of which karmic paths are accomplished by which of the three roots is given below under: (c) The specific explanations of the non-virtuous karmic paths.

130. See {ii.47}.

131. According to Geshe Donyo this refers to appropriating something by means of mantra and other magical powers.

132. These are a sub-category of lying.

133. See Pruden fn#338 for citations.

134. Geshe Donyo says this means to flatter for the sake of alms. See also Poussin's discussion (Pruden fn#352).

135. *ADKB* p.694; *bShad Pa* p.451 explains that this definition is the root text's quotation from a longer sūtra (Pruden fn#361) which goes on to say that wrong view includes the view that there is no giving, no offering, no fire offering, no good action, no bad action, no Arhats in the world and so forth. So false view consists of denying karma and its results, the Āryans and all the essential elements of the Buddhist path system.

136. Here this term is used as a synonym for wrong view.

137. The acquired roots of virtue are those acquired through the effort of the threefold training: hearing, thinking and meditating.

The innate roots of virtue are those to which a being takes possession at the moment of rebirth in the intermediate existence or in the Formless Realm.

We see at {iv.79d} that (according to the Vaibhāṣikas) the roots of virtue are cut in the same manner as the objects to be abandoned by Meditation are eliminated: the strong-strong root of virtue is cut by the weak-weak false view; conversely the weak-weak root of virtue is cut by the strong-strong false view.

So the point here is that the acquired roots of virtue are already cut by the weak-weak false view by the time of the actual cutting of the roots of virtue, which takes place at the time of the most powerful, strong-strong false view.

138. See {vi.33} for description of this process.

139. See my Chapter 2, fn#2 for an account of these characters.

'Bras sPung Edition p.144b5 is corrected from Tha Ma// to Za Ma//. Sarnath Edition p.259 is corrected from Za Ma Dang Ning// to Za Ma Dang Ma Ning//.

140. *SAKV* p.726; *'Grel bShad* p.85a3 in his comment to {iv.100} explains:

> "And the one [who creates the schism] is one who indulges in views (lTa Ba sPyad Pa; dṛṣṭi-carita)" means: Because he indulges (sPyad; carita), which means engages (Zhugs; pravṛtta), in the five views--view of the transitory collection and so forth, he is called one who indulges in views.

141. *ADKB* p.702; *bShad Pa* p.456:

> Those who cut [the roots of virtue] on the strength of a cause (rGyu; hetu) will regenerate them at the time of death. Those who cut them on the strength of conditions (rKyen; pratyaya) will regenerate them at the time of rebirth.
>
> One who cuts them on one's own strength and one who cuts them on the strength of another are the same as [the two above.]

To which *SAKV* p.702; *'Grel bShad* p.70b8 comments:

> "On the strength of a cause" means: on the strength of

homogenous cause (sKal mNyam Gyi rGyu; sabhāga-hetu); due to which one spontaneously (bDag gNyid; svayaṁ) adheres to wrong view.

"On the strength of conditions" means: on the strength of the words of another; due to which one adheres to wrong view.

[Those who cut them] on the strength of cause [regenerate them only after they die in hell--rather than when they are born in hell--] because they possess the essence (sNying Po Dang lDan Pa; sāratvāt) [of the karma that cuts the roots of virtue.]

142. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, all afflicted speech is also idle chatter, so in this case there are the karmic paths of: harmful thought, lying, slander, idle chatter.

143. Five can not arise together because that would be the four karmic paths of the upāsaka plus a virtuous mental path; but non-covetousness and non-harming mind are inseparable, so there would have to be six.

144. A bhikṣu possesses the seven karmic paths of the precepts. When his mind is neutral or non-virtuous there are only those seven. When his mind is virtuous there must be at least nine because non-harming and non-covetousness are inseparable.

145. See {iv.37}. This is action that is not based on a formal vow but is based on a potent field or a strong motivation and promise.

Since these are individual actions and don't travel in groups as do the restraints, they can come in combinations of any number.

146. See {ii.55ff} for definitions of the types of causes and results.

147. *ADKB* p.710; *bShad Pa* p.462:

> Due to all those non-virtues that are assiduously performed (Kun Du bsTen Pa; āsevita), habitually done (Goms Par Byas Pa; bhāvita), or repeatedly practiced (Lan Mang Du Byas Pa; bahulīkṛta) there is rebirth in the hells. This is the fruitional result of those [karmas.]

148. These latter two points seem to be GDD's interpolations. As Geshe Donyo points out they are general guidelines, not pervasions.

In the Tibetan teaching tradition sometimes the last two are given in reverse: by the medium strength actions one is born as a hungry ghost; by the weakest, one is born as an animal.

149. The list continues: By idle chatter one's own words will not be valued. By covetousness one will have intense desires. By harmful thoughts one will have intense hatred. By wrong view one will have profound ignorance.

150. *ADKB* p.711; *bShad Pa* p.463 have gZi; ojas = vitality.
*GDD* has gZi brJid = splendor. The sense seems to be vitality and this is the way Poussin reads it.

Geshe Donyo suggests that GDD may intend "little splendor" to mean it is generally not an appealing place.

151. The list continues: By sexual misconduct the place is filled with dirt. By lying the place is of foul odor. By slander the place is uneven. By harsh words the place is barren, dry, inferior and inhabited by evil persons. By idle chatter the place has an unbalanced climate. By covetousness the crops are small. By harmful thought the crops are sour. By wrong view the crops are few or non-existent.

152. GDD has simplified and left standing clear distinctions between the different kinds of results. However in the *ADKB* Vasubandhu suggests that the distinctions may be purely nominal, and that they are all merely different aspects of the same fruition. *ADKB* p. 711; *bShad Pa* p.463:

> Is it the very same karma which [reaches fruition in the hells and also] causes this life [as a human] to be short; or are they different [karmas?]
>
> Some say that it is the very same [karma:] one is the fruitional result and the other is the naturally flowing result.
>
> Others say that [birth in the hells] is due to the preparation, and that this [short life as a human] is due to the actual act. They say that in speaking of killing [the sūtra] means killing with all the [actions] that accompany it.
>
> What is called naturally flowing result does not exist separately from fruitional result and sovereign result. It is expressed in that way [as naturally flowing result] because of the similarity [between the cause and its result.]

153. See Pruden fn#419 for citations. The text is given at length by *SAKV* p.714; *'Grel bShad* p.77b7.

154. This refers specifically to the uninterrupted paths (Bar Chad Med Lam; ānantarya-marga) discussed at {vi.28, 49}, which can be either contaminated or uncontaminated; i.e. mundane or supermundane.

155. i.e. Those dharmas that this action gives rise to: the paths of liberation (rNam Grol Lam; vimukti-mārga) {vi.28}; those dharmas that are concomitant; future dharmas that will be obtained in the future due to this action; and the abandoning itself.

156. All saṁskṛta dharmas other than the action itself and those that arose previous to the action are sovereign result. See {ii.58}.

157. i.e. It is a separation based on wisdom. See {ii.57}.

158. *SAKV* p.717; *'Grel bShad* p.80a3 explains that this is because separation falls outside of time.

Yaśomitra goes on to explain how the four types of results function as the results of past actions. His commentary is translated by Poussin (Pruden fn#424).

159. *SAKV* p.720; *'Grel bShad* p.82a1:

> "What arises from a misguided thought" means: what arises from a thought that engages in what is misguided (Tsul bZhin Ma Yin Pa; ayoni), improper (Rigs Pa Ma Yin; anyāya) and bound to affliction (Nyon Mongs Dang lDan Pa; kleśa-yoga).

160. Poussin (Pruden fn#430) cites: *Majjhima*, iii.69; *Jātaka*, 390; *Dhammapada*, 355; *Theragāthā* 910.

*KZAV* 345: *Madhyamāgama*, Taisho 1 509a20.

161. i.e. Indra, the leader of the gods of the heaven of the Thirty-three.

162. *ADKB* p.722; *bShad Pa* p.471:

> And it is not exclusively karma that projects a life. What is it? It is also those other things that are associated with a fruition. But in all cases: THE TWO NON-CONSCIOUS ABSORPTIONS DO NOT PROJECT, NOR DOES OBTAINMENT. Although they are associated with fruition the two non-conscious absorptions do not project an existence of same type, because they do not occur together with any karma.

The idea here is that although these two absorptions can contribute to completing karma, because there is no action (karma) in those states--because they are unconscious--they do not have the power to project an existence. Poussin (Pruden fn#434) cites Hsuan-tsang here with a useful explanation:

It is not only action which projects and fills [completes] an existence, but also all the dharmas which embrace retribution. But by reason of the capital importance of action, one only speaks of action. However these dharmas, when they do not coexist (saha) with action, are capable of filling [completing] but not of projecting because their force is small.

And *SAKV* p.722; *'Grel bShad* p.82b3 comments:

> "It is also those other things that are associated with a maturation" means: feelings (Tsor Ba; vedanā) and so forth.
>
> "Because they do not occur together with any karma" means: these two absorptions do not occur together with karma which is called intention. And since there is no cognition (Sems Med Pa; acittakatva), [these absorptions] also do not occur together with bodily or vocal karma either.
>
> There is also no projection [of an existence] by the obtainments which are associated with the fruition because the karma and its result are not identical. Although the obtainments are simultaneous with the projecting karma, they do not have the same result; because the obtainments are like the young sprouts (Phyi Shun; prapāṭika) of a tree, which remain on the outside.

Geshe Sopa explains that the two unconscious absorptions can not themselves act as fruitional cause or projecting karma because they lack mental functions which includes intention, which is karma. However the absorption of non-discrimination is one level of the fourth concentration, and the absorption of cessation is one level of the Peak of Existence.

The cause to be born on the level of a particular concentration or formless absorption comes from attaining that level in meditation. The actual projecting karma or fruitional cause arises when one attains the preparatory level (Nyer bsDogs; sāmantaka) and the completing karma arises from the attainment of the actual absorption (dNgos gZhi sNyoms 'Jog; maula-samāpatti).

So when the text says, "the two non-conscious absorptions do not project [a birth,] because it is already projected by the fourth concentration and the Peak of Existence," it is referring to the fact that by the time the practitioner reaches the actual absorptions of these two non-conscious states, he or she has already acquired the projecting karma on the preparatory stages of those two levels.

163. Geshe Sopa explains that the Āryans, once they complete the Path of Seeing, no longer produce any projecting karma. All future rebirths are projected by previously accumulated seeds. Their actions, however, do produce completing karma. This is also true for those in the states conducing to insight, which are the practices of the Path of Preparation leading up to the Path of Seeing.

164. The five are: killing one's mother; killing one's father, killing an Arhat; causing a schism in the saṅgha; causing blood to flow from the body of a Tathāgata with malicious intent.

165. See {vi.17}.

166. For references on schism see Pruden fn#454.

167. i.e. The saṅgha will once again be reconciled by the next sunrise.

168. *ADKB* p.728; *bShad Pa* p.476:

> There is another [type of] schism in the saṅgha which occurs due to a schism of ritual action. It occurs when, within one religious community they perform ritual actions separately.

169. *ADKB* p.728; *bShad Pa* p.476 reads:

> yadyekasīmāyāṁ vyagrāḥ karmāṇi kurvanti...//
> ...Gal Te mTsams gCig Gi Nang Du Mi mThun Pa Las Dag Byed Na'o //

vyagra / Mi mThun Pa here seems to mean "separately or in separate places" as cited in *BHS* p.513. However by adding bLo, GDD is reading Mi mThun Pa in its more conventional sense of disharmonious, agitated, confused.

170. The Supreme Pair are, according to *SAKV* p.729; *'Grel bShad* p.86a2: Maudgalyāyana and Śāriputra.

171. The six are: When the Buddha has only recently arrived; during the period he is passing away; before any fault has arisen in the teaching; before the Supreme Pair of disciples appears; after the Buddha has passed away; when the boundaries of the religious community are not defined.

172. For citations and arguments within the tradition on this point see Pruden fn#463.

173. *ADKB* p.731; *bShad Pa* p.478:

> But the second [woman] performs all the activities of a mother: gives the child milk, nourishes it, and raises it.

See Pruden fn#468 for various interpretations of these terms.

174. See Pruden fn#469-470 for citations.

175. Geshe Donyo comments that these four attainments correspond to the four fruits:
1. Entry into the path = higher rebirths as gods, humans, etc.
2. Obtaining fruit = Stream-enterers and Once-returners.
3. Freedom from attachment = Non-returners.
4. Extinction of contamination = Arhatship.

176. *Vibhāṣā*, Taisho 27, p.601a10; *Majjhima*, i.372.

177. See Pruden fn#346 for references to this story.

178. See {v.3}.

179. For Supreme Worldly Dharmas see {vi.20-21} and {vi.25}. It is the last of the four states conducing to insight (Nges Che Cha mThun; nirveda-bhāgīyas), and the last moment of the Path of Preparation, from which follows immediately the Path of Seeing.

For Vajropama-samādhi see {vi.44}. At {vi.77} and {viii.27-28} we see that upon attaining the Vajropama-samādhi of the fourth concentration all the remaining afflictions are abandoned and the mind of No-more-learning arises.

These two states are not homogenous cause because the states that succeed them are utterly transformed and not homogenous with them. The states which are their results are the greatest result of human effort and result of separation for, respectively, contaminated and uncontaminated karma.

180. See {iii.44} and {vi.34}. This is an Āryan who is certain to attain Nirvāṇa.

181. *SAKV* p.734; *'Grel bShad* p.88b3:

> Ācārya Vasumitra says: stealing the property of the saṅgha (dGe 'Dun Gyi 'Du Ba'i sGo; saṅghāya-dvara) means to repeatedly steal the permanent endowment (akṣaya-nīvī) [of the saṅgha.] But this is to be

explained: to steal the property of the saṅgha is to steal what is used for their livelihood (Tso Bar Byed Pa; jīvikā kalpayati), what is offered as food (Zhal Du gSol; mukhopabhogika).

Geshe Donyo says this refers to offered food. See Pruden fn#481 for discussion of this term. There seem to be several versions of this passage as the Śāstrī Edition of Yaśomitra reads sukhāya-dvara, whereas the Peking Edition of Yaśomitra and the bShad Pa read mukhāya-dvara (Zhal Du 'Du Ba'i sGo). And Poussin reads the latter part of the definition as Vasumitra's view rather than the earlier part, as is clear in the Peking Edition.

182. This probably should read Vasumitra, as this is his view according to Yaśomitra--see previous footnote.

183. For references on the 32 marks, and a list of references to the Bodhisattva in the *ADKB,* see Pruden fn#483.

184. I have translated according to GDD's reading, which is a different interpretation from Yaśomitra. The *ADKB* p.735; *bShad Pa* p.482 has:

> tasyāṁ ca sugatau kṣatriya-brāhmaṇa-gṛhapatimahāśālakulajo bhavati, nānyaḥ kulīnaḥ //

To which *SAKV* p.735; *'Grel bShad* p.88b6 comments:

> mahāśālakulaja iti = mahāprakārakulaja ityarthaḥ //

So for Yaśomitra the sense is many types of all three high castes.

185. GDD interprets this as the Bodhisattva's motivation must be an intention to attain Buddhahood. The *ADKB* p.736; *bShad Pa* p.483 actually seems to be saying that the karma must have the Buddha as its object, as in giving something to the Buddha.

186. Poussin (Pruden fn#489) quotes the *Vibhāṣā* Taisho 27, p.887c5:

> Are the actions which mature in the marks śrutamaya, cintāmaya, or bhāvanāmaya, i.e., do they come from out of the teaching, out of reflection or out of absorption? They are solely cintāmaya. Why? By reason of the special importance (prādhānya) of this type of action (of action arisen from reflection): the action that issues from out of the teaching exists only in Kāmadhātu...Some say that the action that matures in the marks issues from out of both the teaching and

reflection, but not from absorption. In what place is there produced an action which matures in marks? Only in Kāmadhātu, only in the human realm of rebirth, only in Jambudvīpa, only with a male and not a female body, etc. In what time period? In the period when the Buddhas appear (utpāda); and not in a period empty of Buddhas, for the special volition (cetanā) and resolution-vow (praṇidhāna) [which create this action] do not bear on any other object.

187. *ADKB* p.736; *bShad Pa* p.483:

> But the Bhagavan Śākyamuni, by his purified effort (brTzon 'Grus dByangs Pa; uttapta-vīryatā) skipped over (bsDums; apāvartita) nine kalpas, and projected [the karma] when there were 91 kalpas remaining.

For other references on this point see Pruden fn#492.

188. For extended discussion of various interpretations of how the 100 merits are accumulated see *SAKV* p.737; *'Grel bShad* p.89a5, which is translated by Poussin (Pruden fn#495).

189. The 18 unmatched qualities of a Buddha (āveṇika buddha-dharma) are listed in *BHS* p.108, based on *Mv* 135-153. In the *ADKB* the discussion begins at {vii.28}, where they are introduced as the 18 qualities unique to a Buddha which the Bodhisattva acquires at the moment of the Knowledge of Cessation (Zad Pa Shes Pa; kṣaya-jñāna).

190. Vasubandhu says (*ADKB* p.737; *bShad Pa* p.485) "in reverse order" because he gives the list of names in the root text in the reverse order of their appearance in the first, second and third countless kalpa.

GDD then uses the phrase "in reverse order" to mean "in the reverse of the order [in which the names appear] in the [root] text." He then gives the names in the direct order in which the Buddhas appeared, first, second and third.

191. *Mv* 9107.

192. Yul 'Khor sKyong. See *SCD* p.1140; also *Mv* 3381 where it is the name of a Gandharva.

193. Poussin says (Pruden fn#499): "Example: Śibi."

194. See Pruden fn#500 for citations.

195. *Mv* 3846.

196. For citations and discussion regarding this verse see Pruden fn#501-504.

197. See Pruden fn#506 for citations and definition.

198. *Mv* 1392.

199. Because such an Āryan has passed beyond the Desire Realm where the karma of such giving would ripen--so it is not for himself, except in the case of what ripens in the current existence.

200. One's fame spreads in every direction, like a fragrance.

201. This sūtra is also quoted at {iii.41}. *Majjhima*, iii.255.

202. i.e. The result of giving one piece of bread will be to receive 100 or 1000 pieces of bread.

203. See above, GDD's commentary to {iv.3} includes a list of the seven; number six is making offerings to the sick and medical practitioners, and number seven is offering food to the saṅgha inside the monastery when the conditions are foul from wind and rain.

204. *Majjhima*, iii.253.

205. See below and {vii.48}.

206. See below and {vi.67}.

207. *SAKV* p.745; *'Grel bShad* p.:

> yogasambhāra-arthaṁ = yoga-nidāna-arthaṁ //

208. See {vi.51}, where śrāmaṇya is defined as "the pure path" by which one pacifies the afflictions. As Geshe Donyo explains the śrāmaṇya-phala are the four fruits of Stream-enterer etc. Paramārtha concurs, Pruden Chapter Six, fn#310.

209. This last seems to be the interpolation of a Mahāyāna interpretation. The seven impure levels refers to the first seven Bodhisattva-bhūmis, and the three pure levels refers to the last three bhūmis.

210. To.354. This is a Mahāyāna Sūtra. No Sanskrit name is given.

211. *Mv* 1401.

212. *ADKB* p.746; *bShad Pa* p.492:

> The attitude is the mental wish (sNyam Du bSems Pa; abhiprāya), "I would like to (kuryām) do such and such to them. Then I will do such and such."

Geshe Donyo explains that attitude (bSam Pa) is the initial motivating wish of intention (bSems Pa).

213. Geshe Donyo comments: It has to be done out of one's own thought and intention--deliberately. If I say to you, "Either you steal this or I will kill you," and then you steal it, it is karma that is committed but not accumulated. Or if a king orders one to do it, it is not accumulated. But if one intends to do it and makes the preparations to do it oneself, then it is accumulated.

214. The four limbs: attitude, preparation, actual action, subsequent action.

215. *ADKB* p.747; *bShad Pa* p.493:

> What is the meaning of "due to its retinue" {iv.120}? A non-virtue has a retinue of other non-virtues.

To which comments *SAKV* p.747; *'Grel bShad* p.:

> "A non-virtue has a retinue of other non-virtues," means: having committed [the action] one rejoices (rJes Su Yi Rang Ba; anumodata).

To which GDD comments below.

216. *ADKB* p.746; *bShad Pa* p.493:

> That karma which is not completed (rDzogs Par Byas Pa; samapta) to the degree that one goes to [a good or a bad migration,] is committed

> but not accumulated. That which is completed [to that degree] is accumulated.

See below, where GDD presents this point as a definition of "completed" karma.

217. Geshe Donyo comments: Karma that is accumulated but not committed is like a king who orders someone to be killed. He does not commit the action but he intends it and approves of it and causes it.

218. *Mv* 9090, 9091.

219. *ADKB* p.750; *bShad Pa* p.496:

> VIRTUOUS MEDITATIVE EQUIPOISE IS MEDITATION. What is the meaning of meditative equipoise (mNyam Par bZhag Pa; samāhita)? It is that which has the nature of meditative stabilization (Ting Nge 'Dzin; samādhi) {ii.24} {viii.1}, and what arises together with it.
>
> Why is this called meditation (bsGom Pa; bhāvanā)? BECAUSE IT PERVADES THE MIND (Sems La sGo Phyir Ro; citta-vāsanāt). The meaning of virtuous meditative equipoise is that: by means of the virtuous qualities [of meditative stabilization] the mental continuum is made to assume that same nature, and thus it pervades the mind. Just like sesame is pervaded by [the fragrance] of flowers.

220. To.3846.

221. *ADKB* p.751; *bShad Pa* p.497:

> Although giving also contributes to attaining higher rebirths, morality is primary. Although morality also contributes to separation [from afflictions,] meditation is primary.

222. In Tibetan Kun dGa' Rwa Ba is generally read as "housing for the saṅgha"--a monastery etc. But an ārāma is clearly a pleasure grove, garden or park, which expanded to take on that meaning in the context of the saṅgha being granted such parks and turning them into monastic settlements.

223. Poussin (Pruden fn#549) gives citations and presents the full text which also appears at *SAKV* p.751; *'Grel bShad* p.95b5.

224. There are two types of kalpas in which the length of the gods' lives are measured: From the Parītābha gods of the second concentration on up, the kalpa referred to is a great kalpa (mahā-kalpa), which equals eighty intermediate kalpas (antaḥ-kalpa) {iii.93}. Below that, including the level of the Brahmapurohitas--the second level of the first concentration--the kalpa referred to is one half of a great kalpa, which equals forty intermediate kalpas {iii.80}.

The Brahmapurohitas live for one of these kalpas which means for one half a great kalpa or 40 intermediate kalpas. As GDD explains here, the "merits of Brahma" are the amount of merits that cause one to be born in high rebirths of the Desire Realm for a length of time equal to the life-span of the Brahmapurohitas.

225. "And so forth" means--for the sake of fame (Grags Pa; yaśas). (*ADKB* p.753; *bShad Pa* p.497)

226. For a list of the 12 see Rigzin p.453 or *SCD* p.1307.

227. On mokṣa-bhāgīyas see {iii.44}, {vi.24}, {vii.30}. See also interesting quote from the *Vibhāṣā* excerpted by Poussin (Pruden fn#558).

228. See {vi.17ff}.

229. Quoted by *SAKV* p.755; *'Grel bShad* p.98a7.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# THE PRESENTATION OF POLLUTING TENDENCIES

## Outline to Chapter Five

I. The connection [with the previous chapter.]

II. The actual explanation of the polluting tendencies.
- A. The divisions of the polluting tendencies.
  - 1. The actual topic.
    - a. The divisions of the root [polluting tendencies.]
    - b. The special divisions.
  - 2. What arises tangentially.
    - a. Ascertaining which [polluting tendencies] are to be abandoned [on which paths.]
    - b. The definition of each view.
    - c. Removing the disagreement connected with the last view.
    - d. Distinguishing the mistaken conceptions.
    - e. The extensive [explanation] of the divisions of pride.
- B. Distinguishing the types.
  - 1. The divisions based on cause.
  - 2. The divisions based on the object.
  - 3. The divisions based on nature.
    - a. The actual topic.
    - b. Distinguishing the roots.
    - c. The indeterminate questions, which arise incidentally.
  - 4. The manner of possessing based on time.
    - a. The actual topic.
    - b. Examining the establishment of the three times.
      - (1) Establishing the substantial existence of the object in the three times.
      - (2) Putting the argument against this.
      - (3) Casting the reply to that.
    - c. The differences between eliminating and separating.

5. Distinguishing object and subject.

C. The way in which the mind has the polluting tendencies.
D. The manner of arising of affliction.
E. The list of synonyms.
1. Synonyms that occur in the sūtras.
a. The contaminants (Zag Pa; āśrava).
b. The floods and yokes (Chu sByor; ogha-yoga).
c. The clingings (Nyer Len; upādana).
d. Explaining their etymology.

2. Synonyms that occur in the śāstras.
a. The presentation.
b. The explanation.
(1) The connections.
(a) The nine connections.
(b) The five conducive to lower levels.
(c) The five conducive to higher levels.

(2) The bonds.
(3) The subsidiary afflictions.
(4) The full entanglements.
(a) The actual explanation.
(b) Incidental topics.
1) The six impurities.
2) Distinguishing their qualities.

F. What they are concomitant with.
1. Which are concomitant with which consciousnesses.
2. Which are concomitant with which feelings.

G. The explanation of the five hindrances.

III. The manner of eliminating them.
[A. Objects to be abandoned by Seeing.]
1. Elimination by thorough knowledge of the object.
2. Elimination by the destruction of [the afflictions] that take them as objects.
3. Elimination by abandoning their objects.

[B. Objects to be abandoned by Meditation.]

IV. The presentation of complete knowledge, the fruit of eliminating them.
- A. The divisions.
- B. Which path has which fruit.
- C. Ascertaining the number.
- D. Which individuals possess them.
- E. The explanation of obtaining them and giving them up.

In the explanation of fifth chapter, The Presentation of the Polluting Tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya) there are four topics:

I. The connection [with the previous chapter.]

II. The actual explanation of the polluting tendencies.

III. The manner of eliminating them.

IV. The presentation of complete knowledge, the fruit of eliminating them.

I. The connection [with the previous chapter.]

As it says {iv.1}, "The manifold world arises from karma..." If one asks: Does this manifold animate and inanimate world arise exclusively from karma?

It does not. Because the root of existence (Srid Pa; bhava) is the polluting tendencies. It is due to karma that cyclic existence arises, and the afflictions that act as the source of that [karma] must precede it; because karma alone, without afflictions, will not yield fruit. [p.295; 164a1] It is like, for example, although an Arhat may have indefinite karma (Ma Nges Pa'i Las; aniyata-karma), because he does not have any afflictions, he will not be reborn in cyclic existence.

If one asks: Then is the affliction (Nyon Mongs; kleśa) of attachment simply the same thing as the polluting tendencies or are they different?

According to the Vaibhāṣikas: What is [the affliction of] attachment is

also polluting tendency, so they are the same thing.

The Sautrāntikas say: They are different things because latent (Nyal Ba; prasupta) attachment is a polluting tendency and manifest [attachment] is fully entangling (Kun dKris; paryava-sthāna).[1] {v.1a}

II. <u>The actual explanation of the polluting tendencies</u>.

There are seven topics:

A. The divisions of the polluting tendencies.

B. Distinguishing the types.

C. The way in which the mind has the polluting tendencies.

D. The manner of arising of affliction.

E. The list of synonyms.

F. What they are concomitant with.

G. The explanation of the five hindrances.

A. <u>The divisions of the polluting tendencies</u>.

There are two topics:

1. The actual topic.

2. What arises tangentially.

1. <u>The actual topic</u>.

There are two topics:

a. The divisions of the root [polluting tendencies.]

b. The special divisions.

a. The divisions of the roots.

As it says {v.1}, "The root of existence is the polluting tendencies..." If one asks: How many of these polluting tendencies are there?

There are six polluting tendencies: the polluting tendency of attachment ('Dod Chags; rāga); similarly, the polluting tendencies of anger (Khong Khro; pratigha), pride (Nga rGyal; māna), ignorance (Ma Rig Pa; avidyā), view (lTa Ba; dṛṣṭi) and doubt (The Tsom; vicikitsā).

The term "similarly" (De bZhin; tathā) means that whatever is capable of nourishing attachment when taken as an object, is also capable of nourishing anger and so forth.[2]

These six polluting tendencies are also explained as seven by dividing attachment in two: attachment to desire ('Dod Pa'i 'Dod Chags; kāmarāga) and attachment to existence (Srid Pa'i 'Dod Chags; bhava-rāga).

Attachment to desire is in the Desire Realm, because it arises by taking as objects qualities of the Desire Realm such as form, smell and so forth.

Attachment that arises in the upper two realms is attachment for existence.

If one asks: What is the reason that [the attachment] of these two [realms] are combined into one and called attachment to existence? [p.296; 164b1]

There is a reason for that. They are alike in that for the most part it is attachment for meditative equipoise [in which the mind] is turned inward.

There is a reason why these two are explained as attachment to existence: It is in order to counteract the idea that grasps at those two higher realms as liberation.

There is also [a way of explaining] the polluting tendencies as ten[3]: the five views and the five that are not views.

Within [the polluting tendency of] view there are five [divisions:] view of the transitory collection ('Jig Tsogs La lTa Ba; satkāya-dṛṣṭi); wrong view (Log Par lTa Ba; mithyā-dṛṣṭi); the view of holding to the extremes (mThar 'Dzin Pa'i lTa Ba; antagrāha-dṛṣṭi); esteeming [unworthy] views (lTa Ba mChog 'Dzin; dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa); esteeming [mistaken] morality and asceticism (Tsul Khrims Dang brTul Zhugs mChog Tu 'Dzin Pa'i lTa Ba; śīla-vrata-parāmarśa).[4] {v.1b-3}

b. <u>The special divisions</u>.

And these polluting tendencies, when they are divided by way of aspect (rNam Pa; ākāra), type [of mode of abandoning] (Bye Brag; prakāra)

and realm (Khams; dhātu), are held to be 98:[5]

The ten polluting tendencies that are views and that are not views are the ten that are to be abandoned by seeing the [Truth of] Suffering.

There are seven to be abandoned by seeing the Origination [of Suffering] and seven to be abandoned by seeing the Cessation [of Suffering]; these seven are [the ten] except three--the first two views[6] [the view of the transitory collection and view holding to the extremes,] and the last or fifth view [esteeming morality and asceticism.] There are eight that are to be abandoned by seeing the Path [to the Cessation of Suffering,] these are all except the [same] first two views.

These [32] are abandoned by seeing, respectively, the Truths of Suffering and so forth in the Desire Realm.[7]

Four are to be abandoned by meditation, all those except the [five] views and doubt.[8]

The very same polluting tendencies, with the exception of [the five types of] anger, are in the Form and Formless Realms, in the same way as the Desire Realm.[9] Therefore, it would come out in the Form [and Formless] Realms, [by analogy with {v.4a}:] "They are nine, six, six and seven." [Instead of {v.4a}: "They are ten, seven, seven and eight,"] by not including the three views [mentioned above {v.4b}] and anger. {4-5}

2. What arises tangentially.

There are five topics:

a. Ascertaining which [polluting tendencies] are to be abandoned [on which paths.]

b. The definition of each view.

c. Removing the disagreement connected with the last view.

d. Distinguishing the mistaken conceptions.

e. The extensive [explanation] of the divisions of pride.

[p.297; 165a2]

a. Ascertaining which [polluting tendencies] are to be abandoned [on which paths.]

Then if one asks: Are the polluting tendencies to be abandoned by Seeing only eliminated by the Path of Seeing, and those to be abandoned by Meditation only eliminated by the Path of Meditation?

Those [polluting tendencies] to be abandoned by Seeing that arise in the Peak of Existence and are to be destroyed (gZhom; vadhya) by the Patiences (bZod Pa; kṣānti),[10] are eliminated only by the Path of Seeing. Because the mundane [contaminated] path can not eliminate the afflictions of the Peak of Existence; and prior to the uncontaminated Path of Meditation

[which could eliminate the afflictions of the Peak of Existence] the Path of Seeing is already generated [and so those afflictions are already eliminated.]

The [polluting tendencies] which arise on the remaining eight levels[11] and are to be destroyed by the Patiences, can be eliminated by both the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation. Because the Āryan who is bound by all the bonds ('Ching Ba Kun lDan),[12] eliminates them by the Path of Seeing which sees the Truths directly; for immature beings who combine together those to be abandoned by Seeing and those to be abandoned by Meditation, when they are eliminated they are eliminated by the mundane Path of Meditation.[13]

According to the Sautrāntikas: Outsiders[14] do not eliminate the objects to be abandoned by Seeing, because for the outsider who is separated from attachment [of the Desire Realm, such] attachment still arises.

Those which are to be destroyed by the Knowledges[15] and are not to be destroyed by the Patiences, are eliminated only by the Path of Meditation; because those which are contaminated are not to be abandoned by seeing. {6}

b. <u>The definition of each view</u>.

As it says {v.3}, "The five views are..." If one asks: What is the

nature of these five views?

The view of one's appropriating aggregates (Nyer Len Gyi Phung Po; upādāna-skandha) as "I" or "mine" is the view of the transitory collection.

The view of the appropriating aggregates as eternal (rTag Pa; dhruva) or non-existent (Chad Pa; uccheda) is the view holding to the extremes.

The view that there is no karma, cause and effect is wrong view.

The view that considers inferior views and so forth as superior, is esteeming unworthy views.[16]

The view that considers what is not a cause to be a cause, or what is not the path [to be the path]--such as applying the five fires to the body or fasting--is esteeming mistaken morality and asceticism.

Then if one asks: Why is the first one called view of the transitory collection? [p.298; 165b2]

The appropriating aggregates are collections which are transitory, and because it is a view that sees them as I and mine, it is called that.

Then if one asks: How are they transitory collections? Because they perish due to momentariness and they perish due to the antidotes [so they are transitory;] and because they are collections of many moments they are transitory collections.

Then if one asks: What is the purpose of calling the view that considers the appropriating aggregates as I or mine, the view of the

transitory collection?

Speaking of it that way has the purpose of eliminating the grasping at a mistaken notion of self of persons: because by speaking of it that way, [as transitory and as a collection,] grasping at the self as permanent and unitary will be eliminated; and the grasping at a mistaken notion of self of persons has as its precursor the grasping at the self as permanent and unitary.

If one asks: Then aren't all [thoughts] directed at contaminated [saṁskṛta phenomena] views of transitory collections; or what is the reason for saying that the view of the transitory collections is only the view of the appropriating aggregates as I and mine?

There is a reason. Although those [other thoughts] are views of transitory collections, they do not [impute the conception of] I and mine [upon the transitory collection of the aggregates; so the purpose is] to make this understood. {7}

c. Removing the disagreement connected with the last view.

If one says: The subject is adhering to causes that are not causes, such as Īśvara and so forth. There is the consequence that it is an object to be abandoned by seeing [the Truth of] Origination. Because it is a wrong idea (Log Zhugs) about the cause of suffering. If one says this:

It is to be abandoned by seeing [the Truth of] Suffering, because [adherence to Īśvara as cause] is established by a mistaken conception of permanence (rTag Pa; nitya) and selfhood (bDag; ātman).[17] {8}

d. Distinguishing the mistaken conceptions.

As it says {v.8}, "...by the mistaken conception regarding permanence and selfhood." If one asks: Is it definite that there are only two mistaken conceptions (Phyin Ci Log; viparyāsa)?

It is not. Because there are four mistaken conceptions: mistaking the impermanent for permanent; mistaking the impure for pure; mistaking suffering for pleasure; mistaking the non-self for self. [p.299; 166a3]

Then if one asks: Upon which views are the mistaken conceptions based?

The fourfold mistaken conception is based on three views: From the view of permanence in holding to the extremes, mistaking the impermanent for permanent is established.

From esteeming unworthy views, mistaking the impure for pure and mistaking suffering for pleasure are established.

From the view of self in the view of transitory collections mistaking non-self for self is established.

If one asks: What is the reason that other views are not established as

mistaken conceptions?

Because mistaken conceptions are established by way of three reasons which must all be there: it must invariably be mistaken with respect to the object; it must have complete investigation (Nges Par rTog Pa; nitīraṇa)[18]; and it is a false affirmation (sGro 'Dogs Pa; samāropa).

So, the view esteeming mistaken morality and asceticism [is not a mistaken conception] because it is not [invariably] mistaken with respect to its object; the view of annihilation from the view holding to the extremes, and wrong view, are not false affirmations. Therefore, these are not established as mistaken conceptions.[19]

If one says: Mistaken mind and mistaken discrimination are the subject, from the statement in sūtra, "Mistaken mind (Sems Phyin Ci Log; citta-viparyāsa), mistaken discrimination ('Du Shes Phyin Ci Log; saṁjñā-viparyāsa), and mistaken view (lTa Ba Phyin Ci Log; dṛṣṭi-viparyāsa), which consider the impermanent to be permanent..."[20] There is the consequence that [mistaken mind and mistaken discrimination] are not mistaken conceptions. Because they are not complete investigation. If one says this:

There is no fault. Taking the root polluting tendencies as the basis, these [two] are not established as mistaken conceptions, because they do not fulfill two of the reasons;[21] however, in that sūtra those two are called mistaken conceptions based on their being concomitant with wrong view.

{9}

e. <u>The extensive [explanation] of the divisions of pride</u>.

If one asks: Is it only view that has divisions?

Pride also has seven: pride (Nga rGyal; māna); adhimāna (lHag Pa'i Nga rGyal); mānātmāna (Nga rGyal Las Kyang Nga rGyal); asmimāna (Nga'o sNyam Pa'i Nga rGyal); abhimāna (mNgon Pa'i Nga rGyal); ūnamāna (Cung Zad sNyam Pa'i Nga rGyal); mithyāmāna (Log Pa'i Nga rGyal). [p.300; 166b4]

And to identify these, respectively, starting from the least:

The first [pride,] is a puffed up mind that thinks, "I am superior." The second [adhimāna,] is a puffed up mind that thinks oneself is superior to one's equals. The third [mānātmāna,] is a puffed up mind that thinks oneself is more superior than one's superiors. The fourth [asmimāna,] is a puffed up mind which, when directed at the appropriating aggregates thinks "I". The fifth [abhimāna,] is a puffed up mind that thinks oneself has attained virtues that one has not attained. The sixth [ūnamāna,] is a puffed up mind that thinks oneself just a little bit inferior to those who are greatly superior. The seventh [mithyāmāna,] is a puffed up mind which thinks that oneself has acquired virtues when one has acquired faults that are not virtues.

The *Jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*[22] says there are three in which I am

established in relationship to others; three in which others are established in relationship to me; three in which others are negated in relationship to me. There are three in the first because there are [the thoughts that:] I am superior to others; I am equal to others; I am inferior to others. There are three in the second because there are [the thoughts that:] the other is superior to me; the other is equal to me; the other is inferior to me. There are three in the third because there are [the thoughts that:] there are none superior to me; there are none equal to me; there are none inferior to me.

Then if one asks: In which of the seven forms of pride are these nine forms of pride included?

These [nine] are included in the three: pride, adhimāna and ūnamāna.[23] [p.301; 167a4]

Then if one asks: Which of these forms of pride are objects to be abandoned by Seeing or to be abandoned by Meditation?

They must be extinguished by both the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation.[24]

If one asks: For an Āryan, do the objects to be abandoned by Meditation which have not yet been abandoned not arise in a manifest manner?

The objects to be abandoned by Meditation: the full entanglements

(Kun Nas dKris Pa; paryavasthāna)--killing and so forth;[25] likewise, the craving for birth (sKye Ba'i Sred Pa; bhava-tṛṣṇa), such as the thought, "How nice it would be if I were the great elephant Airāvaṇa"; and the craving for annihilation, such as the thought, "What use is there in living a long time, [it would be better] if I died quickly;" and the seven types of pride; and the nine types of pride which have the thought of I (Nga'o sNyam Pa; asmimāna); these do not become manifest for an Āryan. Because these are nourished (rGyas Par 'Gyur Ba; puṣṭatva) by the views, and the Āryans have eliminated the views. Āryans also do not manifest regret ('Gyod Pa; kaukṛtya) which is non-virtuous;[26] because that is nourished by doubt and the Āryans have eliminated doubt. {10-11}

B. Distinguishing the types [of polluting tendencies.]

There are five topics:

1. The divisions based on cause.
2. The divisions based on the object.
3. The divisions based on nature.
4. The manner of possessing based on time.
5. Distinguishing object and subject.

1. The divisions based on cause.

If one asks: Among these [98] polluting tendencies, how many are universal (Kun Du 'Gro Ba; sarva-traga) in realm?

The subject is [the 11]: The [five] views which are to be abandoned by seeing [the Truth of] Suffering and the [two] to be abandoned by seeing the cause, [the Truth of] Origination; likewise, [two types of] doubt--[to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and to be abandoned by seeing Origination;] the ignorance which is simultaneous with these; and that ignorance which is not mixed with those other root afflictions.[27] These [11] are universal in homogenous realm (sKal Ba mNyam Pa'i Khams Kun Tu 'Gro Ba; sabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga). Because they are nourished by way of taking as their objects all five types of objects to be abandoned in their own [realms.][28]

Of these 11, nine can be directed to higher realms.

If one asks, which are not included? The view of the transitory collection and the view holding to extremes are the two that are not included. Because they only take as objects aggregates of their own level.[29] [p.302; 167b5]

Then if one asks: Is it only the polluting tendencies that are universal?

Those phenomena which arise together with the [polluting tendencies] are also universal.[30]

If one asks, does that mean all [such phenomena?]

With the exception of their obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti). Because that

[obtainment] and the phenomenon to be obtained are not the same continuum and don't have the same fruitional result {ii.36}. {12-13}

2. The divisions based on the object.

If one asks: Of those [98] polluting tendencies, which take as objects contaminated phenomena and which take uncontaminated?

The two [types of] wrong view and [two types of doubt]--those to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and those to be abandoned by seeing the Path; ignorance which is concomitant with these; and independent ignorance--these six have as their sphere of action (sPyod Yul; gocara) uncontaminated [objects.] Because they take as their objects [the Truth of] the Path and [the Truth of] Cessation, [which are uncontaminated.]

And objects to be abandoned by seeing Cessation are directed to Cessation of their own level, but are not directed to Cessation of other levels. Because those two Cessations [of their own level and of other levels] are separate substances.[31]

If one asks: In that case is it definite that [objects to be abandoned by seeing] the Path are also [directed only to their own level?]

The Path, which is the dharma-knowledges (Chos Shes; dharma-jñāna)[32] part of six levels of concentrations, is the sphere of action of the three Desire Realm objects to be abandoned by Seeing[33] which have the

Path as their sphere of action. Because, those Paths of the six levels of concentration, which are mutual [homogenous] causes of equal or superior [Paths] {ii.52}, are the dharma-knowledges which are the class [of Path] that is the antidote of the Desire Realm.[34]

As for the Paths of the nine uncontaminated levels[35]: They are the objects of those three upper realm objects to be abandoned by seeing the Path which have those Paths as their sphere of action. Because, the Paths of the nine uncontaminated levels, which are mutual [homogenous] causes of equal or superior [Paths] {ii.52}, are the subsequent knowledges (rJes Shes; anvaya-jñāna) {vi.26}, which are the antidotes of the upper realms.

Then if one asks: What is the reason that other polluting tendencies do not take as object the [Truths of] Cessation and the Path?

Attachment is not directed to Cessation and the Path, because attachment has the aspect of interest (Don gNyer),[36] and it is to be eliminated by means of cutting the obtainment. [p.303; 168a6].

Anger is not directed to them because [Cessation and the Path] do not injure others [and anger arises towards things that do harm.]

Pride is not directed to them because they are tranquil (Zhi Ba; śānta).[37]

The view esteeming morality and asceticism is not directed to them because [that view] is to hold as pure what is not pure, and the [Truths of

Cessation and the Path] are pure.

Esteeming unworthy views is not directed to them because that [view] is to hold the inferior to be supreme, and Cessation and the Path are in fact supreme. {14-16}

Then if one asks: From those [98] polluting tendencies which are nourished by their objects and which by their concomitants?

The universal polluting tendencies are nourished by means of their objects in the case of all [five types] of their own level. For example: Objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering of the Desire Realm are nourished by all five types of objects to be abandoned in the Desire Realm.

The polluting tendencies which are not universal are nourished by means of their objects, but only by those of their same type.

If one asks: Is that definite for all of them?

The polluting tendencies which have objects that are uncontaminated or of a higher realm are not nourished by means of their objects; because the objects are not appropriated (bDag Gir Ma Byas; svīkṛta) by craving, or those objects are exclusively a type of antidote.

Whatever polluting tendencies are concomitant with [other phenomena such as] feeling and so forth will be nourished by means of concomitance with that. {17-18}

3. The divisions based on nature.

There are three topics:

a. The actual topic.

b. Distinguishing the roots.

c. The indeterminate questions, which arise incidentally.

a. The actual topic.

If one asks: Of these 98 polluting tendencies how many are neutral and how many are non-virtuous?

All the [31] polluting tendencies of the upper realms are obscuring neutral, because they are afflicted [phenomena] which do not yield desirable fruition. [p.304; 168b6]

In the Desire Realm, the view of the transitory collections and the view holding to the extremes, together with the concomitant ignorance that arises simultaneously with them, are neutral, but are not non-virtuous. Because the view of transitory collections observes morality for the sake of one's own pleasure, and undertakes the activity of giving. The view holding to the extremes is concordant with liberation, because liberation is contrary to the aggregates, and the view holding to the extremes is also a view that is always opposed to the aggregates.[38]

Also, the view of the transitory collections is not non-virtuous because

it is merely a confusion with respect to I and mine, but it does not harm anyone.

The Ācārya [Vasubandhu] says: That is not correct because: Attachment is the subject. There is the consequence that it is not non-virtuous. Because for the sake of one's own pleasure one undertakes the activity of giving. Again, pride is the subject. The consequence is that it is not non-virtuous. Because it is a mere confusion with respect to I and mine, but it does not harm anyone.

Other previous Ācāryas say:[39] View of the transitory collections that is innate (lHan sKyes; sahaja) is neutral. The view of the transitory collections that is conceptualized (Kun brTag Pa; vikalpita) is non-virtuous.

The remaining [polluting tendencies] here in the Desire Realm are non-virtuous, because they yield disagreeable fruit. {19}

b. Distinguishing the roots.

If one asks: Among these polluting tendencies, how many are non-virtuous roots, how many are neutral roots, and how many are not [roots?]

In the Desire Realm, attachment, anger and delusion (rMongs Pa; mūḍi) are non-virtuous roots, because their nature is non-virtue, and they are the roots of other non-virtues. The others are not [roots.]

There are three neutral roots; they are craving (Sred Pa; tṛṣṇa),

ignorance (Ma Rig Pa; avidya) and wisdom (Blo; mati).[40]

Other than these--doubt and pride--are not neutral roots. [p.305; 169a6] Because they are inconsistent with the properties of roots: whereas a root must be firm, doubt proceeds with a bipolar aspect and therefore is unstable; and whereas roots are in a lower position, pride proceeds with an aspect of a puffed up mind and therefore takes a lofty position.

The Bāhyakas[41] say there are four neutral roots. They are: neutral craving, view, pride and delusion. The reason they are neutral is: among the practitioners of concentration there are three types--those for whom craving is predominant, view is predominant or pride is predominant; and these arise by the power of ignorance. {20-21}

c. The indeterminate questions, which arise incidentally.

If one asks: As [the Buddha] spoke of 14 indeterminate (Lung Ma bsTan; avyākṛta) views;[42] did he call them indeterminate because they were neither virtuous nor non-virtuous?

Because they were questions which were to be put aside their answers were not directly explained, and those he called indeterminate (Lung Ma bsTan; avyākṛta).[43]

Then if one asks: How many types of questions are there?

There are four types, [questions which are to be answered:]

categorically (mGo gCig Tu; ekāṁśa); by distinguishing (rNam Par Phye Ba; vibhajya); with a question (Dris Nas; paripṛcchya); by putting it aside (gZhag Par Bya Ba; sthāpanīya).

Questions which should be answered categorically are like, "Do [all] sentient beings who are born, die?" Which is to be answered categorically that, sentient beings who are born will not get past death.

[Questions] that are to be answered by distinguishing are like, "Will [all] sentient beings who have died be born or not?" [This should be answered by distinguishing,] those sentient beings who possess afflictions will be born, those without afflictions will not be born.

Questions to be answered with a question are like, "Is this person superior or not superior?" [This should be answered with] the question, in relation to what? In relation to the gods he is inferior; in relation to the bad migrations he is superior.

Questions to be answered by putting them aside are like, "Is the self of persons the same substance as the aggregates or a different substance?" [p.306; 170a1] [This should be put aside because] neither of these two [possibilities fits the case;] because a basis for a self of persons is not established. It is like for example, asking is it white and so forth, about the son of a barren woman, which is a basis that is not established; this is also not to be answered. {22}

4. The manner of possessing based on time.

There are three topics.

a. The actual topic.

b. Examining the establishment of the three times.

c. The differences between eliminating and separating.

a. The actual topic.

If one asks: In which of the three times does the individual possess the object which is made the object of the polluting tendencies?[44]

In general, the afflictions are twofold: afflictions with specific characteristics (Rang Gi mTsan Nyid Pa; svalakṣaṇa); and general afflictions.

Attachment, anger and pride are afflictions with specific characteristics, because they arise by taking as objects suffering or non-suffering, exalted or lowly objects; but they [do not arise with respect to] all objects; and they also do not arise in all times.

Ignorance, doubt and views are general afflictions. Because, by taking as object the contaminated aggregates, they arise in all [three] times.

Among these, in the case of past and present attachment, anger and pride, which bind one (Nye Bar gNas Pa; pratyupa-sthita) [to an object;] the individual is bound to the entity of that object with respect to which those three afflictions have arisen, until [the afflictions] are eliminated.

By those three afflictions of the mind in the future, the individual is bound to [all] the objects of all three times, [because the objects of mental consciousness are of all three times.]

By the other attachment and anger--which are concomitant with the faculty consciousnesses--the individual is bound to the objects of their own time.

By those [afflictions] which are not destined to arise (Mi sKye Ba'i Chos Can; anutpatti-dharmin) the individual is bound to all the objects of all three times.

By the remaining, ignorance, doubt, and all the views, the individual is bound to all the objects of all three times. Because they are the general afflictions. {23-24} [p.307; 170b2]

b. Examining the establishment of the three times.

There are three topics:

(1) Establishing the substantial existence of the object in the three times.

(2) Putting the argument against this.

(3) Casting the reply to that.

(1) Establishing the substantial existence of the

object in the three times.

If one asks: Do the three times substantially exist in the present or not? If they do exist then [phenomena] would be permanent. If not, it would contradict the possession [of afflictions and so forth over time.]

They do substantially exist in all three times, but this does not entail the fault that [phenomena] are permanent. Because they possess the definitive characteristics of samskṛtas.[45]

Then if one asks: What is the reason that the past, future and present exist substantially?

There is [a reason.] Because [the Bhagavan] says in sūtra: "It is because forms (gZugs; rūpa) of the past exist that [it is possible for] the learned Ārya Śrāvaka to not take heed of the forms of the past." It says this and so forth: "Because the forms of the future exist [it is possible for] the learned Ārya Śrāvaka to not delight in the forms of the future."[46]

So it is because of these statements, and also: [The three times exist] because they exist as objects of a present consciousness that is directed to the past and the future. And because it is explained that a consciousness arises in dependence on both an object and a faculty, [so since the consciousness arises, there must be such an object.] And because the fruit of past karma is a present fruition.

Therefore, because they profess the substantial existence in the

present of all three times, they are those who hold that all things exist (Tham Cad Yod Par sMra Ba; Sarvāstivādins).

But, those who advocate the substantial existence of the present up until it has produced its result; and the non-substantial existence of the future and of [karma] that has already produced its result, are those who hold that part [of everything] exists (rNam Par Phye sTe sMra Ba; Vibhajyavādins), but they are not Sarvāstivādins.

Then if one asks: How many types of these Sarvāstivādins are there?

There are four types: The Bhāvānyathika (dNgos Po gZhan Du 'Gyur Bar sMra Ba). The Lakṣaṇānyathika (mTsan Nyid gZhan Du 'Gyur Ba). The Avasthānyathika (gNas sKabs gZhan Du 'Gyur Ba). The Anyathānyathika (gZhan Dang gZhan Du 'Gyur Bar sMra Ba). [p.308; 171a2]

The first is the system of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (bTzun Pa Chos sKyob). In his system, when a sprout, for example, shifts from future to present and from present to past, it does not become another substance, but it does become another state of being (dNgos Po; bhāva). For example: It is like a gold vessel; when it is destroyed and an ornament is fashioned it does not change to another color, however it does change to another shape. Or it is like when curds are changed into butter, its flavor and strength become different but its color does not change.

The second is the system of Bhadanta Ghoṣaka (bTzun Pa dByangs

sGrogs). In his system, at that time [when a phenomenon shifts from one time to another] although [the phenomenon] possesses the definitive characteristics of all three times, it is established as past and so forth by way of whichever [set of] definitive characteristics is strongest. For example: When a man has great desire for a woman, even though he is not thereby free of desire for other women, due to the strength of his great desire for that one woman, it is said that he desires that one woman.

The third is the system of Bhadanta Vasumitra (bTzun Pa dByig bShes). In his system, at that time, past and so forth is posited by way of whether the activity (Bya Ba) has not arisen; the activity has arisen and has not stopped; the activity has died out.[47] For example: One counting token, when it is put in the units place, hundreds place, or thousands place, is posited as one, 100 or 1000 etc.

The fourth is the system of Bhadanta Buddhadeva (bTzun Pa Sangs rGya Lha). In his system, at that time, past and so forth is posited by way of [its relative relationship:] whether it is a previous, subsequent or intermediate moment. For example: One woman is posited as a daughter in relation to her mother, and as a mother in relation to her daughter. {25} [p.309; 171b2]

(2) <u>Putting the argument against this</u>.

Then if one asks: Among these, which is the best?

The first [system] can be placed in a category with the Sāṁkyas (Grans Can). Because they accept that the state of being (Ngo Bo; bhāva) changes but the substance does not change; and they accept that entities (Ngo Bo) are of one nature.

The second has a faulty consequence of confusion with respect to the three times. Because it accepts that although the past, for example, is singular, it possesses the definitive characteristics of all three times.

The fourth has the faulty consequence that although time is singular, it becomes all three. Because here one moment takes on the aspect the previous, subsequent and intermediate moments.

Among these the third is a little bit better: The three times are posited by way of whether [the phenomenon's] activity has not arisen [future;] it's activity has arisen and has not ceased [present;] or it's activity has ceased [past.] But even here there is a fault:

A present eye faculty which is "analogous-to-that"[48] is the subject. There is the consequence that it is not of the present. Because it does not perform the activity that generates a result. Some [Vaibhāṣikas] say: Although [that eye] does not perform the activity of looking at forms of the past and present, because it performs the activity of yielding a result ('Bras Bu 'Dzin 'Byin; phala-dāna-parigraha), it is established as present.[49] If one says this:

[Vasubandhu responds:] Then homogenous cause of the past is the subject. There is the consequence that it is of the present. Because it performs the activity of yielding a result in the present.

The three times are the subject. There is the consequence that whatever obstructs them from performing activities of the present does not [obstruct them.] Because they are substantially existent in the present.[50]

Furthermore, how can an activity [of a particular time] be other than time; or on the other hand, not other than time? In the first case, the activity is the subject: there is the consequence that it is asaṁkṛta, for that reason [that it is other than time.] If one accepts that, the consequence is that it is permanent. In the second case [that the activity is not other than time,] the past and the future are the subject: there is the consequence that [the activity] of the present can not be of the past or future; because it is something that is not other than its time, and it is substantially existent as the present. [p.310; 172a3]

[The Vaibhāṣikas reply:] There is no fault. Because the past and future are posited by way of the activity being unarisen and the activity being ceased. If one says this:

Why does [the activity] not arise in the future and cease in the past; there is the consequence that this would not happen; because [the phenomenon] substantially exists [in the past and future] in the same way as

in the present.[51] {26-27c}

(3) Casting the reply to that.

To this the Vaibhāṣikas say: Because the natures (Chos Nyid; dharmatā) of phenomena are profound, one can not twist one thing into another with ordinary reasoning (rTog Ge'i Blo). And since it comes from reliable scripture, our system of tenets is not to be cast aside. {27d}

c. The differences between eliminating and separating.

If one asks: When objects to be abandoned (sPang Bya) have been eliminated (sPangs Pa; prahīṇa) does it pervade that one is freed (Grol Ba; visaṁyukta)[52] of them? And when one is freed of them does it pervade that one has eliminated them?

When one is freed from them it pervades that they are eliminated; but when they are eliminated it does not pervade that one is freed from them. Because when the knowledge of Suffering [which eliminates the objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering] arises, but the knowledge of Origination has not arisen, the objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering are eliminated; however, the objects to be abandoned by seeing Origination--the remaining universals--cause one to [still] be bound to the objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering [because they can be directed to them.][53]

Also, when one has eliminated the first type [of the nine types] of objects to be abandoned by Meditation, those of the Desire Realm, one is still bound to that first type of object to be abandoned by Meditation by the remaining impurities [i.e. afflictions] which take it as their object. {28}

5. Distinguishing object and subject.

Now, distinguishing objects and subjects:

If one asks: Based on which objects (dNgos Po; vastu) are the polluting tendencies nourished?

In general[54] there are 16 phenomena [which are objects:] there are 15 by taking the five types of objects to be abandoned in each of the three realms; plus uncontaminated [phenomena.]

There are also 16 [types of mind] which are the subjects that take these [as objects.] These are the 15 minds that are directed to the five types of objects to be abandoned in each of the three realms; plus one uncontaminated mind [which is directed to uncontaminated objects.]

Here, the objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering, the objects to be abandoned by seeing the cause of Origination, and the objects to be abandoned by Meditation, which arise in the Desire Realm, are the spheres of activity (sPyod Yul; gocara) of five consciousnesses: because they are the spheres of activity of three [consciousnesses] of their own [type and level;]

one [consciousness] of the Form Realm--to be abandoned by Meditation; and a stainless [uncontaminated] consciousness. [p.311; 172b4]

They are the sphere of activity of the three [consciousnesses] of their own [Desire Realm level] because [those consciousnesses] are directed to the universals which are to be abandoned by seeing Suffering of the Desire Realm; and directed to the non-virtues that arise from the objects to be abandoned by Meditation of the Desire Realm.

They are the sphere of activity of one [consciousness] of the Form Realm, because they are the object of one [consciousness] that is included in the mundane path that is included on the level of the Form Realm.[55]

[They are the sphere of activity of] the third, [the uncontaminated consciousness,] because they are the object of part of the dharma-knowledges.[56]

Aside from those [five consciousnesses] the others are not directed to [those three objects.] Because [the consciousness directed to] objects to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path of the Desire Realm are only directed to the uncontaminated [Truths of Cessation and of the Path] which they directly wrongly [conceive, without reference to these other objects.] Wrong conception of an error is directed only at a direct wrong conception.[57]

The [consciousnesses which are directed to the] afflictions of the

upper realms are not directed to the afflictions of the Desire Realm, because [consciousnesses] of the upper realms are free of attachment to the lower.

[Consciousnesses directed to] objects to be abandoned by Meditation of the Formless Realm are not directed to objects to be abandoned by Meditation of the Desire Realm. Because the Desire Realm and the Formless Realm are far apart by way of the four types of distances.

Objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering [and Origination] and objects to be abandoned by Meditation which arise in the Form Realm, are the spheres of activity of eight consciousnesses. Because they are the objects of, three of their own [level;] three of the lower, Desire Realm; one of the higher, Formless Realm; and the stainless, part of the subsequent knowledges.

Objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering [and Origination] and objects to be abandoned by Meditation which arise in the Formless Realm, are the spheres of activity of ten consciousnesses. Because they are the spheres of activity of three consciousnesses included in each of the three realms; and the uncontaminated, part of the subsequent knowledges.

All objects to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path, are the

spheres of activity of: on top of those [listed above for each realm] each one's own type is to be added.[58]

As for those [objects] that are uncontaminated, they are the spheres of activity of ten consciousnesses. Because they are the spheres of activity of [the consciousnesses directed to] the three last objects to be abandoned[59] [in each] of the three realms; and the uncontaminated consciousness. {29-31} [p.312; 173a5]

C. The way in which the mind has the polluting tendencies.

Now, the way in which the mind has the polluting tendencies (Sems Phra rGyas Dang bCas Pa; sānuśaya):

If one asks: Does it pervade that when a mind has polluting tendencies those polluting tendencies will be nourished [by their association with that mind?]

From the two cases, afflicted minds and non-afflicted minds, in the case of afflicted minds: There are two types--those in which [the polluting tendencies] are nourished; those in which they are not nourished though the mind has polluting tendencies. For the non-afflicted mind there is the case in which [polluting tendencies] are nourished and it has polluting tendencies; but there is no case in which they are not nourished but [the mind] has

polluting tendencies, because that [non-afflicted mind] is not produced together with polluting tendencies. {32a-b}

D. The manner of arising of affliction.

Now, the manner of arising of affliction:

If one asks: What is the order of arising of the polluting tendencies?

Initially, from ignorance (rMongs Pa; moha) regarding the meaning of the Truths, doubt arises, which wonders whether there is or is not suffering.

From that, relying on an inferior spiritual friend one engages in erroneous teaching and learning ('Chad Nyan Log Pa); which produces the wrong view that suffering does not exist.

From that is produced the view of the transitory collections which grasps the aggregates as I and mine.

From that is produced the view holding to the extremes which grasps at the permanence or annihilation of the aggregates. From that is produced the view esteeming morality and asceticism, which grasps at the belief that there is purification from holding those extreme [views.]

From that, esteeming views is produced, because what was believed to provide purification [becomes esteemed as the supreme view.]

From that one feels pride and attachment for one's own views. And hatred arises which despises (sDang Ba) the views of others.

So this is the order of arising of the polluting tendencies.

Then if one asks: How many causes are necessary to give rise to the afflictions?

When a polluting tendency has not been eliminated; when an object which is concordant with the arising affliction is present; and when there is incorrect judgement (Tsul bZhin Ma Yin Pa'i Yid Byed Pa; ayoniśa-manaskāra); then the causes that give rise to the afflictions are complete. [p.313; 173b5]

The Vaibhāṣikas say: In order to give rise to the afflictions these causes are not all definitely necessary. Because the Ārhat, even though he has eliminated the polluting tendencies and incorrect judgement, still has afflictions arise [solely] due to the presence of the object.[60]

The Sautrāntikas say: In order for the afflictions to arise these three causes must be complete. {32c-34}

E. <u>The list of synonyms</u>.

In the explanation of the synonyms there are two topics:

1. Synonyms that occur in the sūtras.
2. Synonyms that occur in the śāstras.

1. Synonyms that occur in the sūtras.

In this there are four topics:

a. The contaminants (Zag Pa; āśrava).

b. The floods and yokes (Chu sByor; ogha-yoga).

c. The clingings (Nyer Len; upādana).

d. Explaining their etymology.

a. The contaminants.

As the Abhidharmikas like to elaborate the sūtras, it says in sūtra: "The contaminants, the floods and yokes, the clingings." To explain this, if one asks, what are these?

The contaminants are three: the contaminant of desire ('Dod Pa'i Zag Pa; kāmāśrava), the contaminant of existence (Srid Pa'i Zag Pa; bhavāśrava), contaminant of ignorance (Ma Rig Pa'i Zag Pa; avidyāsrava).

And the afflictions together with the full entanglements (Kun Nas dKris Pa; paryavasthāna) {v.47} of the Desire Realm, with the exception of ignorance (gTi Mug; moha), are the contaminant of desire. Because most of them are contaminants that are directed to desire.[61]

In the Form and Formless Realms the polluting tendencies with the exception of ignorance are the contaminant of existence. Because most of them are directed to the afflictions of the upper realms.[62]

If one asks: What is the reason for teaching them by combining [the two realms] together in the statement {v.35}, "Only the polluting tendencies that arise in the Form and Formless Realms are the contaminant of existence?"

There is a reason. They are similar in being obscuring neutrals; they are similar in that they are directed inward; and similar in that they are levels of meditative equipoise. And there is another purpose in presenting them as one: Those two upper realms are existence but are not liberation; so [the contaminant of existence] is an interest in those two [upper realms] and an interest in existence, but not an interest in liberation. So it was in order to make that understood [that they are taught together.] [p.314; 174a6]

If one asks: What is the contaminant of ignorance?

The 15 types of ignorance of the three realms are the contaminant of ignorance.

If one asks: Among the five types of objects to be abandoned, what is the reason for teaching as a separate contaminant the 15 types of ignorance?

There is a reason for that. Because the root of cyclic existence is ignorance, so that when ignorance is eliminated the others will also be eliminated. It is in order to make that understood that ignorance is taught as a separate contaminant. {35-36}

b. <u>The floods and yokes</u>.

Now the floods (Chu Bo; ogha) and yokes (sByor Ba; yoga) are to be explained in the same way as the contaminants.

If one asks: Then shouldn't there be three?

There is no mistake. Because of the intensity (gSal Ba; pāṭava) and unsteadiness (gYo Ba) of the views, they were taught separately as the floods and yokes of view.

If one asks: Since the views are taught separately on this occasion, what is the reason they were not taught separately in the case of the contaminants?

They were not taught that way because the meaning of contaminant (āśrava) is "to be established" ('Jog Par Byed Pa; āsayanti) in cyclic existence; and the views alone, without being associated [with other afflictions] are not conducive to being established in cyclic existence. {37}

c. <u>The clingings</u>.

In just the same way that the floods and yokes were explained, so are the clingings (Nyer Len; upādana), [but] together with ignorance.

If one says, then shouldn't there be three?

There is no fault. Because views are divided into two types: the clinging of views; and the clinging of esteeming morality and asceticism.

If one asks: Then what is the reason for teaching as a separate clinging esteeming morality and asceticism?

There is a reason: It is an opponent of the Path, because it views what is not the Path to be the Path. And because it deceives householders and renunciates (Rab Tu Byung Ba; pravrajita). It deceives outsider householders by holding up as the path the application of the five fires, immersion in water and so forth. It deceives outsider renunciates by holding up as the path living naked, having given up [luxuries such as] a hundred foods, a hundred thousand [different] clothes, and 500 houses. [p.315; 174b6]

Then if one asks: What is the reason that ignorance was not taught separately?

Ignorance is taught by combining it with [other] clingings but is not taught separately, because the meaning of clinging is grasping at existence, and ignorance alone, without associated [afflictions,] does not cling to existence. {38}

d. <u>Explaining their etymology</u>.

If one asks: Why are these afflictions called polluting tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya) and so forth?

Because these afflictions are difficult to comprehend they are called subtle (Phra Ba; aṇava); because they are attached (rJes Su 'Brel Ba;

anugata) [to the mental continuum] by obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti) since beginningless time; because they are nourished (rGyas Par 'Gyur Ba; anuśerate) in two ways--by their objects and by concomitants; because they [continually] pursue (rJes Su 'Brang Ba; anubadhnanti), by returning even after they are eliminated; because of these reasons they are termed polluting tendencies (Phra rGyas; anuśaya).[63]

If one asks: Why are these afflictions called contaminants (Zag Pa; āsrava) and so forth?

These afflictions cause one to be established ('Jog Par Byed Pa; āsayanti) in cyclic existence; or by means of the wounds of the six āyatanas they contaminate cyclic existence[64]; so with these meanings [the afflictions are called] contaminants.

And because they carry one away ('Khyer Ba; haranti) to rebirth [they are called] floods (Chu Bo; ogha).

And because they attach ('Byar Ba; śleṣayanti) one to rebirth [they are called] yokes (sByor Ba; yoga).

And because they grasp at (Nye Bar 'Dzin Pa; upagṛhṇanti) cyclic existence [they are called] clingings (Nyer Len; upādāna).

So these are the etymologies of the contaminants and so forth. {39-40}

2. Synonyms that occur in the śāstras.

In the synonyms that occur in the śāstras there are two topics:

a. The presentation.

b. The explanation.

a. The presentation.

But in the śāstra these afflictions are explained in five aspects as the connections (Kun Tu sByor Ba; saṁyojana) and so forth: bonds ('Ching Ba; bandhana), subsidiary afflictions (Nye Ba'i Nyon Mongs; upakleśa), full entanglements (Kun dKris; paryavasthāna) [and polluting tendencies.] {41a-b}

b. The explanation.

There are four topics:

(1) The connections.

(2) The bonds.

(3) The subsidiary afflictions.

(4) The full entanglements.

(1) The connections.

There are three topics:

(a) The nine connections.

(b) The five conducive to lower levels.

(c) The five conducive to higher levels.

(a) The nine connections. [p.316; 175a6]

There are nine connections (Kun Tu sByor Ba; saṁyojana): the six root afflictions (rTza Nyon);[65] the connection of esteeming [unworthy objects] (mChog Tu 'Dzin Pa; parāmarṣa); and the connections of jealousy (Prag Dog; mātsarya) and miserliness (Ser sNa; īrṣya).

Then if one asks: What is the reason for teaching the two types of esteeming [unworthy objects] separately from the connection of view?

The two, esteeming morality and asceticism and esteeming views, are presented separately from the connection of view because: the first three [views--which constitute the connection of view] are similar; and the last two [views--which constitute the connection of esteeming] are similar; [they are similar] in that they are both made up of 18 parts (rDzas; dravya). And they are similar [within the groups] in that the first three are the objects which are esteemed, while the last two are the agents that esteem [the first three.][66]

If one asks: From among the full entanglements, what is the reason for explaining jealousy and miserliness as separate connections?

Jealousy and miserliness are explained as two connections, separate from the eight full entanglements, because both are exclusively non-virtuous

and they are independent.[67] {41c-42}

(b) <u>The five conducive to lower levels</u>.

There are five types of connections that are conducive to the inferior (Tha Ma'i Cha mThun; avara-bhāgīya): view of the transitory collection, esteeming morality and asceticism, desire for pleasure ('Dod Pa La 'Dun Pa; kāmachanda), doubt, and harmful thoughts.

If one asks: Why are these called conducive to the inferior? Because the inferior of the three realms is the Desire Realm, and since these are conducive to that they are called [conducive to the inferior.] They are conducive to the Desire Realm because: due to desire for pleasure and harmful thoughts one does not transcend the Desire Realm. And even if one is born one time in a higher realm, due to the [other] three--view of the transitory collection etc.--one returns again to the Desire Realm.

Then if one asks: Hasn't the Stream Enterer abandoned all six, the five views plus doubt? So why does this presentation distinguish only the abandoning of three connections [i.e. view of the transitory collections, esteeming morality and asceticism, and doubt?] [p.317; 176a1]

The Vaibhaṣikas say: Only three are explained because those three include the entrances (sGo; mukha) and roots of the objects to be abandoned.[68]

The Sautrāntikas say:[69] When travelling to another place there are three main obstacles to getting to that place: in the beginning, not wanting to go; in the middle, mistaking the path; at the end, the arising of doubt [concerning the path.] Similarly, in travelling to the city of liberation, at the beginning the view of the transitory collection makes one not want to go; in the middle, by esteeming morality and asceticism one mistakes the path; and with doubt one has uncertainty about the path to liberation. So to the extent that these are obstacles, they obstruct progress towards liberation. Therefore [the obstructions to liberation] are explained by distinguishing only the abandonment of the three connections. {43-44}

(c) The five conducive to higher levels.

There are five connections that are conducive to the superior (Gong Ma'i Cha Dang mThun Pa; urdhva-bhāgīya): the two attachments which arise in the Form and Formless Realms, excitement (rGod Pa; auddhatya), pride and ignorance.

If one asks: Why are they called conducive to the superior?

Among the three realms the superior are the Form and Formless Realms. Because they are conducive to those, they are called [conducive to the superior.]

If one asks: What is the reason these five are conducive to the

superior realms?

They are conducive to the superior because without eliminating those five one cannot transcend the superior realms. {45a-c}

(2) The bonds.

There are three bonds ('Cing Ba; bandhana): the bonds of attachment, hatred and ignorance. And if one asks, based upon what are they bonds?

Based upon the [three] feelings they are bonds, and there are three of them: by the feeling of pleasure attachment is nourished; by suffering hatred is nourished; and by equanimity ignorance is nourished. {45d}

(3) The subsidiary afflictions.

The subject is the afflicted mental factors--other than those root afflictions[70]--which are said to be included in the aggregate of formative forces, such as intention and so forth. [p.318; 176b2] They are the subsidiary afflictions (Nye Bar Nyon Mongs Pa; upakleśa), because they afflict the mind (Sems Nye Bar Nyon Mongs Par Byed Pa'i Phyir; citta-upakleśanāt).

Those afflicted [mental factors] other than the root afflictions are the subject. They are not called root afflictions, because they remain close to [the root afflictions.][71] {46}

(4) The full entanglements.

There are two topics:

(a) The actual explanation.

(b) Incidental topics.

(a) The actual explanation.

There are eight types of full entanglements:[72] Those that are inconsistent with morality are shamelessness and immodesty; those that are inconsistent with benefiting others are jealousy and miserliness; those that are inconsistent with wisdom are excitement and regret ('Gyod Pa; kaukṛtya); those that are inconsistent with meditative stabilization are the two, sleep (gNyid; middha) and torpor (rMugs Pa; styāna).

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, by adding to these belligerence (Khro Ba; krodha) and concealment ('Chab Pa; mṛakṣa), there are ten.[73]

Then if one asks: If these ten are afflictions that are considered mental factors which are included in the aggregate of formative forces, which root afflictions are they close to?

Shamelessness, excitement and miserliness are close to attachment, because it gives rise to them.

Concerning concealment, some say that because attachment gives rise to it, it is close to attachment. Others say that because ignorance gives rise

to it it is close to ignorance. Some say that because both ignorance and attachment give rise to it, it is close to both. So it is debated.

Torpor, sleep and immodesty are close to ignorance. Because they happen due to [ignorance] giving rise to them.

Regret is close to doubt, because it arises from that.

Belligerence and jealousy are close to anger, because they arise from that cause. {47-49b} [p.319; 177a2]

(b) Incidental topics.

There are two topics:

1) The six impurities.

2) Distinguishing their qualities.

1) The six impurities.

Furthermore, among these afflictions there are six impurities (Dri Ma; mala): deceit (sGyu; māyā), dissimulation (gYo; śāṭhya), haughtiness (rGyags Pa; mada), spite ('Tsig Pa; pradāśa), resentment (Khon 'Dzin; upanāha), and harmfulness (rNam 'Tse; vihiṁsā).[74]

If one asks: Which root afflictions are these six impurities close to?

Deceit and haughtiness are close to attachment, because they arise from that.

Resentment and harmfulness arise from anger.

Spite arises from esteeming views.

Dissimulation is given rise to by [wrong] view. {49c-51b}

2) Distinguishing their qualities.

If one asks: Of these ten full entanglements, how many are to be abandoned by Seeing and how many are to be abandoned by Meditation?

Of these, shamelessness, immodesty, torpor, sleep and excitement are both objects to be abandoned by seeing and by meditation.[75] The first two are the non-virtuous great grounds (Sa Mang Po Pa; mahābhūmika) {ii.26}. The two, torpor and excitement are great grounds of [great] afflictions {ii.26}. And sleep is not incompatible with any [of the three, virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral] {ii.27}. Therefore, these [five] are both concomitants of objects to be abandoned by Seeing and concomitants of objects to be abandoned by Meditation.

The five others, [jealousy, miserliness, regret, belligerence and concealment,] are objects to be abandoned by Meditation. Because they constitute a wrong conception of the characteristics of objects of knowledge.

They also are independent, because they [can arise] concomitant only with ignorance [and no other mental factors.]

In the same way, the six impurities are also objects to be abandoned

by Meditation and independent. The reasons are the same.

Then if one asks: Which full entanglements are virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral?

Afflictions that are in the Desire Realm are non-virtuous. However, the three--sleep, torpor and excitement are both virtuous and neutral.

Above the Desire Realm [the subsidiary afflictions] in the upper realms are neutral.

Then if one asks: In which realms are they?

In the Desire Realm and the first concentration there are dissimulation and deceit. If one asks: What is the reason there are dissimulation and deceit in the first concentration? [p.320; 177b3]

There is a reason. The Venerable Aśvajit (rTa Thul), not knowing where the four elements [constituting the inanimate world] came to an end, he asked Brahmā. Brahmā [did not answer the question but] said, "I am Brahmā! Mahābrahmā!" Thus speaking vacuous words he undertook to mislead Aśvajit.

If one asks, how do you know that he had been misled?

One knows this because later, when Aśvajit was on the road, Brahmā said, "Since the Bhagavan is living, why do you ask me [this question?]"

Then, having asked the question to the Bhagavan, He said, "First, it comes to and end in the Formless Realm. Finally it will come to an end at the time of attaining Nirvāṇa without remainder of aggregates."[76]

Torpor, excitement and haughtiness are in the three realms. Because the first two are great grounds of [great] afflictions; and haughtiness is not incompatible with any aspect.

The eleven [afflictions][77] other than these [five just mentioned,] arise [only] in the Desire Realm. Because they are non-virtuous. {51c-53}

F. What they are concomitant with.

There are two topics:

1. Which are concomitant with which consciousnesses.
2. Which are concomitant with which feelings.

1. Which are concomitant with which consciousnesses.

Then if one asks: With which consciousnesses are these polluting tendencies concomitant?

Those that are to be abandoned by Seeing, as well as sleep and pride which are to be abandoned by Meditation, are of the sphere (Sa Pa; bhūmika) of the mental consciousness, [because they are only concomitant with mental consciousness.] Because they are not clear, and they are with

investigation (Kun Tu rTog bCas; savitarka).

Also those subsidiary afflictions which are independent are also [exclusively of the sphere of the mental consciousness.] Because they are with investigation.

The others, the three poisons and four full entanglements [shamelessness, immodesty, torpor and excitement,] which are to be abandoned by Meditation, have as their bases the six consciousnesses. {54}

2. Which are concomitant with which feelings.

Attachment is concomitant with the [two] feelings of pleasure.[78]

Hatred is concomitant with the opposite, suffering [and mental unhappiness.]

Ignorance is concomitant with all feelings, because it is not incompatible with any. [p.321; 178a4]

The view of annihilation [i.e. wrong view] is concomitant with both mental happiness and mental unhappiness. Because if one has the view that there is no fruit of non-virtuous action it is [concomitant with] mental happiness; if one has the view that there is no fruit of virtuous action it is concomitant with [mental] unhappiness.

Mental unhappiness and doubt are concomitant. Because when doubt arises for one who is seeking certainty, mental unhappiness arises.

The other four views and pride are concomitant with mental happiness. Because they are of the sphere of mental consciousness, and they are engaged with their own aspect of joy (Rang dGa' Ba'i rNam Pas 'Jug Pa; harṣākāra-vartitva).

But this [which has just been explained] is based on [polluting tendencies] that arise in the Desire Realm and have a clear mind.

But for those that do not have a clear mind, they are all concomitant with neutral [feeling.] Because neutral [feeling] is not incompatible with any of them.

The polluting tendencies of the upper realms are concomitant with their respective feelings, in accordance with what feelings are present on any given level.[79]

[This concludes the explanation of the concomitant feelings of the polluting tendencies. Now an explanation of the subsidiary afflictions:]

Regret, jealousy, belligerence, harmfulness, resentment and spite, are concomitant with mental unhappiness; because they are of the sphere of mental consciousness, and they are engaged with their aspect of depression (sKyo Ba; dainya).

As for miserliness, it is concomitant with the opposite, mental happiness.[80]

Dissimulation, deceit, concealment and sleep, are concomitant with both mental happiness and mental unhappiness. Because, for the first three, if they do not accomplish the purpose that they have taken as their object, they are concomitant with mental unhappiness. As for sleep, it is not incompatible with any [feeling.]

Haughtiness [arises on all levels: In the third concentration it is concomitant with pleasure; below that it is concomitant with mental happiness and above that it is concomitant with neutral feeling.][81]

Neutral feeling is universal for the above reason [that it is compatible with all the afflictions.]

And the other four [full entanglements,] shamelessness, immodesty, torpor and excitement, are concomitant with [all] five feelings. Because the first two are non-virtuous great grounds; the latter two are of the [great] grounds of great affliction. {55-58} [p.322; 178b4]

G. <u>The explanation of the five hindrances</u>.

As it says in sūtra[82], "There are five hindrances (sGrib Pa; nivaraṇa): desire for pleasure; harmful thought; sleep and torpor; excitement and regret; and doubt." If one asks: In this explanation is it to be taken that the last three exist in all three realms, or is it to be taken that they exist only in the Desire Realm?

It is the latter. Because it is stated [in the sūtra] that these five hindrances are non-virtuous. In the sūtra it says, "These are unadulterated and completely non-virtuous aggregates; and thus they are the five hindrances."

If one asks: Why are they called hindrances?

They are called hindrances with the meaning that they obstruct the absorption of the concentrations.

If one asks: Aren't the two, sleep and torpor separate mental factors? Then why are they explained as one hindrance?

There is a reason for explaining them in that way. Because those two have the same opponent (Mi mThun Pa; vipakṣa) antidote (gNyen Po; pratipakṣa); the same in having food as a cause (Zas rGyu; āhāra); and the same in action (Bya Ba; kṛtya). The first is established because [for both] they must be dispelled by bright awareness (sNang Ba'i 'Du Shes; ālokasaṁjñā). The second is established because they are the same in that [both] arise from taking food (Ro Myang), from not being able to stop eating (Zas Tsod Ma Zin Pa), from unhappiness (Mi dGa' Ba; arati), mental languor (Sems Zhum Pa; cetaso līnatva) and so forth.[83] The third is established because they are the same in making the mind languid. Then if one asks: Aren't excitement and regret two separate mental factors? Then why are they posited as one hindrance?

There is a reason for explaining them in that way. Because of those [same] three reasons [of having the same antidote, nourishment and action.] The first is established because they [both] must be dispelled by single-pointed concentration (Zhi gNas; śamatha). The second is established because they are the same in that [both] arise from reflecting (rNam rTog; vitarka) on the memories of one's homeland and relatives (Yul Nye; jñāti, janapada), previous excitements, amusements (rTzes Pa; krīḍita) and so forth. The third is established because they [both] make the mind unsettled. [p.323; 179a5]

If one asks: Aren't all afflictions hindrances? Then why are the hindrances explained as five?

Here, the Vaibhāṣikas say: The hindrances are definitely just five, because they harm the three aggregates of meditative stabilization etc.: Desire for pleasure and harmful thoughts harm the aggregate of morality. Sleep and torpor harm the aggregate of wisdom. Excitement and regret harm the aggregate of meditative stabilization. And doubt causes uncertainty concerning the Truths.

Some say this is not correct.[84] If that were the case, excitement and regret would be presented before sleep and torpor in accordance with the order of the aggregates, but they are not presented in that way.[85] Therefore, it is torpor and sleep that harm meditative stabilization.

Excitement and regret harm the aggregate of wisdom. Because sleep and torpor destroy one's interest in meditative stabilization; excitement and regret destroy one's efforts at examining (Rab Tu rNam Par 'Byed Pa; pravicaya) phenomena.

The Cittamātrans say:[86] The hindrances are definitely five because they are the hindrances to the three [stages of] meditative stabilization, the preparation, the actual action and the subsequent stage:

When [the saṅgha] goes about the town [in order to collect alms,] they may grasp at appearances (mTsan Ma bZung; nimitta-grāha) as pleasant or unpleasant--at that time of preparation, desiring pleasure and harmful thoughts create an obstacle. At the time of the actual action [of engaging in meditative stabilization,] sleep and torpor create obstacles to single-pointed concentration (Zhi gNas; śamatha); and excitement and regret create obstacles to special insight (lHag mThong; vipaśyana). [In the subsequent stage,] when arising from that, at the time of reflecting on (Nges Par rTog Pa; nidhyāna) phenomena, doubt creates obstacles. {59}

III. <u>The manner of eliminating them</u>.

[There are two topics:

A. Objects to be abandoned by Seeing.

B. Objects to be abandoned by Meditation.

A. Objects to be abandoned by Seeing.][87]

If one asks: What is the manner of eliminating the objects to be abandoned by Seeing?

Here there are three topics:

1. Elimination by thorough knowledge of the object.

2. Elimination by the destruction of [the afflictions] that take them as objects.

3. Elimination by abandoning their objects. [p.324; 179b5]

1. Elimination by thorough knowledge of the object.

[Afflictions] to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and Origination of the Desire Realm [which are directed to objects of their own level;] and those to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and Origination of the upper realms [which are directed to objects of their own levels;] and [afflictions] to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path [which are directed to uncontaminated phenomena;] with the exception of [the polluting tendencies] that are universal in heterogenous realms (sKal Ba Mi mNyam Pa'i Khams Kun Tu 'Gro Ba; visabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga),[88] are directly counteracted [by complete knowledge of their object.]

2. Elimination by the destruction of [the afflictions] that take

them as objects.

[Afflictions] to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and Origination of the Desire Realm which are universal in heterogenous realms [are eliminated by the destruction of those afflictions that take them as objects.][89]

3. Elimination by abandoning their objects.

[Afflictions] to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path [are eliminated by abandoning their objects] because they are a wrong conception of a wrong conception.[90] {60a-c}

[B. Objects to be abandoned by Meditation.]

Then if one asks: How are the objects to be abandoned by Meditation eliminated?

They are not eliminated by knowing their objects, but rather they are destroyed by the generation of the small, medium and great antidotes (gNyen Po; pratipakṣa).

Then if one asks: How many antidotes are there?

There are four types of antidotes: abandoning antidotes (sPong Ba'i gNyen Po; prahāna-pratipakṣa) which are the uninterrupted paths; maintaining antidotes (gZhi'i gNyen Po; ādhāra-pratipakṣa) which are the paths of liberation; the further-removing antidote (Thag Sring Ba'i Ngo Bo

gNyen Po; dūribhāva-pratipakṣa) which is from the second moment of the path of liberation onward; and the repudiating antidote (rNam Par Sun 'Byin Pa gNyen Po; vidūṣaṇā-pratipakṣa), which, having seen the faults of the object to be abandoned, impermanence and so forth, repudiates such aspects.

Then if one asks: When afflictions are eliminated, are they eliminated by way of the concomitants or by way of their objects?

It is not the former, because [an affliction] cannot be separated from [its concomitants.] It is held that an affliction is to be eliminated with respect to its object. Because when an affliction is eliminated, it no longer arises based on that object.[91]

Then if one asks: How many [types of] remoteness (Thag Sring Ba'i Ngo Bo; dūratā) are there?

There are four: remoteness by difference of nature (mTsan Nyid Mi mThun Pa; vailakṣaṇya); remoteness by incompatibility (Mi mThun Phyogs; vipakṣa); remoteness by separation of place (Yul rNam Par Chad Pa; deśa-viccheda); remoteness by time (Dus; kāla).

The first is like the four elements which arise simultaneously [but are still remote from each other by their natures.] The second is like morality and degenerate conduct. The third is like the eastern ocean and the western ocean. The fourth is like the distance between the two times, past and

future. [p.325; 180a5]

If one asks: As it says {v.60}, "They are destroyed by the arising of the antidotes." Just as the antidotes develop progressively (Khyad Par Du; viśeṣa), is it the case that the abandonments also develop progressively?

No. An affliction is destroyed all at once by the antidote. However, the [obtainment of the] separation (Bral Ba; visaṁyoga) of that abandonment develops progressively, over and over. Because it occurs: upon the arising of the antidote, the path of liberation; upon obtaining the four fruits of monkhood (dGe sByong Tsul Gyi 'Bras Bu; śrāmaṇya-phala); and upon the improvement ('Phel Ba; vivṛddhi) of the faculties[92]; during these [the obtainment of separation] develops progressively. {60d-63}

IV. <u>The presentation of complete knowledge, the fruit of eliminating them</u>.

In the presentation of complete knowledge (Yongs Shes; parijñā), the fruit of eliminating [the polluting tendencies,] there are five topics:

A. The divisions.

B. Which path has which fruit.

C. Ascertaining the number.

D. Which individuals possess them.

E. The explanation of obtaining them and giving them up.

A. The divisions.

If one asks: How many complete knowledges,[93] which are the fruit of eliminating the polluting tendencies, are there?

There are nine resultant complete knowledges:

In the Desire Realm, the destruction of the first two types of objects to be abandoned--by seeing Suffering and seeing Origination in the Desire Realm--is one complete knowledge. And the destruction of the two objects to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path are two complete knowledges.

In the same way there are three [of the upper realms:] the destruction of the objects to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and Origination of the upper realms is one complete knowledge. And the destruction of the objects to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path are two [complete knowledges.]

The other three are the complete knowledges of the destruction of objects to be abandoned by Meditation: The destruction of the [five types of connections that are] conducive to the inferior [is one.][94] The destruction of the contaminants of the Form Realm [is the second.] And the destruction of all contaminants of the Formless Realm makes three complete knowledges. {64-65c}

B. Which path has which fruit.

If one asks: Of which paths are these complete knowledges the fruits?

The first six are the fruit of the Patiences, because they are the fruit of the Path of Seeing. The remaining complete knowledges are the fruit of the Knowledges, because they are the fruit of the Path of Meditation.[95] [p.326; 181a1]

If one asks: Of which levels are they the fruit?

All complete knowledges are the fruit of anāgamya (Mi lCogs Med), the preliminary level of the first concentration. Because based on the uncontaminated anāgamya attachment can be separated from all [afflictions, say the Vaibhāṣikas.][96]

The fruit of the actual concentrations is five complete knowledges. However, the complete knowledges that are the fruit of eliminating the objects to be abandoned by Seeing and to be abandoned by Meditation of the Desire Realm, are not the fruit of actual concentrations; because the actual concentrations are not the antidotes of the Desire Realm.[97]

The Bhadanta Ghoṣaka (dByangs sGrogs) says that the fruit of the actual absorptions are eight, with the exception of the connections that are conducive to the inferior.[98]

One, [#8,] the complete knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants of the Form Realm, is the fruit of the Preparatory Stage of

Space (Nam mKha'i Nyer bDogs; ākāśānantyāyatana) of the Formless Realm {viii.22}. Because it is the Preparatory Stage of Space of the Formless Realm that brings about the separation from attachment to the Form Realm.

And three actual [concentrations] of the Formless Realm have as fruit one complete knowledge--[#9, the destruction of all contaminants of the Formless Realm;] because they bring about separation from attachment to the Peak of Existence.[99] {65d-66}

If one asks: Which are the fruits of the mundane and of the super-mundane paths?

All [nine] complete knowledges are the fruit of the Āryan Path. Because the two complete knowledges, [#7 and #8,] that are the fruit of eliminating two of the last objects to be abandoned by Meditation, are suitable to be fruit of the Āryan Path; and the other seven complete knowledges must be obtained by the Āryan Path.[100]

The two complete knowledges of eliminating two of the last objects to be abandoned by Meditation, [#7 and #8,] are the fruit of the mundane path, because these two latter objects to be abandoned by Meditation can also be eliminated by the mundane path.

The last two complete knowledges are the fruit of Subsequent Knowledges, because the Subsequent Knowledges are the antidotes of the

two upper realms. [p.327; 181b1]

The last three complete knowledges are the fruit of Dharma Knowledges, because the Dharma Knowledges are the antidotes of [objects to be abandoned by Meditation of] all three realms.

There are six complete knowledges that are fruit included in the group of the Dharma Knowledges,[101] the first three and the last three complete knowledges.

There are five complete knowledges that are fruit included in the group of Subsequent Knowledges,[102] the middle three and the last two. {65d-67}

C. Ascertaining the number.

If one asks: What is the reason for fixing the number of resultant complete knowledges at nine?

There is a reason. The complete knowledges of eliminating the objects to be abandoned by Seeing are established [as complete knowledges] because of: the arising newly of an uncontaminated obtainment of separation; the damaging of [the afflictions of] the Peak of Existence; and the total destruction of the two universal causes.[103]

And the complete knowledges of eliminating the objects to be abandoned by Meditation are established from [the above three reasons plus

a fourth,] from transcendence of an entire realm. {68}

D. Which individuals possess them.

If one asks: Who possesses these complete knowledges?

One, the ordinary individual, does not possess any of these. The Āryan abiding on the Path of Seeing possesses from one up to five complete knowledges.[104]

One who abides on the Path of Meditation who is not separated from attachment to the Desire Realm, possesses six complete knowledges. One who abides there and is separated from attachment to the Desire Realm possesses one complete knowledge.[105]

The Arhat possesses one. And the Non-Returner who is [Previously] Freed of Attachment to the Form Realm possesses two.[106] If one asks: What is the reason the Non-Returner who is not free of attachment to the Form Realm, and the Arhat, are established as not having more than one fruit each?

There is a reason. Because they have transcended an entire realm, and because they have attained a fruit, the [complete knowledges] are combined and thereby they are established [as possessing only] one each. {69-70b} [p.328; 182a2]

E. The explanation of obtaining them and giving them up.

If one asks: How many complete knowledges are given up at one time?

Some individuals give up one complete knowledge. For example: One who deteriorates from the fruit of Arhatship.

And there is the case of giving up two at one time, like the obtainment of the fruit of Arhatship.[107]

There is the case of giving up five at one time, like the obtainment of the fruit of Non-returner by one who is Previously Freed of Attachment.[108]

There is the case of giving up six at one time, like the obtainment of the fruit of Gradualist Non-returner.[109]

Then if one asks: How many complete knowledges are obtained at one time?

There is the case of obtaining one complete knowledge, like the obtainment of the fruit of Arhatship.

There is the case of obtaining two at one time, like deteriorating from Arhatship.[110]

There is the case of obtaining six at one time, like deteriorating from the fruit of Gradualist Non-returner.[111]

There is no case of obtaining five complete knowledges at one time,

because it is not possible to deteriorate from the fruit of Previously Freed from Attachment Non-returner; because they have made [their attainment] firm by [following] both the mundane and the super-mundane paths.

This is the explanation of the fifth chapter entitled, "The Presentation of the Polluting Tendencies from the Verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*."

## NOTES--CHAPTER 5

1. The chapter begins with a prolonged argument as to whether the polluting tendency of attachment is identical with attachment, or whether there is a polluting tendency that is distinct from attachment but related to it.

The Opponents of the Vaibhāṣikas point to a sūtra passage which suggests they are distinct:

> Here, some [individuals] do not abide regularly with their minds fully entangled (Kun Nas dGris Pa; paryava-sthita) in attachment. And if full entanglement in attachment should arise they know well the correct way to get free of it. Totally destroying the force of full entanglement in attachment it is eliminated along with its polluting tendency.

However, the Vaibhāṣikas say that if the polluting tendencies were distinct from attachment it would have to be merely a formative force not associated with mind, namely obtainment (Thob Pa; prāpti). Therefore they say:

> Attachment itself is a polluting tendency. And likewise the others up to doubt are also polluting tendencies.

They point out that the Abhidharma uses the term polluting tendencies to mean, definitively, afflictions (Nyon Mongs Pa; kleśa). Therefore the polluting tendencies are exclusively dharmas concomitant with mind.

The Vaibhāṣikas insist that the polluting tendencies must be mental because they perform the mental functions of causing the mind to become afflicted, obscuring it, opposing virtue.

The adversaries, who hold that the polluting tendencies are non-mental, contend that all of these functions are not performed by the polluting tendencies, but rather they are performed by the afflictions (kleśa).

Finally, Vasubandhu says:

> The Sautrāntika theory is best. What is the Sautrāntika theory?
>
> The meaning of "attachment polluting tendency" is the polluting tendency of attachment. And because they are not separate substances, polluting tendencies are neither mental concomitants nor [dharmas] not associated [with mind.]
>
> Rather, afflictions (kleśa) which are dormant (Nyal Ba; prasupta) are called the polluting tendencies; those that are awakened (Sad Pa; prabuddha) are called fully entangling (Kun Nas dGris Pa;

paryavasthāna).

What are the dormant [polluting tendencies?]

Those that are not manifest (mNgon Sum Du Ma Gyur Pa; asammukhī-bhuta) but rather are in the state of being a seed.

What are the awakened ones? Those that are manifest.

What is the meaning of the term, "in the state of being a seed" (Sa Bon Gyi dNgos Po; bhīja-bhāva)? It is the capacity to generate affliction which arises from [previous] afflictions of the person (Lus; ātma).

(On the use of "ātman" here to mean "the person," *SAKV* p.763; *'Gral bShad* p.101a7 comments: "ātmabhāvasya = āśrayasya.")

The entire argument is nicely summarized by Poussin (Pruden fn#4):

For the Sarvāstivādins the anuśaya of a kleśa...is the kleśa itself; for the Vātsiputrīyas, it is the prāpti or possession of this kleśa: a person who is not presently bound by the defilement, "possesses" the defilement that he has had and which he will have; for the Sautrāntikas, it is the seed of the kleśa.

2. *GDD* states it slightly differently from *ADKB* p.731; *bShad Pa* Vol.II p.1: "Similarly" is stated in order to understand that it is by the power of attachment ('Dod Chags Kyi dBang Gis; rāga-vaśena) that the others are nourished (rGyas Par 'Gyur Ba; anuśāyita) by their objects.

To which *SAKV* p.731; *'Gral bShad* p.99b4 comments:
Those objects for which one has attachment can also nourish the others, anger and so forth. Therefore, because there is no polluting tendency of attachment, the afflictions of realms that are uncontaminated or not homogenous [with oneself] (sKal Pa Mi Nyams Pa; visabhāga) are not nourished.

3. According to *Jñāna-prasthāna* Taisho 26, p.943a27.

4. The five that are not views are: attachment ('Dod Chags; rāga); anger (Khong Khro; pratigha), pride (Nga rGyal; māna), ignorance (Ma Rig Pa; avidyā), and doubt (The Tsom; vicikitsā).

5. *ADKB* p.768; *bShad Pa* p.7:

Thus the Abhidharmikas [Poussin: *Jñāna-prasthāna* TD26, p.929c2]

hold that there are 98 polluting tendencies by dividing them according to aspect, type [of mode of abandoning {ii.52}] and realm.

Vasubandhu presents the system of the Abhidharma. *SAKV* p.775; *'Gral bShad* p.109a8 presents the system of the Yogācāra in which there are 128 kleśas or polluting tendencies. The *Abhisamayālaṁkāra* also counts 128, though a little differently. Poussin summarizes these systems (Pruden fn#35).

6. GDD has stated this in a confusing manner. According to the order usually given, including in their first presentation in the root text {v.3}, the second view in the list is wrong view. This is the same order that GDD himself presents them in. However, in Vasubandhu's commentary to {v.3} (*ADKB* p.765; *bShad Pa* p.5) he presents the view holding to the extremes second, and wrong view third.

It is to this list that GDD refers when he says "the first two are excepted." Because Vasubandhu is explicit: the three views that are excepted in order to make seven are--view of the transitory collection, view holding to the extremes, and esteeming morality and asceticism.

7. *ADKB* p.766; *bShad Pa* p.6:

> Thus, these 32 polluting tendencies are objects to be abandoned by seeing, because they are abandoned by the mere seeing of the Truths.

8. So there are 36 polluting tendencies that operate in the Desire Realm. *ADKB* p.767; *bShad Pa* p.6:

> Those that have an object which is to be abandoned by seeing a certain [Truth,] are to be abandoned by seeing. The remainder are abandoned by meditation.

Geshe Donyo comments: Among these ten there are two types, to be abandoned by seeing or by meditation. Those to be abandoned by seeing are those polluting tendencies that come from tenets, or are there by the force of a temporary or adventitious understanding. They are not innate or naturally there. Those that are not adventitious, but are inborn or innate, are those to be abandoned by meditation.

9. So there are 31 in each of the Form and Formless Realms, by excluding the five types of anger.

The five types of anger are: anger to be abandoned by seeing each of the four Truths, and that to be abandoned by meditation.

10. These are the four Subsequent Patiences (rJes bZod; anvaya-jñāna-kṣanti) which are the uninterrupted paths for the upper realms on the Path of Seeing. See {vi.25ff}.

11. i.e. The Desire Realm, the four concentrations of the Form Realm and three of the four Formless Absorptions, with the exception of the Peak of Existence.

12. Geshe Sopa explains that this is an Āryan who has not yet abandoned any of the afflictions of the Path of Meditation and has not attained any of the absorptions.

13. These are the ordinary individuals who follow the mundane Path of Meditation. For them the afflictions of the eight levels which are to be eliminated by Patiences are eliminated on that mundane Path of Meditation.

14. *GDD* (p.297) reads Byis Pa = immature beings, i.e. non-Āryans. But *ADKB* p. 769; *bShad Pa* p.7 has bāhyaka (Phyi Rol Pa) = outsiders, i.e. those who do not follow the uncontaminated path of the Buddhists.

I have translated Byis Pa as outsider in this paragraph, following the *ADKB*.

15. Geshe Sopa explains that the phrase "bZod Pas gZhom Bya Min Pa" (*GDD* p.297) is virtually a synonym for afflictions to be abandoned on the Path of Meditation, because there are no Patiences on the Path of Meditation. So those that are destroyed by Knowledges but not by Patiences must be abandoned on the Path of Meditation.

These Knowledges are discussed at *ADKB* {vii.1ff}.

16. *ADKB* p.773; *bShad Pa* p.9:

> What does inferior (dMan Pa; hīna) mean? It is everything that is contaminated, because the Āryans abandon that.

17. We saw in {v.4} that all ten polluting tendencies are abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering. Seven are abandoned by seeing the Truth of Origination--with the exception of the view of the transitory collection, view holding to the extremes, and esteeming morality and asceticism.

Which of the Four Truths causes the abandonment of which views is based on the 16 aspects of the Four Truths, which are presented by Vasubandhu at {vii.13a}.

The four aspects of the Truth of Origination are: 1) Cause. 2) Origin. 3) Successive generation. 4) Conditions.

Now, the argument here is that, since the view that considers Īśvara or God to be the cause of the world relates to these aspects of the Truths, it should be by seeing this Truth of Origination that this view is eliminated.

The opponent points out that the Vaibhāṣikas have said that "the view that considers what is not a cause to be a cause, or what is not the path [to be the path] is the view of esteeming mistaken morality and asceticism." The view that considers God as the cause of the world fits this description, but the faulty consequence is that esteeming morality and asceticism can not be abandoned by seeing Origination.

The Vaibhāṣikas respond to this {v.8} by maintaining that adherence to God as the cause of the world is due to mistaken conceptions of permanence and selfhood. These are mistaken views that are eliminated by seeing the Truth of Suffering, because the four aspects of that Truth are: 1) Impermanence. 2) Suffering. 3) Empty. 4) Non-self.

18. *BHS* p.295: nitīraṇa = complete and conclusive investigation.

19. The view of morality and asceticism is not invariably or totally mistaken since morality and ascetic practices do contribute to purification.

The view of annihilation from the view holding to the extremes, and wrong view, are not false affirmations because they express (albeit incorrectly) the non-existence of something. (*ADKB* p.776; *bShad Pa* p.11)

20. See Pruden fn#37 for citations.

21. i.e. They do not necessarily have the aspect of investigation; and they are not necessarily mistaken with respect to their object.

22. Taisho 26, p.1028b26.

23. The formula is laid out at *ADKB* p.753; *bShad Pa* p.15.
The first three are, in order: adhimāna, māna, ūnamāna.
The second three are: ūnamāna, māna, adhimāna.
The third three are: māna, adhimāna, ūnamāna.

24. i.e. Some are to be abandoned by seeing, some by meditation.

25. *ADKB* p.784; *bShad Pa* p.785:

> Those fully entangling afflictions due to which one would intentionally (Ched Du bSams Te; sañcintya) commit murder, up to telling a lie, [which includes stealing and sexual misconduct;] those are to be

abandoned by Meditation. Because they take dharmas to be abandoned by Meditation as their objects.

Although this chapter lists eight (or ten) full entanglements that operate as subtle propensities, as the name implies, all afflictions when they are in full operation are fully entangling. Such full entanglements as killing, stealing, lying, and sexual misconduct are to be abandoned by Meditation because they take as their objects other objects to be abandoned by Meditation.

These and other objects to be abandoned by Meditation that have not yet been abandoned will not become manifest for an Āryan.

26. i.e. Regret for doing a virtue. Such regret is itself non-virtuous.

27. The root afflictions are the six polluting tendencies: attachment, anger, pride, ignorance, view and doubt.

In general, there are two types of ignorance. There is one type that assists the other five root afflictions and is concomitant with them; and another type which is not concomitant with the others, but rather is independent.

But here *SAKV* p.785; *'Gral bShad* p.116b3 explains the meaning is slightly different:

> There are two types of ignorance: that to be abandoned by seeing Suffering; and that to be abandoned by seeing Origination. That is from one point of view, but that is not all. The two ignorances that are universals are: that which is concomitant with [other] universals; and that which is independent (Ma 'Dres Pa; āveṇikī) [and not concomitant with any others.]

So the eleven here are the five views to be abandoned by seeing Suffering; the two views to be abandoned by seeing Origination; two types of doubt--that to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and that to be abandoned by seeing Origination; and the two types of ignorance, concomitant ignorance and independent ignorance.

28. We see at {ii.52b} that the dharmas are classified into five types based on whether they are to be abandoned by seeing one of the Four Truths, or by Meditation.

So these 11 are called universals, because they can take as their objects any of these five types which are in their own realm.

29. A being in the Desire Realm may look at Brahma and see him as self-existent and permanent, but one does not consider him to be I or mine, so this is not the view of the transitory collections; such a view can only be held in respect to aggregates of one's own realm. And the view holding to the extremes grows out of the view of the transitory collections, so it too is not directed to objects of another realm. (*ADKB* p.787; *bShad Pa* p.19)

30. What arises concomitant with ignorance, e.g. feeling, discrimination, consciousness etc., although not polluting tendencies, are also universal in realm.

31.Geshe Donyo comments:

Wrong view with respect to the Truth of Cessation in the Desire Realm is the view that the Truth of Cessation in the Desire Realm does not exist. That is only with respect to Cessation on its own level. It does not bear on the Truth of Cessation of other levels. Cessation is distinct for each of the levels up to the Peak of Existence.

On the other hand the objects to be abandoned by seeing the Truth of the Path, have to be directed to the Path. What Path is taken as object? Any of the six uncontaminated levels--[the first four concentrations, as well as the preparatory stage of the first concentration, and the special first concentration.] So, although it is in the Desire Realm, this wrong view is directed to the Path which exists only in upper realms. There is no uncontaminated Path in the Desire Realm.

32. See {vi.26ff}. The four dharma-patiences and four dharma-knowledges are the antidotes of wrong views with respect to the Four Noble Truths of the Desire Realm. In the first moment of the meditation the dharma-patience counteracts its affliction (=the uninterrupted path); in the second moment, with the attainment of abandonment of that affliction it is the dharma-knowledge (=path of liberation.)

33. i.e. Wrong view, doubt, and ignorance, as described above.

34. The main point here is that objects to be abandoned by seeing the Path can be directed to other levels than their own because uncontaminated phenomena like the Path are not restricted to their own level, but can act as the homogenous cause of Paths on other levels, as long as it is an equal or superior Path.

35. The nine are: anāgamya, the special first concentration, the four actual concentrations and the first three formless absorptions. See {ii.52}.

36. *ADKB* p.791; *bShad Pa* p.21:

> ATTACHMENT IS NOT [DIRECTED TO CESSATION OR THE PATH] BECAUSE IT IS TO BE REJECTED. Attachment is to be rejected. If it was directed to uncontaminated objects it would not be something to be rejected, like a predilection ('Dun Pa; chhanda) for virtuous dharmas.

37. *ADKB* p.792; *bShad Pa* p.792:

> Because Cessation and the Path are tranquil, they are not capable of producing a puffed up state of mind.

38. Geshe Donyo comments: Liberation is a thought contrary to the contaminated aggregates; the opposite of the suffering aggregates is liberation. The view of the extremes, nihilism, also holds that there are not permanent or transitory aggregates--it is a view annihilating them. So because it is opposed to the aggregates it is not non-virtuous.

> ADKB p.794; bShad Pa p.24:
>
> Therefore, the Bhagavan said: "Among the views of the outsiders, the best are those views that say, 'May I not exist. May things that are mine not exist. May I not come to exist. May things of mine not come to exist.'"

39. Poussin (Pruden fn#67) cites the Japanese editor, Saeki: this refers to the Sautrāntikas.

40. Geshe Sopa comments: In the upper realms there is no non-virtue, so all afflictions are neutral. Apparently to make this distinction the terminology has been changed, but there are equivalencies: craving (Sred Pa; tṛṣṇa) is attachment in the upper realms. Wisdom (Blo; mati) here refers to afflicted wisdom and is the equivalent of the polluting tendency of view.

41. Bāhyaka (Nyi 'Og Pa) seems to be equivalent to the usual name, Bahirdeśaka. Poussin (Pruden p.799) has Aparāntakas.

42. i.e. The 14 indeterminate points (Lung Du Ma bsTan Pa'i dNgos Po; avyākṛta-vastu). See Pruden fn#77 for citations.

The terms in Sanskrit and Tibetan are the same but I have changed my translation from "neutral" to "indeterminate".

43. This discussion is built around the common roots in Sanskrit for, v. "to distinguish, explain, answer" = vy-ā-√kṛ, which yields, n. "explanation, answer" = vyākaraṇa; and on the other hand adj. "neutral" = avyākṛta, also from a-vy-ā-√kṛ--which literally means undistinguished, undetermined, from which, neutral.

44. *ADKB* p.801; *bShad Pa* p.30:

> That person in whom a certain polluting tendency is nourished in relation to an object--that person is bound to that [object] by that [polluting tendency.] What is to be explained now is to which [objects one] is bound by [polluting tendencies] of the past, up to to which one is bound by [polluting tendencies] of the future.

45.i.e. Arising, duration, aging, impermanence. See {ii.45}.

46. See Pruden fn#91 for citations.

47. *ADKB* p.806; *bShad Pa* p.33:

> They say that when a dharma goes through time periods it is shown to be different because of different states: it is by way of its taking on different states (gNas sKabs; avasthā) that it is this [time] or that [time,] not because of [different] substances.

48. Analogous-to-that (De Dang mTsungs Pa; tatsabhāga) are the dhātus, and specifically here the faculties, when they are not performing their functions. When an eye faculty is performing its function of seeing it is coordinated (brTen Pa Dang bCas Pa; sabhāga); when it is not performing its function--e.g. when it is in the future--it is analogous-to-that. See {i.39}.

49. See {ii.59}. The argument of the Vaibhāṣikas is that although the present eye that is analogous-to-that does not perform the function of looking at form, it does perform the function of yielding naturally flowing result (rGyu mThun Gyi 'Bras Bu; niṣyanda-phala); and therefore it is present.

50. Vasubandhu's argument is: Since you Vaibhāṣikas say that past and future are substantially existent in the present, what is there to stop them from performing activities in the present?

51. The argument is: If the phenomenon substantially exists in the past and future in the same way as in the present, why does it not arise, why does it perish? What is there which has previously not come into being and which

allows us to say it is not arisen? What is it that later disappears and allows us to say that it has ceased?

Once it has been denied that a dharma comes into being from a state of non-existence and subsequently disappears, one cannot possibly establish the three times.

This extensive refutation of the doctrine of the three times continues, but GDD has chosen to cut it short, staying close to the outline of the root text.

52. For some reason in this passage GDD has replaced the bShad Pa's Bral Ba = separated from, with Grol Ba = free from. Nonetheless, they are synonyms here.

53. They are defined as universals by virtue of the fact that they are nourished by way of taking as their objects all five types of objects to be abandoned in their own realms. See {v.12}.

54. *ADKB* p.819; *bShad Pa* p.42:

> Explaining individually how many polluting tendencies are nourished with respect to which objects would require a huge discourse. Therefore, they will be explained in a condensed form.

55. Geshe Sopa explains: This is the consciousness which, on the mundane path, looks down from the Form Realm and compares the coarseness of the Desire Realm to the subtlety of the Form Realm.

56. These objects to be abandoned of the Desire Realm, when they are abandoned, become the objects of the dharma-knowledges, which are uncontaminated consciousnesses.

57. This latter case is for example, when esteeming views takes wrong view as its object.

58. That is, for objects to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path, they are each the objects of:

In the Desire Realm, the five consciousnesses previously mentioned plus their own type, equals six.

In the Form Realm, the previous eight plus their own type, equals nine.

In the Formless Realm, the previous ten plus their own type, equals 11.

59. i.e. Consciousnesses abandoned by seeing Cessation, seeing the Path, and to be abandoned by Meditation.

60. See {vi.58} on the Arhat who degenerates.

61. The *ADKB* p.830; *bShad Pa* p.49 keeps count here. There are 41 afflictions and full entanglements of the Desire Realm which constitute the contaminant of desire: the 36 polluting tendencies minus five types of ignorance = 31; plus 10 full entanglements.

62. 52 polluting tendencies of the two upper realms are the contaminant of existence: 31 in each realm minus the five types of anger = 26 in the Form Realm and 26 in the Formless Realm.

63. See Pruden fn#140-141 for other sources on the meaning of anuśaya.

64. The editor of the Sarnath Edition has (rightly) corrected sKye mChed Drug Gi rMa Nang Nas // to: sKye mChed Drug Gi rMa'i sGo Nas //

> *ADKB* p.835; *bShad Pa* p.52:
>
> They are called contaminants (āsrava; Zag Pa) because they establish one in saṁsāra, and they flow ('Dzag Pa; āsravanti) from the wounds of the six āyatanas, from the Peak of Existence to Avīci.

65. The six root afflictions are the six polluting tendencies: attachment (rJes Su Chags Pa; anunaya); anger (Khong Khro; pratigha); pride (Nga rGyal; māna); ignorance (Ma Rig Pa; avidyā); view (lTa Ba; dṛṣṭi); doubt (The Tsom; vicikitsā).

66. The first three are view of transitory collections; wrong view; view holding to the extremes.

The last two are esteeming unworthy views; esteeming morality and asceticism.

There are 18 types of the first three because: There is view of the transitory collections and view holding to the extremes (to be abandoned by seeing Suffering) in each of the three realms = 6. Then there is wrong view to be abandoned by each of the four Truths = 4, in each of the three realms = 12. 12 + 6 = 18.

There are 18 types of the last two because: There two types of esteeming morality and asceticism (to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and the Path) in each of the three realms = 6. Then there is esteeming unworthy views to be abandoned by each of the four Truths = 4, in each of the three

realms = 12. 12 + 6 = 18.

67. *SAKV* p.839; *'Gral bShad* p.149b8 explains that these two are pulled out of (Phyung Nas; niṣkṛṣya) the group of full entanglements and taught separately because they are the only ones that are both exclusively non-virtuous, and independent. Independent (Rang dBang Can; svatantra) means that they can arise concomitant only with ignorance and no other full entanglement. Yaśomitra goes on:

> Although shamelessness and immodesty are exclusively non-virtuous, they are not independent, because they are concomitant with attachment and other [afflictions.]
>
> Although regret ('Gyod Pa; kaukṛtya) is independent because it can be concomitant with only ignorance, it is not exclusively non-virtuous, because it can also be virtuous.
>
> Torpor (rMongs Pa; styāna), excitement (rGod Pa; auddhatya) and sleep (gNyid; middha) are not independent because they are concomitant with attachment and so forth, and they are also not exclusively non-virtuous because they can be virtuous and neutral.

68. These three are the entrances because they are the first members of each of three categories: 1) afflictions to be abandoned by seeing Suffering--view of the transitory collections is first; 2) afflictions to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and the Path--esteeming morality and asceticism is first; 3) afflictions to be abandoned by seeing all Four Truths--doubt is first.

They are the roots because: the view holding to the extremes develops from the view of the transitory collections. Esteeming unworthy views develops from esteeming morality and asceticism. And wrong view develops from doubt.

69. According to *SAKV* p.841; *'Gral bShad* p.152a2, this is the opinion of "the Ācārya himself"--Vasubandhu.

70. 'Bras sPungs Edition p.176b2, Sarnath Edition p.317 is corrected to: rTza Ba'i Nyon Mongs Pa De Las gZhan Pa'i Nyon Mongs Pa Can Sems Byung...

71. *ADKB* p.844; *bShad Pa* p.58 says that they are enumerated in *Kṣudraka-vastu* (*gZhi Phran Tsegs*). *SAKV* p.844; *'Gral bShad* p.153a5 quotes that list:

> 1) Mi dGa' Ba; arati {v.59}. 2) Glal Byed Pa; vijṛmbhikā {v.59}. 3) Sems Zhum Pa Nyid; cetaso līnatva {v.59}. 4) rMya Ba; tandrī {v.59}. 5) Zas Kyi Drod Mi Zin Pa Nyid; bhakṣe 'smatā {v.59}. 6) Tha Dad Pa Nyid Kyi 'Du Shes; nānātvasaṁjñā. 7) Yid La Mi Byed Pa; amanasikāra.

8) Lus Kyi gNas Ngan Llen; kāyadauṣṭhulya. 9) Ru gDug; śṛṅgī. 10) 'Phya sMod; [bhittiṁkā.] 10a) gNam Pa gNyid. 11) Mi gNam Pa Nyid; anārjava. 12) amārdavatā. 13) Rang bZhin Du Mi 'Dug Pa Nyid; asvabhāvānuvṛttitā. 14) 'Dod Pa'i rNam Par rTog Pa; kāmavitarka. 15) vyāpādavitarka. 16) 'Tse Ba'i rNam Par rTog Pa; vihiṁsāvitarka. 17) Nye Ba'i rNam Par rTog Pa; jñātivitarka {v.59}. 18) Yul Gyi rNam Par rTog Pa; janapadavitarka {v.59}. 18a) Mi 'Chi Ba'i rNam Par rTog Pa; [amaravitarka {v.59}.] 19) brNyas Pa Dang lDan Pa'i rNam Par rTog Pa; avamanyanāpratisaṁyukto vitarka. 20) Rigs sNyems Pa Dang lDan Pa'i rNam Par rTog Pa; kulodayatāpratisaṁyukto vitarka. 21) Myang Na; śoka. 22) sDug bsNgal; duḥkha. 23) Yid Mi bDe Ba; daurmanasya. 24) 'Khrug Pa; upāyāsa.

There are discrepancies between the Tibetan and the Sanskrit lists. Numbers 10a and 18a appear in Tibetan but not in Sanskrit. Numbers 12 and 15 appear in Sanskrit but not in Tibetan. Number 10, bhittiṁkā is in parentheses because its meaning, Tamarind, does not seem to coincide with 'Phya sMod--to revile or blame.

See also Pruden fn#167 for a slightly different list.

However, this is not a comprehensive list, it is only a list of some examples. The term "subsidiary afflictions" (Nye Ba'i Nyon Mongs; upakleśa) is used below to refer to the 16 afflictions included in the ten full entanglements and the six impurities. The main point is that the subsidiary afflictions are only mental factors.

72. There are eight according to the *Prakaraṇa-pāda-śastra*, Taisho 26, p693c20.

73. *ADKB* p.844; *bShad Pa* p.58:

Of these, shamelessness and immodesty have already been explained. Jealousy (Phrag Dog; īrṣyā) is being mentally upset (Khrug Pa; vyāroṣa) over another's success.
Miserliness (Ser sNa; mātsarya) is the possessiveness of mind which opposes the giving of Dharma, material objects, or skills.
Excitement (rGod Pa; auddhatya) is the non-tranquility of mind.
Regret ('Gyod Pa; kaukṛtya) and torpor (rMugs Pa; styāna) have already been explained.
Sleep (gNyid; middha) is the gathering in of the mind which leaves one incapable of controlling the body.

This mental factor and regret are full entanglements only when

they constitute afflicted states of mind.
Belligerence (Khro Ba; krodha) is all animosity (mNar Sems; āghāta) directed towards sentient beings and non-beings, with the exception of harmful thoughts (gNod Sems; vyāpāda) and harmfulness (rNam Par 'Tse Ba; vihiṁsa).
Concealment ('Chab Pa; mrakṣa) is the hiding of disgraceful conduct (Kha Na Ma Tho Ba; avadya).

74. *ADKB* p.845; *bShad Pa* p.59:

> Deceit (sGyu; māyā) is to mislead others.
> Dissimulation (gYo; śāṭhya) is a crookedness of mind due to which one does not present things as they really are, but makes one respond in a distorted or unclear manner. Haughtiness (rGyags Pa; mada) was explained previously.
> Spite ('Tsig Pa; pradāśa) is holding firmly to disgraceful behavior due to which one does not accept proper advice.
> Resentment (Khon 'Dzin; upanāha) is repeatedly considering despised (mNar Sems Kyi; āghāta) objects.
> Harmfulness (rNam Par 'Tse Ba; vihiṁsā) is injuring (rNam Par Tho 'Tsam Pa; viheṭhana) due to which one injures another with weapons or harsh words.

75. Geshe Donyo explains that this is based on their being concomitant. If they are concomitant with a mind that is abandoned by Seeing, they are also abandoned by Seeing.

76. This story is found at *SAKV* p.847; *'Gral bShad* p.154b5.

77. There are sixteen afflictions under consideration here: the ten full entanglements and the six impurities.

78. The two pleasures are the feeling of pleasure, when attachment arises for a faculty consciousness; and mental happiness, when attachment arises for the mental consciousness.

79. In the two upper realms there is no suffering or mental unhappiness. And in the Formless Realm there is also no pleasure or mental happiness. There is only neutral feeling.

In the first concentration there are four consciousnesses--eye, ear, body and mental consciousness. The polluting tendencies that arise with each of these is concomitant with feelings that are proper to that consciousness: the feeling of pleasure for eye, ear and body consciousness;

the feeling of mental happiness for the mental consciousness; and neutral feeling for all four consciousnesses.

From the second concentration on there is only mental consciousness; the polluting tendencies are concomitant with: in the second concentration, mental happiness and neutral feeling; in the third concentration, pleasure (see {ii.8} for this special case) and neutral feeling; in the fourth concentration and the Formless Realm, only neutral feeling.

See {ii.12} and {viii.12}.

80. *ADKB* p.850; *bShad Pa* p.63:

> Because it arises from the cause of desire, it is engaged in its aspect of joy.

81. The *ADKB* p.851; *bShad Pa* p.63 reads:

> HAUGHTINESS IS CONCOMITANT WITH THE TWO TYPES OF HAPPINESS. In the third concentration it is concomitant with pleasure. [See {ii.8} for this special case of pleasure in the third concentration.] Below that it is concomitant with mental happiness. Above that it is concomitant with neutral feeling.
>
> NEUTRAL FEELING IS EVERYWHERE. All polluting tendencies are concomitant with neutral feeling, because it is not restricted with regard to any of them, just like ignorance.

82. See Pruden fn#184 for citations.

83. GDD has paraphrased. The *ADKB* p.852; *bShad Pa* p.64 reads:

> What is the nourishment of torpor and sleep: drowsiness (rMya Ba; tandrī); unhappiness; physical exhaustion (Bya sMyangs; vijṛmbhikā); inability to stop eating (Kha Zas Kyi Drod Mi Zin Pa; bhakte'samatā); and mental depression.

84. Poussin (Pruden fn#193) cites Saeki, the Japanese editor: this is the view of the Sautrāntikas.

85. Geshe Donyo explains that the normal order is: first the aggregate of meditative stabilization, then the aggregate of morality, then the aggregate of wisdom.

86. It is interesting that GDD attributes this view to the Cittamātrans. *ADKB* p.853; *bShad Pa* p.66 merely says "others" (anye), which Yaśomitra (p.853) glosses as "previous masters" (pūrvācāryāḥ). Poussin (Pruden fn#195) again cites the Japanese editor, Saeki, that it is the Sautrāntikas.

87. There is an unusual mistake in the outline here. GDD does not include objects to be abandoned by Seeing, which could either fall as the fourth topic under, III. <u>The manner of eliminating them</u>, or by dividing this as I have done into two topics.

88. We see at {v.12} that there are 11 polluting tendencies that are universal in homogenous realm: the five views to be abandoned by seeing Suffering; wrong view and esteeming views to be abandoned by seeing Origination; and two doubts and two ignorances to be abandoned by seeing Suffering and by seeing Origination.

At {v.13} we see that nine of these, with the exception of two of the five views--view of the transitory collections and the view holding to the extremes--are also universal in other realms. That is they can also be directed to objects in higher realms. There are polluting tendencies produced among beings of the Desire Realm which can be directed to objects in the Form or Formless Realm. And there are polluting tendencies of beings in the Form Realm that can be directed to objects of the Formless Realm.

89. *ADKB* p.854; *bShad Pa* p.67:

> By destroying those [polluting tendencies] which take them as their objects, the [polluting tendencies] which are universal in heterogenous realms are destroyed. Those that take them as their objects are the [polluting tendencies] which are universal in homogenous realms; so when they are eliminated, the others are eliminated too.

Poussin (Pruden fn#197) explains that the polluting tendencies universal in heterogenous realm are the object of the view of the transitory collection; by the elimination of the latter the former are eliminated.

90. *ADKB* p.854; *bShad Pa* p.67:

> By eliminating their objects, [polluting tendencies] to be abandoned by seeing Cessation and the Path which are directed to contaminated phenomena, are destroyed. Since their objects are those [polluting tendencies] which take uncontaminated phenomena as their objects, when [the latter] are eliminated [the former] are eliminated too.

These afflictions have for their object afflictions that are directed to the uncontaminated phenomena, Cessation and the Path. When the latter are eliminated, the former are eliminated also. For example, by abandoning wrong view by means of seeing Cessation or the Path, esteeming views, which takes wrong view as its object is also eliminated.

91. Poussin (Pruden fn#202) quotes Hui-hui with a clear statement of this point:

> The associated [concomitant] dharmas are the mind and its mental states of the existence (nikāya-sabhāga) under consideration. One cannot separate them from the defilements. If the defilements do not arise any more with respect to the object, this is what is called their abandoning.

92. The improvement of the faculties refers to the conversion ('Pho Ba; saṁcāra) of the faculties from dull to sharp. See {vi.29}, {vi.60}.

93. *ADKB* p.861; *bShad Pa* p.70:

> Separation (Bral Ba; visaṁyoga), in certain situations is given the designation of "complete knowledge" (Yongs Su Shes Pa; parijñā). Complete knowledge is twofold: wisdom complete knowledge (Ye Shes Kyi Yongs Su Shes Pa; jñānaparijñā) and abandonment complete knowledge (sPangs Pa'i Yongs Su Shes Pa; prahāṇaparijñā). Of these, wisdom complete knowledge is uncontaminated knowledge. Abandonment complete knowledge is abandonment itself; because the result is given the name of the cause.

94. See {v.43}:

> There are five types of connections that are conducive to the inferior (Tha Ma'i Cha mThun; avara-bhāgīya): view of the transitory collection, esteeming morality and asceticism, desire for pleasure ('Dod Pa La 'Dun Pa; kāmachanda), doubt, and harmful thoughts.

95. For the description of these Knowledges see {vii.1ff}. See also {v.6}.

96. *ADKB* p.863; *bShad Pa* p.72:

> ALL ARE THE FRUIT OF THE ANĀGAMYA. FIVE OR EIGHT ARE THE

FRUIT OF THE CONCENTRATIONS. According to the Vaibhāṣika system, there are five complete knowledges that are fruit of the actual absorptions: that is, those [complete knowledges] whose natures are the elimination of the afflictions that operate in the Form and Formless Realms. The elimination of the afflictions that operate in the Desire Realm are the fruit of anāgamya.

Poussin (Pruden fn#212) quotes Hsuan-tsang:

> All are the result of anāgamya, because anāgamya is the support for the abandoning of the defilements of the three dhātus abandoned through Seeing and Meditation.

On anāgamya see {vi.47} and {viii.22}.

97. i.e. The actual concentrations are the antidotes of the afflictions operative in the upper realms. The abandonment of the afflictions operative in the Desire Realm are the fruit of the anāgamya.

Complete knowledges #1-#3 are the result of eliminating afflictions of the Desire Realm, and so is #7--the destruction of the five types of connections that are conducive to the inferior.

98. His point is this: Suppose an individual becomes freed of attachment to the Desire Realm by means of the contaminated mundane path. Based on one of the concentrations he then enters the Path of Seeing (which is always uncontaminated): his abandonment of the afflictions of the Desire Realm, and his actual obtainment of separation from these afflictions, should be counted as the fruit of the Path of Seeing.

This means that complete knowledges #1-#6 and #8-#9 are all the fruit of the concentrations. It is only #7--the destruction of the five types of connections that are conducive to the inferior, that is the fruit of the anāgamya.

99. i.e. The first three formless absorptions, because there is no uncontaminated path in the fourth formless absorption. There is no attainment of a contaminated path in the Desire Realm because it is too coarse, or in the fourth formless absorption, because it is too subtle. This is the non-conscious state of neither discrimination nor non-discrimination ('Du Shes Med 'Du Shes Med Min Gyi sKye mChed; naiva-saṁjñā-nāsaṁjñāyatana).

100. Seven complete knowledges can only be eliminated by the supermundane path, the Āryan path. But #7--destruction of the five types of

connections that are conducive to the inferior, and #8--destruction of the contaminants of the Form Realm, can be the result of both the mundane Path of Meditation and the supermundane path.

101. i.e. those which are the fruit of both Dharma Patience and Dharma Knowledge.

102. i.e. those which are the fruit of both the Subsequent Patience and the Subsequent Knowledge.

103. An abandonment that possesses all three of these requirements qualifies as a complete knowledge. An ordinary individual's abandonment is not complete knowledge because there is no uncontaminated obtainment of separation, and it does not affect the afflictions of the Peak of Existence.

For an Āryan, until he proceeds beyond the stage of the Subsequent Patience of the Truth of Suffering--the third moment on the Path of Seeing--it does not damage the afflictions of the Peak of Existence, because this begins on the fourth moment of the Path of Seeing. That fourth moment, the Subsequent Knowledge of Suffering, and the fifth moment, the Dharma Patience of Origination do have uncontaminated obtainment and do harm the afflictions of the Peak of Existence, but they have not destroyed the two universal causes--the Truth of Suffering and Truth of Origination.

So the moments that are left that qualify as complete knowledges are the remaining Knowledges: Dharma Knowledges--moments six, ten and 14; and Subsequent Knowledges--moments eight, 12 and 16.

So on the Path of Seeing there are a total of six complete knowledges.

104. There are six moments on the Path of Seeing that qualify as complete knowledges, but the last, the 16th moment, is counted on the Path of Meditation.

105. The Āryan who abides in the Subsequent Knowledge of the Truth of the Path--the 16th moment of the Path of Seeing--but has not attained freedom from attachment to the Desire Realm by means of complete knowledge #7--the destruction of the five types of connections that are conducive to the inferior--possesses six complete knowledges.

One who has attained freedom from attachment to the Desire Realm either previous or subsequent to the Path of Seeing, possesses one complete knowledge, #7--the destruction of the five types of connections that are conducive to the inferior.

One who has attained Arhatship possesses only one complete knowledge, #9--the destruction of all contaminants.

The Non-returner who is Freed of Attachment to the Form Realm

possesses two: #7, having abandoned afflictions of the Desire Realm; and #8, the destruction of contaminants of the Form Realm.

106. i.e. He possesses #7, the destruction of the contaminants of the Desire Realm; and #8, the destruction of the contaminants of the Form Realm.

107. A Non-returner who is previously freed from attachment to the Desire Realm possesses complete knowledges #7 and #8. He gives these up when he attains Arhatship.

108. This is the Non-returner who has attained freedom from attachment to the Desire Realm on the contaminated path, prior to the Path of Seeing. He has the first five complete knowledges, and upon the last, 16th moment of the Path of Seeing he gives up those five and possesses one, #7--extinction of the Desire Realm.

109. This practitioner does everything in order. So he has attained the six complete knowledges of the Path of Seeing, and upon attaining #7 on the Path of Meditation, he gives up the six, as he has attained a fruit and transcended a realm.

110. This is the case of the Arhat who has fallen due to an affliction of the Formless Realm. He obtains complete knowledges #7 and #8, destruction of the contaminants of the Desire and Form Realms.

111. He regains the first six complete knowledges of the Path of Seeing.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## Primary Sources in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Translation

Asaṅga. *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Edited by Pralhad Pradhan. Shantiniketan: Visva Bharati, 1950.

dGe 'Dun Grub. *Dam Pa'i Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi rNam Par bShad Pa Thar Lam gSal Byed*. The Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dGe 'Dun Grub Pa. Dolanji: Patshang Lama Sonam Gyaltsen, 1978.

________. *mDzod Tik Thar Lam gSal Byed*. Second ed. Varanasi: Gelugpa Students Welfare Committee, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1982.

________. *Selected Works of the Dalai Lama I*. Translated by Glenn H. Mullin, 1981; reprint, Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1985.

Gang Ba sPel Ba. *Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi 'Brel bShad mTsan Nyid Kyi rJes Su 'Brang Ba, The Tibetan Tripitika, Peking Edition*. Vol. 117-118, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1957.

kLong rDol bLa Ma. "bKah gDams Pa Dang dGe Lugs Bla Ma Rag Rim Gyi gSung 'Bum mTsan Tho, a Catalogue of Works Written By Lamas of the bKa' gDams Pa and dGe Lugs Pa Sects." As reproduced in Lokesh Chandra, *The Collected Works of Longdol Lama*. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1973. 1285-1414.

________. "Nang Rig Pa mNgon Pa'i sDe sNod Las Byung Ba'i Don bsDu Ming Gi Grangs, Explanation of Important Technical Terms in the Abhidharmakośa." As reproduced in Lokesh Chandra, *The Collected Works of Longdol Lama*. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1973. 510-584.

Kong sPrul Yon Tan rGya mTso. *Shes Bya Kun Khyab*. Lhasa: Mi Rigs dPe sKrun Khang, 1985.

Kun dGa' rGyal mTsan. *bCom lDan 'Das Thub Pa'i dBang Po'i rNam Par Thar Pa'i bsTod Pa bDud dPung Bye Mar 'Thag Pa* . The Collected Works of dGe 'Dun Grub Pa, no. 5. Dolanji: Patshang Lama Sonam Gyaltsen, 1978.

mChims 'Jam Pa'i dByangs. *Chos mNgon Pa mDzod Kyi 'Grel Pa mNgon Pa'i rGyan*. Second ed. Mungod: Drepung Loseling Library Society, 1988.

Pan Chen Ye Shes rTse Mo. *rJes Thams Cad mKhen Pa dGe 'Dun Grub Pa dPal bZang Po'i rNam Thar Ngo mTsar rMad Byung Nor Bu'i Phreng Ba*. The Collected Works of dGe 'Dun Grub Pa, no. 5. Dolanji: Patshang Lama Sonam Gyaltsen, 1978.

Pruden, Leo M., tr. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam by Louis De La Vallée Poussin*. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988.

rGyal Pa'i Sras Grags Pa bShes gNyen. *Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi 'Grel bShad* in *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition*. Vol. 116, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957.

W. Woodville Rockhill, tr. *Udanavarga: A Collection of Verses From the Buddhist Canon*. New Delhi: D.K. Publisher's Distributors, 1982.

sLob dPon dByig gNyen. *Chos mNgon Pa'i mDzod Kyi Tsig Le'ur Byas Pa*. Third ed. Sarnath: Sarnath Legs bShad gTer mDzod Par Khang, 1978.

________. *Chos mNgon Pa mDzod Kyi bShad Pa*. Dharamsala: Council of Cultural & Religious Affairs of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1969.

Sparham, Gareth, tr. *The Tibetan Dhammapada compiled by Dharmatrāta*. New Delhi: Mahayana Publications, 1983.

Vasubandhu. *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. Translated by Louis de La Valée Poussin. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1925-1931.

________. *The Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu*. An English Translation of the Sanskrit Text Edited By Dr. Prahlad Pradhan and the Commentary Annotated and Rendered Into French From the Chinese By Dr. Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Edited by Prahlad Pradhan. Translated by Translated by Subhadra Jha. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1983.

________. *Abhidharmakośabhaṣyam: Prathamam Kośasthānam* [Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, Chapter One, With English Translation of Karikas]. Translated by Mahesh Tiwari. New Delhi: Dept. of Buddhist Studies, U. of New Delhi, 1984.

________. *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu With Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Second ed. Edited by Swāmi Dwārikādās Śastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981.

________. *The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Acarya Vasubandhu's Autocommentary to His Treasury of Higher Learning, Translated From the Sanskrit.*" Translated by Artemus B. Engle. Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, [Unpublished microfilm].

________. *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. Tokyo: sDe dGe Tibetan Tripitika, 1977.

**Secondary Sources**

Anacker, Stefan. "The Abhidharma Piṭaka." As reproduced in Charles Prebish, *Buddhism: A Modern Perspective*. State College: Penn State, 1975. 59-64.

________. "Vasubandhu: Three Aspects." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

Banerji, A.C. "Abhidharma Texts in Tibetan." *Indian Historical Quarterly* 28 (1952): 372-378.

Banerjee, Anukul Chandra. *Sarvāstivāda Literature*. Calcutta: D. Banerjee, 1957.

Bareau, Andre. *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*. Saigon: Publications de EFEO, 1955.

________. "Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule et leurs Abhidharmapiṭaka." *Bulletin de l'École Francaise d'Extrême Orient* 44 (1947-1951): 1-11.

Bechert, Heinz. "Notes on the Formation of Buddhist Sects and the Origins of Mahāyāna." *German Scholars on India*. Calcutta: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1973. 6-18.

Bhikkhu Pāsādika. *Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhaṣya des Vasubandhu*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989.

Bu sTon. *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*. Translated by E. Obermiller. Heidelberg, 1932; reprint, Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1986.

Conze, Edward. *Buddhist Thought in India*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1970.

Cox, Collett. "Controversies in Dharma Theory: Sectarian Dialogue on the Nature of Enduring Reality." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1983.

Dowling, Thomas L. "Vasubandhu on the Avijñapti-Rūpa: A Study in Fifth-Century Abhidharma Buddhism." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1976.

Dutt, Nalinaksha. *Buddhist Sects in India*. Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1970.

Edgerton, Franklin. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.

Ferrari, A. *Mk'yen brtse's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet*. Serie Orientale Roma, no. 16., 1958.

Frauwallner, Erich. "Abhidharma-Studien." *WZKSO* 1963, pp.20-36; 1964, pp.59-99; 1971, pp.69-121; 1972, pp.95-152; 1973, pp.97-121.

________. "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." *WZKS* 5 (1961): 125-148.

________. *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law, Vasubandhu*. Serie Orientale Roma, no.8. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1951.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

Geshe Lobsang Tharchin. *The Logic and Debate Tradition of India, Tibet, and Mongolia*. Howell, N.J.: Rashi Gempil Ling First Kalmuk Buddhist Temple, 1979.

Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey. *A Short Biography and Letter of Je Tzong K'a Pa*. Translated by Khamlung Tulku and Sharpa Tulku. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1975.

Geshe Rabten and Stephen Batchelor. *The Mind and Its Functions*. Second revised ed., 1979; reprint, Switzerland: Tharpa Choeling, 1981.

Gokhale, V.V. "Fragments From the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga." *Journal*

*of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 23: 13-38.

Goldstein, Melvyn C. *Tibetan-English Dictionary of Modern Tibetan*. Third ed., 1975; reprint, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bandhar, 1983.

Golzio, Karl-Heinz. *Regents in Central Asia Since the Mongol Empire*. Materials For the Study of the History of Religions, no. 12. Bonn: 1985.

Gomez, Louis O. "Proto-Madhyamika in the Pali Canon." *Philosophy East and West* 26, no. 2: 137-65.

________. "Some Aspects of the Free-Will Question in the Nikāyas." *Philosophy East and West* 25 (1975): 81-90.

'Gos Lo Tsa Ba gZhon Nu dPal. *The Blue Annals*. Parts I & II. Translated by George N. Roerich. Calcutta, 1949; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.

Govinda, Lama Anagarika. *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy*. New York: Samuel Weiser, 1974.

Griffiths, Paul J. "Indian Buddhist Meditation Theory: History, Development and Systematization." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1983.

________. "Notes Towards a Critique of Buddhist Karmic Theory." *Religious Studies* 18 (1982): 277-291.

________. *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem*. La Salle: Open Court, 1986.

Guenther, Herbert V. *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma*. Berkeley: Shambhala, 1976.

Hirakawa, Akira, ed. *Index to the Abhidharmakoshabhásya*. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kabushikikaisha, 1973.

________. "The Meaning of "Dharma" and "Abhidharma"." *Indianisme et Bouddhisme, Mélanges Offerts á Mgr Etienne Lamotte*. Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 1980. 159-175.

Hopkins, Jeffrey. *Meditation on Emtiness*. London: Wisdom, 1983.

Hurvitz, Leon. "The Abhidharma on the 'Four Aids to Penetration'." As reproduced in Kawamura & Scott, *Buddhist Thought & Asian Civilization*. Emeryville: Dharma Publishing, 1977. 59-104.

Jaini, Padmanabh S. *Abhidharmadīpa With Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, Critically Edited With Notes and Introduction*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, ed. Dr. Jatashankar Jha, no. IV. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977.

________. "The Development of the Theory of Viprayukta-Saṁskāras." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 22, no. 2 (531-547).

________. "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 21 (1958): 48-53.

________. "Prajñā and Dṛṣṭi in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma." As reproduced in Lewis Lancaster, *Prajñāpāramitā & Related Systems*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

________. "The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 22 (1959): 236-249.

________. "The Vaibhāṣika Theory of Words and Meanings." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 22: 95-107.

Johansson, Rune E. A. *The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*. London: Curzon, 1979.

Jones, Elvin W. "Buddhist Theories of Existents: The Systems of Two Truths." As reproduced in Minoru Kiyota, *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978. 3-45.

De Jong, J.W. "Book Review: The Essence of Metaphysics, Translated and Annotated By Charles Willemen; And Le Coeur De La Loi Supreme, Traduit et Annoté Par I. Armelin." *The Eastern Buddhist* 13, no. 2 (Autumn 1980): 151-158.

Kalupahana, David J. *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1975.

________. *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*. Albany: SUNY, 1987.

Kanakura, Y., R. Yamada, T. Tada, H. Hadano eds. *A Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism*. Sendai: The Seminary of Indology, Tohoku University, 1953.

Kloetzli, Randy. *Buddhist Cosmology*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

Lalou, M. "Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-sron-lde-bcan." *Journal Asiatique* CCXLI, no. 3 (1953): 313-353.

Lamotte, Etienne. *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1958.

________. "Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism." As reproduced in L. Cousins, *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner*. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel, 1974. 91-104.

________. "Le traite de l'acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa." *Melanges chinois et bouddhiques* 4 (1936): 151-236.

Lati Rinbochay. *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*. Translated by Elizabeth Napper. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1980.

Lokesh Chandra. *Materials For a History of Tibetan Literature*. Śata-Piṭaka Series: Indo-Asian Literatures, ed. Raghu Vira, no. 30. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963.

Makransky, John. "A Hīnayāna and a Mahāyāna Presentation of the 12 Factors of Dependent Arising: The Implicit Relationship Between Them." 1980. [Unpublished paper].

________. "A Phenomenological Study of Buddhist Karmic Theory." 1982. [Unpublished paper].

McDermott, James Paul. *Development in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/ Karma*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984.

________. "Developments in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/Karma." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1971.

Mejor, Marek. "Klong rdol bla ma's Explanatory Notes on the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu." As reproduced in Helga Uebach and Jampa L. Panglung, *Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International*

*Association For Tibetan Studies*. München: Kommission für Zentralasiatische Studien, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988. 249-252.

________. *Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur*. Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag, 1991.

Mitomo, Kenyo. "Anuśaya As Conceived in Abhidharma Buddhism." *Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu* 22 (1973): 32-36.

Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Oxford University Press, 1899; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

Morichini, G. "The Spiritual Struggle of Vasubandhu and His Karmasiddhi-Prakaraṇa." *East and West* VI (1955): 31-33.

Nagao, Gadjin M. "Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upekśā." *Indianisme et Bouddisme: Mélanges Offerts à Mgr. Etienne Lamotte*. Louvain: Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste, 1980. 245-258.

Nagel, Thomas. "The Rediscovery of the Mind By John Searle." *The New York Review of Books* XL, no. 5 (March 4, 1993): 37-41.

Nakamura, Hajime. *Indian Buddhism, a Survey With Bibliographical Notes*. First Indian ed. Japan, 1980; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987.

Nyanatiloka, Mahathera. *Guide Through the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971.

O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger ed. *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

Pappu, S.S. Rama Rao ed. *The Dimensions of Karma*. Delhi: Chanakya, 1987.

Prebish, Charles. *Buddhism: A Modern Perspective*. State College: Penn State, 1975. 59-64.

Przyluski, Jean. *Le concile de Rajagṛha*. Buddhica Series 1, vol. 2. Paris: Paul Guethner, 1926-1928.

Rhys Davids, Caroline A.F. *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*. First Indian ed. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1900; reprint, New Delhi:

Oriental Books Reprint, 1975.

________. *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1975.

Rigzin, Tsepak. *Tibetan-English Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology*. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 1986.

Ruegg, D. Seyfort. *The Life of Bu ston Rin po che. With the Tibetan Text of the Bu ston rNam thar*. Serie Orientale Roma no. 34. Roma: Istituto Italiano Per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966.

________. *The Study of Indian and Tibetan Thought, Some Problems and Perspectives*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967.

Sakurabe, H. "Abhidharmāvatāra by an Unidentified Author." *Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Institute* II (1960): 363.

________. "On the Abhidharmakośa-ṭika by Samathadeva." *Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu* IV (1956): 462-464.

Sarat Chandra Das, Rai Bahadur. *A Tibetan-English Dictionary*. Compact ed. Calcutta, 1902; reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 1983.

Smith, E. Gene. *University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue*. Seattle: University of Washington, 1969.

Snellgrove, David and Hugh Richardson. *A Cultural History of Tibet*. Boulder: Prajña Press, 1980.

Solomon, Beth E. "The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths." 1982. [Unpublished paper].

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup. "The Special Theory of Pratītyasamutpāda: The Cycle of Dependent Origination." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 9, no. 1 (1986): 105-118.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup and Jeffrey Hopkins. *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*. New York: Grove Press, 1976.

Stcherbatsky, Theodore. *The Central Conception of Buddhism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.

________. *The Soul Theory of the Buddhists*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prkashan, 1976.

Takakusu, J. "The Abhidharma Literature, Pali and Chinese." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (January 1905): 160-162.

________. "The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvástivádins." *Journal of the Pali Text Society* (1904-1905): 67-146.

________. "The Life of Vasu-Bandhu By Paramārtha (A.D.499-569)." *T'oung Pao* (1904).

________. "A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1905): 33.

Taranatha. *History of Buddhism in India*. Edited by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya. Translated by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya. Simla, 1970; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990.

Tatia, Nathmal. "The Avyākṛtas or Indeterminables." As reproduced in Satkari Mookerjee, *The Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara-Research Publication*, Vol. II. Patna: Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, 1960. 139-159.

________. "Sarvāstivāda." As reproduced in Satkari Mookerjee, *The Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication*, Vol. II. Patna: Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, 1960. 75-138.

That, Le Manh. "The Philosophy of Vasubandhu." University of Wisconsin, 1974. [Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis].

Tucci, Giuseppe. *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*. Parts 1-2 ed. Roma: 1949.

Ui, H., M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura, T.Tada. *A Complete Catalogue of The Tibetan Buddhist Canons*. Sendai: Tohoku Imperial University, 1934.

La Vallée Poussin, Louis de. "Documents D'Abhidharma." *Melanges Chinois Et Bouddhiques* 5: 7-158.

________. "Dogmatique Bouddhique: Nouvelle Recherches Sur la Doctrine de l'Acte." *Journal Asiatique* 10, no. 2 (1903): 357-404.

________. "Dogmatique Bouddhique: La Negation de l'Ame et la Doctrine de

l'Acte." *Journal Asiatique* 9, no. 19 (1902): 237-306.

Verdu, Alfonso. *Early Buddhist Philosophy in the Light of the Four Noble Truths.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.

Waldron, William S. "The Alayavijñana in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought: The Yogacara Conception of an Unconscious." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1990.

Warder, A. K. *Indian Buddhism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.

Warren, Henry Clarke. *Buddhism in Translations*. New York: Atheneum, 1977.

Watanabe, Fumimaro. *Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

Whitney, William Dwight. *The Roots, Verb-Forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

________. *Sanskrit Grammar*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

Williams, Paul. "On the Abhidharma Ontology." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (227-257).

Yamada, K. "An Epistemological Problem in Abhidharma Buddhism: On the Words "Viṣaya" and "Ālambana"." *Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu* V (1957): 184- 188.

Yaśomitra. *Sputārthā-vyākhyā, in Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Second ed. Edited by Swāmi Dwārikādās Śastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981.

Zahler, Leah, Jeffrey Hopkins, Lati Rinbochay and Denma Locho Rinbochay. *Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism*. London: Wisdom, 1983.

Zurcher, E. "The Yüeh-Chih and Kaniṣka in Chinese Sources." As reproduced in A.L. Basham, *Papers on the Date of Kaniṣka*. Leiden, 1968. 346-390.

Zwilling, Leonard. "Homosexuality As Seen in Indian Buddhist Texts." As reproduced in Jose I. Cabezon, *Buddhism, Sexuality & Gender*. Albany: SUNY, 1992. 203-214.

## Glossary

| English | Tibetan | Sanskrit |
|---|---|---|
| abandoning antidotes | sPong Ba'i gNyen Po | prahāna-pratipakṣa |
| abandoning restraints | sPong Ba'i sDom Pa | prahāṇa-samvara |
| absorption of cessation | 'Gog Pa'i sNyoms 'Jug | nirodha-samāpatti |
| absorption of non-discrimination | 'Du Shes Med Pa'i sNyoms 'Jug | asaṁjñi-samāpatti |
| accumulated | bSags | upacita |
| acquired by effort | sByor Ba Las Byung Ba | prayogaja |
| acquisition | rNyed Pa | pratilambha |
| action done deliberately | bSams bZhin Pa | sañcetana |
| affection | dGa' Ba | preman |
| afflicted | Kun Nas Nyon Mongs | saṁkleśa |
| affliction obstruction | Nyon Mongs Pa'i sGrib Pa | kleśa-āvaraṇa |
| affliction | Nyon Mongs | kleśa |
| aggregates | Phung Po | skandha |
| aging | rGa Ba | jarā |
| analogous-to-that | De Dang mTsungs Pa | tat-sabhāga |
| analysis | dPyod Pa | vicāra |
| anger | Khong Khro | pratigha |
| animals | Dud 'Gro | tiryañc |
| animate world | Sems Can Gyi 'Jig rTen | sattva-loka |
| antidote | gNyen Po | pratipakṣa |
| Applications of Mindfulness | Dran Pa Nye Bar bZhag Pa | smṛty-upasthāna |
| applying ointments | bSku mNye | abhyañga |
| appreciation | Mos Pa | adhimokṣa |
| appropriated [by consciousness] | Zin Pa | upātta |
| appropriated elements | Zin Pa'i 'Byung Ba | upātta-mahābhūta |
| appropriating | Nye Bar Len Pa | upādāna |
| appropriating aggregates | Nyer Len Gyi Phung Po | upādāna-skandha |
| arisen from development | rGyas Pa Las Byung Ba | aupacayika |
| arisen from fruition | rNam sMin Las Byung Ba | vipāka-ja |
| arisen from mind | Yid Las Byung | manomaya |
| arisen from fruition | rNam sMin Las sKyes Ba | vipāka-ja |
| arisen from effort | sByor Byung | prāyogika |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| arisen from development | rGyas Byung | aupacayika |
| arising | sKye Ba | jāti |
| around the obstructive | Thogs bCas Nye 'Khor | agha-sāmantaka |
| asceticism | brTul Zhugs | vrata |
| aspect | rNam Pa | ākāra |
| astringent | bsKa Ba | kaṣya |
| atoms | rDul Phran | aṇu |
| attachment to existence | Srid Pa'i 'Dod Chags | bhava-rāga |
| attachment to desire | 'Dod Pa'i 'Dod Chags | kāmarāga |
| attachment | 'Dod Chags | rāga |
| attendants | rJes 'Brang | anucara |
| attendants of mind | Sems Kyi rJes 'Brang | citta-anuvartin |
| attentiveness | Yid La Byed Pa | manasikāra |
| automatic transgressions | mTsams Med | ānantarya |
| avarice | Ser sNa | matsarā |
| awareness | Rig Pa | vijñapti |
| āyatanas of mastery | Zil Gyis gNon | abhibhv-āyatana |
| bad conduct | Nyes sPyod | duścarita |
| bases | gZhi | adhiṣṭhāna |
| basis of discourse | gTam Gyi gZhi | kathā-vastu |
| bathing | Dril Phyi | snāna |
| being of confused gender | Ma Ning | napuṁsakaṁ |
| belligerence | Khro Ba | krodha |
| bimonthly confession | gSo sByong | poṣadha |
| birth-sources | sKye gNas | yoni |
| bitter | Kha Ba | tikta |
| Blessed One | bCom lDan 'Das | bhagavan |
| body | rTen | āśraya |
| bonds | 'Ching Ba | bandhana |
| can be pointed out | bsTan Du Yod Pa | sanidarśana |
| capacity to function | Don Byed Nus Pa | artha-kriyā-śākti |
| causal origin | rGyu'i Kun Nas sLong Ba | hetu-samutthāna |
| causal condition | rGyu'i rKyen | hetu-pratyaya |
| cause of arisal | sKye Ba'i rGyu | janana-hetu |
| cause of development | 'Phel Ba'i rGyu | vṛddhi-hetu |
| cause of maintaining | sTon Pa'i rGyu | upastambha-hetu |
| cause of support | gNas Pa'i rGyu | pratishthā-hetu |
| cause of reliance | rTen Pa'i rGyu | niśraya-hetu |
| causing a schism in the | dGe 'Dun dByin | sangha-bheda |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| sangha | | |
| celibacy | Tsangs sPyod | brahmacarya |
| certain | Nges Pa | niyata |
| characteristic marks | mTsan Ma | nimitta |
| characteristics | mTsan Nyid | lakṣaṇa |
| clairvoyances | mNgon Shes | abhijñā |
| clairvoyant ear | rNa Ba'i mNgon Shes | divya-śrotrābhijñā |
| clingings | Nyer Len | upādana |
| cohesion | sDud Pa | saṁgraha |
| collection of words | Ming Gi Tsogs | nāma-kāya |
| collection | bSags Pa | saṁghāta |
| coming into existence | mNog Par 'Grub Pa | abhinirvrtti |
| commentaries | bsTan bCos | śāstra |
| committed | Byas | kṛta |
| complete knowledge | Yongs Shes | parijñā |
| complete investigation | Nges Par rTog Pa | nitīraṇa |
| completed | rDzogs Pa | samāpta |
| complex matter | 'Byung Ba Las Gyur Pa | bhautika |
| concentrations | bSam gTan | dhyāna |
| concepts | rNam rTog | vikalpana |
| conceptuality of memory | rJes Su Dran Pa'i | anusmaraṇa |
| conceptuality | rNam Par rTog Pa | vikalpa |
| conceptuality of memory | rJes Su Dran Pa'i | anusmaraṇa |
| concomitant cause | mTsungs lDan Gyi rGyu | saṁprayuktaka-hetu |
| concomitants | mTsungs lDan | saṁprayukta |
| conducive to liberation | Thar Pa'i Cha mThun Pa | mokṣa-bhāgīya |
| conducive to the inferior | Tha Ma'i Cha mThun | avara-bhāgīya |
| conducive to the superior | Gong Ma'i Cha Dang mThun Pa | urdhva-bhāgīya |
| conducive to merit | bSod Nams Cha mThun Pa | puṇya-bhāgīya |
| conjunction of same type | Ris mThun mTsams sByor Ba | nikāya-sabhāga-saṁbandha |
| connate cause | lHan Cig 'Byung Ba'i rGyu | sahabhū-hetu |
| connections | Kun Tu sByor Ba | saṁyojana |
| conscientiousness | Bag Yod Pa | apramāda |
| consciousness | rNam Shes | vijñāna |
| consciousness basis of | Kun gZhi rNam Shes | ālayavijñāna |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| all | | |
| consciousness | rNam Par Shes Pa | vijñāna |
| consciousness food | rNam Shes Kyi Zas | vijñāna |
| contact of designation | Tsigs Bla Dags Kyi Reg Pa | adhivacana-sparśa |
| contact food | Reg Pa'i Zas | sparśa |
| contact | Reg Pa | sparśa |
| contaminant of existence | Srid Pa'i Zag Pa | bhavāśrava |
| contaminant of desire | 'Dod Pa'i Zag Pa | kāmāśrava |
| contaminant of ignorance | Ma Rig Pa'i Zag Pa | avidyāsrava |
| contaminants | Zag Pa | āśrava |
| conviction | Mos Pa | adhimokṇa |
| coordinated | brTen Pa Dang bCas Pa | sabhāga |
| covetousness | brNab Sems | abhidya |
| craving for birth | sKye Ba'i Sred Pa | bhava-tṛṣṇa |
| craving | Sred Pa | tṛṣṇa |
| cyclic existence | 'Khor Ba | saṁsāra |
| deceit | sGyu | māyā |
| defect | Nyes Pa | doṣa |
| degenerate conduct | 'Chal Ba'i Tsul Khrims | dauḥśīlya |
| delusion | rMongs Pa | moha |
| demigods | lHa Ma Yin | asura |
| demons | Srin Po | rakṣasas |
| demons of karma | Las Kyi Srin Po | karma-rākṣasa |
| demons of Yama | gShin rJe'i Srin Po | yama-rākṣasa |
| depression | sKyo Ba | dainya |
| deranged mind | gYengs Pa'i Sems | citta-kṣepa |
| desire for pleasure | 'Dod Pa La 'Dun Pa | kāmachanda |
| determinate | Lung Du bsTan Pa | vyākṛta |
| determination of | Nges rTog | santīraka |
| dharma patiences | Chos bZod | dharma-kṣanti |
| dharma knowledges | Chos Shes | dharma-jñāna |
| disciple | Nyan Thos | śrāvaka |
| discipline | 'Dul Ba | vinaya |
| discourse | gTam | kathā |
| discrimination | 'Du Shes | saṁjñā |
| disgrace, disgraceful conduct | Kha Na Ma Tho Ba | avadya |
| disgust | sKyo Ba | saṁvega |
| dissimulation | gYo | śāṭhya |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| divine eye | lHa'i Mig | divya-cakṣur-abhijñā |
| done impetuously | Bab Col Du | sahasā |
| doubt | The Tsom | vicikitsā |
| duration | gNas Pa | sthiti |
| dwellings | Sems Can Gyi gNas | sattvāvāsa |
| efficient cause | Byed rGyu | kāraṇa-hetu |
| element | Khams | dhātu |
| elements | 'Byung Ba | bhūta |
| emanation mind | sPrul Sems | nirmāṇa-citta |
| embarassment | Khrel Yod Pa | apatrāpya |
| encompassing āyatanas | Zad Par Gyi sKye mChed | kṛtsna-āyatana |
| endowment of knowing all | Kun Shes lDan Pa | ājñātāvīndriya |
| engaged with their own aspect of joy | Rang dGa' Ba'i rNam Pas 'Jug Pa | harṣākāra-vartitva |
| enlightenment | Byang Chub | bodhi |
| eon | bsKal Pa | kalpa |
| equanimity | bTang sNyoms | upekṣā |
| equipoise | mNyam Par bZhag Pa | samāhitā |
| esteeming [unworthy] views | lTa Ba mChog 'Dzin | dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa |
| esteeming [mistaken] morality and asceticism | Tsul Khrims Dang brTul Zhugs mChog Tu 'Dzin Pa'i lTa Ba | śīla-vrata-parāmarśa |
| ethics | Tsul Khrims | śīla |
| examining conceptuality | Nges Par rTog Pa | abhinirūpaṇa |
| excitement | rGod Pa | auddhatya |
| existence | Srid Pa | bhava |
| expands | rGyas Par Byed | vyūhana |
| external objects | Don | viśaya |
| faculties | dBang Po | indriya |
| faculty of knowing all that is not known | Mi Shes Pa Kun Shes Par Byed Pa | anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya |
| faculties | dBang Po | indriya |
| faith | Dad Pa | śraddhā |
| false affirmation | sGro 'Dogs Pa | samāropa |
| feeling | Tsor Ba | vedanā |
| fetters | Kun sByor | saṁyojana |
| fields | Zhing | kṣetra |
| fire crystal | Me Shel | sphaṭika taijasa |
| floods | Chu Bo | ogha |
| Follower by Reason | Chos Kyi rJes 'Brang | dharmānusārin |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Follower by Faith | Dad Pa'i rJes 'Brang | śraddhānusārin |
| formative forces | 'Du Byed | saṁskāra |
| four possibilities | Mu bZhi | catuṣ-koṭi |
| four fruits of monkhood | dGe sByong Gi Tsul Gyi 'Bras Bu | śrāmanya-phala |
| fourth concentration of the supreme limit | Rab mTha'i bSam gTan bZhi Pa | prānta-koṭika |
| fruition | rNam sMin | vipāka |
| fruition result | rNam sMin 'Bras Bu | vipāka-phala |
| fruition of experience | Longs sPyod Kyi rNam sMin | bhoga-vipāka |
| fruition of longevity | Tse'i rNam sMin | āyur-vipāka |
| fruitional cause | rNam sMin Gyi rGyu | vipāka-hetu |
| fruits of the renunciate's life | dGe sByong Tsul Gyi 'Bras Bu | śrāmaṇya-phala |
| full entanglements | Kun Nas dKris Pa | paryavasthāna |
| further-removing antidote | Thag Sring Ba'i Ngo Bo gNyen Po | dūribhāva-pratipakṣa |
| future lives | Phyi Ma'i mTha | aparānta |
| generality | sPyi | sāmānya |
| good conduct | Legs sPyad | sucarita |
| Gradualist Returner | mThar Gyis Pa'i Phyir 'Ong | ānupūrvika |
| grave transgression | Phas Pham | pārājika |
| great grounds | Sa Mang Po Pa | mahābhūmika |
| great kalpas | bsKal Pa Chen Po | mahākalpa |
| grossness | Rags Pa | audārika |
| harmful thoughts | gNod Sems | vyāpāda |
| harmfulness | rNam Par 'Tse Ba | vihimsā |
| harsh words | Tsig rTzub | pāruṣya |
| hatred | Zhe sDang | dveṣa |
| haughtiness | rGyags Pa | mada |
| having renunciation | Nges Par 'Byung bCas | saniḥsāra |
| having conflict | 'Thab bCas | saraṇa |
| having a foundation | gZhi Dang bCas Pa | savastuka |
| health practices | Legs Par Bya Ba | saṁskāra |
| heat | Dro Nyid | uṣṇatā |
| Heat | Dro Bar Byed Pa | ūṣmagata |
| hell guardians | Myal Srungs | naraka-pāla |
| hells | dMyal Ba | naraka |
| hermaphrodites | mTsan gNyis Pa | ubhaya-vyañjana |
| hindrances | sGrib Pa | nivaraṇa |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| homogeneity | sKal mNyam | sabhāgatā |
| homogenous cause | sKal mNyam Gyi rGyu | sabhāga-hetu |
| hungry ghosts | Yi Dwags | preta |
| idle chatter | Ngag Kyal Pa | saṁbhinna-pralāpa |
| ignorance | Ma Rig Pa | avidyā |
| ignorance | rMongs Pa | saṁmoha |
| ill-will | mNar Sems | āghāta |
| immature beings | Byis Pa | bāla |
| immediate contact | 'Dab Chags | nirantara |
| immodesty | Khrel Med | āhrīkya |
| Immoveable Holder of the Dharma | Mi Gyo Ba'i Chos Can | akopyadharman |
| impermanence | Mi rTag Pa | anityatā |
| improper behavior | Rigs Pa Min Pas bsKyed Pa | ayoga-vihita |
| impurities | Dri Ma | mala |
| inanimate elements | Ma Zin Pa | anupātta |
| inconsistent | Mi 'Khrul Ba | aviparyaya |
| incorrect judgement | Tsul bZhin Ma Yin Pa'i Yid Byed Pa | ayoniśa-manaskāra |
| indefinite karma | Ma Nges Pa'i Las | aniyata-karma |
| indeterminate | Lung Ma bsTan | avyākṛta |
| indicative of sentient beings | Sems Can Du sTon Pa | sattvākhya |
| initiating force | Rab Tu 'Jug Par Byed Pa | pravartaka |
| inanimate [vessel] world | sNod Kyi 'Jig rTen | bhājana-loka |
| innate | lHan sKyes | sahaja |
| insight | lHag mThong | vipaśyanā |
| intelligence, which distinguishes phenomena | Blo Gros | mati |
| intention | Sems Pa | cetanā |
| intention karma | Sems Pa'i Las | cetanā-karma |
| intentional food | Sems Pa'i Zas | mahaḥsañcetanā |
| intermediate state | Bar Dor 'Da' Ba | antarā-parinirvāyin |
| intermediate | Bar Ma | madhya |
| introspective alertness | Shes bZhin | saṁprajāna |
| investigation | rTog Pa | vitarka |
| jealousy | Phrag Dog | īrṣyā |
| joy | dGa' bDe | prītika-sukha |
| karma of the mind | Yid Kyi Las | manas-karma |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| kalpas of dissolution | 'Jig Pa'i bsKal Pa | saṁvarta |
| kalpas of evolution | 'Chags Pa'i bsKal Pa | vivarta |
| karma obstruction | Las sGrib | karma-āvaraṇa |
| karma-having-intended | Sam Pa'i Las | cetayitvā-karma |
| karmic path | Las Lam | karma-patha |
| killing | Srog gCod Pa | prāṇātipāta |
| knowing all | Kun Shes Pa | ājñātendriya |
| knowledge of exhaustion | Zad Pa Shes Pa | kṣaya-jñāna |
| knowledges | Shes Pa | jñāna |
| latent | Nyal Ba | prasupta |
| laziness | Le Lo | kauśīdya |
| levels | Sa | bhūmi |
| life | Srog | jīvita |
| lineage | Rigs | gotra |
| locus of views | lTa gNas | dṛṣṭi-sthāna |
| longevity | Tse | āyus |
| lying | rDzun Tsig | mṛṣā-vaca |
| maintaining antidotes | gZhi'i gNyen Po | ādhāra-pratipakṣa |
| malice | Khro Ba | krodha |
| material necessities of life | Yo Byad | pariṣkāra |
| material enjoyments | Longs sPyod | bhogya |
| means of gaining a living | Log Pas 'Tso Ba | mithyā-jīva |
| meditation | sGom Pa | bhāvanā |
| meditative equipoise | mNyam Par bZhag Pa | samāhita |
| meditative stabilization | Ting Nge 'Dzin | samādhi |
| meditative posture | sKyil Krung | paryaṇka |
| mental engagement | Yid La Byed Pa | manasikāra |
| mental unhappiness | Yid Mi bDe | daurmanasya |
| mental happiness | Yid bDe | saumanasya |
| mental languor | Sems Zhum Pa | cetaso līnatva |
| mentality | Yid | manas |
| middle age | Dar Yol | madhya |
| middle universe | 'Jig rTen | loka-dhātu |
| mind | Yid | manas |
| mind | Sems | citta |
| mind of behavior | sPyod Lam Pa | airyāpathika |
| mind of skill in arts | bZo'i gNas | śailpasthānika |
| mindfulness | Dran Pa | smṛti |
| misdeed by nature | Rang bZhin Gyi Kha Na | prakṛti-sāvadya |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Ma Tho Ba | |
| misdeed of disobedience | bCas Pa'i Kha Na Ma Tho Ba | pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya |
| miserliness | Ser sNa | īrṣya |
| misguided thought | Tsul bZhin Min Pa'i Yid La Byed Pa | ayoniśo-manaskāra |
| mistaken mind | Sems Phyin Ci Log | citta-viparyāsa |
| mistaken discrimination | 'Du Shes Phyin Ci Log | saṁjñā-viparyāsa |
| mistaken view | lTa Ba Phyin Ci Log | dṛṣṭi-viparyāsa |
| moisture | gSher | sneha |
| momentary | sKad Cig Ma | kṣaṇika |
| monks | Rab Tu Byung Ba | pravrajita |
| morality | Tsul Khrims | śīla |
| morsel food | Kam Gyi Zas | kavaḍīkāra-āhāra |
| moveable | gYo Ba | iṅjya |
| movement | gYo Ba | īraṇā |
| natural-born eunuchs | Za Ma | ṣaṇḍha |
| naturally flowing result | rGyu mThun Gyi 'Bras Bu | niṣyanda-phala |
| nature of reality | Chos Nyid | dharmatā |
| neutral | Lung Du Ma bsTan Pa | avyākṛta |
| non-associated formative forces | lDan Min 'Du Byed | viprayukta-saṁskāra |
| non-attachment | 'Dod Chags Med Pa | alobha |
| non-conscientiousness | Bag Med | pramāda |
| non-discrimination | 'Du Shes Med Pa | āsaṁjñika |
| non-faith | Ma Dad Pa | āśraddhya |
| non-harming | rNam Par Mi 'Tse Ba | avihiṁsā |
| non-hatred | Zhe sDang Med Pa | adveṣa |
| non-obscuring neutral | Ma bsGribs Lung Ma bsTan | akliṣṭa-avyākṛta |
| non-obstructive | Mi sGrib Pa | anāvaraṇa |
| non-obtainment | Ma Thob Pa | aprāpti |
| non-revealing form | rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa'i gZugs | avijñapti-rūpa |
| non-revealing karma | rNam Par Rig Byed Ma Yin Pa | avijñapti |
| not destined to arise | Mi sKye Ba'i Chos Can | anutpatti-dharmin |
| Not Unable | Mi lCogs Med | anāgamya |
| nourished | rGyas Pa | anuśerate |
| object | dMigs Pa | ālambana |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| object | Yul | viṣaya |
| object | Don | artha |
| obscuration | Mun Pa | andhakhāra |
| obscuring neutral mind | bsGribs La Lung Du Ma bsTan Pa | nivṛta-avyākṛta |
| obstinacy | 'Tsig Pa | pradāsa |
| obstruction of object | Yul La Thogs Pa | viṣaya-pratighāta |
| obstruction of referent object | dMigs Pa La Thogs Pa | ālambana-pratighāta |
| obstruction of blocking | sGrib Pa La Thogs Pa | āvaraṇa-pratighāta |
| obtained by birth | sKyes Nas Thob Pa | aupapatti-lābhika |
| obtainment | Thob Pa | prāpti |
| occasions of meritorious action | bSod Nams Bya Ba'i gZhi | puṇya-kriyā-vastu |
| occasions of meritorious action that arise from substances | rDzas Las Byung Ba'i bSod Nams Bya Ba'i dNgos Po | aupadhika-puṇya-kriyā-vastu |
| odor eaters | Dri Za | gandharva |
| offences | Nyes Pa | daṇḍa |
| offerings | Yon | dakṣiṇā |
| old age | rGas Pa | jīrṇa |
| omnipresent mental factors | Kun 'Gro | sarva-traga |
| omnipresent cause | Kun 'Gro'i rGyu | sarvatraga-hetu |
| one who lives by the path | Lam Phyir 'Tso | mārga-jīvin |
| one who triumphs by the path | Lam Gyis rGyal | mārga-jina |
| one who defiles the path | Lam Sun 'Byin | mārga-dūṣin |
| one who has entered the fruit | 'Bras Bu La Zhugs Pa | phala-pratipannaka |
| one who teaches the path | Lam sTon Pa | mārga-daiśika |
| ordination by entering the path | Nges Pa La 'Jug Pa | niyāmā-vakrānti |
| ordination | bsNyen Par rDzogs Pa | upasaṁpad |
| ordination by showing the special obligations | lCi Ba'i Chos | gurudharma |
| ordination by messenger | 'Phrin Chog | dūta |
| origination | Kun 'Byung | samudaya |
| past lives | sNgon Gyi mTha' | pūrvānta |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| paths of time | Dus | adhvan |
| Paths of Liberation | rNam Grol Lam | vimukti-mārga |
| patience of understanding the dharma of suffering | sDug bsNgal Chos Shes Pa'i bZod Pa | duḥkha-dharmajñāna-kṣanti |
| Patience | bZod Pa | kṣānti |
| Peak of Existence | Srid rTse | bhavāgra |
| persevering effort | brTson 'Grus | vīrya |
| phonemes | Yi Ge | vyañjana |
| phrases | Tsig | pada |
| playing oceans | Rol mTso | śītā |
| pliancy | Shin Tu sByangs Pa | praśrabdhi |
| polluting tendencies | Phra rGyas | anuśaya |
| possessing by having obtained | Thob Nas lDan Pa | pratilabdhena samanvāgama |
| precept | sPong Ba | virati |
| predestined stage | Nges Par rTogs Pa | niyati-patita |
| prediliction | 'Dun Pa | chanda |
| preparation | sByor | maula |
| preparatory stages | Nyer bsDogs | sāmantaka |
| Preparatory Stage of Space | Nam mKha'i Nyer bDogs | ākāśānantyāyatana |
| prescribed behavior | Rigs Pas bsKyed Pa | yoga-vihita |
| present life | mThong Chos | dṛṣṭa-dharma |
| previous-time-existence | sNgon Dus Kyi Srid Pa | pūrva-kāla-bhava |
| pride | Nga rGyal | māna |
| proceeding force | rJes Su 'Jug Byed | anuvartaka |
| projected | 'Phangs Pa | ākṣipta |
| puffed up | Khengs Pa | unnati |
| pungent | Tsa Ba | kaṭuka |
| pure places | gNas gTzang Ma | śuddhāvāsa |
| purified phenomena | rNam Byang | vyavadānika |
| realm | Khams | dhātu |
| receptacle [or inanimate] world | sNod Kyi 'Jig rTen | bhājana-loka |
| recollection | Dran Pa | smṛti |
| referent object | dMigs Pa | ālambana |
| referent object condition | dMigs Pa'i rKyen | ālambana-pratyaya |
| regret | 'Gyod | kaukṛtya |
| religious community | mTsams | sīmā |
| relinquishment | gTong Ba | tyāga |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| remoteness by incompatibility | Mi mThun Phyogs | vipakṣa |
| remoteness by difference of nature | mTsan Nyid Mi mThun Pa | vailakṣaṇya |
| remoteness by time | Dus | kāla |
| remoteness by separation of place | Yul rNam Par Chad Pa | deśa-viccheda |
| repudiating antidote | rNam Par Sun 'Byin Pa gNyen Po | vidūṣaṇā-pratipakṣa |
| resentment | Khon 'Dzin | upanāha |
| resistance | rDugs Pa | pratighāta |
| respect | Gus Pa | gaurava |
| restraint | sDom Pa | saṁvara |
| restraint of concentration | bSam gTan Gyi sDom Pa | dhyāna-saṁvara |
| result of separation | Bral Ba'i 'Bras Bu | visaṁyoga-phala |
| result of human effort | sKyes Bu Byed 'Bras Bu | puruṣa-kāra-phala |
| Returner Previously Freed of Attachment | Chags Bral sNgon Song | bhūyo-vītarāga |
| revealing karma | rNam Par Rig Byed | vijñapti |
| revealing form | rNam Par Rig Byed gZugs | vijñapti-rūpa |
| ripens | sMin Pa | pakti |
| ritual schism | Las Kyi dByen | karma-bheda |
| ritual actions | Las | karma |
| root downfalls | lTung Bar 'Gyur | patanīya |
| roots of disputation | rTzod Pa'i rTza Ba | vivāda-mūla |
| saṁskāra of longevity | Tse'i 'Du Byed | āyuḥ-saṁskāra |
| schism of the wheel of the dharma | Chos Kyi 'Khor Lo'i dByen | dharma-cakra-bheda |
| secondary characteristics | rJes Su mThun Pa'i mTsan Nyid | anulakṣaṇa |
| sense objects | 'Dod Pa'i Yon Tan | kāma-guṇa |
| seven abodes of consciousness | Nam Shes gNas Pa | vijñāna-sthiti |
| seven acts of merit derived from substances | rDzas Las Byung Ba'i bSod Nams Bya Ba'i dNgos Po | aupadhika puṇya-kriyā-vastu |
| sexual activity | Mi Tsangs Par sPyod Pa | abrahmacarya |
| sexual misconduct | 'Dod Pas Log Par gYem Pa | kāma-mithyā-cāra |
| shame | Ngo Tsa Shes Pa | hrī |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| shamelessness | Ngo Tsa Med Pa | manapatrāpya |
| similar and immediately preceding condition | mTsungs Pa De Ma Thag Pa'i rKyen | samanantara-pratyaya |
| single-pointed concentration | Zhi gNas | śamatha |
| slander | Phra Ma | paiśunya |
| sleep | gNyid | middha |
| small chiliocosm | sTong sPyi Phud | sāhasra-cūḍika |
| solidity | Sra | khara |
| sour | sKyur Ba | amla |
| sovereign result | bDag Po'i 'Bras Bu | adhipati-phala |
| sovereign condition | bDag Po'i rKyen | adhipati-pratyaya |
| space | Nam mKha' | ākāśa |
| special first concentration | bSam gTan Dang Po'i dNgos gZhi Khyad Par Can | dhyānāntara |
| special authority | dBang Byed | indanti |
| speech | Tsig | vāc |
| sphere of action | sPyod Yul | gocara |
| spite | 'Tsig Pa | pradāśa |
| stain | sNyig Ma | kaṣāya |
| states conducing to insight | Nges 'Byad Cha mThun | nirvedha-bhāgiya |
| stealing | Ma Byin Par Len Pa | adattā-dāna |
| subsequent actions | mJug | pṛṣṭhabhūta |
| subsequent stage | rJes | pṛṣṭha |
| subsequent knowledges | rJes Shes | anvaya-jñāna |
| subsidiary afflictions | Nye Ba'i Nyon Mongs | upakleśa |
| subsistence as same type | Ris mThun gNas Pa | nikāya-sabhāga-sādhāraṇa |
| subtle atoms | rDul Phra Rab | paramāṇu |
| subtle propensities | Bag Chags | vāsanā |
| superior knowledge | mNgon Par Shes Pa | abhijñā |
| supernatural powers | rKang Pa | ṛddhi-pāda |
| support | rTen | āśraya |
| supported | brTen | āśrita |
| sweet | mNgar Ba | madhura |
| terms | Ming | nāman |
| those who attain after a rebirth | sKyes Nas 'Da' Ba | upapadya-parinirvāyin |
| those who indulge in views | lTa Ba sPyad Pa | dṛṣṭi-carita |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| those who indulge in desire | Sred Pa sPyad Pa | tṛṣṇa-carita |
| three occurrences of desire | 'Dod Pa sKye Ba | kāma-upapatti |
| timely origin | Dus Kyi Kun Nas sLong Ba | tatkṣaṇa-samutthāna |
| to be experienced in a subsequent existence | Lan Grangs gZhan La Myong 'Gyur Gyi Las | karma-apara-paryāya-vedanīya |
| to be experienced as pleasure | bDe Ba Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba | sukha-vedanīya |
| to be experienced as neither pleasure nor suffering | bDe Ba Yang Ma Yin sDug bsNgal Yang Ma Yin Pa Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba | aduḥkha-asukha-vedanīya |
| to be experienced | Myong 'Gyur | vedanīya |
| to be experienced as suffering | sDug bsNgal Myong Bar 'Gyur Ba | duḥkha-vedanīya |
| to be experienced in the next life | sKyes Nas Myong 'Gyur | upapadya-vedanīya |
| torpor | rMugs Pa | styāna |
| transformation of duration | gNas Pa La gZhen Du 'Gyur Ba | sthityanyathātvam |
| type | Rigs | gotra |
| types of rebirth | 'Gro Ba | gati |
| ultimate good | Nges Legs | niḥśreyas |
| unbearable world | Mi mJed 'Jig rTen Gyi Khams | sahā-lokadhātu |
| uncertain karma | Ma Nges Pa | anyiyata |
| uncontaminated restraint | Zag Pa Med Pa'i sDom Pa | anāsrava-saṁvara |
| Uninterrupted Paths | Bar Chad Med Lam | ānantarya-mārga |
| universal in homogenous realm | sKal Ba mNyam Pa'i Khams Kun Tu 'Gro Ba | sabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga |
| universal | Kun Du 'Gro Ba | sarva-traga |
| universal in heterogenous realms | sKal Ba Mi mNyam Pa'i Khams Kun Tu 'Gro Ba | visabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga |
| unmovable | Mi gYo Ba | ānejya |
| unrestraint | sDom Pa Ma Yin Pa | asaṁvara |
| untainted | 'Phan Ma Byung | ahata |
| untimely death | Dus Ma Yin Par 'Chi Ba | akāla-maraṇa |
| view of non-existence | Med Par lTa Ba | asad-dṛṣṭi |
| view of holding to the | mThar 'Dzin Pa'i lTa Ba | antagrāha-dṛṣṭi |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| extremes | | |
| view of the transitory collection | 'Jig Tsogs La lTa Ba | satkāya-dṛṣṭi |
| vital organ | gNad | marman |
| water crystal | Chu Shel | āpya |
| wisdom | Shes Rab | prajñā |
| words | Ming | nāman |
| world | 'Jig rTen | loka |
| world system | 'Jig rTen Gyi Khams | loka-dhātu |
| wrong view | Log Par lTa Ba | mithyā-dṛṣṭi |
| wrong livelihood | Log Pa'i 'Tso Ba | mithyā-jīva |
| wrong action | Log Pa'i Las Kyi mTha | mithyā-karmānta |
| wrong speech | Log Pa'i Ngag | mithyā-vāc |
| yokes | sByor Ba | yoga |